Digital Emblems - Use Cases and Requirements
draft-ietf-diem-requirements-03
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (diem WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Rahel Fainchtein , Felix Linker , Alex Rosenberg , Casey Deccio , Allison Mankin | ||
| Last updated | 2026-07-06 | ||
| Replaces | draft-fainchtein-diem-use-cases | ||
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draft-ietf-diem-requirements-03
Digital Emblems R. A. Fainchtein
Internet-Draft JHU/APL
Intended status: Informational F. Linker
Expires: 7 January 2027
A. Rosenberg
Veridigo
C. Deccio
Brigham Young University
A. Mankin
Packet Clearing House
6 July 2026
Digital Emblems - Use Cases and Requirements
draft-ietf-diem-requirements-03
Abstract
Digital emblems are a means for an asset to signal to validating
entities that it should be protected or treated in a specific way,
using some normative framework. This document lists the requirements
and use cases that an architecture for digital emblems must
accommodate.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://ietf-wg-
diem.github.io/diem-requirements/draft-ietf-diem-requirements.html.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-diem-requirements/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Digital Emblems
Working Group mailing list (mailto:diem@ietf.org), which is archived
at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/diem. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/diem/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/ietf-wg-diem/diem-requirements.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Digital Emblem Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Digital Emblem Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. Emblem Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Discovery Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2. Query Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.3. Removable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.4. Undetectable Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Validation Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.1. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. Other Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4.1. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Data Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Asset Identifier Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Implicit Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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4.4. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.5. Proof of Presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Basel Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Diplomatic Pouches (1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.1. Limitations of proof of presence: . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) . . . . . . . . 11
5.4. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) . . . . 12
5.5. Protective Emblems under the Geneva Conventions, their
Additional Protocols, and the 1954 Hague Convention . . 12
5.5.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.5.2. Domain Model and Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.5.3. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.6. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.7. Other IHL-related use cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.8. Press . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.9. Ramsar Convention on the Wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.10. United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) . . . 15
5.11. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) . 15
5.12. United Nations Peacekeepers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.13. World Customs Organization (WCO) . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.14. World Health Organization (WHO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.15. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction
Digital emblems are a means for an asset to signal to validating
entities that it should be protected or treated in a specific way,
using some normative framework. The DIEM WG will define a set of
standards for an architecture that enables discovery and validation
of digital emblems. This document lists the requirements that the
architecture must accommodate. These requirements were identified
across different use cases. Not all use cases share all
requirements. We envision an architecture comprising multiple
standards, which can be flexibly profiled for different use cases.
We use the terms "(digital) emblem" and "validation" in accordance
with the DIEM charter as of this writing [CHARTER]. These
definitions have been reproduced in Section 2.
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2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The definitions for terms "(digital) emblem" and "validation" are
reproduced from the charter [CHARTER] as of this writing.
(Digital) Emblem: Emblems such as the Red Cross, Red Crescent, Red
Crystal, and Blue Shield can be symbols of protection governed by
International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Emblems can also be
identified by other laws, agreements, or standards. There is a
need to present emblems through digital communication channels.
Emblems presented in such ways are called digital emblems.
Digital emblems extend the range of identifying marks from the
physical (visual and tactile) to the digital realm.
Asset: A physical resource -- such as a place or thing -- or a
digital resource, system, or service -- such as a server, data
repository, or networked device -- that can present a digital
emblem.
Emblem issuer: The entity that operates or controls an asset that
bears a digital emblem. Depending on the applicable emblem, the
issuer may have received authorization to issue emblems, and in
such cases, emblem issuers are also called _authorized entities_.
For example, emblem issuers could be a medical or humanitarian
organization, a cultural institution, or an operator of
installations containing dangerous forces, among others.
Authorizing entity: An entity competent to grant authorization for
the use, by an authorized entity, of a digital emblem. The
authorizing entity ensures that such authorization is issued and
recorded in accordance with applicable legal requirements,
enabling technical and operational verification. In certain
specific cases, the authorizing entity is also the authorized
entity.
Validator: An entity that queries, inspects, or otherwise interacts
with assets to determine whether they are marked with a valid
digital emblem. Validators may include technical systems, network
operators, or other actors implementing protective or non-
interference measures consistent with the emblem's purpose.
Validation: "To validate an emblem" means to confirm the
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authenticity or legitimacy of a particular symbol or design, often
by checking its details against a known standard or reference
point. Validation may include ensuring that the emblem has not
been forged, stolen, or tampered with.
3. Requirements
The DIEM architecture will allow validators to discover and validate
digital emblems that are associated with assets. This section
contains the requirements that this architecture will address. They
are based on use cases identified thus far (see Section Use Cases),
but note that not all use cases share all requirements. We
categorize these requirements into: requirements on digital emblems
and their format, on their discovery, on their validation, and other
requirements.
The requirements for individual use cases are independent, and the
requirements for one use case MUST NOT constrain, override, or
otherwise affect the requirements of any other use case. Where a use
case specifies a limited domain of application for a particular
emblem (e.g. only digital or physical assets, a narrow scope of valid
issuers or validators, or a specific discovery mechanism), such a
limitation SHOULD be understood as reflecting current use case
constraints only.
Drafts will likely address a subset of the requirements set out in
this document. Whenever a draft addresses one use case's
requirement, this must not be interpreted as that draft inheriting
all limitations of the respective use case. Future or different use
cases should be able to reuse any draft or parts thereof, in
particular, when the use case has a different or expanded domain of
application.
3.1. Digital Emblem Requirements
3.1.1. Digital Emblem Format
Digital emblems MUST identify the marked asset and their kind of
digital emblem. Beyond that, digital emblems MAY include other data,
for example, an issuer or a validity window. To accommodate use
cases requiring extensible data, a digital emblem architecture SHOULD
introduce minimal size overhead except for fields required to fulfil
other requirements in this document.
As of this writing, the DIEM charter requires that digital emblems
MUST explicitly identify the marked asset by a Fully Qualified Domain
Name (FQDN).
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3.1.2. Emblem Semantics
Individual use cases MUST specify the semantics of the emblem. It
must be clearly stated how discovery and validation of a digital
emblem should inform validator behavior.
3.2. Discovery Requirements
3.2.1. Discovery
Digital emblems MUST specify how validators can check for the
presence of a digital emblem. That is, given an asset, a validator
must be able to determine whether it has an associated emblem. For
example, verifying whether a FQDN has an emblem associated with it
could be realized by fetching digital emblem-associated records for
that FQDN.
3.2.2. Query Response
Specifications for each use case MUST determine how servers must
respond to queries for Digital Emblems of their specified type.
Specifically, they must determine the responsiveness and consistency
requirements for emblems of their given type and provide explanations
of how the chosen requirements apply and the rationales for their
selection.
For responsiveness, an instance of a specific type of digital emblem
can either be required to respond to all queries for it (Assured
Response), or allowed to selectively respond to a specific subset of
incoming queries (Selective Response).
For consistency of response, specifications for a given type of
Digital Emblem T must denote whether all queries for an asset's
records (as denoted by its FQDN) must return all Digital Emblems of
type T associated with the asset (Consistent Content), or whether the
inclusion of emblems of type T in a response may vary based on
specific requester attributes (Selective Content).
Note that as of this writing, neither the baseline definition for the
minimum set of attributes that constitute a unique Digital Emblem,
nor the attributes needed to attain Consistent Content have been
defined. Given the limited scope of this document, that definition
as well as the mechanism to ensure its extensibility across newly
defined emblem types will be outlined in the architecture document.
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3.2.3. Removable
Some use cases require that digital emblems are removable.
"Removing" an emblem means that one cannot determine whether an
emblem ever was applied to a particular asset. This means, in
particular, emblems do not count as removed when they become invalid,
e.g., due to expiry.
Note that removability is a security requirement. Therefore, drafts
that address removability MUST specify a threat model for
removability that specifies when and under what conditions it is
acceptable that someone can learn after the fact that an emblem was
applied.
3.2.4. Undetectable Validation
Some use cases require that digital emblem discovery and validation
is undetectable. This requirement is motivated by emblems that mark
their assets as protected and ask validators to not disrupt the
marked asset. If emblem discovery were detectable, malicious parties
could misuse the digital emblem as an intrusion detection system.
For specific use cases and designs, it may be acceptable that certain
parties can detect emblem discovery and validation, for example, when
the validator can hide in a sufficiently large anonymity set, or it
is acceptable that the given party could detect the discovery or
validation. Concrete designs MUST specify a threat model for
undetectable validation. This threat model must detail which parties
can detect emblem discovery and validation, under which conditions,
and to what extent.
3.3. Validation Requirements
3.3.1. Validation
Some use cases require that digital emblems be validated. The
digital emblem architecture MUST, without restriction, allow
individual standards to support verification of all the digital
emblem's data or a defined subset. This ensures digital emblems can
support static or dynamic data without having to account for the pain
of frequent re-signing of dynamic data if its validation is not
required by a given digital emblem type. In particular, when
validation is defined, it MUST ensure that the emblem was issued for
the respective asset. Some use cases MAY use unverified digital
emblems.
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3.3.2. Authorization
For some use cases, use of a digital emblem requires authorization by
third parties. When a digital emblem requires authorization,
standards MUST define a trust model that describes how validators can
discover authorities and how the system selects authorities. The
generalized digital emblem architecture MUST NOT assume that Internet
access is available or required so that individual digital emblem
standards can choose to take a dependency on Internet access or not.
For example, a given digital emblem MAY use a PKI or the DNS as a
root of trust if desired, but the generalized digital emblem
architecture cannot mandate this or other options and MUST make this
a point of extensibility.
Any authorization mechanism MUST account for the possibility of
compromise of cryptographic key material, for example, by specifying
revocation mechanisms or using short-lived credentials.
3.4. Other Requirements
3.4.1. Extensibility
The digital emblem architecture should be extensible. The initial
work should not preclude future extensions, and individual standards
should be designed to be as general as possible.
4. Extensions
In this section, we sketch how the digital emblem architecture could
be extended by future standards to accommodate more use cases, but it
is not a comprehensive list.
4.1. Data Formats
Emblems for additional use cases may be defined via new profiles in
future standards, potentially including new types of atomic data
elements requiring additional specification.
4.2. Asset Identifier Discovery
It may be non-obvious for some use cases to learn the identifier
associated with an asset, and thus impossible to discover emblems
associated with that asset. To accommodate such use cases, one could
specify means to discover identifiers for different types of assets.
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4.3. Implicit Discovery
An alternative approach to the above problem would be to bind emblems
implicitly to the marked asset. Implicit binding could identify the
marked asset by the emblem's location. For example, if emblems were
distributed via NFC, the marked asset could be the asset to which the
NFC chip was attached. As of this writing, the current charter scope
requires that digital emblems explicitly identify their asset, but
such discovery mechanisms could be investigated in future WG work.
4.4. Confidentiality
Some use cases may contain confidential or sensitive data, and may
require mechanisms to protect such data. For example, this could be
realized with encryption of the general emblem data format that will
be part of the architecture or by only serving emblems over channels
with access control mechanisms.
4.5. Proof of Presence
Since emblems themselves are unable to directly protect assets
against attack, emblems indicating assets are entitled to protections
may require a mechanism through which violations of their laws or
provisions can be verified forensically. This would be particularly
relevant in cases where emblems can be applied and removed
dynamically. These protections are defined in three different
levels, listed from weakest to strongest.
Level 1 - presence and verifiability: Establishing that an actor or
querying party was able to obtain the emblem at the time of
violation. That is forensically demonstrating/proving that the
emblem was discoverable and verifiable at the time of an alleged
violation.
Level 2 - presence, verifiability and access: Establishing the
emblem's presence and verifiability and that the querying party
accessed the digital emblem.
Level 3 - presence, verifiability access and verification:
Demonstrating presence verifiability and access and that the querying
party verified the emblem upon accessing it. This level of proof can
only be made by the querying party.
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Note that Levels 2 and 3 are intended to be mutually exclusive
requirements with Undetectable Validation Section 3.2.4. An example
from the Diplomatic Pouch use case, described in Section Section 5.2,
illustrates the Level 3 Proof of Presence requirement, and how it in
some cases may need to be part of a chain of custody and/or
accompanied by additional security measures to provide adequate
security guarantees.
| Level 2 validation could be available for the validator without
| violating Undetectable Validation Section 3.2.4. However,
| enabling Level 2 validation to the asset, issuer or authorizer
| would violate that requirement.
5. Use Cases
Different use cases have different requirements. The purpose of this
document is to list the requirements that will be addressed with the
initial architecture. The use cases overlap and would benefit from a
DIEM architecture developed to provide the requirements listed above,
though some may require additional extensions. We alphabetically
list use cases here so that relevant stakeholders can provide input
on whether their use case would indeed benefit from a DIEM
architecture, and invite participants to provide use cases or details
that we have missed.
We provide auxiliary material under Informative References.
5.1. Basel Convention
Regulates the trans-boundary movement of hazardous wastes. Use cases
are functionally identical to OPCW and IAEA.
5.2. Diplomatic Pouches (1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations)
Digital emblems can protect diplomatic pouch shipments, diplomatic
couriers, and diplomatic envoys. All three of these are protected
under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
[VIENNACONV], which states that they may not be stopped, delayed, or
inspected. This creates the paradox that the validity of their
credentials must be evaluated, yet doing so has historically
compromised the very rights that are intended to be signaled.
Diplomatic markings have also been misappropriated as cover for the
smuggling of drugs and other contraband. Digital emblems, which can
be validated instantaneously, at a distance, and without interrupting
the subject, address both of these problems, while streamlining and
automating customs and immigrations processes.
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The use case for diplomatic pouches involves the following entities:
- Point of Entry Country/Customs Agent(s): Validator - Origin Country
or Accredited Organization: Issuer and Authorizing entity - Diplomat:
Agent of Country or Accredited Organization - Pouch: Asset
As noted in Section Section 4.5, a Level 3 Proof of presence record
could help demonstrate, for the benefit of the customs service, that
a customs agent(s) in a Point of Entry country validated the
diplomatic pouch. To that end, the Proof of Presence record of
processing a diplomatic pouch's digital emblem could include the
following information.
* Specific point of entry
* Time/Date of arrival at point of entry
* identifier(s) of customs agent(s) validating the pouch
* A baseline record establishing the Emblem's existence and
accessibility (or a pointer thereto)
* Record of the customs agent's attempt to validate the Digital
Emblem and its result signed by the customs agent(s)
5.2.1. Limitations of proof of presence:
As indicated in Section Section 4.5, Level 3 Proof of Presence alone
does not provide proof that no tampering with the diplomatic pouch or
inspection of its contents has occured. This is because a proof of
presence neither provides a chain of custody nor any mechanisms to
detect tampering should it occur. For this reason, Level 3
validation may be used along side or as part of an attested chain of
custody and/or accompanied by the use of physical mechanisms for
tamper-proofing a physical asset. Any such chain of custody
specification or anti-tampering mechanism is out of the scope of the
DIEM WG.
5.3. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
IAEA administers several treaties, especially related to the
controlled shipment of atomic fuels and wastes across borders.
Similar use case as OPCW.
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5.4. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Requires protection of civil aviation flights and the ability to
assert that they are not dual-use (i.e., not carrying military
cargo). Digital emblem would carry a geographic description of the
flight plan, its current location, and an indicator of its identity
(i.e., tail number). Potential need for the emblem to reference a
limited or partially redacted flight manifest.
5.5. Protective Emblems under the Geneva Conventions, their Additional
Protocols, and the 1954 Hague Convention
5.5.1. Background
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols constitute the
core of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Some assets enjoy
certain specific protections under IHL, including that they must not
be attacked. In addition to recognizing other signs, IHL codifies
four types of protective emblems for armed conflict, which inform
other parties that marked assets benefit from one or several of these
specific or special protections. In other words, protective emblems
under IHL signal the applicability of a specific or special
protection under IHL. Namely, these emblems are:
* The emblems of the Red Cross, Red Crescent, and Red Crystal,
defined in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol III of
the Geneva Conventions [GCI1949] [APIII2005]
* The Blue Shield emblem, defined in the 1954 Hague Convention
[HAGUE1954]
* The international distinctive sign of civil defence, defined in
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions [API1977]
* The dangerous forces special sign, defined in Additional Protocol
I of the Geneva Conventions [API1977]
However, these emblems can currently only be used to mark physical
assets, and there is no way to mark digital, network-connected
infrastructure that enjoys the same protections. A digital emblem
using the DIEM architecture could address this gap, and resolutions
from UNESCO and the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent have expressed support for such a digital emblem [RCRCRES]
[UNESCORES].
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5.5.2. Domain Model and Stakeholders
In the context of digital, protective emblems under IHL, emblems will
mark assets that are digital services and that solely serve protected
purposes (for example, a medical unit, a cultural site, or an
installation containing dangerous forces). Such emblems will be
issued by the party controlling the marked service, and they signal
that these assets must be respected and protected. Emblems must only
be issued by entities that have been authorized to bear a digital
emblem or other distinctive sign under international law. Such
authorizations must be issued by a state, other party to an armed
conflict, or other entity competent under international law.
For digital, protective emblems under IHL, validators will typically
be armed forces under the command of either state or non-state
actors. In situations of armed conflict, all such actors are under
an obligation to check whether assets subject to military activities
bear an emblem. Similarly, other malicious ICT actors, whilst not
necessarily obligated under IHL, may choose to respect assets bearing
the emblem. Concretely, we can assume that they will typically first
identify an asset that they plan to engage with and then check
whether that asset bears an emblem.
5.5.3. Requirements
The purpose of a digital emblem is to prevent disruptions of assets
by informing verifiers that marked assets enjoy protection under IHL.
Digital emblems will only be able to do so when verifiers are willing
to pay attention to them. As verifiers intend to attack assets that
are not protected under IHL, this will only be the case when they are
confident that their targets cannot fake protection and that they do
not alert their target about an imminent attack. Therefore, digital,
protective emblems under IHL require validation for authenticity
(Section 3.3.1) that is undetectable (Section 3.2.4).
At the same time, digital, protective emblems under IHL should fit
well into the existing framework of IHL and not put emblem issuers at
increased risk. First, IHL requires that emblem issuers must seek
authorization from a competent authority prior to applying them (see
Section 3.3.2 and Section 5.5.2). The authorization must be
decentralized, i.e., there must be no central authorities that govern
the use or distribution of digital emblems. Second, bearing an
emblem can increase the risk for targeted attacks. We require that
emblem issuers must be able to individually assess that risk and
remove emblems whenever they see the risks as outweighing the
benefits, i.e., we require that digital emblems are removable
(Section 3.2.3).
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Beyond the DIEM architecture as described in this document, digital,
protective emblems under IHL would benefit from other discovery
mechanisms than the DNS, as not all assets may have domain names
associated with them.
5.6. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
Requires protection of Schedule 1 chemicals in transit between
signatory countries for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or
protective purposes. Emblem would identify place, date, and volume
of production, and the emblem can contain confidential data.
5.7. Other IHL-related use cases
Many organizations use recognizable insignia or logos to mark staff,
vehicles, buildings, and materials that derive protection from IHL
and Customary IHL [CUSTOMARY]. Most humanitarian medical
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) use their own
logos rather than using the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblem, even
when they would have authorization to do so.
As humanitarian NGOs have a "right of initiative" [IHL-GUIDE]
established by IHL, and many NGOs have been operating for years in a
location before conflict breaks out, their presence is natural and
they are often first to provide medical care. Customary IHL requires
combatants to provide the same protection to a marked hospital or
identified medical staff as they would to one marked with a Red Cross
or Red Crescent, provided the combatant reasonably understand that
the mark is associated with a humanitarian medical function.
Community acceptance of unarmed humanitarian staff requires awareness
of their presence and identity, whether in time of conflict or in
time of peace.
IHL generally requires combatants to limit impact on civilians and
infrastructure that civilians rely on. For example, destroying an
electrical substation that serves a hospital and serves no military
function, is usually prohibited by IHL. Other types of
infrastructure important to civilians include drinking water
reservoirs, water towers, and gas lines. Likewise schools and elder
care facilities usually contain a high concentration of civilians.
Digital emblems could be defined to identify such civilian
infrastructure. The Whiteflag Protocol [WHITEFLAG] specifically
identifies several categories of infrastructure.
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5.8. Press
Journalists in conflict zones use protective markings that indicate
their status as a non-combatant. Assets belonging to the press could
be digitally marked, and protective markings in conflict zones could
be digitized.
5.9. Ramsar Convention on the Wetlands
The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as
Waterfowl Habitat "providees the single most global framework for
intergovernmental cooperation on wetland issues" and it features a
list of geographic areas designated by Member States. A digital
emblem for the geographic areas potentially requires
* Indication of location
* Access to presence or absence of Ramsar designation of a specified
location
* Textual description
* Ability to validate the presence or absence of Ramsar designation
5.10. United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
UN Model Regulations [UNMODELREGS] includes "Recommendations on the
Transport of Dangerous Goods." This includes labeling of items with
a four digit "UN Number" that indicates the comounds contained
within, such as chemicals, explosives, flammable liquids, etc. For
example, items containing lithium-based batteries are labeled with
3480 or 3481 and accompanied by a specific "battery mark" emblem.
5.11. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
Among other things is responsible for the International Plant
Protection Convention (IPPC) and International Standards for
Phytosanitary Measures standards including ISPM 15 that requires wood
packaging materials (pallets, crates, dunnages) to be debarked, heat-
treated or fumigated with methyl-bromide, and stamped or branded with
a compliance mark known as a "wheat stamp."
5.12. United Nations Peacekeepers
UN Peacekeepers use protective markings in theater as well as
facilities associated with the mission.
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5.13. World Customs Organization (WCO)
Specifies "Harmonized Systems" codes [HARMONIZED] that classify items
such as livestock, arms and ammunition, chemicals, plastics,
machinery, foodstuffs, etc. They also provide a system for labeling
origin of items and valuation of items, all enforced by numerous
international trade agreements between individual nations and groups
of nations.
5.14. World Health Organization (WHO)
Similar to the use case of the Red Cross, Red Crystal, and Red
Crescent.
5.15. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
WIPO administers 26+ treaties with different protections for
different things. Brands that are protected under international law
(e.g., Madrid Protocol) can mark their shipments with an emblem
allowing customs agents to positively identify legitimate products.
6. Security Considerations
Many of the requirements defined in this document have security
implications: in particular, query response (Section 3.2.2),
removable (Section 3.2.3), undetectable validation (Section 3.2.4),
validation (Section 3.3.1), and authorization (Section 3.3.2). The
DIEM architecture and respective standards will include discussions
of desired security guarantees and respective threat models. For
example, in a use case where removability is needed, there are
security considerations such as the potential for replay of removed
emblems. Similarly, for emblems that require validation or
authorization, specifications will discuss falsified presentation of
emblems.
Moreover, there may be use case specific risks. Some emblem types
are intended to signal specific rights or status by law, convention,
or agreement. As with physical emblems, the presence of a digital
emblem exists to inform; it does not ensure that the corresponding
rights or status will be respected by those who are privy to the
emblem. In some cases, the presentation of an emblem may even result
in a greater likelihood of attack. Specifications that address
specific use cases should consider such use-case-specific risks and
their consequences.
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7. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[CHARTER] "Digital Emblems", 27 May 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-diem/01/>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
8.2. Informative References
[API1977] International Committee of the Red Cross, "Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)", 8 June 1977, <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/assets/treaties/470-AP-I-EN.pdf>.
[APIII2005]
International Committee of the Red Cross, "Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive
Emblem (Protocol III)", 8 December 2005, <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/assets/treaties/615-AP-III-EN.pdf>.
[BLUEHELMET]
Doctors Without Borders, "The Practical Guide to
Humanitarian Law", n.d., <https://guide-humanitarian-
law.org/content/article/3/peacekeeping/>.
[BLUESHIELD]
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, "Enhanced Protection - Cultural Property of
Highest Importance to Humanity", n.d.,
<https://www.unesco.org/en/heritage-armed-conflicts/
enhanced-protection-cultural-property-highest-importance-
humanity>.
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[CUSTOMARY]
International Committee of the Red Cross, "Customary IHL -
IHL Databases", n.d.,
<https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl>.
[DIPLOMAT] Cornell Law School - Legal Information Institute,
"Personnel of Foreign Governments and International
Organizations and Special Treatment for Returning
Individuals", n.d.,
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/19/148.83>.
[GCI1949] International Committee of the Red Cross, "Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field", 12 August
1949, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/assets/treaties/365-
GC-I-EN.pdf>.
[HAGUE1954]
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, "Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict", 14 May 1954,
<https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000082464>.
[HARMONIZED]
World Customs Organization, "Harmonized System", n.d.,
<https://www.wcotradetools.org/en/harmonized-system>.
[IHL-GUIDE]
"", n.d., <https://guide-humanitarian-
law.org/content/article/3/right-of-humanitarian-
initiative/>.
[ISPM15] International Plant Protection Convention, Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
"International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures No.
15: Regulation of Wood Packaging Material in International
Trade", n.d.,
<https://www.ippc.int/static/media/files/publication/
en/2019/02/ISPM_15_2018_En_WoodPackaging_Post-
CPM13_Rev_Annex1and2_Fixed_2019-02-01.pdf>.
[PRESS] Reporters Without Borders, "RSF Resource for Journalists'
Safety", n.d., <https://safety.rsf.org/appendix-i-
protection-of-journalists-in-war-zones/>.
[RAMSAR] Convention on Wetlands Secretariat, "The Convention on
Wetlands", n.d., <https://www.ramsar.org>.
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[RCRCRES] 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent, "Protecting Civilians and Other Protected
Persons and Objects Against the Potential Human Cost of
ICT Activities During Armed Conflict", Document prepared
by the International Committee of the Red Cross in
consultation with the International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies , October 2024,
<https://rcrcconference.org/app/uploads/2024/10/34IC_R2-
ICT-EN.pdf>.
[REDCROSS] International Committee of the Red Cross, "The Protection
of the Red Cross / Red Crescent Emblems", n.d.,
<https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/
protection_emblems.pdf>.
[UNESCORES]
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, "Resolutions Adopted During the 16th Meeting
of the High Contracting Parties to the 1954 Hague
Convention", 1 December 2025,
<https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/
pf0000396721.locale=en>.
[UNMODELREGS]
United Nations Economic and Social Council, "UN Model
Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods", n.d.,
<https://unece.org/transport/dangerous-goods/un-model-
regulations-rev-23>.
[VIENNACONV]
United Nations, "Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations", n.d., <https://treaties.un.org/pages/
Viewdetails.aspx/?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-
3&chapter=3&clang=en>.
[WHITEFLAG]
Whiteflag Foundation, "Whiteflag Specification", n.d.,
<https://standard.whiteflagprotocol.org/>.
Acknowledgments
Brian Haberman and Bill Woodcock created an early version of a use
cases and requirements document, from which this draws ideas. We
also thank Eric Vynke, Suresh Krishan, Antonio DeSimone, Nick Doty,
Tommy Jensen, and Michael Christie for their valuable input.
Contributors
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Bill Woodcock
Packet Clearing House
Email: woody@pch.net
Jim Reid
RTFM llp
Email: jim@rfc1035.com
Samit D'Cunha
International Committee of the Red Cross
Email: sdcunha@icrc.org
Natasha Chabbra
Australian Red Cross
Email: nchabbra@redcross.org.au
Authors' Addresses
Rahel A. Fainchtein
JHU/APL
Email: rahel.fainchtein@jhuapl.edu
Felix Linker
Email: linkerfelix@gmail.com
Alex Rosenberg
Veridigo
Email: alexr@veridigo.com
Casey Deccio
Brigham Young University
Email: casey@byu.edu
Allison Mankin
Packet Clearing House
Email: allison@pch.net
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