Device Pairing Using Short Authentication Strings
draft-ietf-dnssd-pairing-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dnssd WG)
Last updated 2017-03-07
Replaces draft-kaiser-dnssd-pairing
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Network Working Group                                         C. Huitema
Internet-Draft                                      Private Octopus Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                               D. Kaiser
Expires: September 8, 2017                        University of Konstanz
                                                           March 7, 2017

           Device Pairing Using Short Authentication Strings
                    draft-ietf-dnssd-pairing-01.txt

Abstract

   This document proposes a device pairing mechanism that establishes a
   relationship between two devices by agreeing on a secret and manually
   verifying the secret's authenticity using an SAS (short
   authentication string).  Pairing has to be performed only once per
   pair of devices, as for a re-discovery at any later point in time,
   the exchanged secret can be used for mutual authentication.

   The proposed pairing method is suited for each application area where
   human operated devices need to establish a relation that allows
   configurationless and privacy preserving re-discovery at any later
   point in time.  Since privacy preserving applications are the main
   suitors, we especially care about privacy.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 8, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Huitema & Kaiser        Expires September 8, 2017               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               Device Pairing                   March 2017

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Problem Statement and Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Secure Pairing Over Internet Connections  . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Identity Assurance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Adequate User Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.3.1.  Short PIN Proved Inadequate . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.3.2.  Push Buttons Just Work, But Are Insecure  . . . . . .   6
       2.3.3.  Short Range Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.3.4.  Short Authentication Strings  . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.4.  Resist Cryptographic Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.5.  Privacy Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.6.  Using TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.7.  QR codes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.8.  Intra User Pairing and Transitive Pairing . . . . . . . .  13
   3.  Design of the Pairing Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.1.  Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.2.  Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     3.3.  Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     3.4.  Public Authentication Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   4.  Solution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.1.  Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.2.  Agreement and Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
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