DNS Privacy Considerations
draft-ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis-05
dprive S. Bortzmeyer
Internet-Draft AFNIC
Obsoletes: 7626 (if approved) S. Dickinson
Intended status: Informational Sinodun IT
Expires: November 5, 2020 May 4, 2020
DNS Privacy Considerations
draft-ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis-05
Abstract
This document describes the privacy issues associated with the use of
the DNS by Internet users. It is intended to be an analysis of the
present situation and does not prescribe solutions. This document
obsoletes RFC 7626.
Status of This Memo
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Bortzmeyer & Dickinson Expires November 5, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft DNS Privacy Considerations May 2020
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Risks in the DNS Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. The Alleged Public Nature of DNS Data . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Data in the DNS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.1. Data in the DNS Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Cache Snooping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Risks On the Wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Unencrypted Transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Encrypted Transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Risks in the Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. In the Recursive Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.1. Resolver Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.2. Active Attacks on Resolver Configuration . . . . . . 14
6.1.3. Blocking of User Selected DNS Resolution Services . . 15
6.1.4. Encrypted Transports and Recursive Resolvers . . . . 15
6.2. In the Authoritative Name Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Other risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Re-identification and Other Inferences . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2. More Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Actual "Attacks" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. Legalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
13. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
14.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Introduction
This document is an analysis of the DNS privacy issues, in the spirit
of Section 8 of [RFC6973].
The Domain Name System (DNS) is specified in [RFC1034], [RFC1035],
and many later RFCs, which have never been consolidated. It is one
of the most important infrastructure components of the Internet and
often ignored or misunderstood by Internet users (and even by many
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