DNS Privacy Considerations
draft-ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis-09

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dprive WG)
Author Tim Wicinski 
Last updated 2021-04-01 (latest revision 2021-03-09)
Replaces draft-bortzmeyer-dprive-rfc7626-bis
Stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Intended RFC status Informational
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Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Brian Haberman
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Consensus Boilerplate Yes
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Responsible AD √Čric Vyncke
Send notices to Brian Haberman <brian@innovationslab.net>, dns-privacy@ietf.org
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Details
dprive                                                  T. Wicinski, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                             March 9, 2021
Obsoletes: 7626 (if approved)
Intended status: Informational
Expires: September 10, 2021

                       DNS Privacy Considerations
                    draft-ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis-09

Abstract

   This document describes the privacy issues associated with the use of
   the DNS by Internet users.  It provides general observations about
   typical current privacy practices.  It is intended to be an analysis
   of the present situation and does not prescribe solutions.  This
   document obsoletes RFC 7626.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Wicinski               Expires September 10, 2021               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         DNS Privacy Considerations             March 2021

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Risks in the DNS Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  The Public Nature of DNS Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Data in the DNS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.2.1.  Data in the DNS Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Cache Snooping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Risks On the Wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Unencrypted Transports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  Encrypted Transports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Risks in the Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  In the Recursive Resolvers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       6.1.1.  Resolver Selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       6.1.2.  Active Attacks on Resolver Configuration  . . . . . .  14
       6.1.3.  Blocking of DNS Resolution Services . . . . . . . . .  15
       6.1.4.  Encrypted Transports and Recursive Resolvers  . . . .  15
     6.2.  In the Authoritative Name Servers . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Other risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.1.  Re-identification and Other Inferences  . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.2.  More Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  Actual "Attacks"  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  Legalities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   12. Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     14.3.  URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   Appendix A.  Updates since RFC7626  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Appendix B.  Changelog  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30

1.  Introduction

   This document is an analysis of the DNS privacy issues, in the spirit
   of Section 8 of [RFC6973].

   The Domain Name System (DNS) is specified in [RFC1034], [RFC1035],
   and many later RFCs, which have never been consolidated.  It is one
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