Bundle Protocol Security Specification
draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-08
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Active Internet-Draft (dtn WG)
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2018-10-22
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draft-birrane-dtn-sbsp
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IETF
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(None)
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plain text
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WG state
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In WG Last Call
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Document shepherd |
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Scott Burleigh
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IESG state |
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I-D Exists
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Unknown
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(None)
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Send notices to |
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Scott Burleigh <Scott.C.Burleigh@jpl.nasa.gov>
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Delay-Tolerant Networking E. Birrane
Internet-Draft K. McKeever
Intended status: Standards Track JHU/APL
Expires: April 25, 2019 October 22, 2018
Bundle Protocol Security Specification
draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-08
Abstract
This document defines a security protocol providing end to end data
integrity and confidentiality services for the Bundle Protocol.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Birrane & McKeever Expires April 25, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Bundle Protocol Security Specification October 2018
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Supported Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Specification Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Related Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Design Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Block-Level Granularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Multiple Security Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Mixed Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4. User-Selected Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.5. Deterministic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Security Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Block Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3. Target Multiplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4. Target Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5. Block Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.6. Security Association Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.7. Abstract Security Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.8. Block Integrity Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.9. Block Confidentiality Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.10. Block Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.11. SA Parameters and Result Identification . . . . . . . . . 20
3.12. BSP Block Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.12.1. Example 1: Constructing a Bundle with Security . . . 21
3.12.2. Example 2: Adding More Security At A New Node . . . 22
4. Canonical Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5. Security Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1. Bundles Received from Other Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.1.1. Receiving BCBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.1.2. Receiving BIBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2. Bundle Fragmentation and Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7. Security Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.1. Attacker Capabilities and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.2. Attacker Behaviors and BPSec Mitigations . . . . . . . . 30
8.2.1. Eavesdropping Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8.2.2. Modification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.2.3. Topology Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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