Bundle Protocol Security Specification
draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-07

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Delay-Tolerant Networking                                     E. Birrane
Internet-Draft                                               K. McKeever
Intended status: Standards Track                                 JHU/APL
Expires: January 2, 2019                                    July 1, 2018

                 Bundle Protocol Security Specification
                        draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-07

Abstract

   This document defines a security protocol providing end to end data
   integrity and confidentiality services for the Bundle Protocol.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Birrane & McKeever       Expires January 2, 2019                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft   Bundle Protocol Security Specification        July 2018

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Supported Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Specification Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Related Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.4.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Design Decisions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Block-Level Granularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Multiple Security Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Mixed Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.4.  User-Selected Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.5.  Deterministic Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Security Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Block Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Uniqueness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  Target Multiplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.4.  Target Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.5.  Block Representation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.6.  Abstract Security Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.7.  Block Integrity Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.8.  Block Confidentiality Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     3.9.  Block Interactions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.10. Cipher Suite Parameter and Result Identification  . . . .  18
     3.11. BSP Block Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.11.1.  Example 1: Constructing a Bundle with Security . . .  18
       3.11.2.  Example 2: Adding More Security At A New Node  . . .  19
   4.  Canonical Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   5.  Security Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.1.  Bundles Received from Other Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       5.1.1.  Receiving BCBs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       5.1.2.  Receiving BIBs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     5.2.  Bundle Fragmentation and Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   6.  Key Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   7.  Security Policy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     8.1.  Attacker Capabilities and Objectives  . . . . . . . . . .  26
     8.2.  Attacker Behaviors and BPSec Mitigations  . . . . . . . .  27
       8.2.1.  Eavesdropping Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       8.2.2.  Modification Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       8.2.3.  Topology Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       8.2.4.  Message Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29