Bundle Protocol Security Specification
draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-22
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (dtn WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2020-03-10 | ||
| Replaces | draft-birrane-dtn-sbsp | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | plain text xml pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication (wg milestone: Jul 2019 - Bundle Security Prot... ) | |
| Document shepherd | Scott Burleigh | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2019-06-19) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
Has a DISCUSS. Needs 3 more YES or NO OBJECTION positions to pass. |
||
| Responsible AD | Magnus Westerlund | ||
| Send notices to | Scott Burleigh <Scott.C.Burleigh@jpl.nasa.gov> | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
| IANA expert review state | Expert Reviews OK | ||
| IANA expert review comments | An update on this assignment: we have converged on the registry questions in the new Bundle Protocol specification, agreeing to register new BPv7 block type numbers in the existing Bundle Block Types registry rather than starting up a new registry for BPv7 block types. This means that block type numbers 2 and 3 -- originally requested for the BPsec BIB and BCB blocks -- are not available (they are used by the old Bundle Authentication Block and Payload Integrity Block), so we must assign from one of the unassigned ranges. The BPbis specification requests that block types 11 and 12 be reserved for the Block Integrity Block and Block Confidentiality Block respectively, so those are the values that I would propose we assign. My understanding is that a slightly revised BPsec Internet Draft will be posted that simply requests that IANA assign numbers for these two blocks, without specifically asking for any particular values, so in the end I think there will be no conflict. | ||
Delay-Tolerant Networking E. Birrane
Internet-Draft K. McKeever
Intended status: Standards Track JHU/APL
Expires: September 9, 2020 March 8, 2020
Bundle Protocol Security Specification
draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-22
Abstract
This document defines a security protocol providing data integrity
and confidentiality services for the Bundle Protocol.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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Birrane & McKeever Expires September 9, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Bundle Protocol Security Specification March 2020
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Supported Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Specification Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Related Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Design Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Block-Level Granularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Multiple Security Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. Mixed Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4. User-Defined Security Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5. Deterministic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Security Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1. Block Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3. Target Multiplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4. Target Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.5. Block Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.6. Abstract Security Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.7. Block Integrity Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.8. Block Confidentiality Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.9. Block Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.10. Parameter and Result Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.11. BSP Block Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.11.1. Example 1: Constructing a Bundle with Security . . . 20
3.11.2. Example 2: Adding More Security At A New Node . . . 21
4. Canonical Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. Security Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1. Bundles Received from Other Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1.1. Receiving BCBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1.2. Receiving BIBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2. Bundle Fragmentation and Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7. Security Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.1. Attacker Capabilities and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.2. Attacker Behaviors and BPSec Mitigations . . . . . . . . 29
8.2.1. Eavesdropping Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.2.2. Modification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8.2.3. Topology Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.2.4. Message Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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