Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-03
Network Working Group J. Mattsson
Internet-Draft M. Sethi
Updates: 5216 (if approved) Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track November 14, 2018
Expires: May 18, 2019
Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-03
Abstract
This document specifies the use of EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 while
remaining backwards compatible with existing implementations of EAP-
TLS. TLS 1.3 provides significantly improved security, privacy, and
reduced latency when compared to earlier versions of TLS. EAP-TLS
with TLS 1.3 provides significantly improved protection against
pervasive monitoring by mandating use of privacy. This document
updates RFC 5216.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 18, 2019.
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Mattsson & Sethi Expires May 18, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 November 2018
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1.1. Base Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.3. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.4. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.5. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2. Identity Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3. Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4. Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements . . . . 14
2.5. EAP State Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3. Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol . . . . . . . . 15
4. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1. Security Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. Peer and Server Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.3. Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.4. Certificate Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.5. Packet Modification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.7. Pervasive Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Updated references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC3748],
provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication
methods. EAP-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) [RFC5216] specifies
an EAP authentication method with certificate-based mutual
authentication and key derivation utilizing the TLS handshake
protocol for cryptographic algorithms and protocol version
negotiation, mutual authentication, and establishment of shared
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