Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-13

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (emu WG)
Authors John Preuß Mattsson  , Mohit Sethi 
Last updated 2021-01-07 (latest revision 2020-11-19)
Replaces draft-mattsson-eap-tls13
Stream IETF
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Network Working Group                                        J. Mattsson
Internet-Draft                                                  M. Sethi
Updates: 5216 (if approved)                                     Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track                       November 19, 2020
Expires: May 23, 2021

                       Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3
                      draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-13

Abstract

   This document specifies the use of EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 while
   remaining backwards compatible with existing implementations of EAP-
   TLS.  TLS 1.3 provides significantly improved security, privacy, and
   reduced latency when compared to earlier versions of TLS.  EAP-TLS
   with TLS 1.3 further improves security and privacy by mandating use
   of privacy and revocation checking.  This document also provides
   guidance on authorization and resumption for EAP-TLS in general
   (regardless of the underlying TLS version used).  This document
   updates RFC 5216.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 23, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

Mattsson & Sethi          Expires May 23, 2021                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3             November 2020

   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements and Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation  . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.1.  Mutual Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.2.  Ticket Establishment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.3.  Resumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.4.  Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.1.5.  No Peer Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.1.6.  Hello Retry Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.1.7.  Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       2.1.8.  Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.1.9.  Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.2.  Identity Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     2.3.  Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     2.4.  Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements . . . .  16
     2.5.  EAP State Machines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   3.  Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol  . . . . . . . .  18
   4.  IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.1.  Security Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.2.  Peer and Server Identities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.3.  Certificate Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.4.  Certificate Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.5.  Packet Modification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.6.  Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.7.  Resumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.8.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     5.9.  Pervasive Monitoring  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     5.10. Discovered Vulnerabilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     6.2.  Informative references  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   Appendix A.  Updated references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
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