Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-14

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (emu WG)
Authors John Preuß Mattsson  , Mohit Sethi 
Last updated 2021-02-25 (latest revision 2021-02-02)
Replaces draft-mattsson-eap-tls13
Stream Internent Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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Network Working Group                                        J. Mattsson
Internet-Draft                                                  M. Sethi
Updates: 5216 (if approved)                                     Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track                        February 2, 2021
Expires: August 6, 2021

                       Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3
                      draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-14

Abstract

   The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in RFC 3748,
   provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication
   methods.  This document specifies the use of EAP-Transport Layer
   Security (EAP-TLS) with TLS 1.3 while remaining backwards compatible
   with existing implementations of EAP-TLS.  TLS 1.3 provides
   significantly improved security, privacy, and reduced latency when
   compared to earlier versions of TLS.  EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 further
   improves security and privacy by always providing forward secrecy,
   never disclosing the peer identity, and by mandating use of
   revocation checking.  This document also provides guidance on
   authorization and resumption for EAP-TLS in general (regardless of
   the underlying TLS version used).  This document updates RFC 5216.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 6, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Mattsson & Sethi         Expires August 6, 2021                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3             February 2021

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements and Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation  . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.1.  Mutual Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.2.  Ticket Establishment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.3.  Resumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.1.4.  Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.1.5.  No Peer Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.1.6.  Hello Retry Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       2.1.7.  Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       2.1.8.  Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       2.1.9.  Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     2.2.  Identity Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     2.3.  Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     2.4.  Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements . . . .  19
     2.5.  EAP State Machines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   3.  Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol  . . . . . . . .  20
   4.  IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.1.  Security Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.2.  Peer and Server Identities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.3.  Certificate Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.4.  Certificate Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.5.  Packet Modification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     5.6.  Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     5.7.  Resumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     5.8.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     5.9.  Pervasive Monitoring  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     5.10. Discovered Vulnerabilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
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