Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')
draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis-02
Network Working Group J. Arkko
Internet-Draft V. Lehtovirta
Obsoletes: 5448 (if approved) V. Torvinen
Updates: 4187 (if approved) Ericsson
Intended status: Informational P. Eronen
Expires: March 21, 2019 Nokia
September 17, 2018
Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation
Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')
draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis-02
Abstract
This specification defines a new EAP method, EAP-AKA', a small
revision of the EAP-AKA method. The change is a new key derivation
function that binds the keys derived within the method to the name of
the access network. The new key derivation mechanism has been
defined in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). This
specification allows its use in EAP in an interoperable manner. In
addition, EAP-AKA' employs SHA-256 instead of SHA-1.
This specification also updates RFC 4187 EAP-AKA to prevent bidding
down attacks from EAP-AKA'.
This version of the EAP-AKA' specification provides updates to
specify the protocol behaviour for 5G deployments as well.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 21, 2019.
Arkko, et al. Expires March 21, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft EAP-AKA' September 2018
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. EAP-AKA' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. AT_KDF_INPUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. AT_KDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4. Hash Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4.1. PRF' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4.2. AT_MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4.3. AT_CHECKCODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Bidding Down Prevention for EAP-AKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Peer Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1. Username Types in EAP-AKA' Identities . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.2. Generating Pseudonyms and Fast Re-Authentication
Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.3. Identifier Usage in 5G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3.1. Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3.2. EAP Identity Response and EAP-AKA' AT_IDENTITY
Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. Exported Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.1. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.2. Discovered Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.3. Pervasive Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.4. Security Properties of Binding Network Names . . . . . . 31
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.1. Type Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.2. Attribute Type Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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