Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')
draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis-03

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (emu WG)
Last updated 2018-11-07 (latest revision 2018-10-19)
Replaces draft-arkko-eap-rfc5448bis
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text pdf html bibtex
Stream WG state In WG Last Call
Document shepherd No shepherd assigned
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Network Working Group                                           J. Arkko
Internet-Draft                                             V. Lehtovirta
Obsoletes: 5448 (if approved)                                V. Torvinen
Updates: 4187 (if approved)                                     Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                                 P. Eronen
Expires: April 22, 2019                                            Nokia
                                                        October 19, 2018

 Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation
              Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')
                      draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis-03

Abstract

   This specification defines an EAP method, EAP-AKA', a small revision
   of the EAP-AKA method.  EAP-AKA' provides a key derivation function
   that binds the keys derived within the method to the name of the
   access network.  The key derivation mechanism has been defined in the
   3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).  This specification allows
   its use in EAP in an interoperable manner.  In addition, EAP-AKA'
   employs SHA-256 instead of SHA-1.

   This specification also updates RFC 4187 EAP-AKA to prevent bidding
   down attacks from EAP-AKA'.

   This version of the EAP-AKA' specification provides updates to
   specify the protocol behaviour for 5G deployments as well.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 22, 2019.

Arkko, et al.            Expires April 22, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                  EAP-AKA'                    October 2018

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  EAP-AKA'  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  AT_KDF_INPUT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  AT_KDF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.3.  Key Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.4.  Hash Functions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.4.1.  PRF'  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.4.2.  AT_MAC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.4.3.  AT_CHECKCODE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.  Bidding Down Prevention for EAP-AKA . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   5.  Peer Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.1.  Username Types in EAP-AKA' Identities . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.2.  Generating Pseudonyms and Fast Re-Authentication
           Identities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.3.  Identifier Usage in 5G  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       5.3.1.  Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       5.3.2.  EAP Identity Response and EAP-AKA' AT_IDENTITY
               Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   6.  Exported Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     7.1.  Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     7.2.  Discovered Vulnerabilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     7.3.  Pervasive Monitoring  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     7.4.  Security Properties of Binding Network Names  . . . . . .  30
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     8.1.  Type Value  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     8.2.  Attribute Type Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
Show full document text