Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')
draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis-04

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Network Working Group                                           J. Arkko
Internet-Draft                                             V. Lehtovirta
Obsoletes: 5448 (if approved)                                V. Torvinen
Updates: 4187 (if approved)                                     Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                                 P. Eronen
Expires: July 21, 2019                                       Independent
                                                        January 17, 2019

 Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation
              Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')
                      draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis-04

Abstract

   The 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) is the
   primary authentication mechanism for devices wishing to access mobile
   networks.  RFC 4187 (EAP-AKA) made the use of this mechanism possible
   within the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) framework.  RFC
   5448 (EAP-AKA') was an improved version of EAP-AKA.

   This memo is an update of the specification for EAP-AKA'.  This
   version obsoletes RFC 5448.

   EAP-AKA' differs from EAP-AKA by providing a key derivation function
   that binds the keys derived within the method to the name of the
   access network.  The key derivation function has been defined in the
   3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).  EAP-AKA' allows its use
   in EAP in an interoperable manner.  EAP-AKA' is also an algorithm
   update, as it employs SHA-256 instead of SHA-1 as in EAP-AKA.

   This version of EAP-AKA' specification specifies the protocol
   behaviour for 5G deployments as well.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

Arkko, et al.             Expires July 21, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                  EAP-AKA'                    January 2019

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 21, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  EAP-AKA'  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  AT_KDF_INPUT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  AT_KDF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.3.  Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.4.  Hash Functions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.4.1.  PRF'  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.4.2.  AT_MAC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.4.3.  AT_CHECKCODE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.  Bidding Down Prevention for EAP-AKA . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   5.  Peer Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.1.  Username Types in EAP-AKA' Identities . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.2.  Generating Pseudonyms and Fast Re-Authentication
           Identities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.3.  Identifier Usage in 5G  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       5.3.1.  Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       5.3.2.  EAP Identity Response and EAP-AKA' AT_IDENTITY
               Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   6.  Exported Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     7.1.  Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     7.2.  Discovered Vulnerabilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     7.3.  Pervasive Monitoring  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     7.4.  Security Properties of Binding Network Names  . . . . . .  30