Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-04

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (grow WG)
Last updated 2017-03-27
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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Global Routing Operations                                       J. Mauch
Internet-Draft                                                    Akamai
Intended status: Standards Track                             J. Snijders
Expires: September 28, 2017                                          NTT
                                                              G. Hankins
                                                                   Nokia
                                                          March 27, 2017

        Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
                     draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-04

Abstract

   This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when
   there is no import or export policy associated with an External BGP
   session.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4

1.  Introduction

   There are BGP routing security issues that need to be addressed to
   make the Internet more stable.  Route leaks [RFC7908] are part of the
   problem, but software defects or operator misconfigurations can
   contribute too.  This document provides guidance to BGP [RFC4271]
   implementers to improve the default level of Internet routing
   security.

   Many deployed BGP speakers send and accept any and all route
   announcements between their BGP neighbors by default.  This practice
   dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were
   permissive in sending routing information to allow all networks to
   reach each other.  As the Internet has become more densely
   interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
   significant risks to Internet routing.

   This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
   explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any
   External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or
   confederation boundaries for all enabled address families.  When this
   solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes
   without policies configured on EBGP sessions.

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