Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-08

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (grow WG)
Last updated 2017-06-12 (latest revision 2017-05-26)
Replaces draft-mauch-bgp-reject
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Global Routing Operations                                       J. Mauch
Internet-Draft                                                    Akamai
Updates: 4271 (if approved)                                  J. Snijders
Intended status: Standards Track                                     NTT
Expires: November 25, 2017                                    G. Hankins
                                                                   Nokia
                                                            May 24, 2017

        Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
                     draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-08

Abstract

   This document updates RFC4271 by defining the default behavior of a
   BGP speaker when there is no Import or Export Policy associated with
   an External BGP session.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Mauch, et al.           Expires November 25, 2017               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             BGP Default Reject                   May 2017

   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Changes to RFC4271  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Appendix A.  Transition Considerations for BGP Implementers . . .   5
     A.1.  "N+1 N+2" Release Strategy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   BGP routing security issues need to be addressed in order to make the
   Internet more stable.  Route leaks [RFC7908] are part of the problem,
   but software defects or operator misconfiguration can contribute too.
   This document updates [RFC4271] so that routes are neither imported
   nor exported unless specifically enabled by configuration.  This
   change reduces the consequences of these problems, and improves the
   default level of Internet routing security.

   Many deployed BGP speakers send and accept any and all route
   announcements between their BGP neighbors by default.  This practice
   dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were
   permissive in sending routing information to allow all networks to
   reach each other.  As the Internet has become more densely
   interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
   significant risks to Internet routing.

   This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
   explicit configuration of both BGP Import and Export Policies for any
   External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or
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