Implicit IV for Counter-based Ciphers in Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-11

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (ipsecme WG)
Last updated 2019-11-11 (latest revision 2019-10-22)
Replaces draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-iv-generation, draft-mglt-6lo-aes-implicit-iv, draft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv
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Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication (wg milestone: Apr 2018 - IETF Last Call on Im... )
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IPSECME                                                       D. Migault
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track                             T. Guggemos
Expires: April 23, 2020                                       LMU Munich
                                                                  Y. Nir
                                                                Dell EMC
                                                        October 21, 2019

Implicit IV for Counter-based Ciphers in Encapsulating Security Payload
                                 (ESP)
                   draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-11

Abstract

   Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) sends an initialization vector
   (IV) in each packet.  The size of IV depends on the applied
   transform, being usually 8 or 16 octets for the transforms defined by
   the time this document is written.  Some algorithms such as AES-GCM,
   AES-CCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 when used with IPsec, take the IV to
   generate a nonce that is used as an input parameter for encrypting
   and decrypting.  This IV must be unique but can be predictable.  As a
   result, the value provided in the ESP Sequence Number (SN) can be
   used instead to generate the nonce.  This avoids sending the IV
   itself, and saves in the case of AES-GCM, AES-CCM and
   ChaCha20-Poly1305 8 octets per packet.  This document describes how
   to do this.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 23, 2020.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Implicit IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  IKEv2 Initiator Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IKEv2 Responder Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     10.2.  Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described BCP 14
   [RFC2119], [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Introduction

   Counter-based AES modes of operation such as AES-CCM ([RFC4309]), and
   AES-GCM ([RFC4106]) require the specification of an nonce for each
   ESP packet.  The same applies for ChaCha20-Poly1305 ([RFC7634]).
   Currently this nonce is generated thanks to the Initialization Vector
   (IV) provided in each ESP packet ([RFC4303]).  This practice is
   designated in this document as "explicit IV".

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   In some contexts, such as IoT, it may be preferable to avoid carrying
   the extra bytes associated to the IV and instead generate it locally
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