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Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines

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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 6518.
Authors Gregory M. Lebovitz , Manav Bhatia
Last updated 2015-10-14 (Latest revision 2011-12-12)
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KARP Working Group                                      G. Lebovitz 
   Internet Draft                                                      
   Intended status: Informational                            M. Bhatia  
   Expires: June 16, 2012                               Alcatel-Lucent 
                                                     December 13, 2011 
           Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) 
                              Design Guidelines 

   Status of this Memo 

      This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance 
      with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.   
      Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet 
      Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working 
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      This Internet-Draft will expire on June 2012. 
   Copyright Notice 
      Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 
      document authors.  All rights reserved. 
      This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 
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      in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided 
      without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.  


      This document is one of a series concerned with defining a 
      roadmap of protocol specification work for the use of modern 
      cryptographic mechanisms and algorithms for message 
      authentication in routing protocols.  In particular, it defines 
      the framework for a key management protocol that may be used to 
      create and manage session keys for message authentication and 

   Conventions used in this document 

      The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL 
      "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described 
      in RFC 2119. [RFC2119] 

   Table of Contents 

      1. Introduction..................................................3 
      2. Categorizing Routing Protocols................................5 
         2.1. Category: Message Transaction Type.......................5 
         2.2. Category: Peer vs Group Keying...........................6 
      3. Consider the future existence of a Key Management Protocol....7 
         3.1. Consider Asymmetric Keys.................................7 
         3.2. Cryptographic Keys Life Cycle............................8 
      4. RoadMap.......................................................9 
         4.1. Work Phases on any Particular Protocol...................9 
         4.2. Work Items Per Routing Protocol.........................11 
      5. Routing Protocols in Categories..............................13 
      6. Supporting Incremental Deployment............................17 
      7. Denial of Service Attacks....................................17 
      8. Gap Analysis.................................................18 
      9. Security Considerations......................................21 
         9.1. Use Strong Keys.........................................21 
         9.2. Internal vs. External Operation.........................22 
         9.3. Unique versus Shared Keys...............................23 
         9.4. Key Exchange Mechanism..................................24 
      10. Acknowledgments.............................................27 
      11. IANA Considerations.........................................27 
      12. References..................................................27 
         12.1. Normative References...................................27 
         12.2. Informative References.................................27 
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   1. Introduction 

      In March 2006 the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a 
      workshop on the topic of "Unwanted Internet Traffic".  The 
      report from that workshop is documented in RFC 4948 [RFC4948].  
      Section 8.1 of that document states that "A simple risk 
      analysis would suggest that an ideal attack target of minimal 
      cost but maximal disruption is the core routing 
      infrastructure."  Section 8.2 calls for "[t]ightening the 
      security of the core routing infrastructure."  Four main steps 
      were identified for that tightening: 
      o  Increased security mechanisms and practices for operating  
      o  Cleaning up the Internet Routing Registry repository [IRR],   
         and securing both the database and the access, so that it  
         can be used for routing verifications.   
      o  Specifications for cryptographic validation of routing  
      message content.   
      o Securing the routing protocols' packets on the wire 
      The first bullet is being addressed in the OPSEC Working Group. 
      The second bullet should be addressed through liaisons with 
      those running the IRR's globally.  The third bullet is being 
      addressed in the SIDR Working Group. 
      This document addresses the last bullet, securing the packets 
      on the wire of the routing protocol exchanges.  Thus, it is 
      concerned with guidelines for describing issues and techniques 
      for protecting the messages between directly communicating 
      peers.  This may overlap with, but is strongly distinct from, 
      protection designed to ensure that routing information is 
      properly authorized relative to sources of this information.  
      Such authorizations are provided by other mechanisms and are 
      outside the scope of this document and work that relies on it. 
      This document uses the terminology "on the wire" to talk about 
      the information used by routing systems.  This term is widely 
      used in IETF RFCs, but is used in several different ways.  In 
      this document, it is used to refer both to information 
      exchanged between routing protocol instances, and to underlying 
      protocols that may also need to be protected in specific 
      circumstances. Other documents that will analyze individual 
      protocols will need to indicate how they use the term "on the 
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      The term "routing transport" is used to refer to the layer that 
      exchanges the routing protocols. This can be TCP, UDP, or even 
      direct link level messaging in the case of some routing 
      protocols.  The term is used here to allow a referent for 
      discussing both common and disparate issues that affect or 
      interact with this dimension of the routing systems.  The term 
      is used here to refer generally to the set of mechanisms and 
      exchanges underneath the routing protocol, whatever that is in 
      specific cases. 
      KARP will focus on an abstraction for keying information that 
      describes the interface between routing protocols, operators 
      and automated key management. Conceptually when routing 
      protocols send or receive messages they will look up the key to 
      use in this abstract key table. Conceptually, there will be an 
      interface for a routing protocol to make requests of automated 
      key management when it is being used; when keys become 
      available they will be made available in the key table. There 
      is no requirement that this abstraction be used for 
      implementation; the abstraction serves the needs of 
      standardization and management. Specifically as part of the 
      KARP work plan: 
      1) KARP will design the key table abstraction, the interface 
      between key management protocols and routing protocols and 
      possibly security protocols at other layers. 
      2) For each routing protocol, KARP will define the mapping 
      between how the protocol represents key material and the 
      protocol independent key table abstraction. When routing 
      protocols share a common mechanism for authentication, such as 
      the TCP Authentication Option, the same mapping is likely to be 
      reused between protocols. An implementation may be able to move 
      much of the keying logic into code related to this shared 
      authentication primitive rather than code specific to routing 
      3) When designing automated key management for both symmetric 
      keys and group keys, we will only use the abstractions designed 
      in point 1 above to communicate between automated key 
      management and routing protocols. 
      Readers must refer to the [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-reqs] for a 
      clear definition of the scope, goals, non goals and the 
      audience for the design work being undertaken in KARP WG. 

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   2. Categorizing Routing Protocols 

      This document places the routing protocols into two categories 
      according to their requirements for authentication.  We hope 
      these categories will allow design teams to focus on security 
      mechanisms for a given category. Further, we hope that the each 
      protocol in the group will be able to reuse the authentication 
      mechanism. It is also hoped that, down the road we can create one 
      Key Management Protocol (KMP) per category (if not for several 
      categories) so that the work can be easily leveraged by for use 
      in the various Routing Protocol groupings.  KMPs are useful for 
      allowing simple, automated updates of the traffic keys used in a 
      base protocol.  KMPs replace the need for humans, or OSS 
      routines, to periodically replace keys on running systems.  It 
      also removes the need for a chain of manual keys to be chosen or 
      configured on such systems.  When configured properly, a KMP will 
      enforce the key freshness policy among peers by keeping track of 
      the key lifetime and negotiating a new key at the defined 
   2.1. Category: Message Transaction Type 

      The first category defines three types of messaging 
      transactions used on the wire by the base Routing Protocol.  
      They are: 
        One peer router directly and intentionally delivers a route    
        update specifically to one other peer router. Examples are 
        BGP [RFC4271], LDP [RFC5036], BFD [RFC5880] and RSVP-TE 
        [RFC3209] [RFC3473] [RFC4726] [RFC5151]. Point-to-point modes 
        of both IS-IS [RFC1195] and OSPF [RFC2328], when sent over 
        both traditional point-to-point links and when using multi-
        access layers, may both also fall into this category.  
        A router peers with multiple other routers on a single 
        network segment -- i.e. on link local -- such that it creates 
        and sends one route update message which is intended for 
        multiple peers.  Examples would be OSPF and IS-IS in their 
        broadcast, non-point-to-point mode and Routing Information 
        Protocol (RIP) [RFC2453]. 
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        Multicast protocols have unique security properties because 
        they are inherently group-based protocols and thus have group 
        keying requirements at the routing level where link-local 
        routing messages are multicasted.  Also, at least in the case 
        of PIM-SM [RFC4601], some messages are sent unicast to a 
        given peer(s), as is the case with router-close-to-sender and 
        the "Rendezvous Point".  Some work for application layer 
        message security has been done in the Multicast Security 
        working group (MSEC) and may be helpful to review, but is not 
        directly applicable. 
      These categories affect both the routing protocol view of the 
      communication, and the actual message transfer.  As a result, 
      some message transaction types for a few routing protocols, may 
      be mixtures, for example using broadcast where multicast might 
      be expected, or using unicast to deliver what looks to the 
      routing protocol like broadcast or multicast.  
      Protocol security analysis documents produced in KARP need to 
      pay attention both to the semantics of the communication, and 
      the techniques that are used for the message exchanges. 

   2.2. Category: Peer vs Group Keying 

      The second category is the keying mechanism that will be used 
      to distribute the session keys to the routing transports.They 
      Peer keying   
      One router sends the keying messages only to one other router, 
      such that a one-to-one, uniquely keyed security association 
      (SA) is established between the two routers (e.g., BGP, BFD and 
      Group Keying 
      One router creates and distributes a single keying message to 
      multiple peers.  In this case a group SA will be established 
      and used among multiple peers simultaneously. Group keying 
      exists for protocols like OSPF [RFC2328], and also for 
      multicast protocols like PIM-SM [RFC4601].  

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   3. Consider the future existence of a Key Management Protocol 

      When it comes time for the KARP WG to design a re-usable model 
      for a Key Management Protocol (KMP), [RFC4107] should be 
      When conducting the design work on a manually-keyed version of 
      a routing protocol's authentication mechanism, consideration 
      must be made for the eventual use of a KMP. In particular, 
      design teams must consider what parameters would need to be 
      handed to the routing protocols by a KMP.  
      Examples of parameters that might need to be passed are:  a 
      security association identifier (e.g. IPsec SPI, or TCP-AO's 
      KeyID), a key lifetime (which may be represented either in 
      bytes or seconds), the cryptographic algorithms being used, the 
      keys themselves, and the directionality of the keys (i.e., 
      receive versus the sending keys) 
   3.1. Consider Asymmetric Keys 

      The use of asymmetric keys can be a very powerful way to 
      authenticate machine peers as used in routing protocol peer 
      exchanges. If generated on the machine, and never moved off the 
      machine, these keys will not need to be changed if an 
      administrator leaves the organization. Since the keys are 
      random they are far less susceptible to off-line dictionary and 
      guessing attacks. 
      An easy and simple way to use asymmetric keys is to start by 
      having the router generate a public/private key pair. At the 
      time of this writing, the recommended key size for algorithms 
      based on integer factorization cryptography like RSA is 1024 
      bits and 2048 bits for extremely valuable keys like the root 
      key pair used by a certification authority. It is believed that 
      a 1024-bit RSA key is equivalent in strength to 80-bit 
      symmetric keys and 2048-bit RSA keys to 112-bit symmetric keys 
      [RFC3766]. Elliptic Curve Cryptography [RFC4492] (ECC) appears 
      to be secure with shorter keys than those needed by other 
      asymmetric key algorithms. NIST guidelines [NIST-800-57] state 
      that ECC keys should be twice the length of equivalent strength 
      symmetric key algorithms. Thus, a 224-bit ECC key would roughly 
      have the same strength as a 112-bit symmetric key. 
      Many routers have the ability to be remotely managed using 
      Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol [RFC4252] and [RFC4253]. As such, 
      routers will also have the ability to generate and store an 
      asymmetric key pair, because this is the common authentication 

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      method employed by SSH when an administrator connects to a 
      router for management sessions. 
      Once an asymmetric key pair is generated, the KMP generating 
      security association parameters and keys for routing protocol 
      may use the machine's asymmetric keys for the authentication 
      mechanism. The form of the identity proof could be raw keys, 
      the more easily administrable self-signed certificate format, 
      or a PKI-issued [RFC5280] certificate credential. 
      Regardless of which credential is standardized, the 
      authentication mechanism can be as simple as a strong hash over 
      a string of human readable and transferable form of ASCII   
      characters. More complex, but also more secure, the identity 
      proof could be verified through the use of a PKI system's 
      revocation checking mechanism, (e.g. Certificate Revocation 
      List (CRL) or OCSP responder). If the SHA-1 fingerprint is 
      used, the solution could be as simple as loading a set of 
      neighbor routers' peer ID strings into a table and listing the 
      associated fingerprint string for each ID string. In most 
      organizations or peering points, this list will not be longer 
      than a thousand or so routers, and often the list will be much 
      shorter. In other words, the entire list for a given 
      organization's router ID and hash could be held in a router's 
      configuration file, uploaded, downloaded and moved about at 
      will. And it doesn't matter who sees or gains access to these 
      fingerprints, because they can be distributed publicly as it 
      needn't be kept secret. 
   3.2. Cryptographic Keys Life Cycle 

      Cryptographic keys should have a limited lifetime and may need 
      to be changed when an operator who had access to them leaves. 
      Using a key chain, a set of keys derived from the same keying 
      material and used one after the other, also does not help as 
      one still has to change all the keys in the key chain when an 
      operator having access to all those keys leaves the company. 
      Additionally, key chains will not help if the routing transport 
      subsystem does not support rolling over to the new keys without 
      bouncing the routing sessions and adjacencies. So the first 
      step is to fix the routing stack so that routing protocols can 
      change keys without breaking or bouncing the adjacencies. 

      An often cited reason for limiting the lifetime of a key is to 
      minimize the damage from a compromised key. It could be argued 
      that it is likely a user will not discover an attacker has 
      compromised the key if the attacker remains "passive" and thus 
      relatively frequent key changes will limit any potential damage 
      from compromised keys.  
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      Another threat against the long-lived key is that one of the 
      systems storing the key, or one of the users entrusted with the 
      key, will be subverted. So, while there may not be 
      cryptographic motivations of changing the keys, there could be 
      system security motivations for rolling the key.  

      Although manual key distribution methods are subject to human 
      error and frailty, more frequent manual key changes might 
      actually increase the risk of exposure as it is during the time 
      that the keys are being changed that they are likely to be 
      disclosed. In these cases, especially when very strong 
      cryptography is employed, it may be more prudent to have fewer, 
      well controlled manual key distributions rather than more 
      frequent, poorly controlled manual key distributions. In 
      general, where strong cryptography is employed, physical, 
      procedural, and logical access protection considerations often 
      have more impact on the key life than do algorithm and key size 

      For incremental deployments we could start by associating life 
      times with the send and the receive keys in the key chain for 
      the long-lived keys. This is an incremental approach that we 
      could use until the cryptographic keying material for 
      individual sessions is derived from the keying material stored 
      in a database of long-lived cryptographic keys as described in 
      [I-D.ietf-karp-crypto-key-table]. A key derivation function 
      (KDF) and its inputs are also specified in the database of 
      long-lived cryptographic keys; session-specific values based on 
      the routing protocol are input to the KDF. Protocol-specific 
      key identifiers may be assigned to the cryptographic keying 
      material for individual sessions if needed. 

      The long-lived cryptographic keys used by the routing protocols 
      can be either inserted manually in a database or can make use 
      of an automated key management protocol to do this.  

   4. RoadMap 

   4.1. Work Phases on any Particular Protocol 

      It is believed that improving security for any routing protocol 
      will be a two phase process. The first phase would be to modify 
      routing protocols to support modern cryptography algorithms and 
      key agility. The second phase would be to design and move to an 
      automated key management mechanism. This is like a crawl, walk 
      and run process. In order for operators to accept these phases, 
      we believe that the key management protocol should be clearly 
      separated from the routing transport. This would mean that the 
      routing transport subsystem is oblivious to how the keys are 
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      derived, exchanged and downloaded as long as there is something 
      that it can use. It is like having a routing protocol 
      configuration switch that requests the security module for the 
      "KARP security parameters" so that it can refer to some module 
      written, maintained, and operated by security experts and 
      insert those parameters in the routing exchange. 

      The desired end state for the KARP work contains several items.  
      First, the people desiring to deploy securely authenticated and 
      integrity validated packets between routing peers have the 
      tools specified, implemented and shipping in order to deploy.  
      These tools should be fairly simple to implement, and not more 
      complex than the security mechanisms to which the operators are 
      already accustomed. (Examples of security mechanisms to which 
      router operators are accustomed include: the use of asymmetric 
      keys for authentication in SSH for router configuration, the 
      use of pre-shared keys (PSKs) in TCP MD5 for BGP protection, 
      the use of self-signed certificates for HTTPS access to device 
      Web-based user interfaces, the use of strongly constructed 
      passwords and/or identity tokens for user identification when 
      logging into routers and management systems.)  While the tools 
      that we intend to specify may not be able to stop a deployment 
      from using "foobar" as an input key for every device across 
      their entire routing domain, we intend to make a solid, modern 
      security system that is not too much more difficult than that.  
      In other words, simplicity and deployability are keys to 
      success.  The Routing Protocols will specify modern 
      cryptographic algorithms and security mechanisms.  Routing 
      peers will be able to employ unique, pair-wise keys per peering 
      instance, with reasonable key lifetimes, and updating those 
      keys on a regular basis will be operationally easy, causing no 
      service interruption. 

      Achieving the above described end-state using manual keys may 
      be pragmatic only in very small deployments.  However, manual 
      keying in larger deployments will be too burdensome for 
      operators.  Thus, the second goal is to support key life cycle 
      management with a KMP. We expect that both manual and automated 
      key management will co-exist in the real world.   

      In accordance with the desired end state just described, we 
      define two main work phases for each Routing Protocol: 

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      1. Enhance the Routing Protocol's current authentication 
         mechanism(s). This work involves enhancing a Routing 
         Protocol's current security mechanisms in order to achieve a 
         consistent, modern level of security functionality within its 
         existing key management framework.  It is understood and 
         accepted that the existing key management frameworks are 
         largely based on manual keys.  Since many operators have 
         already built operational support systems (OSS) around these 
         manual key implementations, there is some automation 
         available for an operator to leverage in that way, if the 
         underlying mechanisms are themselves secure.  In this phase, 
         we explicitly exclude embedding or creating a KMP.  Refer to 
         [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-reqs] for the list of the requirements 
         for Phase 1 work. 

      2. Develop an automated key management framework.  The second 
         phase will focus on the development of an automated keying 
         framework to facilitate unique pair-wise (group-wise, where 
         applicable) keys per peering instance.  This involves the use 
         of a KMP.  The use of automatic key management mechanisms 
         offers a number of benefits over manual keying. Most 
         importantly it provides fresh traffic keying material for 
         each session, thus helping to prevent inter-connection replay 
         attacks. In an inter-connection replay attack protocol 
         packets from the earlier protocol session are replayed 
         affecting the current execution of the protocol. A KMP is 
         also helpful because it negotiates unique, pair wise, random 
         keys without administrator involvement.  It negotiates 
         several SA parameters like algorithms, modes, and parameters 
         required for the secure connection, thus providing 
         interoperability between endpoints with disparate 
         capabilities and configurations. In addition it could also 
         include negotiating the key life times. The KMP can thus keep 
         track of those lifetimes using counters, and can negotiate 
         new keys and parameters before they expire, again, without 
         administrator interaction. Additionally, in the event of a 
         breach, changing the KMP key will immediately cause a rekey 
         to occur for the Traffic Key, and those new Traffic Keys will 
         be installed and used in the current connection.  In summary, 
         a KMP provides a protected channel between the peers through 
         which they can negotiate and pass important data required to 
         exchange proof of identities, derive Traffic Keys, determine 
         re-keying, synchronize their keying state, signal various 
         keying events, notify with error messages, etc.   

   4.2. Work Items Per Routing Protocol 

      Each Routing Protocol will have a team (the [Routing_Protocol]-
      KARP team) working on incrementally improving the security of a 
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      Routing Protocol. These teams will have the following main work 
   PHASE 1: 

      Characterize the RP 
         Assess the Routing Protocol to see what authentication and 
         integrity mechanisms it has today.  Does it needs 
         significant improvement to its existing mechanisms or not?  
         This will include determining if modern, strong security 
         algorithms and parameters are present and if the protocol 
         supports key agility without bouncing adjacencies. 

      Define Optimal State 
         List the requirements for the Routing Protocol's session key 
         usage and format to contain modern, strong security 
         algorithms and mechanisms, per the Requirements document  
         [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-reqs].  The goal here is to determine 
         what is needed for the Routing Protocol to be used securely 
         with at least manual key management. 

      Gap Analysis 
         Enumerate the requirements for this protocol to move from 
         its current security state, the first bullet, to its optimal 
         state, as listed just above. 
       Transition and Deployment Considerations  
         Document the operational transition plan for moving from the 
         old to the new security mechanism.  Will adjacencies need to 
         bounce?  What new elements/servers/services in the 
         infrastructure will be required?  What is an example work 
         flow that an operator will take?  The best possible case is 
         if the adjacency does not break, but this may not always be 
       Define, Assign, Design 
         Create a deliverables list of the design and specification 
         work, with milestones. Define owners. Release one or more 
   PHASE 2: 

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      KMP Analysis 
         Review requirements for KMPs.  Identify any nuances for this 
         particular routing protocol's needs and its use cases for a 
         KMP.  List the requirements that this Routing Protocol has 
         for being able to be used in conjunction with a KMP.  Define 
         the optimal state and check how easily it can be decoupled 
         from the KMP. 
      Gap Analysis 
         Enumerate the requirements for this protocol to move from 
         its current security state to its optimal state, with 
         respect to the key management. 
      Define, Assign, Design 
         Create a deliverables list of the design and specification 
         work, with milestones.  Define owners.  Generate the design 
         and document work for a KMP to be able to generate the 
         Routing Protocol's session keys for the packets on the wire. 
         These will be the arguments passed in the API to the KMP in 
         order to bootstrap the session keys for the Routing 
         There will also be a team formed to work on the base 
         framework mechanisms for each of the main categories. 

   5. Routing Protocols in Categories 

      This section groups the Routing Protocols into categories, 
      according to attributes set forth in Categories Section 
      (Section 2). Each group will have a design team tasked with 
      improving the security of the Routing Protocol mechanisms and 
      defining the KMP requirements for their group, then rolling 
      both into a roadmap document upon which they will execute. 
      BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP 
         These Routing Protocols fall into the category of the one-
         to-one peering messages, and will use peer keying protocols. 
         BGP [RFC4271], PCEP [RFC5440] and MSDP [RFC3618] messages 
         are transmitted over TCP, while LDP [RFC5036] uses both UDP 
         and TCP.  A team will work on one mechanism to cover these 
         TCP unicast protocols. Much of the work on the Routing 
         Protocol update for its existing authentication mechanism 
         has already occurred in the TCPM Working Group, on the TCP-
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         AO [RFC5925] document, as well as its cryptography-helper 
         document, TCP-AO-CRYPTO [RFC5926].  However, TCP-AO cannot 
         be used for discovery exchanges carried in LDP as those are 
         carried over UDP. A separate team might want to look at LDP. 
         Another exception is the mode where LDP is used directly on 
         the LAN.  The work for this may go into the Group keying 
         category (along with OSPF) as mentioned below. 
      OSPF, IS-IS, and RIP 
         The Routing Protocols that fall into the category Group 
         Keying *with one-to-many peering) includes OSPF [RFC2328], 
         IS-IS [RFC1195] and RIP [RFC2453].  Not surprisingly, all 
         these routing protocols have two other things in common.  
         First, they are run on a combination of the OSI datalink 
         layer 2, and the OSI network layer 3.  By this we mean that 
         they have a component of how the routing protocol works 
         which is specified in Layer 2 as well as in Layer 3.  
         Second, they are all internal gateway protocols(IGPs).  The 
         keying mechanisms will be much more complicated to define 
         for these than for a one-to-one messaging protocol. 
         Because it is less of a routing protocol, per se, and more 
         of a peer liveness detection mechanism, Bidirectional 
         Forwarding Detection (BFD) [RFC5880] will have its own team. 
         BFD is also different from the other protocols covered here 
         as it works on millisecond timers and would need separate 
         considerations to mitigate the potential for DoS attacks. It 
         also raises interesting issues [RFC6039] with respect to the 
         sequence number scheme that is generally deployed to protect 
         against replay attacks as this space can rollover quite 
         frequently because of the rate at which BFD packets are 
      RSVP and RSVP-TE  
         The Resource reSerVation Protocol [RFC2205] allows hop-by-
         hop authentication of RSVP neighbors, as specified in 
         [RFC2747]. In this mode, an integrity object is attached to 
         each RSVP message to transmit a keyed message digest.  This 
         message digest allows the recipient to verify the identity 
         of the RSVP node that sent the message, and to validate the 
         integrity of the message. Through the inclusion of a 
         sequence number in the scope of the digest, the digest also 
         offers replay protection.  

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         [RFC2747] does not dictate how the key for the integrity 
         operation is derived.  Currently, most implementations of 
         RSVP use a statically configured key, on a per interface or 
         per neighbor basis. 
         RSVP relies on a per peer authentication mechanism, where 
         each hop authenticates its neighbor using a shared key or a 
         Trust in this model is transitive.  Each RSVP node trusts 
         explicitly only its RSVP next hop peers, through the message 
         digest contained in the INTEGRITY object [RFC2747]. The next 
         hop RSVP speaker in turn trusts its own peers and so on.  
         See also the document "RSVP security properties" [RFC4230] 
         for more background. 
         The keys used for protecting the RSVP messages can be group 
         keys (for example distributed via GDOI [RFC3547], as 
         discussed in [I-D.weis-gdoi-mac-tek]). 
         The trust an RSVP node has to another RSVP node has an 
         explicit and an implicit component.  Explicitly the node 
         trusts the other node to maintain the integrity (and, 
         optionally confidentiality) of RSVP messages depending on 
         whether authentication or encryption (or both) are used.  
         This means that the message has not been altered or its 
         contents seen by another, non-trusted node.  Implicitly each 
         node trusts the other node to maintain the level of 
         protection specified within that security domain  Note that 
         in any group key management scheme, like GDOI, each node 
         trusts all the other members of the group with regard to 
         data origin authentication. 
         RSVP TE [RFC3209] [RFC3473] [RFC4726] [RFC5151] is an 
         extension of the RSVP protocol for traffic engineering. It 
         supports the reservation of resources across an IP network 
         and is used for establishing MPLS label switch paths (LSPs), 
         taking into consideration network constraint parameters such 
         as available bandwidth and explicit hops. RSVP-TE signaling 
         is used to establish both intra and inter-domain TE LSPs.  
         When signaling an inter-domain RSVP-TE LSP, operators may 
         make use of the security features already defined for RSVP-
         TE [RFC3209].  This may require some coordination between 
         domains to share keys ([RFC2747],[RFC3097]), and care is 
         required to ensure that the keys are changed sufficiently 
         frequently.  Note that this may involve additional 
         synchronization, should the domain border nodes be protected 

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         with Fast Reroute, since the merge point (MP) and point of 
         local repair (PLR) should also share the key. 
         For inter-domain signaling for MPLS-TE, the administrators 
         of neighboring domains must satisfy themselves as to the 
         existence of a suitable trust relationship between the 
         domains. In the absence of such a relationship, the 
         administrators should decide not to deploy inter-domain 
         signaling, and should disable RSVP-TE on any inter-domain 
         KARP will currently be working only on RSVP-TE as the native 
         RSVP lies outside the scope of the WG charter. 
      PIM-SM and PIM-DM 
          Finally, the multicast protocols PIM-SM [RFC4601] and PIM-DM 
         [RFC3973] will be grouped together. PIM-SM multicasts 
         routing information (Hello, Join/Prune, Assert) on a link-
         local basis, using a defined multicast address.  In 
         addition, it specifies unicast communication for exchange of 
         information (Register, Register-Stop) between the router 
         closest to a group sender and the "rendezvous point" (RP).  
         The RP is typically not "on-link" for a particular router.  
         While much work has been done on multicast security for 
         application-layer groups, little has been done to address 
         the problem of managing hundreds or thousands of small one-
         to-many groups with link-local scope.  Such an 
         authentication mechanism should be considered along with the 
         router-to-Rendezvous Point authentication mechanism.  The 
         most important issue is ensuring that only the "authorized 
         neighbors" get the keys for (S,G), so that rogue routers 
         cannot participate in the exchanges.  Another issue is that 
         some of the communication may occur intra-domain, e.g. the 
         link-local messages in an enterprise, while others for the 
         same (*,G) may occur inter-domain, e.g. the router-to-
         Rendezvous Point messages may be from one enterprise's 
         router to another.   
         One possible solution proposes a region-wide "master" key 
         server (possibly replicated), and one "local" key server per 
         speaking router. There is no issue with propagating the 
         messages outside the link, because link-local messages, by 
         definition, are not forwarded. This solution is offered only 
         as an example of how work may progress; further discussion 
         should occur in this work team. Specification of a link-
         local protection mechanism for PIM-SM is defined in 
         [RFC4601], and this mechanism has been updated in PIM-SM-
         LINKLOCAL [RFC5796].  However, the KMP part is completely 
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         unspecified, and will require work outside the expertise of 
         the PIM working group to accomplish, another example of why 
         this roadmap is being created. 

   6. Supporting Incremental Deployment 

      It is imperative that the new authentication and security 
      mechanisms defined support incremental deployment, as it is not 
      feasible to deploy a new routing protocol authentication 
      mechanism throughout the network instantaneously. One of the 
      goals of KARP WG is to add incremental security to existing 
      mechanisms rather than replacing them. Delivering better 
      deployable solutions to which vendors and operators can migrate 
      to is more important than getting a perfect security solution. 
      It may also not be possible to deploy such a mechanism to all 
      routers in a large AS at one time. This means that the 
      designers must work on this aspect of authentication mechanism 
      for the routing protocol that they are working on. The 
      mechanisms must provide backward compatibility in the message 
      formatting, transmission, and processing of routing information 
      carried through a mixed security environment. 

   7. Denial of Service Attacks 

      Denial of Service (DoS) attacks must be kept in mind when 
      designing KARP solutions. [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-reqs] 
      describes DoS attacks that are in scope for the KARP work. 
      Protocol designers should ensure that the new cryptographic 
      validation mechanisms must not provide an attacker with an 
      opportunity for DoS attacks. Cryptographic validation, while 
      typically cheaper than signing, is still an incremental cost. 
      If an attacker can force a system to validate many packets 
      multiple times then this could be a potential DoS attack 
      vector. On the other hand, if the authentication procedure is 
      itself quite CPU intensive, then overwhelming the CPU with 
      multiple bogus packets can bring down the system. In this case, 
      the authentication procedure itself aids the DoS attack. 

      There are some known techniques to reduce the cryptographic 
      computation load. Packets can include non cryptographic 
      consistency checks. For example, [RFC5082] provides a mechanism 
      that uses the IP header to limit the attackers that can inject 
      packets that will be subject to cryptographic validation. In 
      the design phase II, once an automated key management protocol 
      is developed, it may be possible to determine the peer IP 
      addresses that are valid participants. Only the packets from 
      the verified sources could be subject to cryptographic 
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      Protocol designers must ensure that device never needs to check 
      incoming protocol packets using multiple keys, as this can 
      overwhelm the CPU, leading to a DoS attack. KARP solutions 
      should indicate the checks that are appropriate prior to 
      performing cryptographic validation. KARP solutions should 
      indicate where information about valid neighbors can be used to 
      limit the scope of the attacks. 

      Particular care needs to be paid to design of automated key 
      management schemes. It is often desirable to force a party 
      attempting to authenticate to do work and to maintain state 
      until that work is done. That is, the initiator of the 
      authentication should maintain the cost of any state required 
      by the authentication for as long as possible. This also helps 
      when an attacker send an overwhelming load of keying protocol 
      initiations from bogus sources.  

      Another important class of attack is denial of service against 
      the routing protocol where an attacker can manipulate either 
      the routing protocol or cryptographic authentication mechanism 
      to disrupt routing adjacencies. 

      Without KARP solutions, many routing protocols are subject to 
      disruption simply by injecting an invalid packet or a packet 
      for the wrong state. Even with cryptographic validation, replay 
      attacks are often a vector where a previously valid packet can 
      be injected to create a denial of service.  KARP solutions 
      should prevent all cases where packet replays or other packet 
      injections by an outsider can disrupt routing sessions. 

      Some residual denial of service risk is always likely. If an 
      attacker can generate a large enough number of packets, the 
      routing protocol can get disrupted. Even if the routing 
      protocol is not disrupted, the loss rate on a link may rise to 
      a point where claiming that traffic can successfully be routed 
      across the link will be inaccurate. 

   8. Gap Analysis 

      The [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-reqs] document lists the generic 
      requirements for the security mechanisms that must exist for 
      the various routing protocols that come under the purview of 
      KARP. There will be different design teams working for each of 
      the categories of routing protocols defined. 

      To start, design teams must review the "Threats and 
      Requirements for Authentication of Routing Protocols" document 
      [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-reqs]. This document contains detailed 
      descriptions of the threat analysis for routing protocol 
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      authentication and integrity in general. Note that it will not 
      contain all the authentication-related threats for any one 
      routing protocol, or category of routing protocols. The design 
      team must conduct a protocol-specific threat analysis to 
      determine if threats beyond those in the [I-D.ietf-karp-
      threats-reqs] document arise in the context of the protocol 
      (group), and to describe those threats. 
      The [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-reqs] document also contains many 
      security requirements. Each routing protocol design team must 
      walk through each section of the requirements and determine one 
      by one how its protocol either does or does not relate to each 
      Examples include modern, strong cryptographic algorithms, with 
      at least one such algorithm listed as a MUST; algorithm 
      agility; secure use of simple PSKs; intra-connection replay 
      protection; inter-connection replay protection, etc. 
      When doing the gap analysis we must first identify the elements 
      of each routing protocol that we wish to protect. In case of 
      protocols riding on top of IP, we might want to protect the IP 
      header and the protocol headers, while for those that work on 
      top of TCP, it will be the TCP header and the protocol payload. 
      There is patently value in protecting the IP header and the TCP 
      header if the routing protocols rely on these headers for some 
      information (for example, identifying the neighbor which 
      originated the packet). 
      Then there will be a set of Cryptography requirements that we 
      might want to look at. For example, there must be at least on 
      set of cryptographic algorithms (MD5, SHA, etc.) or 
      constructions (HMAC, etc.) whose use is supported by all 
      implementations and can be safely assumed to be supported by 
      any implementation of the authentication option. The design 
      teams should look for this for the protocol that they are 
      working on. If such algorithms or constructions are not 
      available then some should be defined to support 
      interoperability by having a single default. 
      Design teams must ensure that the default cryptographic 
      algorithms and constructions supported by the routing protocols 
      are accepted by the community. This means that the protocols 
      must not rely on non-standard or ad-hoc hash functions, keyed-
      hash constructions, signature schemes, or other functions, and 
      must use published and standard schemes. 
      Care should also be taken to ensure that the routing protocol   
      authentication scheme has algorithm agility (i.e., it is 
      capable of supporting algorithms other than its defaults). 
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      Ideally, the authentication mechanism should not be affected by 
      packet loss and reordering. 
      Design teams should ensure that their protocols authentication 
      mechanism is able to accommodate rekeying. This is essential 
      since it is well known that keys must periodically be changed. 
      Also what the designers must ensure is that this rekeying event 
      should not affect the functioning of the routing protocol. For 
      example, OSPF rekeying requires coordination among the adjacent 
      routers, while IS-IS requires coordination among routers in the 
      entire domain. 

      If new authentication and security mechanisms are needed then 
      the design teams must design in such a manner that the routing 
      protocol authentication mechanism remains oblivious to how the 
      keying material is derived. This decouples the authentication 
      mechanism from the key management system that is employed.  

      Design teams should also note that many routing protocols 
      require prioritized treatment of certain protocol packets and 
      authentication mechanisms should honor this. 

      Not all routing protocol authentication mechanisms provide 
      support for replay attacks, and the design teams should 
      identify such authentication mechanisms and work on them so 
      that this can get fixed. The design teams must look at the 
      protocols that they are working on and see if packets captured 
      from the previous/stale sessions can be replayed.  

      What might also influence the design is the rate at which the 
      protocol packets are originated. In case of protocols like BFD, 
      where packets are originated at millisecond intervals, there 
      are some special considerations that must be kept in mind when 
      defining the new authentication and security mechanisms.  

      The designers should also consider whether the current 
      authentication mechanisms impose considerable processing 
      overhead on a router that's doing authentication. Most 
      currently deployed routers do not have hardware accelerators 
      for cryptographic processing and these operations can impose a 
      significant processing burden under some circumstances. The 
      proposed solutions should be evaluated carefully with regard to 
      the processing burden that they will impose, since deployment 
      may be impeded if network operators perceive that a solution 
      will impose a processing burden which either entails 
      substantial capital expenses or threatens to destabilize the 

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   9. Security Considerations 

      As mentioned in the Introduction, RFC4948 [RFC4948] identifies 
      additional steps needed to achieve the overall goal of 
      improving the security of the core routing infrastructure. 
      Those include validation of route origin announcements, path 
      validation, cleaning up the IRR databases for accuracy, and 
      operational security practices that prevent routers from 
      becoming compromised devices. The KARP work is but one step 
      needed to improve core routing infrastructure. 
      The security of cryptographic-based systems depends on both the 
      strength of the cryptographic algorithms chosen and the 
      strength of the keys used with those algorithms. The security 
      also depends on the engineering of the protocol used by the 
      system to ensure that there are no non-cryptographic ways to 
      bypass the security of the overall system. 
   9.1. Use Strong Keys 

      Care should be taken to ensure that the selected key is 
      unpredictable, avoiding any keys known to be weak for the 
      algorithm in use. [RFC4086] contains helpful information on 
      both key generation techniques and cryptographic randomness. 
      Care should also be taken when choosing the length of the key.  
      [RFC3766] provides some additional information on asymmetric 
      and symmetric key sizes and how they related to system 
      requirements for attack resistance. 
      In addition to using a key of appropriate length and 
      randomness, deployers of KARP protocols should use different 
      keys between different routing peers whenever operationally 
      possible. This is especially true when the Routing Protocol 
      takes a static Traffic Key as opposed to a Traffic Key derived 
      on a per-connection basis using a KDF. The burden for doing so 
      is understandably much higher than for using the same static 
      Traffic Key across all peering routers. Depending upon the 
      specific KMP it can be argued that generally using a KMP 
      network-wide increases peer-wise security. Consider an attacker 
      that learns or guesses the Traffic Key used by two peer-
      routers: if the Traffic key is only used between those two 
      routers, then the attacker has only compromised that one 
      connection not the entire network. 
      However, whenever using manual keys, it is best to design a 
      system where a given pre-shared key (PSK) will be used in a 
      KDF, mixed with connection-specific material, in order to 
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      generate session unique -- and therefore peer-wise -- Traffic 
      Keys. Doing so has the following advantages: the Traffic Keys 
      used in the per-message authentication mechanism are peer-wise 
      unique, it provides inter-connection replay protection, and, if 
      the per-message authentication mechanism covers some connection 
      counter, intra-connection replay protection. 
      Note that certain key derivation functions (e.g. 
      KDF_AES_128_CMAC, as used in TCP-AO [RFC5926], the pseudorandom 
      function (PRF) used in the KDF may require a key of a certain 
      fixed size as an input.  
      For example, AES_128_CMAC requires a 128 bit (16 byte) key as 
      the seed. However, for convenience to the administrators, a 
      specification may not want to require the entry of a PSK of 
      exactly 16 bytes. Instead, a specification may call for a key 
      prep routine that could handle a variable length PSK, one that 
      might be less or more than 16 bytes (see [RFC4615], section 3, 
      as an example). That key prep routine would derive a key of 
      exactly the required length and thus suitable as a seed to the 
      PRF. This does NOT mean that administrators are safe to use 
      weak keys. Administrators are encouraged to follow [RFC4086] 
      [NIST-800-118]. We simply attempted to "put a fence around 
      stupidity", as much as possible as its hard to imagine 
      administrators putting in a password that is, say 16 bytes in 
      A better option, from a security perspective, is to use some 
      representation of a device-specific asymmetric key pair as the 
      identity proof, as described in section "Unique versus Shared 
      Keys" section. 
   9.2. Internal vs. External Operation 

      Design teams must consider whether the protocol is an internal 
      routing protocol or an external one, i.e. does it primarily run 
      between peers within a single domain of control or between two 
      different domains of control?  Some protocols may be used in 
      both cases, internally and externally, and as such various 
      modes of authentication operation may be required for the same 
      protocol. While it is preferred that all routing exchanges run 
      with the best security mechanisms enabled in all deployment 
      contexts, this exhortation is greater for those protocols 
      running on inter-domain point-to-point links, and greatest for 
      those on shared access link layers with several different 
      domains interchanging together, because the volume of attackers 
      are greater from the outside.  Note however that the 
      consequences of internal attacks maybe no less severe -- in 
      fact they may be quite a bit more severe -- than an external 
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      attack.  An example of this internal versus external 
      consideration is BGP which has both EBGP and IBGP modes.  
      Another example is a multicast protocol where the neighbors are 
      sometimes within a domain of control and sometimes at an inter-
      domain exchange point.  In the case of PIM-SM running on an 
      internal multi-access link, it would be acceptable to give up 
      some security to get some convenience by using a group key 
      among the peers on the link.  On the other hand, in the case of 
      PIM-SM running over a multi-access link at a public exchange 
      point, operators may favor security over convenience by using 
      unique pair-wise keys for every peer.  Designers must consider 
      both modes of operation and ensure the authentication 
      mechanisms fit both. 
      Operators are encouraged to run cryptographic authentication on 
      all their adjacencies, but to work from the outside in, i.e.  
      EBGP links are a higher priority than the IBGP links because 
      they are externally facing, and, as a result, more likely to be 
      targeted in an attack. 
   9.3. Unique versus Shared Keys 

      This section discusses security considerations regarding when 
      it is appropriate to use the same authentication key inputs for 
      multiple peers and when it is not. This is largely a debate of 
      convenience versus security. It is often the case that the best 
      secured mechanism is also the least convenient mechanism. For 
      example, an air gap between a host and the network absolutely 
      prevents remote attacks on the host, but having to copy and 
      carry files using the "sneaker net" is quite inconvenient and 
      does not scale. 
      Operators have erred on the side of convenience when it comes 
      to securing routing protocols with cryptographic 
      authentication. Many do not use it at all. Some use it only on 
      external links, but not on internal links. Those that do use it 
      often use the same key for all peers in a network. It is common 
      to see the same key in use for years, e.g., the key was entered 
      when authentication mechanisms were originally configured, or 
      the routing gear was deployed. 
      One goal for designers is to create authentication and 
      integrity mechanisms that are easy for operators to deploy and 
      manage, and still use unique keys between peers (or small 
      groups on multi-access links), and for different sessions among 
      the same peers. Operators have the impression that they NEED 
      one key shared across the network, when in fact they do not. 
      What they need is the relative convenience they experience from 
      deploying cryptographic authentication with one key (or a few 
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      keys), compared to the inconvenience they would experience if 
      they deployed the same authentication mechanism using unique 
      pairwise keys. An example is BGP Route Reflectors. Here 
      operators often use the same authentication key between each 
      client and the route reflector. The roadmaps defined from this 
      guidance document should allow for unique keys to be used 
      between each client and the peer, without sacrificing much 
      convenience. Designers should strive to deliver peer-wise 
      unique keying mechanisms with similar ease-of-deployment 
      properties as today's one-key method. 
      Operators must understand the consequences of using the same 
      key across many peers. One argument against using the same key 
      is that if the same key that is used in multiple devices then a 
      compromise of any one of the devices will expose the key. Also 
      since the same key is supported on many devices this is known 
      by many people which affects its distribution to all of the 
      Consider also the attack consequence size, the amount of 
      routing adjacencies that can be negatively affected once a 
      breach has occurred, i.e., once the keys have been acquired by 
      the attacker. 
      Again, if a shared key is used across the internal domain, then 
      the consequence size is the whole network. Ideally, unique key 
      pairs would be used for each adjacency. 
      In some cases use of shared keys is needed because of the 
      problem space. For example, a multicast packet is sent once but 
      then consumed by several routing neighbors. If unique keys were 
      used per neighbor, the benefit of multicast would be erased 
      because sender would have to create a different announcement 
      packet for each receiver. Though this may be desired and 
      acceptable in some small number of use cases, it is not the 
      norm. Shared (i.e., group) keys are an acceptable solution 
      here, and much work has been done already in this area (see 
      MSEC working group). 
   9.4. Key Exchange Mechanism 

      This section discusses the security and use case considerations 
      for key exchange for routing protocols.   Two options exist: an 
      out-of-band mechanism or a KMP.  An out-of-band mechanism 
      involves operators configuring keys in the device through a 
      configuration tool or management method (e.g., SNMP, NETCONF). 
      A KMP is an automated protocol that exchanges key without 
      operator intervention.  KMPs can occur either in-band to the 

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      routing protocol or out-of-band to the routing protocol (i.e., 
      a different protocol). 
      An example of an out-of-band configuration mechanism could be 
      an administrator who makes a remote management connection (e.g. 
      using SSH) to a router and manually enters the keying 
      information, e.g., the algorithm, the key(s), the key 
      lifetimes, etc. Another example could be an OSS system that 
      inputs the same information using a script over an SSH 
      connection, or by pushing configuration through some other 
      management connection, standard (Netconf-based) or proprietary. 
      The drawbacks of an out-of-band configuration mechanism 
      include: lack of scaleability, complexity, and speed of 
      changing if a security breach is suspected. For example, if an 
      employee who had access to keys was terminated, or if a machine 
      holding those keys was believed to be compromised, then the 
      system would be considered insecure and vulnerable until new 
      keys were generated and distributed. Those keys then need to be 
      placed into the OSS system, and the OSS system then needs to 
      push the new keys -- often during a very limited change window 
      -- into the relevant devices. If there are multiple 
      organizations involved in these connections, because the 
      protected connections are inter-domain, this process is very 
      The principle benefit of out-of-band configuration mechanism is 
      that once the new keys/parameters are set in OSS system, they 
      can be pushed automatically to all devices within the OSS's 
      domain. Operators have mechanisms in place for this already for 
      managing other router configuration data. In small environments 
      with few routers, a manual system is not difficult to employ. 
      We further define a peer-to-peer KMP as using cryptographically 
      protected identity verification, session key negotiation, and 
      security association parameter negotiation between the two 
      routing peers. The KMP among peers may also include the 
      negotiation of parameters, like cryptographic algorithms, 
      cryptographic inputs (e.g. initialization vectors), key life-
      times, etc.  
      There are several benefits of a peer-to-peer KMP versus 
      centrally managed and distributing keys. It results in key(s) 
      that are privately generated, and need not be recorded 
      permanently anywhere. Since the traffic keys used in a 
      particular connection are not a fixed part of a device 
      configuration no security sensitive data exists anywhere else 
      in the operator's systems which can be stolen, e.g. in the case 
      of a terminated or turned employee. If a server or other data 
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      store is stolen or compromised, the thieves gain limited or no 
      access to current traffic keys. They may gain access to key 
      derivation material, like a PSK, but may not be able to access 
      the current traffic keys in use. In this example, these PSKs 
      can be updated in the device configurations (either manually or 
      through an OSS) without bouncing or impacting the existing 
      session at all. In the case of using raw asymmetric keys or 
      certificates, instead of PSKs, the data theft (from the data 
      store) would likely not result in any compromise, as the key 
      pairs would have been generated on the routers, and never leave 
      those routers. In such a case no changes are needed on the 
      routers; the connections will continue to be secure, 
      uncompromised. Additionally, with a KMP regular rekey 
      operations occur without any operator involvement or oversight. 
      This keeps keys fresh. 
      There are a few drawbacks to using a KMP. First, a KMP requires 
      more cryptographic processing for the router at the beginning 
      of a connection. This will add some minor start-up time to 
      connection establishment versus a purely manual key management 
      approach. Once a connection with traffic keys has been 
      established via a KMP, the performance is the same in the KMP 
      and the out-of-band configuration case. KMPs also add another 
      layer of protocol and configuration complexity which can fail 
      or be misconfigured. This was more of an issue when these KMPs 
      were first deployed, but less so as these implementations and 
      operational experience with them has matured. 
      One of the goals for KARP is to develop a KMP; an out-of-band 
      configuration protocol for key exchange is out of scope. 
      Within this constraint there are two approaches for a KMP: 
      The first, is to use a KMP that runs independent of the routing 
      and the signaling protocols. It would run on its own port and 
      use its own transport (to avoid interfering with the routing 
      protocol that it is serving). When a routing protocol needs a 
      key, it would contact the local instance of this key management 
      protocol and request a key. The KMP generates a key that is 
      delivered to the routing protocol for it to use for 
      authenticating and integrity verification of the routing 
      protocol packets. This KMP could either be an existing key 
      management protocol like ISAKMP/IKE, GKMP, etc., extended for 
      the routing protocols, or it could be a new KMP, designed for 
      the routing protocol context. 
      The second approach is to define an In-band KMP extension for 
      existing routing protocols putting the key management 
      mechanisms inside the protocol itself. In this case, the key 
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      management messages would be carried within the routing 
      protocol packets, resulting in very tight coupling between the 
      routing protocols and the key management protocol. 
   10. Acknowledgments 

      Much of the text for this document came originally from draft-
      lebovitz-karp-roadmap, authored by Gregory M. Lebovitz.  
      We would like to thank Sam Hartman, Eric Rescorla, Russ White, 
      Sean Turner, Stephen Kent, Stephen Farrell, Adrian Farrel, Russ 
      Housley, Michael Barnes and Vishwas Manral for their comments 
      on the draft. 
   11. IANA Considerations 

      This document places no requests to IANA. 
   12. References 

   12.1. Normative References 

      [RFC2119] Bradner, S.,"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 
                Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 

      [RFC4948] Andersson, L., et. al, "Report from the IAB workshop 
                on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006", RFC 4948, 
                August 2007. 

   12.2. Informative References 

      [RFC1195] Callon, R. , "Use of OSI IS-IS for Routing in TCP/IP 
                and Dual Environments", RFC 1195, December 1990. 

      [RFC2205] Braden, R., et. al, "Resource ReSerVation Protocol 
                (RSVP) Version 1 Functional Specification", RFC 2205, 
                September 1197. 

      [RFC2328] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", RFC 2328, April 1998. 

      [RFC2453] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2", RFC 2453, November 1998. 

      [RFC2747] Baker, F., Lindell, B., and M. Talwar, "RSVP 
                Cryptographic Authentication", RFC 2747, January 

      [RFC3097] Braden, R, and Zhang, L., "RSVP Cryptographic 
                Authentication -- Updated Message Type Value", RFC 
                3097, April 2001 
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   Internet-Draft          KARP Design Guidelines         December 2011 

      [RFC3209] Awduche, D., Berger, L., Gan, D., Li, T., Srinivasan, 
                V., and G. Swallow, "RSVP-TE: Extensions to RSVP for 
                LSP Tunnels", RFC 3209, December 2001. 

      [RFC3473] Berger, L., "Generalized Multi-Protocol Label 
                Switching (GMPLS) Signaling Resource ReserVation 
                Protocol-Traffic Engineering (RSVP-TE) Extensions", 
                RFC 3473, January 2003. 

      [RFC3547] Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, 
                "The Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 

      [RFC3618] Fenner, B. and D. Meyer, "Multicast Source Discovery 
                Protocol (MSDP)", RFC 3618, October 2003.  

      [RFC3766] Orman, H. and Hoffman, P., "Determining Strengths For 
                Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", RFC 
                3766, April 2004.  

      [RFC3973] Adams, A., Nicholas, J., and W. Siadak, "Protocol 
                Independent Multicast - Dense Mode (PIM-DM): Protocol 
                Specification (Revised)", RFC 3973, January 2005.  

      [RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, 
                Randomness      Requirements for Security", BCP 106, 
                RFC 4086, June 2005. 

      [RFC4107] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for 
                Cryptographic Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, 
                June 2005. 

      [RFC4230] Tschofenig, H. and R. Graveman, "RSVP Security 
                Properties", RFC 4230, December 2005. 

      [RFC4252] Ylonen, T., et. al, "The Secure Shell (SSH) 
                Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006. 

      [RFC4253] Ylonen, T., et. al, "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport 
                Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, January 2006 

      [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T. and Hares, S.,"A Border Gateway 
                Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. 

      [RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., "Elliptical Curve Cryptography 
                (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security 
                (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006 

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   Internet-Draft          KARP Design Guidelines         December 2011 

      [RFC4601] Fenner, B., Handley, M., Holbrook, H., and I. 
                Kouvelas,"Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse 
                Mode (PIM-SM): Protocol Specification (Revised)", RFC 
                4601, August 2006. 

      [RFC4615] Song, J., Poovendran, R., Lee, J., and T. Iwata, "The      
                Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based Message 
                Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128 (AES-
                CMAC-PRF-128) Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange 
                Protocol (IKE)", RFC 4615, August 2006. 

      [RFC4726] Farrel, A., et. al.,"A Framework for Inter-Domain 
                Multiprotocol Label Switching Traffic Engineering", 
                RFC 4726, November 2006. 

      [RFC5036] Andersson, L., Minei, I., and B. Thomas, "LDP 
                Specification", RFC 5036, October 2007. 

      [RFC5082] Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P. and 
                Pignataro, C.,"The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism 
                (GTSM)" , RFC 5082, October 2007 

      [RFC5151] Farrel, A., et. al.,"Inter-Domain MPLS and GMPLS 
                Traffic Engineering -- Resource Reservation Protocol-
                Traffic Engineering (RSVP-TE) Extensions", RFC 5151, 
                February 2008. 

      [RFC5280] Cooper, D., et. al.,"Internet X.509 Public Key 
                Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation 
                List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008 

      [RFC5440] Vasseur, J.P. and Le Roux, J.L., "Path Computation 
                Element (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP)", RFC 
                5440, March 2009 

      [RFC5796] Atwood, W., Islam, S., and M. Siami, "Authentication 
                and Confidentiality in PIM-SM Link-local Messages", 
                RFC 5796, March 2010. 

      [RFC5880] Katz, D. and Ward, D., "Bidirectional Forwarding 
                Detection", RFC 5880, June 2010. 

      [RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP 
                Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.  

      [RFC5926] Lebovitz, G., "Cryptographic Algorithms, Use and 
                Implementation Requirements for TCP Authentication 
                Option", RFC 5926, June 2010. 

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   Internet-Draft          KARP Design Guidelines         December 2011 

      [RFC6039] Manral, V., Bhatia, M., Jaeggli, J. and White, 
                R.,"Issues with Existing Cryptographic Protection 
                Methods for Routing Protocols", RFC 6039, October 

      [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-reqs] Lebovitz, G., "KARP Threats and 
                Requirements", Work in Progress, October 2010. 

       [I-D.ietf-karp-crypto-key-table] Housley, R. and Polk, T., 
                "Database of Long-Lived Symmetric Cryptographic Keys" 
                , Work in Progress, May 2011 

      [I-D.weis-gdoi-mac-tek] Weis, B. and S. Rowles, "GDOI Generic 
                Message Authentication Code Policy", Work in 
                Progress, June 2010. 

      [IRR] Merit Network Inc , "Internet Routing Registry Routing 
                Assets Database", 2006, 

      [NIST-800-57] US National Institute of Standards & Technology,          
                "Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General 
                (Revised)", March 2007 


      [NIST-800-118] US National Institute of Standards & Technology,          
                "Guide to Enterprise Password Management (Draft)", 
                April 2009 


      Author's Addresses 

                           Expires June 16, 2012             [Page 30] 

   Internet-Draft          KARP Design Guidelines         December 2011 

      Gregory M. Lebovitz 
      USA 95003 
      Manav Bhatia 


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