X.509 Extended Key Usage (EKU) for configuration, updates and safety-communication
draft-ietf-lamps-automation-keyusages-08
The information below is for an old version of the document that is already published as an RFC.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 9809.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Hendrik Brockhaus , Dr. David Goltzsche | ||
| Last updated | 2025-07-11 (Latest revision 2025-04-09) | ||
| Replaces | draft-brockhaus-lamps-automation-keyusages | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Russ Housley | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2025-01-14 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 9809 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Deb Cooley | ||
| Send notices to | housley@vigilsec.com | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
| IANA action state | RFC-Ed-Ack | ||
| IANA expert review state | Expert Reviews OK |
draft-ietf-lamps-automation-keyusages-08
LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft Siemens
Intended status: Standards Track D. Goltzsche
Expires: 11 October 2025 Siemens Mobility
9 April 2025
X.509 Extended Key Usage (EKU) for configuration, updates and safety-
communication
draft-ietf-lamps-automation-keyusages-08
Abstract
RFC 5280 defines the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension and several
extended key purposes (KeyPurposeIds) for use with that extension in
X.509 certificates. This document defines KeyPurposeIds for general-
purpose and trust anchor configuration files, for software and
firmware update packages, and for safety-critical communication to be
included in the EKU extension of X.509 v3 public key certificates.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 October 2025.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Extended Key Purpose for configuration files, update packages
and safety-communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Including the Extended Key Purpose in Certificates . . . . . 5
5. Implications for a Certification Authority . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix B. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix C. History of Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
Key purposes (KeyPurposeIds) added to the certificate's extended key
usage extension as defined in [RFC5280] are meant to express intent
as to the purpose of the named usage, for humans and for complying
libraries. A full list of KeyPurposeIds is maintained in the IANA
registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose"
[SMI-PKIX-PURPOSE]. The use of the anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId,
as defined in Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280], is generally considered
a poor practice.
This document defines KeyPurposeIds for certificates that are used
for the following purposes, among others:
* Validating signatures of general-purpose software configuration
files.
* Validating signatures of trust anchor configuration files.
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* Validating signatures of software and firmware update packages.
* Authenticating communication endpoints authorized for safety-
critical communication.
If the purpose of an issued certificate is not restricted, i.e., the
type of operations for which a public key contained in the
certificate can be used in unintended ways, the risk of cross-
application attacks is increased. Failure to ensure adequate
segregation of duties means that an application or system that
generates the public/private keys and applies for a certificate to
the operator Certification Authority (CA) could obtain a certificate
that can be misused for tasks that this application or system is not
entitled to perform. For example, management of trust anchors is a
particularly critical task. A device could potentially accept a
trust anchor configuration file signed by a service that uses a
certificate with no Extended Key Usage (EKU) or with the KeyPurposeId
id-kp-codeSigning (Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280]) or id-kp-
documentSigning [RFC9336]. A device should only accept trust anchor
configuration files if the file is verified with a certificate that
has been explicitly issued for this purpose.
The KeyPurposeId id-kp-serverAuth (Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280]) can
be used to identify that the certificate is for a TLS WWW server, and
the KeyPurposeId id-kp-clientAuth (Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280]) can
be used to identify that the certificate is for a TLS WWW client.
However, there are currently no KeyPurposeIds for usage with X.509
certificates for safety-critical communication.
This document addresses the above problems by defining keyPurposeIds
for the EKU extension of X.509 public key certificates. These
certificates are either used for signing files (general-purpose
configuration and trust anchor configuration files, software and
firmware update packages) or are used for safety-critical
communication.
Vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds used within a PKI governed by vendors
typically do not pose interoperability concerns, as non-critical
extensions can be safely ignored if unrecognized. However, using
KeyPurposeIds outside of their intended vendor-controlled environment
or in ExtendedKeyUsage extensions that have been marked critical can
lead to interoperability issues. Therefore, it is advisable not to
rely on vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds. Instead, this specification
defines standard KeyPurposeIds to ensure interoperability across
various vendors and industries.
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The definitions of theses KeyPurposeIds are intentionally broad to
allow their use in different deployments even though they were
initially motivated by industrial automation and rail automation, see
Appendix B. The details for each deployment needs to be described in
the relevant technical standards and certificate policies.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses terms defined in [RFC5280]. X.509 certificate
extensions are defined using ASN.1 [X.680] and [X.690].
The term 'safety-critical communication' refers to communication that
could, under certain conditions, lead to a state in which human life,
health, property, or the environment is endangered. For the
definition of 'safety' see [NIST_Glossary] and [ISO.IEC.IEEE_12207].
3. Extended Key Purpose for configuration files, update packages and
safety-communication
This specification defines the KeyPurposeIds id-kp-configSigning, id-
kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning, id-kp-updatePackageSigning, and id-kp-
safetyCommunication. These KeyPurposeIds are used, respectively,
for: signing general-purpose configuration files or trust anchor
configuration files, signing software or firmware update packages, or
authenticating communication peers for safety-critical communication.
As described in Section 4.2.1.12 of [RFC5280], "[i]f the [extended
key usage] extension is present, then the certificate MUST only be
used for one of the purposes indicated" and "[i]f multiple [key]
purposes are indicated the application need not recognize all
purposes indicated, as long as the intended purpose is present".
None of the KeyPurposeIds specified in this document are
intrinsically mutually exclusive. Instead, the acceptable
combinations of those KeyPurposeIds with others specified in this
document and with other KeyPurposeIds specified elsewhere are left to
the technical standards of the respective application and the
certificate policy of the respective PKI. For example, a technical
standard may specify: 'Different keys and certificates must be used
for safety communication and for trust anchor updates, and a relying
party must ignore the KeyPurposeId id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning if
id-kp-safetyCommunication is one of the specified key purposes in a
certificate.' The certificate policy for example may specify: 'The
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id-kp-safetyCommunication KeyPuposeId should not be included in an
issued certificate together with the KeyPurposeId id-kp-
trustAnchorConfigSigning.' Technical standards and certificate
policies of different applications may specify other rules. Further
considerations on prohibiting combinations of KeyPurposeIds is
described in Section 6.
Systems or applications that verify the signature of a general-
purpose configuration file or trust anchor configuration file, the
signature of a software or firmware update package, or the
authentication of a communication peer for safety-critical
communication SHOULD require that corresponding KeyPurposeIds be
specified by the EKU extension. If the certificate requester knows
the certificate users are mandated to use these KeyPurposeIds, it
MUST enforce their inclusion. Additionally, such a certificate
requester MUST ensure that the KeyUsage extension be set to
digitalSignature for signature verification, to keyEncipherment for
public key encryption, and keyAgreement for key agreement.
4. Including the Extended Key Purpose in Certificates
[RFC5280] specifies the EKU X.509 certificate extension for use on
end entity certificates. The extension indicates one or more
purposes for which the certified public key is valid. The EKU
extension can be used in conjunction with the Key Usage (KU)
extension, which indicates the set of basic cryptographic operations
for which the certified key may be used. The EKU extension syntax is
repeated here for convenience:
ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
As described in [RFC5280], the EKU extension may, at the option of
the certificate issuer, be either critical or non-critical. The
inclusion of KeyPurposeIds id-kp-configSigning, id-kp-
trustAnchorConfigSigning, id-kp-updatePackageSigning, and id-kp-
safetyCommunication in a certificate indicates that the public key
encoded in the certificate has been certified for the following
usages:
* id-kp-configSigning
A public key contained in a certificate containing the
KeyPurposeId id-kp-configSigning may be used for verifying
signatures of general-purpose configuration files of various
formats (e.g., XML, YAML, or JSON). Configuration files are used
to configure hardware or software.
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* id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning
A public key contained in a certificate containing the
KeyPurposeId id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning may be used for
verifying signatures of trust anchor configuration files of
various formats (e.g., XML, YAML, or JSON). Trust anchor
configuration files are used to add or remove trust anchors to the
trust store of a device.
* id-kp-updatePackageSigning
A public key contained in a certificate containing the
KeyPurposeId id-kp-updatePackageSigning may be used for verifying
signatures of software or firmware update packages. Update
packages are used to install software (including bootloader,
firmware, safety-related applications, and others) on systems.
* id-kp-safetyCommunication
A public key contained in a certificate containing the
KeyPurposeId id-kp-safetyCommunication may be used to authenticate
a communication peer for safety-critical communication based on
TLS or other protocols.
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 3 }
id-kp-configSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 41 }
id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 42 }
id-kp-updatePackageSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 43 }
id-kp-safetyCommunication OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 44 }
5. Implications for a Certification Authority
The procedures and practices employed by a certification authority
must ensure that the correct values for the EKU extension as well as
the KU extension are inserted in each certificate that is issued.
The inclusion of the id-kp-configSigning, id-kp-
trustAnchorConfigSigning, id-kp-updatePackageSigning, and id-kp-
safetyCommunication KeyPurposeIds does not preclude the inclusion of
other KeyPurposeIds.
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6. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] are applicable to this
document. These extended key usage key purposes do not introduce new
security risks but instead reduce existing security risks by
providing the means to identify if a certificate is generated to
verify the signature of a general-purpose or trust anchor
configuration file, the signature of a software or firmware update
package, or the authentication of a communication peer for safety-
critical communication.
To reduce the risk of specific cross-protocol attacks, the relying
party may additionally prohibit use of specific combinations of
KeyPurposeIds. The procedure for allowing or disallowing
combinations of KeyPurposeIds using excluded KeyPurposeId and
permitted KeyPurposeId, as carried out by a relying party, is defined
in Section 4 of [RFC9336]. The technical standards and certificate
policies of the application should explicitly enumerate requirements
for excluded or permitted KeyPurposeIds or their combinations. It is
out of scope of this document to enumerate those, but an example of
excluded KeyPurposeIds can be the presence of the anyExtendedKeyUsage
KeyPurposeId. Examples of allowed KeyPurposeIds combinations can be
the presence of id-kp-safetyCommunication together with id-kp-
clientAuth or id-kp-serverAuth.
7. Privacy Considerations
In some protocols, e.g., TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], certificates are
exchanged in the clear. In other protocols, e.g., TLS 1.3 [RFC8446],
the certificates are encrypted. The inclusion of the EKU extension
can help an observer determine the purpose of the certificate. In
addition, if the certificate is issued by a public certification
authority, the inclusion of an EKU extension can help an attacker to
monitor the Certificate Transparency logs [RFC9162] to identify the
purpose of the certificate which may reveal private information of
the certificate subject.
8. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to register the following ASN.1 [X.680] module OID
in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry
[SMI-PKIX-MOD]. This OID is defined in Appendix A.
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+=========+=============================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=============================+============+
| TBD1 | id-mod-config-update-sc-eku | This-RFC |
+---------+-----------------------------+------------+
Table 1
IANA is also requested to register the following OIDs in the "SMI
Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" registry [SMI-PKIX-PURPOSE].
These OIDs are defined in Section 4.
+=========+================================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+================================+============+
| 41 | id-kp-configSigning | This-RFC |
+---------+--------------------------------+------------+
| 42 | id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning | This-RFC |
+---------+--------------------------------+------------+
| 43 | id-kp-updatePackageSigning | This-RFC |
+---------+--------------------------------+------------+
| 44 | id-kp-safetyCommunication | This-RFC |
+---------+--------------------------------+------------+
Table 2
9. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the authors of [RFC9336] and [RFC9509] for
their excellent template.
We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
feedback.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[X.680] ITU-T, "Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
Recommendation X.680 , February 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC.X.680>.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690 , February 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC.X.690>.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9162>.
[RFC9336] Ito, T., Okubo, T., and S. Turner, "X.509 Certificate
General-Purpose Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Document
Signing", RFC 9336, DOI 10.17487/RFC9336, December 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9336>.
[RFC9509] Reddy.K, T., Ekman, J., and D. Migault, "X.509 Certificate
Extended Key Usage (EKU) for 5G Network Functions",
RFC 9509, DOI 10.17487/RFC9509, March 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9509>.
[Directive-2016_797]
European Parliament, Council of the European Union,
"Directive 2016/797 - Interoperability of the rail system
within the EU", May 2020,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/797/2020-05-28>.
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[ERJU] Europe's Rail Joint Undertaking, "Shared Cybersecurity
Services Specification - SP-SEC-ServSpec - V1.0", February
2025, <https://rail-research.europa.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2025/03/ERJU-SP-Cybersecurity-
Specifications-V1.0.zip>.
[ERJU-web] Europe's Rail Joint Undertaking, "Europe’s Rail Joint
Undertaking - System Pillar",
<https://rail-research.europa.eu/system_pillar/>.
[EU-CRA] European Commission, "Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUCIL on horizontal
cybersecurity requirements for products with digital
elements and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020",
September 2022, <https://digital-
strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cyber-resilience-act>.
[EU-STRATEGY]
European Commission, "The EU's Cybersecurity Strategy for
the Digital Decade", December 2020, <https://digital-
strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/eus-cybersecurity-
strategy-digital-decade-0>.
[NIST_Glossary]
NIST CSRC, "Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European
Parliament and of the Council", n.d.,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/safety>.
[ISO.IEC.IEEE_12207]
ISO/IEC/IEEE, "Systems and software engineering – Software
life cycle processes", December 2024,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/63712.html>.
[NIS2] European Commission, "Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the
European Parliament and of the Council", December 2024,
<https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/
nis2-directive>.
[IEC.62443-4-2]
IEC, "Security for industrial automation and control
systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for
IACS components", IEC 62443-4-2:2019 , February 2019,
<https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421>.
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[IEC.62443-3-3]
IEC, "Industrial communication networks - Network and
system security - Part 3-3: System security requirements
and security levels", IEC 62443-3-3:2013 , August 2013,
<https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/7033>.
[CE-marking]
European Commission, "CE marking", n.d., <https://single-
market-economy.ec.europa.eu/single-market/ce-marking_en>.
[SMI-PKIX-PURPOSE]
IANA, "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-
numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3>.
[SMI-PKIX-MOD]
IANA, "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-
numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
The following module adheres to ASN.1 specifications [X.680] and
[X.690].
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<CODE BEGINS>
Automation-EKU
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-config-update-sc-eku (TBD1) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- OID Arc
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
-- Extended Key Usage Values
id-kp-configSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 41 }
id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 42 }
id-kp-updatePackageSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 43 }
id-kp-safetyCommunication OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 44 }
END
<CODE ENDS>
Appendix B. Use Cases
These use cases are only for informational purposes.
Automation hardware and software products strive to become more safe
and secure by fulfilling mandatory, generic system requirements
related to cyber security, e.g., driven by federal offices like the
European Union Cyber Resilience Act [EU-CRA] governed by the European
Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy. Automation products connected to the
Internet would bear the so-called CE marking [CE-marking] to indicate
they comply. Such regulation was announced in the 2020 EU
Cybersecurity Strategy [EU-STRATEGY], and complements other
legislation in this area, like the NIS2 Framework, Directive on
measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union
[NIS2].
2020 EU Cybersecurity Strategy [EU-STRATEGY] suggests to implement
and extend international standards such as the Security for
industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical
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security requirements for IACS components [IEC.62443-4-2] (IACS
refers to industrial automation and control system) and the
Industrial communication networks - Network and system security -
Part 3-3: System security requirements and security levels
[IEC.62443-3-3]. Automation hardware and software products of
diverse vendors that are connected on automation networks and the
Internet can be used to build common automation solutions.
Standardized attributes would allow transparency of security
properties and interoperability for vendors in context of software
and firmware updates, general-purpose configuration, trust anchor
configuration, and safety communication.
A concrete example for automation is a Rail Automation system. The
Europe's Rail web page [ERJU-web] states: "The System Pillar [ERJU]
brings rail sector representatives under a single coordination body.
To achieve this, the System Pillar will deliver a unified operational
concept and a functional, safe and secure system architecture, with
due consideration of cyber-security aspects, focused on the European
railway network to which Directive 2016/797 [Directive-2016_797]
applies (i.e. the heavy rail network) as well as associated
specifications and/or standards."
Appendix C. History of Changes
[RFC Editor: Please remove this appendix in the release version of
the document.]
Changes from 07 -> 08:
* Updated Appendix B
Changes from 06 -> 07:
* Moved Section 1.1 to the Appendix
* Addressed DISCUSS items from Mohamed Boucadair and Paul Wouters
* Addressed AD review comments from Paul Wouters and Orie Steele
* Fixed some minor issues
* Updated reference of EU Rail specification to V1.0
Changes from 05 -> 06:
* Addressed AD review comments from Mike Bishop, Gorry Fairhurst,
Andy Newton, Mohamed Boucadair, Erik Kline, and Eric Vyncke
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Changes from 04 -> 05:
* Addressed SECDIR review comments from Carl Wallace
Changes from 03 -> 04:
* Addressed Deb's AD review comments (see "AD Comments on draft-
ietf-lamps-automation-keyusages")
* Added early allocated OIDs
Changes from 02 -> 03:
* Rename id-kp-trustanchorSigning to id-kp-trustAnchorConfigSigning
* Rename id-kp-updateSigning to id-kp-updatePackageSigning
* Fixed some nits
Changes from 01 -> 02:
* Updates Sections 3 and 6 addressing last call comments (see "WG
Last Call for draft-ietf-lamps-automation-keyusages-01")
Changes from 01 -> 02:
* Implemented the changes requested during WGLC
Changes from 00 -> 01:
* Fixed some minor nids and wording issues
draft-ietf-lamps-automation-keyusages version 00:
* Updated document and filename after WG adoption
Changes from 00 -> 01:
* Updated last paragraph of Section 1 addressing WG adoption
comments by Rich and Russ
* Updated name and OID of ASN.1 module
draft-brockhaus-lamps-automation-keyusages version 00:
* Broadened the scope to general automation use case and use ERJU as
an example.
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* Fixed some nits reported.
draft-brockhaus-lamps-eu-rail-keyusages version 00:
* Initial version of the document following best practices from RFC
9336 and RFC 9509
Contributors
Szofia Fazekas-Zisch
Siemens AG
Breslauer Str. 5
90766 Fuerth
Germany
Email: szofia.fazekas-zisch@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com
Baptiste Fouques
Alstom
Email: baptiste.fouques@alstomgroup.com
Daniel Gutierrez Orta
CAF Signalling
Email: daniel.gutierrez@cafsignalling.com
Martin Weller
Hitachi Rail
Email: martin.weller@urbanandmainlines.com
Nicolas Poyet
SNCF
Email: nicolas.poyet@sncf.fr
Authors' Addresses
Hendrik Brockhaus
Siemens
Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1
80333 Munich
Germany
Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com
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David Goltzsche
Siemens Mobility
Ackerstrasse 22
38126 Braunschweig
Germany
Email: david.goltzsche@siemens.com
URI: https://www.mobility.siemens.com
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