Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Algorithm Identifiers for HSS and XMSS
draft-ietf-lamps-x509-shbs-02
The information below is for an old version of the document.
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| Authors | Kaveh Bashiri , Scott Fluhrer , Stefan-Lukas Gazdag , Daniel Van Geest , Stavros Kousidis | ||
| Last updated | 2024-07-04 (Latest revision 2024-06-04) | ||
| Replaces | draft-gazdag-x509-shbs | ||
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draft-ietf-lamps-x509-shbs-02
LAMPS - Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME K. Bashiri
Internet-Draft BSI
Intended status: Standards Track S. Fluhrer
Expires: 5 January 2025 Cisco Systems
S. Gazdag
genua GmbH
D. Van Geest
CryptoNext Security
S. Kousidis
BSI
4 July 2024
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Algorithm Identifiers for HSS
and XMSS
draft-ietf-lamps-x509-shbs-02
Abstract
This document specifies algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding
formats for the Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes (S-HBS)
Hierarchical Signature System (HSS), eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme
(XMSS), and XMSS^MT, a multi-tree variant of XMSS. This
specification applies to the Internet X.509 Public Key infrastructure
(PKI) when those digital signatures are used in Internet X.509
certificates and certificate revocation lists.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-x509-shbs/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the LAMPS Working Group
mailing list (mailto:spasm@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm/. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/x509-hbs/draft-x509-shbs.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 January 2025.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Use Cases of S-HBS in X.509 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. HSS Algorithm Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. XMSS Algorithm Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. XMSS^MT Algorithm Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Public Key Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. HSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. XMSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.3. XMSS^MT Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Key Usage Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. HSS Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. XMSS Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.3. XMSS^MT Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11. Backup and Restore Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. HSS X.509 v3 Certificate Example . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. XMSS X.509 v3 Certificate Example . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix C. XMSS^MT X.509 v3 Certificate Example . . . . . . . . 18
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes (S-HBS) such as HSS, XMSS and
XMSS^MT combine Merkle trees with One Time Signatures (OTS) in order
to provide digital signature schemes that remain secure even when
quantum computers become available. Their theoretic security is well
understood and depends only on the security of the underlying hash
function. As such they can serve as an important building block for
quantum computer resistant information and communication technology.
The private key of S-HBS is a finite collection of OTS keys, hence
only a limited number of messages can be signed and the private key's
state must be updated and persisted after signing to prevent reuse of
OTS keys. While the right selection of algorithm parameters would
allow a private key to sign a virtually unbounded number of messages
(e.g. 2^60), this is at the cost of a larger signature size and
longer signing time. Due to the statefulness of the private key and
the limited number of signatures that can be created, S-HBS might not
be appropriate for use in interactive protocols. However, in some
use cases the deployment of S-HBS may be appropriate. Such use cases
are described and discussed later in Section 3.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Use Cases of S-HBS in X.509
As many cryptographic algorithms that are considered to be quantum-
resistant, S-HBS have several pros and cons regarding their practical
usage. On the positive side they are considered to be secure against
a classical as well as a quantum adversary, and a secure
instantiation of S-HBS may always be built as long as a
cryptographically secure hash function exists. Moreover, S-HBS offer
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small public key sizes, and, in comparison to other post-quantum
signature schemes, the S-HBS can offer relatively small signature
sizes (for certain parameter sets). While key generation and
signature generation may take longer than classical alternatives,
fast and minimal verification routines can be built. The major
negative aspect is the statefulness. Private keys always have to be
handled in a secure manner, S-HBS necessitate a special treatment of
the private key in order to avoid security incidents like signature
forgery [MCGREW], [SP800208]. Therefore, for S-HBS, a secure
environment MUST be used for key generation and key management.
Note that, in general, root CAs offer such a secure environment and
the number of issued signatures (including signed certificates and
CRLs) is often moderate due to the fact that many root CAs delegate
OCSP services or the signing of end-entity certificates to other
entities (such as subordinate CAs) that use stateless signature
schemes. Therefore, many root CAs should be able to handle the
required state management, and S-HBS offer a viable solution.
As the above reasoning for root CAs usually does not apply for
subordinate CAs, it is NOT RECOMMENDED for subordinate CAs to use
S-HBS for issuing end-entity certificates. Moreover, S-HBS MUST NOT
be used for end-entity certificates.
However, S-HBS MAY be used for code signing certificates, since they
are suitable and recommended in such non-interactive contexts. For
example, see the recommendations for software and firmware signing in
[CNSA2.0]. Some manufactures use common and well-established key
formats like X.509 for their code signing and update mechanisms.
Also there are multi-party IoT ecosystems where publicly trusted code
signing certificates are useful.
4. Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters
In this document, we define new OIDs for identifying the different
stateful hash-based signature algorithms. An additional OID is
defined in [I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-rfc8708bis] and repeated here for
convenience. For all of the OIDs, the parameters MUST be absent.
4.1. HSS Algorithm Identifier
The object identifier and public key algorithm identifier for HSS is
defined in [I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-rfc8708bis]. The definitions are
repeated here for reference.
The object identifier for an HSS public key is id-alg-hss-lms-
hashsig:
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id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) alg(3) 17 }
Note that the id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig algorithm identifier is also
referred to as id-alg-mts-hashsig. This synonym is based on the
terminology used in an early draft of the document that became
[RFC8554].
The public key and signature values identify the hash function and
the height used in the HSS/LMS tree. [RFC8554] and [SP800208] define
these values, but an IANA registry [IANA-LMS] permits the
registration of additional identifiers in the future.
4.2. XMSS Algorithm Identifier
The object identifier for an XMSS public key is id-alg-xmss-hashsig:
id-alg-xmss-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD1 }
The public key and signature values identify the hash function and
the height used in the XMSS tree. [RFC8391] and [SP800208] define
these values, but an IANA registry [IANA-XMSS] permits the
registration of additional identifiers in the future.
4.3. XMSS^MT Algorithm Identifier
The object identifier for an XMSS^MT public key is id-alg-xmssmt-
hashsig:
id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD2 }
The public key and signature values identify the hash function and
the height used in the XMSS^MT tree. [RFC8391] and [SP800208] define
these values, but an IANA registry [IANA-XMSS] permits the
registration of additional identifiers in the future.
5. Public Key Identifiers
Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any
public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the algorithm
through an algorithm identifier. An algorithm identifier consists of
an OID and optional parameters.
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[RFC8554] and [RFC8391] define the raw octet string encodings of the
public keys used in this document. When used in a
SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, the subjectPublicKey BIT STRING contains
the raw octet string encodings of the public keys.
This document defines ASN.1 OCTET STRING types for encoding the
public keys when not used in a SubjectPublicKeyInfo. The OCTET
STRING is mapped to a subjectPublicKey (a value of type BIT STRING)
as follows: the most significant bit of the OCTET STRING value
becomes the most significant bit of the BIT STRING value, and so on;
the least significant bit of the OCTET STRING becomes the least
significant bit of the BIT STRING.
5.1. HSS Public Keys
The HSS public key identifier is as follows:
pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig
-- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }
The HSS public key is defined as follows:
HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING
[RFC8554] defines the raw octet string encoding of an HSS public key
using the hss_public_key structure. See [SP800208] and [RFC8554] for
more information on the contents and format of an HSS public key.
Note that the single-tree signature scheme LMS is instantiated as HSS
with number of levels being equal to 1.
5.2. XMSS Public Keys
The XMSS public key identifier is as follows:
pk-XMSS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmss-hashsig
-- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }
The XMSS public key is defined as follows:
XMSS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING
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[RFC8391] defines the raw octet string encoding of an HSS public key
using the xmss_public_key structure. See [SP800208] and [RFC8391]
for more information on the contents and format of an XMSS public
key.
5.3. XMSS^MT Public Keys
The XMSS^MT public key identifier is as follows:
pk-XMSSMT-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig
-- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }
The XMSS^MT public key is defined as follows:
XMSSMT-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING
[RFC8391] defines the raw octet string encoding of an HSS public key
using the xmssmt_public_key structure. See [SP800208] and [RFC8391]
for more information on the contents and format of an XMSS^MT public
key.
6. Key Usage Bits
The intended application for the key is indicated in the keyUsage
certificate extension [RFC5280]. When one of the
AlgorithmIdentifiers specified in this document appears in the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo field of a certification authority (CA) X.509
certificate [RFC5280], the certificate key usage extension MUST
contain at least one of the following values: digitalSignature,
nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, or cRLSign. However, it MUST NOT
contain other values.
When one of these AlgorithmIdentifiers appears in the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo field of an end entity X.509 certificate
[RFC5280], the certificate key usage extension MUST contain at least
one of the following values: digitalSignature or nonRepudiation.
However, it MUST NOT contain other values.
Note that for certificates that indicate id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig the
above definitions are more restrictive than the requirement defined
in Section 4 of [I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-rfc8708bis].
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7. Signature Algorithms
This section identifies OIDs for signing using HSS, XMSS, and
XMSS^MT. When these algorithm identifiers appear in the algorithm
field as an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding MUST omit the
parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a
SEQUENCE of one component, one of the OIDs defined in the following
subsections.
When the signature algorithm identifiers described in this document
are used to create a signature on a message, no digest algorithm is
applied to the message before signing. That is, the full data to be
signed is signed rather than a digest of the data.
For HSS, the signature value is described in section 6.4 of
[RFC8554]. For XMSS and XMSS^MT the signature values are described
in sections B.2 and C.2 of [RFC8391], respectively. The octet string
representing the signature is encoded directly in the OCTET STRING
without adding any additional ASN.1 wrapping. For the Certificate
and CertificateList structures, the signature value is wrapped in the
"signatureValue" OCTET STRING field.
7.1. HSS Signature Algorithm
The HSS public key OID is also used to specify that an HSS signature
was generated on the full message, i.e. the message was not hashed
before being processed by the HSS signature algorithm.
id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) alg(3) 17 }
The HSS signature is defined as follows:
HSS-LMS-HashSig-Signature ::= OCTET STRING
See [SP800208] and [RFC8554] for more information on the contents and
format of an HSS signature.
7.2. XMSS Signature Algorithm
The XMSS public key OID is also used to specify that an XMSS
signature was generated on the full message, i.e. the message was not
hashed before being processed by the XMSS signature algorithm.
id-alg-xmss-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
TBD }
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The XMSS signature is defined as follows:
XMSS-HashSig-Signature ::= OCTET STRING
See [SP800208] and [RFC8391] for more information on the contents and
format of an XMSS signature.
The signature generation MUST be performed according to 7.2 of
[SP800208].
7.3. XMSS^MT Signature Algorithm
The XMSS^MT public key OID is also used to specify that an XMSS^MT
signature was generated on the full message, i.e. the message was not
hashed before being processed by the XMSS^MT signature algorithm.
id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
TBD }
The XMSS^MT signature is defined as follows:
XMSSMT-HashSig-Signature ::= OCTET STRING
See [SP800208] and [RFC8391] for more information on the contents and
format of an XMSS^MT signature.
The signature generation MUST be performed according to 7.2 of
[SP800208].
8. Key Generation
The key generation for XMSS and XMSS^MT MUST be performed according
to 7.2 of [SP800208]
9. ASN.1 Module
For reference purposes, the ASN.1 syntax is presented as an ASN.1
module here. This ASN.1 Module builds upon the conventions
established in [RFC5911].
X509-SHBS-2024
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-shbs-2024(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL;
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IMPORTS
PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- RFC 5911 [CMSASN1]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig, pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig
FROM MTS-HashSig-2013
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
id-smime(16) id-mod(0) id-mod-mts-hashsig-2013(64) };
--
-- Object Identifiers
--
-- id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig is defined in [RFC8708]
id-alg-xmss-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD1 }
id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) TBD2 }
--
-- Signature Algorithms and Public Keys
--
-- sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig is defined in [RFC8708]
sa-XMSS-HashSig SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmss-hashsig
PARAMS ARE absent
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-XMSS-HashSig }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-xmss-hashsig } }
sa-XMSSMT-HashSig SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig
PARAMS ARE absent
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-XMSSMT-HashSig }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig } }
-- pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig is defined in [RFC8708]
pk-XMSS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmss-hashsig
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-- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }
pk-XMSSMT-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig
-- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }
--
-- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms
--
PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
-- This expands PublicKeys from RFC 5912
pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig |
pk-XMSS-HashSig |
pk-XMSSMT-HashSig,
...
}
--
-- Signature Algorithms (sa-)
--
SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from RFC 5912
sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig |
sa-XMSS-HashSig |
sa-XMSSMT-HashSig,
...
}
END
10. Security Considerations
The security requirements of [SP800208] MUST be taken into account.
For S-HBS it is crucial to stress the importance of a correct state
management. If an attacker were able to obtain signatures for two
different messages created using the same OTS key, then it would
become computationally feasible for that attacker to create forgeries
[BH16]. As noted in [MCGREW] and [ETSI-TR-103-692], extreme care
needs to be taken in order to avoid the risk that an OTS key will be
reused accidentally. This is a new requirement that most developers
will not be familiar with and requires careful handling.
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Various strategies for a correct state management can be applied:
* Implement a track record of all signatures generated by a key pair
associated to a S-HBS instance. This track record may be stored
outside the device which is used to generate the signature. Check
the track record to prevent OTS key reuse before a new signature
is released. Drop the new signature and hit your PANIC button if
you spot OTS key reuse.
* Use a S-HBS instance only for a moderate number of signatures such
that it is always practical to keep a consistent track record and
be able to unambiguously trace back all generated signatures.
* Apply the state reservation strategy described in Section 5 of
[MCGREW], where upcoming states are reserved in advance by the
signer. In this way the number of state synchronisations between
nonvolatile and volatile memory is reduced.
11. Backup and Restore Management
Certificate Authorities have high demands in order to ensure the
availability of signature generation throughout the validity period
of signing key pairs.
Usual backup and restore strategies when using a stateless signature
scheme (e.g. SLH-DSA) are to duplicate private keying material and
to operate redundant signing devices or to store and safeguard a copy
of the private keying material such that it can be used to set up a
new signing device in case of technical difficulties.
For S-HBS such straightforward backup and restore strategies will
lead to OTS reuse with high probability as a correct state management
is not guaranteed. Strategies for maintaining availability and
keeping a correct state are described in Section 7 of [SP800208].
12. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to assign a module OID from the "SMI for PKIX
Module Identifier" registry for the ASN.1 module in Section 9.
One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A is requested
for the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0)
registry:
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+=========+========================+====================+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+========================+====================+
| TBD | id-mod-pkix1-shbs-2024 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
+---------+------------------------+--------------------+
Table 1
IANA is requested to update the SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms
[SMI-PKIX] (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry with four additional entries:
+=========+=======================+====================+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=======================+====================+
| TBD1 | id-alg-xmss-hashsig | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+--------------------+
| TBD2 | id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+--------------------+
Table 2
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-rfc8708bis]
Housley, R., "Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signature
Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 8708, DOI 10.17487/RFC8708, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8708>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC5911] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 5911,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5911, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5911>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8391] Huelsing, A., Butin, D., Gazdag, S., Rijneveld, J., and A.
Mohaisen, "XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme",
RFC 8391, DOI 10.17487/RFC8391, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8391>.
[RFC8554] McGrew, D., Curcio, M., and S. Fluhrer, "Leighton-Micali
Hash-Based Signatures", RFC 8554, DOI 10.17487/RFC8554,
April 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8554>.
[SP800208] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature
Schemes", 29 October 2020,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-208>.
13.2. Informative References
[BH16] Bruinderink, L. and S. Hülsing, "Oops, I did it again –
Security of One-Time Signatures under Two-Message
Attacks.", 2016, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1042.pdf>.
[CNSA2.0] National Security Agency (NSA), "Commercial National
Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 (CNSA 2.0) Cybersecurity
Advisory (CSA)", 7 September 2022,
<https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071834/-1/-1/0/
CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS_.PDF>.
[ETSI-TR-103-692]
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI),
"State management for stateful authentication mechanisms",
November 2021, <https://www.etsi.org/deliver/
etsi_tr/103600_103699/103692/01.01.01_60/
tr_103692v010101p.pdf>.
[IANA-LMS] IANA, "Leighton-Micali Signatures (LMS)", n.d.,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/leighton-micali-
signatures/>.
[IANA-XMSS]
IANA, "XMSS: Extended Hash-Based Signatures", n.d.,
<https://iana.org/assignments/xmss-extended-hash-based-
signatures/>.
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[MCGREW] McGrew, D., Kampanakis, P., Fluhrer, S., Gazdag, S.,
Butin, D., and J. Buchmann, "State Management for Hash-
Based Signatures", 2 November 2016,
<https://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/id/eprint/101633>.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3279>.
[RFC8410] Josefsson, S. and J. Schaad, "Algorithm Identifiers for
Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", RFC 8410,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8410, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8410>.
[RFC8411] Schaad, J. and R. Andrews, "IANA Registration for the
Cryptographic Algorithm Object Identifier Range",
RFC 8411, DOI 10.17487/RFC8411, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8411>.
[SMI-PKIX] IANA, "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms", n.d.,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-
numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6>.
Appendix A. HSS X.509 v3 Certificate Example
This section shows a self-signed X.509 v3 certificate using HSS.
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
e8:91:d6:06:91:4f:ce:f3
Signature Algorithm: HSS
Issuer: C=US, ST=VA, L=Herndon, O=Bogus CA
Validity
Not Before: May 14 08:58:11 2024 GMT
Not After : May 14 08:58:11 2034 GMT
Subject: C=US, ST=VA, L=Herndon, O=Bogus CA
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: HSS
HSS public key:
PQ key material:
00:00:00:01:00:00:00:05:00:00:00:04:74:e4:73:
a8:23:a6:6a:7e:9f:a5:45:a8:fa:63:c6:fb:17:8f:
af:fe:28:d1:82:d3:95:92:3e:f9:e2:5f:92:20:56:
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00:09:e4:36:f9:39:a8:ea:8d:e7:79:02:61:a8:42
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
D6:FD:27:12:44:AD:D2:76:19:C0:FC:6D:52:95:6B:19:
1B:F8:4C:9D:37:9E:6E:F0:7A:98:F0:6C:6E:C5:A2:14
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
D6:FD:27:12:44:AD:D2:76:19:C0:FC:6D:52:95:6B:19:
1B:F8:4C:9D:37:9E:6E:F0:7A:98:F0:6C:6E:C5:A2:14
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Key Usage:
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
Signature Algorithm: HSS
Signature Value:
00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:04:b8:20:60:54:98:f9:
ca:6b:fb:d4:91:a0:24:0c:19:f6:e2:4c:94:5d:b1:52:41:93:
85:8f:dd:97:2a:e4:76:8a:cd:36:7f:05:d6:35:ed:c4:8e:ff:
72:fe:16:41:54:e4:0b:2a:aa:e6:52:8c:03:25:5e:bd:79:b0:
48:c8:71:65:8c:31:bf:d0:8e:1a:59:88:37:c6:74:8d:62:4d:
7d:f2:e0:29:6e:46:58:43:a5:cd:6c:6e:65:19:66:50:59:f4:
94:51:ca:e0:f9:91:ac:92:c4:c0:04:78:cf:5b:9e:36:35:14:
0e:8b:84:3d:77:af:ef:58:2b:34:2e:c5:01:c5:45:09:ac:28:
8c:e1:db:c5:bf:19:d1:a8:0e:02:72:21:82:e5:f2:fc:9f:bd:
1f:72:31:23:62:f7:2b:60:80:49:21:7e:46:b5:cb:80:b2:4d:
6c:9a:68:8a:2e:84:ec:06:47:80:1b:da:c4:40:07:2f:c2:57:
02:39:cb:8c:06:9f:38:55:2f:18:80:2a:7d:08:e4:10:d0:f7:
41:7f:26:0e:4c:6a:73:78:a4:f7:1b:db:2d:b1:6c:16:b8:64:
f1:9c:69:2e:d7:b4:a8:d9:49:c0:c8:df:33:de:ac:ad:89:1a:
f1:14:42:b4:39:3c:cb:2d:1a:93:96:61:d8:ba:70:0c:b4:64:
23:80:ac:17:34:f5:e4:67:36:d1:2c:dc:b1:7c:ec:1a:41:3f:
be:28:f8:7a:c4:b9:f2:a0:8c:cf:8b:68:c3:98:02:09:5c:72:
4f:f5:4e:c7:22:37:8f:2d:67:f0:86:75:fc:ab:34:07:a7:bc:
9c:0c:b8:d6:90:93:a2:92:4c:a0:eb:7b:83:10:ed:ea:73:a2:
93:ac:8e:d3:e5:6a:93:ac:5f:17:5a:6a:67:84:9e:84:4b:64:
35:8b:2d:d0:47:8c:9d:9d:8c:d3:d5:99:a2:ed:e4:84:5e:bc:
5e:9a:f4:07:51:9d:08:94:19:95:46:c5:94:b1:e3:8a:9a:e3:
0f:80:9e:b7:9a:eb:a2:33:83:40:9f:47:e7:a4:9e:26:01:cf:
57:60:cf:ae:78:a2:0d:1b:a2:4d:41:aa:45:08:15:4c:ee:ad:
87:3b:74:58:f1:60:19:67:62:45:2b:da:c8:74:dc:a3:02:d3:
29:26:2c:b0:55:67:0b:a5:b8:a2:c2:1b:16:6a:9e:5f:23:02:
9d:b8:4a:61:8a:ab:3e:91:ef:0b:ab:be:ff:46:9d:c3:1f:2a:
b0:93:1d:86:64:42:d4:d9:31:ec:b1:5b:2c:8e:78:e6:41:4c:
5d:0a:f7:ec:d7:51:c8:5d:7f:de:df:ef:87:2a:2e:d6:3d:e7:
23:3b:1e:e1:86:ca:96:95:50:45:60:10:3d:95:f1:47:cf:d2:
d7:de:5e:db:65:a7:15:9e:bd:dc:f6:96:0e:f8:90:26:1a:8b:
cb:6a:7b:d2:32:fc:e5:99:4b:82:82:48:ee:56:f4:dc:a9:7c:
61:7f:60:94:c7:53:53:31:71:fe:5e:31:42:07:4d:9b:d3:4e:
48:39:75:56:33:67:6a:d6:b5:2c:36:9a:41:fd:a7:c7:fa:10:
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2d:3d:50:a6:d5:c3:f6:2a:ab:ba:31:40:c7:2d:ec:d4:74:43:
c2:6e:2e:9b:a9:0d:36:9d:b7:c5:55:8e:08:09:8e:54:a2:a1:
9c:af:61:8d:b3:a3:4a:51:67:2d:60:7a:1c:f0:72:9b:90:5e:
42:a5:1a:af:74:e8:82:64:e4:78:d9:e9:4d:74:04:35:e3:71:
fd:0a:c8:f8:3a:fa:e4:a2:fe:08:eb:e1:69:84:ee:d0:ba:60:
f4:7d:80:8a:06:e6:df:32:68:da:07:4f:15:2e:82:75:92:6c:
e2:bf:ac:e7:ab:a4:e0:a3:ab:2c:71:1b:81:e5:8d:1d:d8:44:
c7:fd:a1:46:51:84:7b:e3:8a:b8:9b:04:28:63:26:0d:44:16:
1d:7f:b0:e2:76:c5:0e:c3:0a:d3:5a:da:ed:b7:28:f7:e9:55:
e6:d1:1f:0d:46:b9:1d:4a:79:7e:bd:4b:60:d3:bc:54:ef:95:
e3:e9:1c:57:1e:3a:48:b5:98:89:e4:92:cb:48:aa:db:ab:08:
31:7f:08:3f:d9:a8:3b:2d:81:40:cf:60:90:08:ba:a2:ca:0a:
0b:a7:76:2a:98:40:3c:03:e6:a2:a1:ce:8a:a4:bd:ab:04:87:
35:cc:b5:ef:da:92:d2:be:98:08:74:89:b2:e4:cd:78:75:7f:
8f:b8:fe:9c:02:07:a2:07:cb:34:e1:0d:e1:9b:4a:74:69:97:
f1:1c:5e:5f:28:2c:82:97:b8:08:c7:4f:97:33:90:83:df:d1:
c7:db:7a:28:1d:98:4e:ef:d5:c2:30:4f:a1:b8:ed:c6:c5:15:
11:d6:ee:f3:97:f4:22:95:48:12:f8:5f:ba:15:71:e5:5f:19:
44:50:c1:e1:70:bd:3e:48:a8:f3:2c:62:ad:8f:8a:9f:64:c7:
92:a7:ec:77:8c:5a:78:99:73:7e:77:12:61:28:90:92:a7:e0:
46:9a:39:29:1d:06:a1:5e:5c:f2:d6:bb:49:73:e2:88:da:ef:
3f:93:2e:98:b6:7d:01:b5:56:bc:30:08:2a:0a:22:4b:45:92:
b3:72:94:ff:07:e1:fe:f3:4e:58:38:cf:0e:e1:45:15:e1:93:
5a:21:52:77:5e:e6:98:17:16:71:b9:e7:8a:a2:2c:5a:d9:d7:
0b:15:86:70:69:6f:47:80:7e:87:c7:d0:3d:4b:f6:8f:ca:7d:
8b:6a:45:27:ee:10:72:b7:df:6c:43:1d:75:e3:ae:64:1d:b3:
30:85:32:32:2a:c2:8f:21:67:58:25:dc:51:6d:a3:6a:06:d1:
5d:77:b1:dc:33:6c:ba:0c:be:fa:c2:61:8f:30:18:c3:c1:c7:
6e:6b:d8:17:1d:bf:67:be:ca:af:94:cc:5b:f2:49:a7:00:00:
00:05:16:46:55:cf:04:6f:4f:43:be:87:22:e6:11:92:45:5d:
17:31:92:6f:17:15:2c:b5:f6:37:d1:fb:a5:8f:83:1c:ac:7c:
54:ce:2d:95:ef:b0:d4:44:c8:d5:d8:a3:e5:0a:b4:ba:f0:d0:
c5:ab:6a:34:88:72:d7:32:22:27:54:13:1b:60:0f:cd:32:e7:
cc:33:06:47:68:46:80:06:72:11:f7:74:ab:eb:38:23:30:68:
ad:48:01:e4:77:5e:34:e4:b1:c3:e9:46:a4:96:da:71:12:19:
b1:c2:7f:53:0f:f6:cd:4a:cf:12:e8:ea:25:1b:89:f6:35:54:
e9:9b:e1:02:d5:f8:d4:8b:92:56:43:fd:05:3b:4b:0b:dd:8a:
20:05:2e:18:7e:a1:a8:e8:55:18:3d:40:ff:5e:35:a3:c3:fb
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Appendix B. XMSS X.509 v3 Certificate Example
[EDNOTE: To be provided once id-alg-xmss-hashsig is assigned]
Appendix C. XMSS^MT X.509 v3 Certificate Example
[EDNOTE: To be provided once id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig is assigned]
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Acknowledgments
Thanks for Russ Housley and Panos Kampanakis for helpful suggestions.
This document uses a lot of text from similar documents [SP800208],
([RFC3279] and [RFC8410]) as well as
[I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-rfc8708bis]. Thanks go to the authors of those
documents. "Copying always makes things easier and less error prone"
- [RFC8411].
Authors' Addresses
Kaveh Bashiri
BSI
Email: kaveh.bashiri.ietf@gmail.com
Scott Fluhrer
Cisco Systems
Email: sfluhrer@cisco.com
Stefan Gazdag
genua GmbH
Email: ietf@gazdag.de
Daniel Van Geest
CryptoNext Security
Email: daniel.vangeest@cryptonext-security.com
Stavros Kousidis
BSI
Email: kousidis.ietf@gmail.com
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