NETCONF over QUIC
draft-ietf-netconf-over-quic-01
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (netconf WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Jinyou Dai , Shaohua Yu , Weiqiang Cheng , Marc Blanchet , Per Andersson | ||
| Last updated | 2024-10-21 | ||
| Replaces | draft-dai-netconf-quic-netconf-over-quic | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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draft-ietf-netconf-over-quic-01
Network Working Group J. Dai
Internet-Draft CICT
Intended status: Standards Track S. Yu
Expires: 24 April 2025 PCL
W. Cheng
China Mobile
M. Blanchet
Viagenie
P. Andersson
Cisco systems
21 October 2024
NETCONF over QUIC
draft-ietf-netconf-over-quic-01
Abstract
This document specifies how to use QUIC as a secure transport for
exchanging Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) messages. QUIC
provides encryption properties similar to TLS, while eliminating TCP
head-of-line blocking issues and also providing more loss detection
and congestion control than UDP. NETCONF over QUIC has privacy
properties similar to NETCONF over TLS specified in
[I-D.ietf-netconf-over-tls13].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 April 2025.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Connection Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Connection establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Connection Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2.1. QUIC Connection Termination Process . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2.2. Considerations for Connection Termination . . . . . . 4
4. Stream mapping and usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Bidirectional Stream Between client and server . . . . . 6
4.2. Unidirectional Stream from server to client . . . . . . . 6
5. Endpoint Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Using QUIC Handshake Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1.1. Using Third-Party Authentication . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241] defines a
mechanism through which the configuration of network devices can be
installed, manipulated, and deleted.
NETCONF can be conceptually partitioned into four layers: content,
operation, message and security transport layers.
The Secure Transport layer provides a communication path between the
client and server. NETCONF can be layered over any transport
protocol that provides a set of basic requirements, such as:
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1. NETCONF is connection-oriented, requiring a persistent connection
between peers. This connection MUST provide reliabl and
sequenced data delivery. NETCONF connections are long-lived,
persisting between protocol operations.
2. NETCONF connections MUST provide authentication, data integrity,
confidentiality, and replay protection. NETCONF depends on the
transport protocol for this capability.
The NETCONF protocol is not bound to any particular transport
protocol, but allows a mapping to define how it can be implemented
over any specific protocol.
However, because of the connection-oriented feature, almost all of
the current secure transport protocols used by NETCONF are TCP based.
As is well known, TCP has some shortcomings such as head-of-line
blocking.
QUIC ([RFC9000][RFC9001]) conforms to the above requirements,
therefore is also an appropriate transport protocol for NETCONF.
Moreover, QUIC provides the following additional benefits not present
in the other NETCONF transports:
* Single connection can be long lived and support multiple NETCONF
RPC calls and responses within the same connection, using streams.
This is very useful for a network management control station who
is regularly monitoring devices and therefore having a long lived
connection requires way less resources on both peers.
* 1 RTT initial handshake that includes TLS.
* Adaptable to more difficult environments such as those with long
delays([I-D.many-deepspace-ip-assessment],
[I-D.huitema-quic-in-space]).
Therefore, QUIC is a proper transport protocol for the secure
transport layer of NETCONF. This document specifies how to use QUIC
as the secure transport protocol for NETCONF.
2. Terminology and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
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3. Connection Management
3.1. Connection establishment
QUIC connections are established as described in [RFC9000]. During
connection establishment, NETCONF over QUIC support is indicated by
selecting the ALPN token as listed in the IANA sectionSection 7 in
the crypto handshake.
3.2. Connection Termination
3.2.1. QUIC Connection Termination Process
The typical QUIC connection termination process is described in
[RFC9000]
3.2.2. Considerations for Connection Termination
When a NETCONF session is implemented based on a QUIC connection, the
idle timeout should be set appropriately in order to keep the QUIC
connection persistent even if the NETCONF session is idle. In some
cases, disabling it may be a possible option.
When a NETCONF server receives a <close-session> request, it will
gracefully close the NETCONF session. The server SHOULD close the
associated QUIC connection.
When a NETCONF entity receives a <kill-session> request for an open
session, it SHOULD close the associated QUIC connection.
When a NETCONF entity is detecting the interruption of the QUIC
connection, it SHOULD send a <close-session> request to the peer
NETCONF entity.
When a stateless reset event occurs, nothing needs to be done by
either the client or the server.
4. Stream mapping and usage
[RFC6241] specifies protocol layers of NETCONF as shown below.
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Layer Example
+-------------+ +-----------------+ +----------------+
(4) | Content | | Configuration | | Notification |
| | | data | | data |
+-------------+ +-----------------+ +----------------+
| | |
+-------------+ +-----------------+ |
(3) | Operations | | <edit-config> | |
| | | | |
+-------------+ +-----------------+ |
| | |
+-------------+ +-----------------+ +----------------+
(2) | Messages | | <rpc>, | | <notification> |
| | | <rpc-reply> | | |
+-------------+ +-----------------+ +----------------+
| | |
+-------------+ +-----------------------------------------+
(1) | Secure | | SSH, TLS, BEEP/TLS, SOAP/HTTP/TLS, ... |
| Transport | | |
+-------------+ +-----------------------------------------+
Figure 1: NETCONF Protocol Layers
Figure 1 shows that there are two kinds of main data flow exchanged
between client and server:
* Configuration data from client to server.
* Notification data from server to client.
The two kinds of data flow need to be mapped into QUIC streams.
QUIC Streams provide a lightweight, ordered byte-stream abstraction
to an application. Streams can be unidirectional or bidirectional
meanwhile streams can be initiated by either the client or the
server. Unidirectional streams carry data in one direction: from the
initiator of the stream to its peer. Bidirectional streams allow for
data to be sent in both directions.
QUIC uses Stream ID to identify the stream. The least significant
bit (0x1) of the stream ID identifies the initiator of the stream.
The second least significant bit (0x2) of the stream ID distinguishes
between bidirectional streams (with the bit set to 0) and
unidirectional streams. Table 1 describes the four types of streams
and this table can also be seen from [RFC9000].
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+======+==================================+
| Bits | Stream Type |
+======+==================================+
| 0x0 | Client-Initiated, Bidirectional |
+------+----------------------------------+
| 0x1 | Server-Initiated, Bidirectional |
+------+----------------------------------+
| 0x2 | Client-Initiated, Unidirectional |
+------+----------------------------------+
| 0x3 | Server-Initiated, Unidirectional |
+------+----------------------------------+
Table 1: Stream ID Types
4.1. Bidirectional Stream Between client and server
NETCONF protocol uses an RPC-based communication model. So, the
configuration data from client to server is exchanged based on
'<rpc>' (the server initiating) and '<rpc-reply>' (sent by the
server) and so on. So the messages used to exchange configuration
data MUST be mapped into one or more bidirectional stream whose
stream type is 0x0 according to the above table.
4.2. Unidirectional Stream from server to client
There are some notification data exchanged between the client and the
server. Notification is an server initiated message indicating that
a certain event has been recognized by the server.
Notification messages are initiated by the server and no reply is
needed from the client. So the messages used to exchange
configuration data SHOULD be mapped into one unidirectional stream
whose stream type is 0x3 according to the above table.
5. Endpoint Authentication
5.1. Using QUIC Handshake Authentication
NETCONF over QUIC uses QUIC which uses TLS version 1.3 or greater.
Therefore, the TLS handshake process can be used for endpoint
authentication.
5.1.1. Using Third-Party Authentication
A third-party authentication mechanism can also be used for endpoint
authentication, such as a TLS client certificate.
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6. Security Considerations
The security considerations described throughout [RFC5246] and
[RFC6241] apply here as well. This document does not require to
support third-party authentication (e.g., backend Authentication,
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) servers) due to the fact that TLS
does not specify this way of authentication and that NETCONF depends
on the transport protocol for the authentication service. If third-
party authentication is needed, TLS client certificates, BEEP or SSH
transport can be used. Especially TLS client certificates are
recommended to be used here.
An attacker might be able to inject arbitrary NETCONF messages via
some application that does not carefully check exchanged messages
deliberately insert the delimiter sequence in a NETCONF message to
create a DoS attack. Hence, applications and NETCONF APIs MUST
ensure that the delimiter sequence defined in Section 2.1 never
appears in NETCONF messages; otherwise, those messages can be
dropped, garbled, or misinterpreted.
If invalid data or malformed messages are encountered, a robust
implementation of this document MUST silently discard the message
without further processing and then stop the NETCONF session.
Finally, this document does not introduce any new security
considerations compared to [RFC6242].
7. IANA Considerations
This document creates a new registration for the identification of
NETCONF over QUIC in the "Application Layer Protocol Negotiation
(ALPN) Protocol IDs registry established in [RFC7301].
The "noq" string identifies NETCONF over QUIC:
* Protocol: NETCONF over QUIC
* Identification Sequence: 0x6e 0x6f 0x71 ("noq")
* Specification: This document
In addition, it is requested for IANA to reserve a UDP port TBD for
'NETCONF over QUIC'.
8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge all contributors including
Huaimo Chen, Lifen Zhou et al. for their beneficial comments.
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9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
[RFC9001] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure
QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9001>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-over-tls13]
Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Updates to Using the NETCONF
Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Mutual
X.509 Authentication", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-netconf-over-tls13-04, 18 January 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
over-tls13-04>.
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[I-D.many-deepspace-ip-assessment]
Blanchet, M., Huitema, C., and D. Bogdanović, "Revisiting
the Use of the IP Protocol Stack in Deep Space: Assessment
and Possible Solutions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-many-deepspace-ip-assessment-02, 10 September 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-many-
deepspace-ip-assessment-02>.
[I-D.huitema-quic-in-space]
Huitema, C. and M. Blanchet, "QUIC in Space", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-huitema-quic-in-space-00,
24 September 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-huitema-quic-in-space-00>.
Authors' Addresses
Jinyou Dai
China Information Communication Technologies Group.
Gaoxin 4th Road 6#
Wuhan, Hubei 430079
China
Email: djy@fiberhome.com
Shaohua Yu
China PCL.
China
Email: yush@cae.cn
Weiqiang Cheng
China Mobile
China
Email: chengweiqiang@chinamobile.com
Marc Blanchet
Viagenie
Canada
Email: marc.blanchet@viagenie.ca
Per Andersson
Cisco systems
Sweden
Email: per.ietf@ionio.se
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