OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer (DPoP)
draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-02
Web Authorization Protocol D. Fett
Internet-Draft yes.com
Intended status: Standards Track B. Campbell
Expires: 22 May 2021 Ping Identity
J. Bradley
Yubico
T. Lodderstedt
yes.com
M. Jones
Microsoft
D. Waite
Ping Identity
18 November 2020
OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer
(DPoP)
draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-02
Abstract
This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0
tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level.
This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access
and refresh tokens.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 May 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Fett, et al. Expires 22 May 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft OAuth DPoP November 2020
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. DPoP Proof JWTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. The DPoP HTTP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. DPoP Proof JWT Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Checking DPoP Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. DPoP Access Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Public Key Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. JWK Thumbprint Confirmation Method . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. JWK Thumbprint Confirmation Method in Token
Introspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Protected Resource Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1. The DPoP Authorization Request Header Scheme . . . . . . 16
7.2. The Bearer Authorization Request Header Scheme . . . . . 18
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.1. DPoP Proof Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.2. Signed JWT Swapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.3. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.4. Message Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.5. Public Key Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.1. OAuth Access Token Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.2. HTTP Authentication Scheme Registration . . . . . . . . . 21
9.3. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.4. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.5. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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