OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests
draft-ietf-oauth-par-08
Web Authorization Protocol T. Lodderstedt
Internet-Draft yes.com
Intended status: Standards Track B. Campbell
Expires: 15 November 2021 Ping Identity
N. Sakimura
NAT.Consulting
D. Tonge
Moneyhub Financial Technology
F. Skokan
Auth0
14 May 2021
OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests
draft-ietf-oauth-par-08
Abstract
This document defines the pushed authorization request endpoint,
which allows clients to push the payload of an OAuth 2.0
authorization request to the authorization server via a direct
request and provides them with a request URI that is used as
reference to the data in a subsequent call to the authorization
endpoint.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 15 November 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Introductory Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Pushed Authorization Request Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Successful Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4. Management of Client Redirect URIs . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. The "request" Request Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. Request URI Guessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.2. Open Redirection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.3. Request Object Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.4. Client Policy Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.5. Request URI Swapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.1. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata . . . . . . . 17
10.3. OAuth URI Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction
Pushed authorization requests (PAR), defined by this document, enable
OAuth [RFC6749] clients to push the payload of an authorization
request directly to the authorization server in exchange for a
request URI value, which is used as reference to the authorization
request payload data in a subsequent call to the authorization
endpoint via the user-agent.
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In OAuth [RFC6749] authorization request parameters are typically
sent as URI query parameters via redirection in the user-agent. This
is simple but also yields challenges:
* There is no cryptographic integrity and authenticity protection.
An attacker could, for example, modify the scope of access
requested or swap the context of a payment transaction by changing
scope values. Although protocol facilities exist to enable
clients or users to detect some such changes, preventing
modifications early in the process is a more robust solution.
* There is no mechanism to ensure confidentiality of the request
parameters. Although HTTPS is required for the authorization
endpoint, the request data passes through the user-agent in the
clear and query string data can inadvertently leak to web server
logs and to other sites via referer. The impact of which can be
significant, if personal identifiable information or other
regulated data is sent in the authorization request (which might
well be the case in identity, open banking, and similar
scenarios).
* Authorization request URLs can become quite large, especially in
scenarios requiring fine-grained authorization data, which might
cause errors in request processing.
JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq]
provides solutions for the security challenges by allowing OAuth
clients to wrap authorization request parameters in a request object,
which is a signed and optionally encrypted JSON Web Token (JWT)
[RFC7519]. In order to cope with the size restrictions, JAR
introduces the "request_uri" parameter that allows clients to send a
reference to a request object instead of the request object itself.
This document complements JAR by providing an interoperable way to
push the payload of an authorization request directly to the
authorization server in exchange for a "request_uri" value usable at
the authorization server in a subsequent authorization request.
PAR fosters OAuth security by providing clients a simple means for a
confidential and integrity protected authorization request. Clients
requiring an even higher security level, especially cryptographically
confirmed non-repudiation, are able to use JWT-based request objects
as defined by [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq] in conduction with a pushed
authorization request.
PAR allows the authorization server to authenticate the client before
any user interaction happens. The increased confidence in the
identity of the client during the authorization process allows the
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authorization server to refuse illegitimate requests much earlier in
the process, which can prevent attempts to spoof clients or otherwise
tamper with or misuse an authorization request.
Note that HTTP "POST" requests to the authorization endpoint via the
user-agent, as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC6749] and
Section 3.1.2.1 of [OIDC], could also be used to cope with the
request size limitations described above. However, it's only
optional per [RFC6749] and, even when supported, it is a viable
option for traditional web applications but is prohibitively
difficult to use with mobile apps. Those apps typically invoke a
custom tab with an URL that is translated into a GET request. Using
"POST" would require the app to first open a web page under its
control in the custom tab that in turn would initiate the form "POST"
towards the authorization server. PAR is simpler to use and has
additional security benefits as described above.
1.1. Introductory Example
A client typically initiates an authorization request by directing
the user-agent to make an HTTP request like the following to the
authorization server's authorization endpoint (extra line breaks and
indentation for display purposes only):
GET /authorize?response_type=code
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=af0ifjsldkj
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Such a request could instead be pushed directly to the authorization
server by the client with a "POST" request to the pushed
authorization request endpoint as illustrated in the following
example (extra line breaks for display purposes only). The client
can authenticate (e.g., using the "Authorization" header as shown)
because the the request is made directly to the authorization server.
POST /as/par HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3
response_type=code
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=af0ifjsldkj
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
The authorization server responds with a request URI:
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HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store
Content-Type: application/json
{
"request_uri": "urn:example:bwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2",
"expires_in": 90
}
The client uses the request URI value to create the subsequent
authorization request by directing the user-agent to make an HTTP
request to the authorization server's authorization endpoint like the
following (extra line breaks and indentation for display purposes
only):
GET /authorize?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&request_uri=urn%3Aexample%3Abwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2 HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
1.2. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This specification uses the terms "access token", "authorization
server", "authorization endpoint", "authorization request", "token
endpoint", and "client" defined by The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework [RFC6749].
2. Pushed Authorization Request Endpoint
The pushed authorization request endpoint is an HTTP API at the
authorization server that accepts HTTP "POST" requests with
parameters in the HTTP request entity-body using the "application/x-
www-form-urlencoded" format with a character encoding of UTF-8 as
described in Appendix B of [RFC6749]. The pushed authorization
request endpoint URL MUST use the "https" scheme.
Authorization servers supporting pushed authorization requests SHOULD
include the URL of their pushed authorization request endpoint in
their authorization server metadata document [RFC8414] using the
"pushed_authorization_request_endpoint" parameter as defined in
Section 5.
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The endpoint accepts the authorization request parameters defined in
[RFC6749] for the authorization endpoint as well as all applicable
extensions defined for the authorization endpoint. Some examples of
such extensions include PKCE [RFC7636], Resource Indicators
[RFC8707], and OpenID Connect [OIDC]. The endpoint MAY also support
sending the set of authorization request parameters as a request
object according to [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq] and Section 3.
The rules for client authentication as defined in [RFC6749] for token
endpoint requests, including the applicable authentication methods,
apply for the pushed authorization request endpoint as well. If
applicable, the "token_endpoint_auth_method" client metadata
[RFC7591] parameter indicates the registered authentication method
for the client to use when making direct requests to the
authorization server, including requests to the pushed authorization
request endpoint. Similarly, the
"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" authorization server metadata
[RFC8414] parameter lists client authentication methods supported by
the authorization server when accepting direct requests from clients,
including requests to the pushed authorization request endpoint.
Due to historical reasons there is potential ambiguity regarding the
appropriate audience value to use when employing JWT client assertion
based authentication (defined in Section 2.2 of [RFC7523] with
"private_key_jwt" or "client_secret_jwt" authentication method names
per Section 9 of [OIDC]). To address that ambiguity the issuer
identifier URL of the authorization server according to [RFC8414]
SHOULD be used as the value of the audience. In order to facilitate
interoperability the authorization server MUST accept its issuer
identifier, token endpoint URL, or pushed authorization request
endpoint URL as values that identify it as an intended audience.
2.1. Request
A client sends the parameters that comprise an authorization request
directly to the pushed authorization request endpoint. A typical
parameter set might include: "client_id", "response_type",
"redirect_uri", "scope", "state", "code_challenge", and
"code_challenge_method" as shown in the example below. However, the
pushed authorization request can be composed of any of the parameters
applicable for use at authorization endpoint including those defined
in [RFC6749] as well as all applicable extensions. The "request_uri"
authorization request parameter is one exception, which MUST NOT be
provided.
The request also includes, as appropriate for the given client, any
additional parameters necessary for client authentication (e.g.,
"client_secret", or "client_assertion" and "client_assertion_type").
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Such parameters are defined and registered for use at the token
endpoint but are applicable only for client authentication. When
present in a pushed authorization request, they are relied upon only
for client authentication and are not germane to the authorization
request itself. Any token endpoint parameters that are not related
to client authentication have no defined meaning for a pushed
authorization request. The "client_id" parameter is defined with the
same semantics for both authorization requests and requests to the
token endpoint; as a required authorization request parameter, it is
similarly required in a pushed authorization request.
The client adds the parameters in "x-www-form-urlencoded" format with
a character encoding of UTF-8 as described in Appendix B of [RFC6749]
to the body of an HTTP "POST" request. If applicable, the client
also adds its authentication credentials to the request header or the
request body using the same rules as for token endpoint requests.
This is illustrated by the following example (extra line breaks in
the message-body for display purposes only):
POST /as/par HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3
response_type=code&state=af0ifjsldkj&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&code_challenge=K2-ltc83acc4h0c9w6ESC_rEMTJ3bww-uCHaoeK1t8U
&code_challenge_method=S256&scope=account-information
The authorization server MUST process the request as follows:
1. Authenticate the client in the same way as at the token endpoint
(Section 2.3 of [RFC6749]).
2. Reject the request if the "request_uri" authorization request
parameter is provided.
3. Validate the pushed request as it would an authorization request
sent to the authorization endpoint. For example, the
authorization server checks whether the redirect URI matches one
of the redirect URIs configured for the client and also checks
whether the client is authorized for the scope for which it is
requesting access. This validation allows the authorization
server to refuse unauthorized or fraudulent requests early. The
authorization server MAY omit validation steps that it is unable
to perform when processing the pushed request, however such
checks MUST then be performed at the authorization endpoint.
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The authorization server MAY allow clients with authentication
credentials to establish per-authorization request redirect URIs with
every pushed authorization request. Described in more detail in
Section 2.4, this is possible since, in contrast to [RFC6749], this
specification gives the authorization server the ability to
authenticate clients and validate client requests before the actual
authorization request is performed.
2.2. Successful Response
If the verification is successful, the server MUST generate a request
URI and return a JSON response with the following members at the top
level with "201 Created" HTTP response code.
* "request_uri" : The request URI corresponding to the authorization
request posted. This URI is used as reference to the respective
request data in the subsequent authorization request only. The
way the authorization process obtains the authorization request
data is at the discretion of the authorization server and out of
scope of this specification. There is no need to make the
authorization request data available to other parties via this
URI.
* "expires_in" : A JSON number that represents the lifetime of the
request URI in seconds as a positive integer. The request URI
lifetime is at the discretion of the authorization server but will
typically be relatively short (e.g., between 5 and 600 seconds).
The format of the "request_uri" value is at the discretion of the
authorization server but it MUST contain some part generated using a
cryptographically strong pseudorandom algorithm such that it is
computationally infeasible to predict or guess a valid value (see
Section 10.10 of [RFC6749] for specifics). The authorization server
MAY construct the "request_uri" value using the form
"urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:<reference-value>" with
"<reference-value>" as the random part of the URI that references the
respective authorization request data.
The "request_uri" value MUST be bound to the client that posted the
authorization request.
The following is an example of such a response:
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HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store
{
"request_uri":
"urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:bwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2",
"expires_in": 60
}
2.3. Error Response
The authorization server returns an error response with the same
format as is specified for error responses from the token endpoint in
Section 5.2 of [RFC6749] using the appropriate error code from
therein or from Section 4.1.2.1 of [RFC6749]. In those cases where
Section 4.1.2.1 of [RFC6749] prohibits automatic redirection with an
error back to the requesting client and hence doesn't define an error
code, for example when the request fails due to a missing, invalid,
or mismatching redirection URI, the "invalid_request" error code can
be used as the default error code. Error codes defined by OAuth
extension can also be used when such an extension is involved in the
initial processing of authorization request that was pushed. Since
initial processing of the pushed authorization request does not
involve resource owner interaction, error codes related to user
interaction, such as "consent_required" defined by [OIDC], are never
returned.
If the client is required to use signed request objects, either by
authorization server or client policy (see [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq],
section 10.5), the authorization server MUST only accept requests
complying with the definition given in Section 3 and MUST refuse any
other request with HTTP status code 400 and error code
"invalid_request".
In addition to the above, the pushed authorization request endpoint
can also make use of the following HTTP status codes:
* 405: If the request did not use the "POST" method, the
authorization server responds with an HTTP 405 (Method Not
Allowed) status code.
* 413: If the request size was beyond the upper bound that the
authorization server allows, the authorization server responds
with an HTTP 413 (Payload Too Large) status code.
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* 429: If the number of requests from a client during a particular
time period exceeds the number the authorization server allows,
the authorization server responds with an HTTP 429 (Too Many
Requests) status code.
The following is an example of an error response from the pushed
authorization request endpoint:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store
{
"error": "invalid_request",
"error_description":
"The redirect_uri is not valid for the given client"
}
2.4. Management of Client Redirect URIs
While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered
"redirect_uri" values in certain circumstances, or for the
authorization server to apply its own matching semantics to the
"redirect_uri" value presented by the client at the authorization
endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as
well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an authorization
server exactly match the "redirect_uri" parameter against the set of
redirect URIs previously established for a particular client. This
is a means for early detection of client impersonation attempts and
prevents token leakage and open redirection. As a downside, this can
make client management more cumbersome since the redirect URI is
typically the most volatile part of a client policy.
The exact matching requirement MAY be relaxed when using pushed
authorization requests for clients that have established
authentication credentials with the authorization server. This is
possible since, in contrast to a traditional authorization request,
the authorization server authenticates the client before the
authorization process starts and thus ensures it is interacting with
the legitimate client. The authorization server MAY allow such
clients to specify "redirect_uri" values that were not previously
registered with the authorization server. This will give the client
more flexibility (e.g. to mint distinct redirect URI values per
authorization server at runtime) and can simplify client management.
It is at the discretion of the authorization server to apply
restrictions on supplied "redirect_uri" values, e.g. the
authorization server MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow only a
query parameter to vary at runtime.
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Note: The ability to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is
also useful in situations where client ids and corresponding
credentials and policies are managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via
client certificates containing client permissions. Such an
externally managed client could interact with an authorization server
trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additional
registration step.
3. The "request" Request Parameter
Clients MAY use the "request" parameter as defined in JAR
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq] to push a request object JWT to the
authorization server. The rules for processing, signing, and
encryption of the request object as defined in JAR
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq] apply. When the "application/x-www-form-
urlencoded" HTTP entity-body "request" parameter is used, the request
object MUST contain all the authorization request parameters as
claims of the JWT. Additional request parameters as required by the
given client authentication method are to be included as
'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' parameters in the HTTP request
entity-body (e.g. Mutual TLS client authentication [RFC8705] uses
the "client_id" HTTP request parameter while JWT assertion based
client authentication [RFC7523] uses "client_assertion" and
"client_assertion_type").
The following is an example of a pushed authorization request using a
signed request object. The client is authenticated by its client
secret using the HTTP Basic Authentication scheme specified in
Section 2.3.1 of [RFC6749] (extra line breaks for display purposes
only):
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POST /as/par HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3
request=eyJraWQiOiJrMmJkYyIsImFsZyI6IlJTMjU2In0.eyJpc3MiOiJzNkJoZ
FJrcXQzIiwiYXVkIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJyZXNwb2
5zZV90eXBlIjoiY29kZSIsImNsaWVudF9pZCI6InM2QmhkUmtxdDMiLCJyZWRpcmV
jdF91cmkiOiJodHRwczovL2NsaWVudC5leGFtcGxlLm9yZy9jYiIsInNjb3BlIjoi
YWlzIiwic3RhdGUiOiJhZjBpZmpzbGRraiIsImNvZGVfY2hhbGxlbmdlIjoiSzItb
HRjODNhY2M0aDBjOXc2RVNDX3JFTVRKM2J3dy11Q0hhb2VLMXQ4VSIsImNvZGVfY2
hhbGxlbmdlX21ldGhvZCI6IlMyNTYifQ.O49ffUxRPdNkN3TRYDvbEYVr1CeAL64u
W4FenV3n9WlaFIRHeFblzv-wlEtMm8-tusGxeE9z3ek6FxkhvvLEqEpjthXnyXqqy
Jfq3k9GSf5ay74ml_0D6lHE1hy-kVWg7SgoPQ-GB1xQ9NRhF3EKS7UZIrUHbFUCF0
MsRLbmtIvaLYbQH_Ef3UkDLOGiU7exhVFTPeyQUTM9FF-u3K-zX-FO05_brYxNGLh
VkO1G8MjqQnn2HpAzlBd5179WTzTYhKmhTiwzH-qlBBI_9GLJmE3KOipko9TfSpa2
6H4JOlMyfZFl0PCJwkByS0xZFJ2sTo3Gkk488RQohhgt1I0onw
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
The authorization server MUST take the following steps beyond the
processing rules defined in Section 2.1:
1. If applicable, decrypt the request object as specified in JAR
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq], section 6.1.
2. Validate the request object signature as specified in JAR
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq], section 6.2.
3. If the client has authentication credentials established with the
authorization server, reject the request if the authenticated
"client_id" does not match the "client_id" claim in the request
object. Additionally requiring the "iss" claim to match the
"client_id" is at the discretion of authorization server.
The following RSA key pair, represented in JWK [RFC7517] format, can
be used to validate or recreate the request object signature in the
above example (extra line breaks and indentation within values for
display purposes only):
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{
"kty": "RSA",
"kid":"k2bdc",
"n": "y9Lqv4fCp6Ei-u2-ZCKq83YvbFEk6JMs_pSj76eMkddWRuWX2aBKGHAtKlE
5P7_vn__PCKZWePt3vGkB6ePgzAFu08NmKemwE5bQI0e6kIChtt_6KzT5Oa
aXDFI6qCLJmk51Cc4VYFaxgqevMncYrzaW_50mZ1yGSFIQzLYP8bijAHGVj
dEFgZaZEN9lsn_GdWLaJpHrB3ROlS50E45wxrlg9xMncVb8qDPuXZarvghL
L0HzOuYRadBJVoWZowDNTpKpk2RklZ7QaBO7XDv3uR7s_sf2g-bAjSYxYUG
sqkNA9b3xVW53am_UZZ3tZbFTIh557JICWKHlWj5uzeJXaw",
"e": "AQAB",
"d": "LNwG_pCKrwowALpCpRdcOKlSVqylSurZhE6CpkRiE9cpDgGKIkO9CxPlXOL
zjqxXuQc8MdMqRQZTnAwgd7HH0B6gncrruV3NewI-XQV0ckldTjqNfOTz1V
Rs-jE-57KAXI3YBIhu-_0YpIDzdk_wBuAk661Svn0GsPQe7m9DoxdzenQu9
O_soewUhlPzRrTH0EeIqYI715rwI3TYaSzoWBmEPD2fICyj18FF0MPy_SQz
k3noVUUIzfzLnnJiWy_p63QBCMqjRoSHHdMnI4z9iVpIwJWQ3jO5n_2lC2-
cSgwjmKsFzDBbQNJc7qMG1N6EssJUwgGJxz1eAUFf0w4YAQ",
"qi": "J-mG0swR4FTy3atrcQ7dd0hhYn1E9QndN-
-sDG4EQO0RnFj6wIefCvwIc4
7hCtVeFnCTPYJNc_JyV-mU-9vlzS5GSNuyR5qdpsMZXUMpEvQcwKt23ffPZ
YGaqfKyEesmf_Wi8fFcE68H9REQjnniKrXm7w2-IuG_IrVJA9Ox-uU",
"q": "4hlMYAGa0dvogdK1jnxQ7J_Lqpqi99e-AeoFvoYpMPhthChTzwFZO9lQmUo
BpMqVQTws_s7vWGmt7ZAB3ywkurf0pV7BD0fweJiUzrWk4KJjxtmP_auuxr
jvm3s2FUGn6f0wRY9Z8Hj9A7C72DnYCjuZiJQMYCWDsZ8-d-L1a-s",
"p": "5sd9Er3I2FFT9R-gy84_oakEyCmgw036B_nfYEEOCwpSvi2z7UcIVK3bSEL
5WCW6BNgB3HDWhq8aYPirwQnqm0K9mX1E-4xM10WWZ-rP3XjYpQeS0Snru5
LFVWsAzi-FX7BOqBibSAXLdEGXcXa44l08iec_bPD3xduq5V_1YoE",
"dq": "Nz2PF3XM6bEc4XsluKZO70ErdYdKgdtIJReUR7Rno_tOZpejwlPGBYVW19
zpAeYtCT82jxroB2XqhLxGeMxEPQpsz2qTKLSe4BgHY2ml2uxSDGdjcsrbb
NoKUKaN1CuyZszhWl1n0AT_bENl4bJgQj_Fh0UEsQj5YBBUJt5gr_k",
"dp": "Zc877jirkkLOtyTs2vxyNe9KnMNAmOidlUc2tE_-0gAL4Lpo1hSwKCtKwe
ZJ-gkqt1hT-dwNx_0Xtg_-NXsadMRMwJnzBMYwYAfjApUkfqABc0yUCJJl3
KozRCugf1WXkU9GZAH2_x8PUopdNUEa70ISowPRh04HANKX4fkjWAE"
}
4. Authorization Request
The client uses the "request_uri" value returned by the authorization
server to build an authorization request as defined in
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq]. This is shown in the following example
where the client directs the user-agent to make the following HTTP
request (extra line breaks and indentation for display purposes
only):
GET /authorize?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&request_uri=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams
%3Aoauth%3Arequest_uri%3Abwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2 HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
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Since parts of the authorization request content, e.g. the
"code_challenge" parameter value, are unique to a particular
authorization request, the client MUST only use a "request_uri" value
once. Authorization servers SHOULD treat "request_uri" values as
one-time use but MAY allow for duplicate requests due to a user
reloading/refreshing their user-agent.
The authorization server MUST validate authorization requests arising
from a pushed request as it would any other authorization request.
The authorization server MAY omit validation steps that it performed
when the request was pushed, provided that it can validate that the
request was a pushed request, and that the request or the
authorization server's policy has not been modified in a way that
would affect the outcome of the omitted steps.
Authorization server policy MAY dictate, either globally or on a per-
client basis, that pushed authorization requests are the only means
for a client to pass authorization request data. In this case, the
authorization server will refuse, using the "invalid_request" error
code, to process any request to the authorization endpoint that does
not have a "request_uri" parameter with a value obtained from the
pushed authorization request endpoint.
Note: authorization server and clients MAY use metadata as defined in
Section 5 and Section 6 to signal the desired behavior.
5. Authorization Server Metadata
The following authorization server metadata [RFC8414] parameters are
introduced to signal the server's capability and policy with respect
to pushed authorization requests.
"pushed_authorization_request_endpoint" The URL of the pushed
authorization request endpoint at which a client can post an
authorization request in exchange for a "request_uri" value usable
at the authorization server.
"require_pushed_authorization_requests" Boolean parameter indicating
whether the authorization server accepts authorization request
data only via the pushed authorization request method. If
omitted, the default value is "false".
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Note that the presence of "pushed_authorization_request_endpoint" is
sufficient for a client to determine that it may use the pushed
authorization request flow. A "request_uri" value obtained from the
PAR endpoint is usable at the authorization endpoint regardless of
other authorization server metadata such as
"request_uri_parameter_supported" or
"require_request_uri_registration".
6. Client Metadata
The Dynamic Client Registration Protocol [RFC7591] defines an API for
dynamically registering OAuth 2.0 client metadata with authorization
servers. The metadata defined by [RFC7591], and registered
extensions to it, also imply a general data model for clients that is
useful for authorization server implementations even when the Dynamic
Client Registration Protocol isn't in play. Such implementations
will typically have some sort of user interface available for
managing client configuration. The following client metadata
parameter is introduced by this document to indicate whether pushed
authorization requests are required for the given client.
"require_pushed_authorization_requests" Boolean parameter indicating
whether the only means of initiating an authorization request the
client is allowed to use is a pushed authorization request. If
omitted, the default value is "false".
7. Security Considerations
7.1. Request URI Guessing
An attacker could attempt to guess and replay a valid request URI
value and try to impersonate the respective client. The
authorization server MUST consider the considerations given in JAR
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq], section 10.2, clause (d) on request URI
entropy.
7.2. Open Redirection
An attacker could try register a redirect URI pointing to a site
under his control in order to obtain authorization codes or launch
other attacks towards the user. The authorization server MUST only
accept new redirect URIs in the pushed authorization request from
authenticated clients.
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7.3. Request Object Replay
An attacker could replay a request URI captured from a legitimate
authorization request. In order to cope with such attacks, the
authorization server SHOULD make the request URIs one-time use.
7.4. Client Policy Change
The client policy might change between the lodging of the request
object and the authorization request using a particular request
object. It is therefore recommended that the authorization server
check the request parameter against the client policy when processing
the authorization request.
7.5. Request URI Swapping
An attacker could capture the request URI from one request and then
substitute it into a different authorization request. For example,
in the context of OpenID Connect, an attacker could replace a request
URI asking for a high level of authentication assurance with one that
requires a lower level of assurance. Clients SHOULD make use of PKCE
[RFC7636], a unique "state" parameter [RFC6749], or the OIDC "nonce"
parameter [OIDC] in the pushed request object to prevent this attack.
8. Privacy Considerations
OAuth 2.0 is a complex and flexible framework with broad ranging
privacy implications due to the very nature of it having one entity
intermediate user authorization to data access between two other
entities. The privacy considerations of all of OAuth are beyond the
scope of this document, which only defines an alternative way of
initiating one message sequence in the larger framework. Using
pushed authorization requests, however, may improve privacy by
reducing the potential for inadvertent information disclosure due to
passing authorization request data directly between client and
authorization server over a secure connection in the message-body of
an HTTP request rather than in the query component of a URL that
passes through the user-agent in the clear.
9. Acknowledgements
This specification is based on the work towards Pushed Request Object
(https://bitbucket.org/openid/fapi/src/master/
Financial_API_Pushed_Request_Object.md) conducted at the Financial-
grade API working group at the OpenID Foundation. We would like to
thank the members of the WG for their valuable contributions.
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We would like to thank Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Aaron Parecki, Justin
Richer, Sascha Preibisch, Daniel Fett, Michael B. Jones, Annabelle
Backman, Joseph Heenan, Sean Glencross, Maggie Hung, Neil Madden,
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen, Roman Danyliw, and Takahiko Kawasaki for
their valuable feedback on this draft.
10. IANA Considerations
10.1. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata
This specification requests registration of the following values in
the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry of
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC8414].
Metadata Name: "pushed_authorization_request_endpoint"
Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's pushed
authorization request endpoint
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): Section 5 of [[ this document ]]
Metadata Name: "require_pushed_authorization_requests"
Metadata Description: Indicates whether the authorization server
accepts authorization request only via the pushed authorization
request method.
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): Section 5 of [[ this document ]]
10.2. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata
This specification requests registration of the following value in
the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata" registry of
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591].
Metadata Name: "require_pushed_authorization_requests"
Metadata Description: Indicates whether the client is required to
use the pushed authorization request method to initiate
authorization requests.
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): Section 6 of [[ this document ]]
10.3. OAuth URI Registration
This specification requests registration of the following value in
the "OAuth URI" registry of [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by
[RFC6755].
URN: "urn:ietf:params:oauth:request_uri:"
Common Name: A URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth Request URIs.
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Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this document ]]
11. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. B. Jones, "The OAuth 2.0
Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request
(JAR)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
oauth-jwsreq-34, 8 April 2021,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-34>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
12. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
"OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-security-
topics-18, 13 April 2021, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-18>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1]
Hardt, D., Parecki, A., and T. Lodderstedt, "The OAuth 2.1
Authorization Framework", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-02, 15 March 2021,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-02>.
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.
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[OIDC] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
errata set 1", 8 November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6755] Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace
for OAuth", RFC 6755, DOI 10.17487/RFC6755, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6755>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7523] Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token
(JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and
Authorization Grants", RFC 7523, DOI 10.17487/RFC7523, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7523>.
[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[RFC7636] Sakimura, N., Ed., Bradley, J., and N. Agarwal, "Proof Key
for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients", RFC 7636,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7636, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7636>.
[RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T.
Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication
and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8705>.
[RFC8707] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Resource
Indicators for OAuth 2.0", RFC 8707, DOI 10.17487/RFC8707,
February 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8707>.
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Appendix A. Document History
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]
-08
* Updates to address feedback from AD Review
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/
bGSyonUqsvJ1vtY7l_ohwov25SA/
(https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/
bGSyonUqsvJ1vtY7l_ohwov25SA/)
-07
* updated references (however they did not actually update due to
tooling issues - some info in this thread:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/xml2rfc/
zqYiMxZ070SCIi7CRNF9vbDeYno/
(https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/xml2rfc/
zqYiMxZ070SCIi7CRNF9vbDeYno/) )
-06
* Add a note clarifying that the presence of
"pushed_authorization_request_endpoint" is sufficient for a client
to know that it can use the PAR flow
-05
* Mention use of "invalid_request" error code for cases, like a bad
"redirect_uri", that don't have a more specific one
-04
* Edits to address WGLC comments
* Replace I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls reference with now published RFC8705
* Moved text about redirect URI management from introduction into
separate section
-03
* Editorial updates
* Mention that https is required for the PAR endpoint
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* Add some discussion of browser form posting an authz request vs.
the benefits of PAR for any application
* Added text about motivations behind PAR - integrity,
confidentiality and early client auth
* Better explain one-time use recommendation of the request_uri
* Drop the section on special error responses for request objects
* Clarify authorization request examples to say that the client
directs the user-agent to make the HTTP GET request (vs. making
the request itself)
-02
* Update Resource Indicators reference to the somewhat recently
published RFC 8707
* Added metadata in support of pushed authorization requests only
feature
* Update to comply with draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-21, which requires
"client_id" in the authorization request in addition to the
"request_uri"
* Clarified timing of request validation
* Add some guidance/options on the request URI structure
* Add the key used in the request object example so that a reader
could validate or recreate the request object signature
* Update to draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-25 and added note regarding
"require_signed_request_object"
-01
* Use the newish RFC v3 XML and HTML format
* Added IANA registration request for
"pushed_authorization_request_endpoint"
* Changed abbrev to "OAuth PAR"
-00 (WG draft)
* Reference RFC6749 sec 2.3.1 for client secret basic rather than
RFC7617
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* further clarify that a request object JWT contains all the
authorization request parameters while client authentication
params, if applicable, are outside that JWT as regular form
encoded params in HTTP body
-01
* List "client_id" as one of the basic parameters
* Explicitly forbid "request_uri" in the processing rules
* Clarification regarding client authentication and that public
clients are allowed
* Added option to let clients register per-authorization request
redirect URIs
* General clean up and wording improvements
-00
* first draft
Authors' Addresses
Torsten Lodderstedt
yes.com
Email: torsten@lodderstedt.net
Brian Campbell
Ping Identity
Email: bcampbell@pingidentity.com
Nat Sakimura
NAT.Consulting
Email: nat@sakimura.org
Dave Tonge
Moneyhub Financial Technology
Email: dave@tonge.org
Filip Skokan
Auth0
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Email: panva.ip@gmail.com
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