BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export
draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-04

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidrops WG)
Last updated 2020-05-12 (latest revision 2020-04-08)
Replaces draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-egress
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
Formats plain text pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex
Reviews
Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Keyur Patel
Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2020-03-01)
IESG IESG state RFC Ed Queue
Consensus Boilerplate Yes
Telechat date
Responsible AD Warren Kumari
Send notices to sidrops-chairs@ietf.org, keyur@arrcus.com, warren@kumari.net, nathalie@ripe.net
IANA IANA review state IANA OK - No Actions Needed
IANA action state No IANA Actions
RFC Editor RFC Editor state RFC-EDITOR
Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
Internet-Draft                        Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus
Updates: 6811 (if approved)                                      R. Volk
Intended status: Standards Track                        Deutsche Telekom
Expires: October 10, 2020                                       J. Heitz
                                                                   Cisco
                                                           April 8, 2020

               BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export
                    draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-04

Abstract

   A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes
   received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from
   other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP
   neighbors.  For egress policy, it is important that the
   classification uses the 'effective origin AS' of the processed route,
   which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs
   such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other
   modifications of the origin AS.  This document updates [RFC6811].

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 10, 2020.

Bush, et al.            Expires October 10, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export     April 2020

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811],
   BGP prefix origin validation.  It highlights an important use case of
   origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of
   correct implementation in this context.

   The term 'effective origin AS' as used in this document refers to the
   Route Origin ASN [RFC6811] of the UPDATE to be sent to neighboring
   BGP speakers.

   The effective origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration
   and outbound policy of the BGP speaker.  A validating BGP speaker
   MUST apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics (see [RFC6811]
   Sec 2 and [RFC8481] Sec 4) after applying any egress configuration
   and policy.

   This effective origin AS of the announcement might be affected by
   removal of private ASs, confederation [RFC5065], migration [RFC7705],

Bush, et al.            Expires October 10, 2020                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export     April 2020

   etc.  Any AS_PATH modifications resulting in effective origin AS
Show full document text