Requirements for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Relying Parties
draft-ietf-sidrops-rp-03
SIDROPS D. Ma
Internet-Draft ZDNS
Intended status: Informational S. Kent
Expires: August 1, 2019 Independent
January 28, 2019
Requirements for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Relying
Parties
draft-ietf-sidrops-rp-03
Abstract
This document provides a single reference point for requirements for
Relying Party (RP) software for use in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) in the context of securing Internet routing.
It cites requirements that appear in several RPKI RFCs, making it
easier for implementers to become aware of these requirements that
are segmented with orthogonal functionalities.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 1, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
Ma & Kent Expires August 1, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft RPKI RP Requirements January 2019
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Fetching and Caching RPKI Repository Objects . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. TAL Acquisition and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Locating RPKI Objects Using Authority and Subject
Information Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Dealing with Key Rollover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4. Dealing with Algorithm Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.5. Strategies for Efficient Cache Maintenance . . . . . . . 5
3. Certificate and CRL Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Verifying Resource Certificate and Syntax . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. CRL Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Processing RPKI Repository Signed Objects . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Basic Signed Object Syntax Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Syntax and Validation for Each Type of Signed Object . . 6
4.2.1. Manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.2. ROA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.3. Ghostbusters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.4. Verifying BGPsec Router Certificate . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. How to Make Use of Manifest Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. What to Do with Ghostbusters Information . . . . . . . . 8
5. Distributing Validated Cache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
The RPKI Relying Party (RP) software is used by network operators and
others to acquire and verify Internet Number Resource (INR) data
stored in the RPKI repository system. RPKI data, when verified,
allow an RP to verify assertions about which Autonomous Systems
(ASes) are authorized to originate routes for IP address prefixes.
RPKI data also establishes binding between public keys and BGP
Show full document text