A Profile for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Canonical Cache Representation (CCR)
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr-04
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| Authors | Job Snijders , Bart Bakker , Tim Bruijnzeels , Theo Buehler | ||
| Last updated | 2026-05-12 (Latest revision 2026-05-06) | ||
| Replaces | draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-ccr | ||
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draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr-04
SIDROPS J. Snijders
Internet-Draft BSD
Intended status: Standards Track B. Bakker
Expires: 7 November 2026 T. Bruijnzeels
RIPE NCC
T. Buehler
OpenBSD
6 May 2026
A Profile for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Canonical Cache
Representation (CCR)
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr-04
Abstract
This document specifies a Canonical Cache Representation (CCR)
content type for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI). CCR is a DER-encoded data interchange format which can be
used to represent various aspects of the state of a validated RPKI
cache at a particular point in time. The CCR profile is a compact
and versatile format well-suited for applications such as audit
trails, analytics pipelines, and validated payload dissemination.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 November 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The Canonical Cache Representation content type . . . . . . . 3
3. The Canonical Cache Representation content . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. hashAlg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. producedAt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. State aspect fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4.1. ManifestState . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4.2. ROAPayloadState . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4.3. ASPAPayloadState . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4.4. TrustAnchorState . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4.5. RouterKeyState . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Constructing Consistent Views on Distributed Data . . . . 10
4.2. Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. CCR file integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2. RPKI Repository Name Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.4. Media Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.4.1. Canonical Cache Representation Media Type . . . . . . 12
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix B. Example CCR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix C. Implementation status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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1. Introduction
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) operators often wish to
analyze Certification Authority (CA) and Relying Party (RP) behavior
by inspecting validation outcomes. To this end, Canonical Cache
Representation (CCR) was developed to capture and archive RPKI
validation states in a standardized data representation.
CCR offers a compact and versatile format well-suited for
applications such as audit trails, analytics pipelines, and validated
payload dissemination. A validated cache contains all RPKI objects
that the RP has verified to be valid according to the rules for
validation (see [RFC6487], [RFC6488], [RFC9286]). CCR is a data
interchange format using Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER, [X.690])
which can be used to represent various aspects of the state of a
validated cache at a particular point in time in a reproducible
manner.
This document formally specifies the CCR content type for use with
the RPKI and provides test vectors.
1.1. History
The format was initially designed to support comparative analysis of
multiple RP instances using a variety of RPKI transport protocols
([RFC5781], [RFC8182], and [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol]).
1.2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. The Canonical Cache Representation content type
The content of a CCR file is an instance of ContentInfo.
The contentType for a CCR is defined as id-ct-
rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation, with Object Identifier (OID)
1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.54.
The content field contains an instance of
RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation.
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3. The Canonical Cache Representation content
The content of a Canonical Cache Representation is formally defined
as follows:
RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation-2025
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiCCR-2025(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE, Digest, DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
SubjectKeyIdentifier
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }
ASID, ROAIPAddressFamily
FROM RPKI-ROA-2023 -- in [RFC9582]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(75) }
CAS, PAS
FROM RPKI-ASPA-2023 -- in [draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-aspa-2023(TBD) }
CertificateSerialNumber, SubjectPublicKeyInfo
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }
AccessDescription, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59) }
;
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
contentType CONTENT-TYPE.&id({ContentSet}),
content [0] EXPLICIT
CONTENT-TYPE.&Type({ContentSet}{@contentType}) }
ContentSet CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
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ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation, ... }
ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation
IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation }
id-ct-rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) ccr(54) }
RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
hashAlg DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
producedAt GeneralizedTime,
mfts [1] ManifestState OPTIONAL,
vrps [2] ROAPayloadState OPTIONAL,
vaps [3] ASPAPayloadState OPTIONAL,
tas [4] TrustAnchorState OPTIONAL,
rks [5] RouterKeyState OPTIONAL,
... }
-- at least one of mfts, vrps, vaps, tas, or rks MUST be present
( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., mfts PRESENT } |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., vrps PRESENT } |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., vaps PRESENT } |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., tas PRESENT } |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., rks PRESENT } )
ManifestState ::= SEQUENCE {
mis SEQUENCE OF ManifestInstance,
mostRecentUpdate GeneralizedTime,
hash Digest }
ManifestInstance ::= SEQUENCE {
hash Digest,
size INTEGER (1000..MAX),
aki KeyIdentifier,
manifestNumber INTEGER (0..MAX),
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
locations SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF AccessDescription,
subordinates SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF SubjectKeyIdentifier
OPTIONAL }
ROAPayloadState ::= SEQUENCE {
rps SEQUENCE OF ROAPayloadSet,
hash Digest }
ROAPayloadSet ::= SEQUENCE {
asID ASID,
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ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }
ASPAPayloadState ::= SEQUENCE {
aps SEQUENCE OF ASPAPayloadSet,
hash Digest }
ASPAPayloadSet ::= SEQUENCE {
customerASID CAS,
providers SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF PAS }
TrustAnchorState ::= SEQUENCE {
skis SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF SubjectKeyIdentifier,
hash Digest }
RouterKeyState ::= SEQUENCE {
rksets SEQUENCE OF RouterKeySet,
hash Digest }
RouterKeySet ::= SEQUENCE {
asID ASID,
routerKeys SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF RouterKey }
RouterKey ::= SEQUENCE {
ski SubjectKeyIdentifier,
spki SubjectPublicKeyInfo }
END
3.1. version
The version field contains the format version for the
RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation structure, in this version of the
specification it MUST be 0.
3.2. hashAlg
The hashAlg field specifies the algorithm used to construct the
message digests. This profile uses SHA-256 [SHS], therefore the OID
MUST be 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 and the parameters field MUST be
absent (Section 2 of [RFC5754]).
3.3. producedAt
The producedAt field contains a GeneralizedTime and indicates the
moment in time the CCR was generated.
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3.4. State aspect fields
Each CCR contains one or more fields representing particular aspects
of the cache's state. Implementers should note the ellipsis
extension marker in the RpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation ASN.1
notation and anticipate future changes as new signed object types are
standardized.
Each state aspect generally consists of a sequence of details
extracted from RPKI Objects of a specific type, along with a digest
computed by hashing the aforementioned DER-encoded sequence, and
optionally including some metadata.
3.4.1. ManifestState
An instance of ManifestState represents the set of valid, current
Manifests ([RFC9286]) in the cache. It contains three fields: mis,
mostRecentUpdate, and hash.
3.4.1.1. ManifestInstance
The mis field contains a SEQUENCE of ManifestInstance. There is one
ManifestInstance for each current manifest. A manifest is nominally
current until the time specified in nextUpdate or until a manifest is
issued with a greater manifestNumber, whichever comes first (see
Section 4.2.1 of [RFC9286]).
A ManifestInstance is a structure consisting of the following fields:
hash the hash of the represented DER-encoded manifest object
size the size of the represented DER-encoded manifest object
aki the manifest issuer's key identifier
manifestNumber the manifest number contained within the manifest's
eContent field
thisUpdate the thisUpdate contained within the manifest's eContent
field
locations a sequence of AccessDescription instances from the
manifest's End-Entity certificate's Subject Information Access
extension
subordinates a optional non-empty SEQUENCE of SubjectKeyIdentifier
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The subordinates field represents the keypairs associated with the
set of non-revoked, non-expired, validly signed, certification
authority (CA) resource certificates subordinate to the manifest
issuer. Each SubjectKeyIdentifier is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the
value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the resource
certificate's Subject Public Key, as described in Section 4.8.2 of
[RFC6487]. The sequence elements of the subordinates field MUST be
sorted in ascending order by interpreting each SubjectKeyIdentifier
value as an unsigned 160-bit integer and MUST be unique with respect
to each other.
The sequence elements in the mis field MUST be sorted in ascending
order by hash value contained in each instance of ManifestInstance
and MUST be unique with respect to the other instances of
ManifestInstance.
3.4.1.2. mostRecentUpdate
The mostRecentUpdate is a metadata field which contains the most
recent thisUpdate amongst all current manifests represented by the
ManifestInstance structures. If the mis field contains an empty
sequence, the mostRecentUpdate MUST be set to the POSIX Epoch
("19700101000000Z").
Comparing the ManifestState mostRecentUpdate timestamp value with the
producedAt timestamp might help offer insight into the timing and
propagation delays of the RPKI ecosystem.
3.4.1.3. hash
The hash field contains a message digest computed using the mis value
(encoded in DER format) as input message.
3.4.2. ROAPayloadState
An instance of ROAPayloadState contains a field named rps which
represents the current set of Validated ROA Payloads (Section 2 of
[RFC6811]) encoded as a SEQUENCE of ROAPayloadSet instances.
The ROAPayloadSet structure is modeled after the
RouteOriginAttestation (Section 4 of [RFC9582]). The asID value in
each instance of ROAPayloadSet MUST be unique with respect to other
instances of ROAPayloadSet. The contents of the ipAddrBlocks field
MUST appear in canonical form and ordered as defined in Section 4.3.3
of [RFC9582].
The hash field contains a message digest computed using the rps value
(encoded in DER format) as input message.
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3.4.3. ASPAPayloadState
An instance of ASPAPayloadState contains an aps field which
represents the current set of deduplicated and merged ASPA payloads
([I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]) ordered by ascending customerASID
value encoded as a SEQUENCE of ASPAPayloadSet instances. The
customerASID value in each instance of ASPAPayloadSet MUST be unique
with respect to other instances of ASPAPayloadSet.
The ASPAPayloadSet structure is modeled after the ProviderASSet
(Section 3.3 of [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]).
The hash field contains a message digest computed using the aps value
(encoded in DER format) as input message.
3.4.4. TrustAnchorState
An instance of TrustAnchorState represents the set of valid Trust
Anchor (TA) Certification Authority (CA) resource certificates used
by the relying party when producing the CCR.
Each SubjectKeyIdentifier is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of
the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the TA's Subject Public Key, as
described in Section 4.8.2 of [RFC6487]. The skis field contains a
sequence of Subject Key Identifiers (SKI) sorted in ascending order
by interpreting the SKI value as an unsigned 160-bit integer.
The hash field contains a message digest computed using the skis
value (encoded in DER format) as input message.
3.4.5. RouterKeyState
An instance of RouterKeyState contains an rksets field which
represents the current set of valid BGPsec Router Keys [RFC8205]
encoded as a SEQUENCE of RouterKeySet instances. The asID value in
each instance of RouterKeySet MUST be unique with respect to other
instances of RouterKeySet. Instances of RouterKeySet are sorted by
ascending value of asID. Instances of RouterKey are sorted by
ascending value of ski by interpreting the SKI value as an unsigned
160-bit integer.
The hash field contains a message digest computed using the rks value
(encoded in DER format) as input message.
4. Use Cases
This section describes a number of applications for the CCR format
across different contexts.
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4.1. Constructing Consistent Views on Distributed Data
This section describes a use case for CCRs in the context of
distributed systems.
Assuming CAs issue Manifests in accordance with Section 5 of
[RFC9286], a ManifestInstance can be considered a state-based
Conflict-free Replicated Data Type ([CRDT]), meaning that
ManifestInstance sets contain sufficient information to form a
monotonic semilattice.
The implication is that ManifestState instances from multiple CCRs
produced by multiple different RPs at different times can safely be
merged in order to construct an internally consistent view of the
RPKI distributed database.
The reconciled merge result can be useful, for example, as a backend
for Erik Synchronization relays
([I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol]) which execute separate
validation processes for different Trust Anchors and varying maximum
certificate chain depths.
4.2. Data Collection
Operators have an interest in determining how the global RPKI is
viewed from the perspectives of several different locations around
the Internet. As CCR allows for point-in-time capture and later
reconstruction and analysis, it found use in multi-perspective
collector methods such as described RPKISPOOL
[I-D.snijders-rpkispool-format].
An example of a large-scale CCR-based RPKI data archival project is
[RPKIViews].
5. Operational Considerations
This section covers operational considerations.
5.1. CCR file integrity
The integrity of a CCR file can be checked by confirming whether the
hash value embedded inside each state aspect matches the computed
hash value of the respective state aspect payload structure. Readers
MUST verify the integrity of CCR files and stop further processing on
failure.
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5.2. Efficiency
CCRs compress very well due to its data layout characteristics: the
content contains repetitive sequences, does not contain high entropy
data such as public keys, and is consistently ordered. Readers and
writers of CCR data are RECOMMENDED to support data compression using
Gzip ([RFC1952]) in context of durable storage.
6. Security Considerations
The CCR format utilizes a structure that can store information about
the state of a given RPKI cache at a particular moment in time. The
fields defined in this specification are of a descriptive nature and
provide information that is useful to facilitate the analysis of RPKI
data. As such, these fields do not in themselves create additional
security risks, since the fields are not used to induce any
particular behavior by the recipient application.
Readers MUST check contextual bounds on all fields appropriately and
stop further processing on failure. E.g., the maxLength element in a
ROAIPAddress cannot contain an integer smaller than the length of the
accompanying prefix, the manifestNumber field is cannot be longer
than 20 octets, etc.
The CCR format contains no executable code, and it does not define
any extensible areas that could be used to store such code.
CCRs are not signed objects. RPKI information is normally public and
does not call for confidentiality protection. Ascertaining the
provenance (and thus authenticity) of any given CCR is out-of-scope
for this document.
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)
IANA has allocated the following in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS
Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry:
+=========+==================================+==================+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+==================================+==================+
| 54 | id-ct- | draft-ietf- |
| | rpkiCanonicalCacheRepresentation | sidrops-rpki-ccr |
+---------+----------------------------------+------------------+
Table 1
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7.2. RPKI Repository Name Schemes
IANA is requested to add the Canonical Cache Representation file
extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry [RFC6481] as
follows:
+===========+=================+=============================+
| Filename | RPKI Object | Reference |
| Extension | | |
+===========+=================+=============================+
| .ccr | Canonical Cache | draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr |
| | Representation | |
+-----------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
Table 2
7.3. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)
IANA is requested to allocate the following in the "SMI Security for
S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:
+=========+=====================+=============================+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=====================+=============================+
| TBD | id-mod-rpkiCCR-2025 | draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr |
+---------+---------------------+-----------------------------+
Table 3
7.4. Media Types
IANA is requested to register the media types "application/rpki-ccr"
and "application/rpki-ccr+gz" in the "Media Types" registry as
follows:
7.4.1. Canonical Cache Representation Media Type
Type name: application
Subtype name: rpki-ccr
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: This media type contains no active content.
Interoperability considerations: N/A
Published specification: draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr
Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
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Additional information:
Content: This media type is a RPKI
Canonical Cache Representation object, as defined in draft-
ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr.
Magic number(s): N/A
File extension(s): .ccr
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information: Job
Snijders (job@bsd.nl)
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: N/A
Author: Job Snijders (job@bsd.nl)
Change controller: IETF
Type name: application
Subtype name: rpki-ccr+gz
Content: This media type is a Gzip compressed RPKI Canonical Cache
Representation object, as defined in draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr.
Magic number(s): N/A
File extension(s): .ccr.gz
References: RFC1952, RFC6713
Encoding considerations: gzip is a binary encoding
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]
Snijders, J., Azimov, A., Uskov, E., Bush, R., Housley,
R., and B. Maddison, "A Profile for Autonomous System
Provider Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-26, 19 April 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
aspa-profile-26>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5754] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", RFC 5754, DOI 10.17487/RFC5754, January
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5754>.
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[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9286] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 9286, DOI 10.17487/RFC9286, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9286>.
[RFC9582] Snijders, J., Maddison, B., Lepinski, M., Kong, D., and S.
Kent, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",
RFC 9582, DOI 10.17487/RFC9582, May 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9582>.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", March 2012,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-
180-4.pdf>.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1:2021,
February 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690-202102-I/en>.
8.2. Informative References
Snijders, et al. Expires 7 November 2026 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft RPKI Canonical Cache Representation May 2026
[CRDT] Shapiro, M., Preguiça, N., Baquero, C., and M. Zawirski,
"Conflict-free Replicated Data Types", INRIA RR-7687, July
2011, <https://inria.hal.science/inria-00609399>.
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-erik-protocol]
Snijders, J., Bruijnzeels, T., Harrison, T., and W. Ohgai,
"The Erik Synchronization Protocol for use with the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-erik-
protocol-04, 17 March 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
rpki-erik-protocol-04>.
[I-D.snijders-rpkispool-format]
Snijders, J. and F. Vompe, "The RPKISPOOL Format for
Materializing Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Data", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-snijders-
rpkispool-format-00, 2 March 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-snijders-
rpkispool-format-00>.
[RFC1952] Deutsch, P., "GZIP file format specification version 4.3",
RFC 1952, DOI 10.17487/RFC1952, May 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1952>.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Scheme", RFC 5781, DOI 10.17487/RFC5781, February 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5781>.
[RFC8182] Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., and R. Austein,
"The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)", RFC 8182,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8182, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8182>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
[rpki-client]
Jeker, C., Dzonsons, K., Buehler, T., and J. Snijders,
"rpki-client", December 2025,
<https://www.rpki-client.org/>.
[rpki-commons]
NCC, R., "rpki-commons", April 2026,
<https://github.com/RIPE-NCC/rpki-commons>.
Snijders, et al. Expires 7 November 2026 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft RPKI Canonical Cache Representation May 2026
[rpkitouch]
Snijders, J., "rpki-client", December 2025,
<https://www.github.com/job/rpkitouch>.
[RPKIViews]
Snijders, J., "The RPKIViews Project", April 2026,
<https://www.rpkiviews.org/>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Russ Housley and Luuk Hendriks for their
generous feedback on this specification.
Appendix B. Example CCR
The below is a Base64-encoded example CCR object. For a more
elaborate example based on the global RPKI, see the URL in
Appendix C.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, et al. Expires 7 November 2026 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft RPKI Canonical Cache Representation May 2026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, et al. Expires 7 November 2026 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft RPKI Canonical Cache Representation May 2026
QIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATgXEmvSfZu7HW5fUS+X5BbBli8hp0+Mu4VfabGoq4AZSEqev
tUssOCsT76X2nl4faRZM1UA3bYVRTd1v9EqkTbBCC6X7RJzvtroA82Enliou6m6Gf+hRK
73a3pxuS4vBbB0g==
It decodes as follows:
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
File: example.ccr
Hash identifier: u8u0JbdDaij8cplt6kTaIyQFSzvgexIKuEsLhBzGhQI=
CCR produced at: Sat 11 Apr 2026 08:04:31 +0000
Manifest state hash: 8bXskzbWa1oCoQYF1VnbQskxegvOO2eyS67YnkY29wg=
Manifest last update: Sat 11 Apr 2026 08:00:03 +0000
Manifest instances:
hash:AAA2wRwPsxllQz3CGSuUSNg95LD7ve8TkQG8oJf\
Zf/Q= size:1998 aki:46387C56B331FF84BC10D8AC90E1E2C16F172345 seqnum:\
18B2 thisupdate:1775862111 sia:rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFA\
ULT/48/1b40ff-b1e1-4951-9165-23bb39a83481/1/Rjh8VrMx_4S8ENiskOHiwW8X\
I0U.mft
hash:AAFxGHgJjLarAoLN6aV4ByTazpqHNrQ4xDjc5eX\
RQrY= size:2360 aki:C0D733E05D4C056E3A7E94332DC46BE80148688A seqnum:\
010D0C9F43285843EC2B3B6AE919C88C87F39200 thisupdate:1775858403 sia:r\
sync://rpki.arin.net/repository/arin-rpki-ta/5e4a23ea-e80a-403e-b08c\
-2171da2157d3/871da40f-793a-4a45-a0a9-978148321a07/a120b5d4-da56-49b\
1-8ae1-7987a6afde99/a120b5d4-da56-49b1-8ae1-7987a6afde99.mft
hash:AAW6NCJNhHhc/7A9Breu8dpn2xXFC71OKRA9u9x\
KsZQ= size:2360 aki:AE122805FDB09BF5B1DFDC14985AC40F07F43E85 seqnum:\
010D0C9F4328584B9CE67A3ADA7D16609B932F8F thisupdate:1775876403 sia:r\
sync://rpki.arin.net/repository/arin-rpki-ta/5e4a23ea-e80a-403e-b08c\
-2171da2157d3/85e06eaf-37a7-4588-abea-e4909ef1b4e2/b2c58ba9-3393-4f4\
c-abe1-b231a3ea2700/b2c58ba9-3393-4f4c-abe1-b231a3ea2700.mft
hash:AAa3zi7lmCVevHrdjC4RltPtW7yVv4w8/6KfKt+\
1EQY= size:1998 aki:16B198B6EE3AF68DEBC2347A5E98F711FB30F28B seqnum:\
05B6 thisupdate:1775876533 sia:rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFA\
ULT/3a/22ae14-e45e-4eee-bd07-4482ada232e3/1/FrGYtu469o3rwjR6Xpj3Efsw\
8os.mft
hash:AAdjp/1ti4quGz7ucd/EZ/g28pqgrdsIN2FoHsI\
/O/s= size:2443 aki:02725494FA7C81427EC59F0713F3B9B068EBC8C2 seqnum:\
010D0C9F43285842762E5CDF487448DBE3D65306 thisupdate:1775862003 sia:r\
sync://rpki.arin.net/repository/arin-rpki-ta/5e4a23ea-e80a-403e-b08c\
-2171da2157d3/5b7fb122-dfdf-4c0c-b90d-3bc7a5feb82b/fdc3365a-18ea-469\
6-ad8c-6b66a3e152b7/fdc3365a-18ea-4696-ad8c-6b66a3e152b7.mft
hash:AAgBgdsAF5T25s1DMzpv6dmVkk/F8ye6gUxqw2Q\
+UWs= size:1924 aki:38D63C5FCE1EF09E4BF2CFC94BB2509FD5FF509C seqnum:\
06E4 thisupdate:1775887279 sia:rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFA\
ULT/bf/ee3d73-9729-4da4-8bc7-67c442d6a850/1/ONY8X84e8J5L8s_JS7JQn9X_\
UJw.mft
hash:AAgGTG8qcTnrJ+s3v2qwsYhicint7+AAzZvEBKS\
Snijders, et al. Expires 7 November 2026 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft RPKI Canonical Cache Representation May 2026
0/Cg= size:2072 aki:73E157B2918CADCA8A5A9FBC66E977608A6DF5E1 seqnum:\
18BB thisupdate:1775880020 sia:rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFA\
ULT/79/bbcd53-c4f8-4245-bb90-00a154b8ecb1/1/c-FXspGMrcqKWp-8Zul3YIpt\
9eE.mft
hash:AAxlL+UgVK9Dx4hdFmtC1Io4cnNXa+WSktfxHND\
M2dQ= size:2360 aki:9E6EF4051C0BC6DB084757A8A37A7D5929AED033 seqnum:\
010D0C9F43285847D8BF5EF10E9318A0E5C72573 thisupdate:1775844003 sia:r\
sync://rpki.arin.net/repository/arin-rpki-ta/5e4a23ea-e80a-403e-b08c\
-2171da2157d3/69fd0156-bb1f-48b6-bf32-c9492286f195/afb3511b-f1b6-44a\
d-9c36-f6576a5400df/afb3511b-f1b6-44ad-9c36-f6576a5400df.mft
hash:ABHMuie2PQZfMvLKOxKMHfjD1eaPqk9g7ApjxVq\
Reko= size:1998 aki:DA77FA100D6CD288E544C7CB4C7D4D18879079ED seqnum:\
0344 thisupdate:1775865660 sia:rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFA\
ULT/dc/e31ad5-ef74-40a4-9a0d-df872fb269cf/1/2nf6EA1s0ojlRMfLTH1NGIeQ\
ee0.mft
hash:ABRkjCfKzkq+VljmLDPOTrRzb9XCSHS4+MdJ85h\
48Ck= size:2360 aki:4E428C958C2E77BF29924C4307CA4C7AAFCCAC8F seqnum:\
010D0C9F432858457C8ED47A37E56E1C2B792621 thisupdate:1775894403 sia:r\
sync://rpki.arin.net/repository/arin-rpki-ta/5e4a23ea-e80a-403e-b08c\
-2171da2157d3/4ab7ae4d-bd7b-4b33-9a88-5b22d2a8337d/022d0269-7d56-45c\
c-8167-b1e7ab13f1f4/022d0269-7d56-45cc-8167-b1e7ab13f1f4.mft
hash:ABmkMrkqDHq5RUqsoySxusyf+4z3PHRJyCZKs08\
B5xw= size:2280 aki:D6BA7E3355B5CBF6740392364CA921379241C027 seqnum:\
010D0C9F432858410FF677C49D023E85FBC3671F thisupdate:1775833203 sia:r\
sync://rpki.arin.net/repository/arin-rpki-ta/5e4a23ea-e80a-403e-b08c\
-2171da2157d3/2a246947-2d62-4a6c-ba05-87187f0099b2/0a94b460-7441-495\
e-9358-475ea795ecc6/0a94b460-7441-495e-9358-475ea795ecc6.mft
ROA payload state hash: 1YAaU0XAqrxHTlD4u0b5hsPYI5aDsNzXDQMKFESDEQI=
ROA payload entries:
192.35.94.0/24-32 AS 7
192.67.43.0/24-32 AS 7
194.32.69.0/24-32 AS 7
194.32.218.0/23-32 AS 7
194.34.138.0/24-32 AS 7
194.61.92.0/23-32 AS 7
2a0b:3b40::/29-128 AS 7
91.208.34.0/24 AS 8283
94.142.240.0/21 AS 8283
94.142.240.0/24 AS 8283
94.142.241.0/24 AS 8283
94.142.242.0/24 AS 8283
94.142.244.0/24 AS 8283
94.142.245.0/24 AS 8283
94.142.246.0/24 AS 8283
94.142.247.0/24 AS 8283
185.52.224.0/22 AS 8283
185.52.224.0/24 AS 8283
185.52.225.0/24 AS 8283
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185.52.226.0/24 AS 8283
185.52.227.0/24 AS 8283
2001:678:688::/48 AS 8283
2a02:898::/32 AS 8283
67.221.245.0/24 AS 15562
165.254.225.0/24 AS 15562
165.254.255.0/24-32 AS 15562
192.147.168.0/24 AS 15562
198.58.2.0/23-24 AS 15562
204.2.30.0/23-24 AS 15562
209.24.1.0/24 AS 15562
209.24.5.0/24 AS 15562
209.24.9.0/24 AS 15562
2001:418:144e::/47-64 AS 15562
2001:67c:208c::/48 AS 15562
2001:728:1808::/48 AS 15562
2607:fae0:245::/48 AS 15562
2a0e:b240::/48 AS 15562
2a0e:b240:118::/48 AS 15562
ASPA payload state hash:yExPStpSJe0pyUQMoBovEeEja7lgiIKJVkbv+MYaCY0=
ASPA payload entries:
customer: 80 providers: 3356, 6461
customer: 174 providers: 0
customer: 267 providers: 12129, 14103
customer: 553 providers: 174, 559, 680, 1299\
, 2914, 3320
customer: 559 providers: 174, 513, 553, 1299\
, 3257, 3356, 20965, 21320
Trust anchor state hash:oebI0qUfh/d/trWLqpORmZAQEQCoYQD+4fhyhkfmoAw=
Trust anchor keyids: 13D4F24F9A9FCD98DB36F930631808C88F3974BC, E8\
552B1FD6D1A4F7E404C6D8E5680D1EBC163FC3
Router key state hash: ul+0Sc77a6APNhJ5YqLupuhn/oUSu92t6cbkuLwWwdI=
Router keys:
asid:15562 ski:5D4250E2D81D4448D8A29EFCE91D2\
9FF075EC9E2 pubkey:MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEgFcjQ/g//LAQe\
rAH2Mpp+GucoDAGBbhIqD33wNPsXxnAGb+mtZ7XQrVO9DQ6UlAShtig5+QfEKpTtFgiq\
fiAFQ==
asid:15562 ski:BE889B55D0B737397D75C49F485B8\
58FA98AD11F pubkey:MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE4FxJr0n2bux1u\
X1Evl+QWwZYvIadPjLuFX2mxqKuAGUhKnr7VLLDgrE++l9p5eH2kWTNVAN22FUU3db/R\
KpE2w==
Validation: N/A
Appendix C. Implementation status
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
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This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942.
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist.
According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".
* Example .ccr files were created by Job Snijders. A current
example CCR (regenerated every few minutes) is available here:
https://console.rpki-client.org/rpki.ccr
* A CCR serializer and deserializer implementation based on
[rpki-client] was provided by Job Snijders and Theo Buehler.
* Another CCR serializer, deserializer, and CRDT effector
implementation based on [rpkitouch] was provided by Job Snijders.
* A CCR encoding and decoding implementation in Java library
[rpki-commons] was provided by RIPE NCC.
Authors' Addresses
Job Snijders
BSD Software Development
Amsterdam
Netherlands
Email: job@bsd.nl
URI: https://www.bsd.nl
Bart Bakker
RIPE NCC
Netherlands
Email: bbakker@ripe.net
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Tim Bruijnzeels
RIPE NCC
Netherlands
Email: tbruijnzeels@ripe.net
Theo Buehler
OpenBSD
Switzerland
Email: tb@openbsd.org
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