Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates
draft-ietf-stir-certificates-12

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (stir WG)
Last updated 2017-03-13
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
On Agenda stir at IETF-98
Document shepherd Robert Sparks
Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2016-10-18)
IESG IESG state IESG Evaluation::AD Followup
Consensus Boilerplate Yes
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Has enough positions to pass.
Responsible AD Alissa Cooper
Send notices to "Robert Sparks" <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
IANA IANA review state Version Changed - Review Needed
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Network Working Group                                        J. Peterson
Internet-Draft                                                   Neustar
Intended status: Standards Track                               S. Turner
Expires: September 14, 2017                                        sn3rd
                                                          March 13, 2017

          Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates
                  draft-ietf-stir-certificates-12.txt

Abstract

   In order to prevent the impersonation of telephone numbers on the
   Internet, some kind of credential system needs to exist that
   cryptographically asserts authority over telephone numbers.  This
   document describes the use of certificates in establishing authority
   over telephone numbers, as a component of a broader architecture for
   managing telephone numbers as identities in protocols like SIP.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Peterson & Turner      Expires September 14, 2017               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 STIR Certs                     March 2017

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Authority for Telephone Numbers in Certificates . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Certificate Usage with STIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Enrollment and Authorization using the TN Authorization List    6
     5.1.  Constraints on Signing PASSporTs  . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Certificate Extension Scope and Structure . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Provisioning Private Keying Material  . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Acquiring Credentials to Verify Signatures  . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  JWT Claim Constraints Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  TN Authorization List Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   10. Certificate Freshness and Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     10.1.  Acquiring TN Lists By Reference  . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

1.  Introduction

   The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] identifies the primary enabler
   of robocalling, vishing, swatting and related attacks as the
   capability to impersonate a calling party number.  The starkest
   examples of these attacks are cases where automated callees on the
   PSTN rely on the calling number as a security measure, for example to
   access a voicemail system.  Robocallers use impersonation as a means
   of obscuring identity; while robocallers can, in the ordinary PSTN,
   block (that is, withhold) their caller identity, callees are less
   likely to pick up calls from blocked identities, and therefore
   appearing to call from some number, any number, is preferable.
   Robocallers however prefer not to call from a number that can trace
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