Deprecating Obsolete Key Exchange Methods in TLS 1.2
draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex-05
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (tls WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Carrick Bartle , Nimrod Aviram | ||
| Last updated | 2024-09-14 (Latest revision 2024-09-03) | ||
| Replaces | draft-bartle-tls-deprecate-ffdh, draft-aviram-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Joseph A. Salowey | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2024-09-01 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | AD Evaluation::External Party | |
| Action Holder |
Paul Wouters
90
|
||
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Paul Wouters | ||
| Send notices to | joe@salowey.net |
draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex-05
TLS Working Group C. Bartle
Internet-Draft Roblox
Updates: 9325, 4346, 5246, 4162, 6347, 5932, N. Aviram
5288, 6209, 6367, 8422, 5289, 5469, 3 September 2024
4785, 4279, 5487, 6655, 7905 (if
approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: 7 March 2025
Deprecating Obsolete Key Exchange Methods in TLS 1.2
draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex-05
Abstract
This document deprecates the use of RSA key exchange and Diffie
Hellman over a finite field in TLS 1.2, and discourages the use of
static elliptic curve Diffie Hellman cipher suites.
Note that these prescriptions apply only to TLS 1.2 since TLS 1.0 and
1.1 are deprecated by RFC 8996 and TLS 1.3 either does not use the
affected algorithm or does not share the relevant configuration
options.
This document updates RFCs 9325, 4346, 5246, 4162, 6347, 5932, 5288,
6209, 6367, 8422, 5289, 5469, 4785, 4279, 5487, 6655, and 7905.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 March 2025.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Non-Ephemeral Diffie Hellman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Ephemeral Finite Field Diffie Hellman . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. DH Cipher Suites Deprecated by This Document . . . . 11
Appendix B. ECDH Cipher Suites Whose Use Is Discouraged by This
Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix C. DHE Cipher Suites deprecated by This Document . . . 16
Appendix D. RSA Cipher Suites Deprecated by This Document . . . 19
Appendix E. TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers Deprecated by
This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
TLS 1.2 supports a variety of key exchange algorithms, including RSA,
Diffie Hellman over a finite field, and elliptic curve Diffie Hellman
(ECDH).
Diffie Hellman key exchange, over any group, comes in ephemeral and
non-ephemeral varieties. Non-ephemeral DH algorithms use static DH
public keys included in the authenticating peer's certificate; see
[RFC4492] for discussion. In contrast, ephemeral DH algorithms use
ephemeral DH public keys sent in the handshake and authenticated by
the peer's certificate. Ephemeral and non-ephemeral finite field DH
algorithms are called DHE and DH (or FFDHE and FFDH), respectively,
and ephemeral and non-ephemeral elliptic curve DH algorithms are
called ECDHE and ECDH, respectively [RFC4492].
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In general, non-ephemeral cipher suites are not recommended due to
their lack of forward secrecy. Moreover, as demonstrated by the
[Raccoon] attack on finite-field DH, public key reuse, either via
non-ephemeral cipher suites or reused keys with ephemeral cipher
suites, can lead to timing side channels that may leak connection
secrets. For elliptic curve DH, invalid curve attacks similarly
exploit secret reuse in order to break security [ICA], further
demonstrating the risk of reusing public keys. While both side
channels can be avoided in implementations, experience shows that in
practice, implementations may fail to thwart such attacks due to the
complexity and number of the required mitigations.
Additionally, RSA key exchange suffers from security problems that
are independent of implementation choices as well as problems that
stem purely from the difficulty of implementing security
countermeasures correctly.
At a rough glance, the problems affecting FFDHE in TLS 1.2 are as
follows:
1. FFDHE suffers from interoperability problems because there is no
mechanism for negotiating the group, and some implementations
only support small group sizes (see [RFC7919], Section 1).
2. FFDHE groups may have small subgroups, which enables several
attacks [subgroups]. When presented with a custom, non-
standardized FFDHE group, a handshaking client cannot practically
verify that the group chosen by the server does not suffer from
this problem. There is also no mechanism for such handshakes to
fall back to other key exchange parameters that are acceptable to
the client. Custom FFDHE groups are widespread (as a result of
advice based on [weak-dh]). Therefore, clients cannot simply
reject handshakes that present custom, and thus potentially
dangerous, groups.
3. In practice, some operators use 1024-bit FFDHE groups since this
is the maximum size that ensures wide support (see [RFC7919],
Section 1). This size leaves only a small security margin vs.
the current discrete log record, which stands at 795 bits
[DLOG795].
4. Expanding on the previous point, just a handful of very large
computations allow an attacker to cheaply decrypt a relatively
large fraction of FFDHE traffic (namely, traffic encrypted using
particular standardized groups) [weak-dh].
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5. When secrets are not fully ephemeral, FFDHE suffers from the
[Raccoon] side channel attack. (Note that FFDH is inherently
vulnerable to the Raccoon attack unless constant-time mitigations
are employed.)
The problems affecting RSA key exchange in TLS 1.2 are as follows:
1. RSA key exchange offers no forward secrecy, by construction.
2. RSA key exchange may be vulnerable to Bleichenbacher's attack
[BLEI]. Experience shows that variants of this attack arise
every few years because implementing the relevant countermeasure
correctly is difficult (see [ROBOT], [NEW-BLEI], [DROWN]).
3. In addition to the above point, there is no convenient mechanism
in TLS 1.2 for the domain separation of keys. Therefore, a
single endpoint that is vulnerable to Bleichenbacher's attack
would affect all endpoints sharing the same RSA key (see [XPROT],
[DROWN]).
This document updates [RFC9325], [RFC4346], [RFC5246], [RFC4162],
[RFC6347], [RFC5932], [RFC5288], [RFC6209], [RFC6367], [RFC8422],
[RFC5289], [RFC4785], [RFC4279], [RFC5487], [RFC6655], [RFC7905] and
[RFC5469] to remediate the above problems.
1.1. Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Non-Ephemeral Diffie Hellman
Clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select non-ephemeral FFDH
cipher suites in TLS 1.2 connections. (Note that TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are
deprecated by [RFC8996] and TLS 1.3 does not support FFDH
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis].) This includes all cipher suites listed
in the table in Appendix A.
Clients SHOULD NOT offer and servers SHOULD NOT select non-ephemeral
ECDH cipher suites in TLS 1.2 connections. (This requirement is
already present in [RFC9325]. Note that TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are
deprecated by [RFC8996] and TLS 1.3 does not support ECDH
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis].) This includes all cipher suites listed
in the table in Appendix B.
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In addition, to avoid the use of non-ephemeral Diffie Hellman,
clients SHOULD NOT use use and server SHOULD NOT accept certificates
with fixed DH parameters. These certificate types are rsa_fixed_dh,
dss_fixed_dh, rsa_fixed_ecdh and ecdsa_fixed_ecdh as listed in
Appendix E. These values only apply to TLS versions of 1.2 and
below.
3. Ephemeral Finite Field Diffie Hellman
Clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select FFDHE cipher
suites in TLS 1.2 connections. This includes all cipher suites
listed in the table in Appendix C. (Note that TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are
deprecated by [RFC8996].) FFDHE cipher suites in TLS 1.3 do not
suffer from the problems presented in Section 1; see
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]. Therefore, clients and servers MAY offer
FFDHE cipher suites in TLS 1.3 connections.
4. RSA
Clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select RSA cipher suites
in TLS 1.2 connections. (Note that TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated by
[RFC8996], and TLS 1.3 does not support static RSA
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis].) This includes all cipher suites listed
in the table in Appendix D. Note that these cipher suites are
already marked as not recommended in the "TLS Cipher Suites"
registry.
5. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA to mark the cipher suites from the "TLS
Cipher Suites" registry listed in Appendix A, Appendix B, Appendix C,
Appendix D, and the certificate types from the "TLS
ClientCertificateType Identifiers" registed listed in Appendix E as
"D" in the "Recommended" column, see [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8447bis].
6. Security Considerations
Non-ephemeral finite field DH cipher suites (TLS_DH_*), as well as
ephemeral key reuse for finite field DH cipher suites, are prohibited
due to the [Raccoon] attack. Both are already considered bad
practice since they do not provide forward secrecy. However, Raccoon
revealed that timing side channels in processing TLS premaster
secrets may be exploited to reveal the encrypted premaster secret.
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As for non-ephemeral elliptic curve DH cipher suites, forgoing
forward secrecy not only allows retroactive decryption in the event
of key compromise but may also enable a broad category of attacks
where the attacker exploits key reuse to repeatedly query a
cryptographic secret.
This category includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the
following examples:
1. Invalid curve attacks, where the attacker exploits key reuse to
repeatedly query and eventually learn the key itself. These
attacks have been shown to be practical against real-world TLS
implementations [ICA].
2. Side channel attacks, where the attacker exploits key reuse and
an additional side channel to learn a cryptographic secret. As
one example of such attacks, refer to [MAY4].
3. Fault attacks, where the attacker exploits key reuse and
incorrect calculations to learn a cryptographic secret. As one
example of such attacks, see [PARIS256].
Such attacks are often implementation-dependent, including the above
examples. However, these examples demonstrate that building a system
that reuses keys and avoids this category of attacks is difficult in
practice. In contrast, avoiding key reuse not only prevents
decryption in the event of key compromise, but also precludes this
category of attacks altogether. Therefore, this document discourages
the reuse of elliptic curve DH public keys.
As for ephemeral finite field Diffie-Hellman in TLS 1.2, as explained
above, clients have no practical way to support these cipher suites
while ensuring they only negotiate security parameters that are
acceptable to them. In TLS 1.2, the server chooses the Diffie-
Hellman group, and custom groups are prevalent. Therefore, once the
client includes these cipher suites in its handshake and the server
presents a custom group, the client cannot complete the handshake
while ensuring security. Verifying the group structure is
prohibitively expensive for the client. Using a safelist of known-
good groups is also impractical, since server operators were
encouraged to generate their own custom group. Further, there is no
mechanism for the handshake to fall back to other parameters, that
are acceptable to both the client and server.
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7. Acknowledgments
This document was inspired by discussions on the TLS WG mailing list
and a suggestion by Filippo Valsorda following the release of the
[Raccoon] attack. Thanks to Christopher A. Wood for writing up the
initial draft of this document. Thanks also to Thomas Fossati, John
Preuß Mattsson and Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard for comments and
suggestions.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-10, 3 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8446bis-10>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8447bis]
Salowey, J. A. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for
TLS and DTLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-09, 30 April 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8447bis-09>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4162] Lee, H.J., Yoon, J.H., and J.I. Lee, "Addition of SEED
Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4162, DOI 10.17487/RFC4162, August 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4162>.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4279>.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4346>.
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[RFC4785] Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, DOI 10.17487/RFC4785, January
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4785>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.
[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5288, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5288>.
[RFC5289] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5289, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5289>.
[RFC5469] Eronen, P., Ed., "DES and IDEA Cipher Suites for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5469, DOI 10.17487/RFC5469,
February 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5469>.
[RFC5487] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5487, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5487>.
[RFC5932] Kato, A., Kanda, M., and S. Kanno, "Camellia Cipher Suites
for TLS", RFC 5932, DOI 10.17487/RFC5932, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5932>.
[RFC6209] Kim, W., Lee, J., Park, J., and D. Kwon, "Addition of the
ARIA Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 6209, DOI 10.17487/RFC6209, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6209>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6347>.
[RFC6367] Kanno, S. and M. Kanda, "Addition of the Camellia Cipher
Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6367,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6367, September 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6367>.
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[RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6655>.
[RFC7905] Langley, A., Chang, W., Mavrogiannopoulos, N.,
Strombergson, J., and S. Josefsson, "ChaCha20-Poly1305
Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 7905, DOI 10.17487/RFC7905, June 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7905>.
[RFC7919] Gillmor, D., "Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 7919, DOI 10.17487/RFC7919, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7919>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8422>.
[RFC8996] Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS
1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8996>.
[RFC9325] Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325>.
8.2. Informative References
[BLEI] Bleichenbacher, D., "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks against
Protocols Based on RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1",
Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO'98, LNCS vol. 1462,
pages: 1-12 , 1998.
[DLOG795] Boudot, F., Gaudry, P., Guillevic, A., Heninger, N.,
Thomé, E., and P. Zimmermann, "Comparing the difficulty of
factorization and discrete logarithm: a 240-digit
experiment", 17 August 2020,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/697>.
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[DROWN] Aviram, N., Schinzel, S., Somorovsky, J., Heninger, N.,
Dankel, M., Steube, J., Valenta, L., Adrian, D.,
Halderman, J. A., Dukhovni, V., Käsper, E., Cohney, S.,
Engels, S., Paar, C., and Y. Shavitt, "DROWN: Breaking TLS
using SSLv2", August 2016,
<https://drownattack.com/drown-attack-paper.pdf>.
[ICA] Jager, T., Schwenk, J., and J. Somorovsky, "Practical
invalid curve attacks on TLS-ECDH", 21 September 2015,
<https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.704.7932&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.
[MAY4] Genkin, D., Valenta, L., and Y. Yarom, "May the fourth be
with you: A microarchitectural side channel attack on
several real-world applications of curve25519", n.d.,
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3133956.3134029>.
[NEW-BLEI] Meyer, C., Somorovsky, J., Weiss, E., Schwenk, J.,
Schinzel, S., and E. Tews, "Revisiting SSL/TLS
Implementations: New Bleichenbacher Side Channels and
Attacks", August 2014,
<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/
usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-meyer.pdf>.
[PARIS256] Devlin, S. and F. Valsorda, "The PARIS256 Attack", n.d.,
<https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Wed-August-8/us-18-Valsorda-
Squeezing-A-Key-Through-A-Carry-Bit-wp.pdf>.
[Raccoon] Merget, R., Brinkmann, M., Aviram, N., Somorovsky, J.,
Mittmann, J., and J. Schwenk, "Raccoon Attack: Finding and
Exploiting Most-Significant-Bit-Oracles in TLS-DH(E)", 9
September 2020,
<https://raccoon-attack.com/RacoonAttack.pdf>.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4492>.
[ROBOT] Boeck, H., Somorovsky, J., and C. Young, "Return Of
Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT)", 27th USENIX
Security Symposium , 2018.
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[subgroups]
Valenta, L., Adrian, D., Sanso, A., Cohney, S., Fried, J.,
Hastings, M., Halderman, J. A., and N. Heninger,
"Measuring small subgroup attacks against Diffie-Hellman",
15 October 2016,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/995/20161017:193515>.
[weak-dh] Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P.,
Green, M., Halderman, J. A., Heninger, N., Springall, D.,
Thomé, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E.,
Zanella-Béguelin, S., and P. Zimmermann, "Weak Diffie-
Hellman and the Logjam Attack", October 2015,
<https://weakdh.org/>.
[XPROT] Jager, T., Schwenk, J., and J. Somorovsky, "On the
Security of TLS 1.3 and QUIC Against Weaknesses in PKCS#1
v1.5 Encryption", Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security , 2015.
Appendix A. DH Cipher Suites Deprecated by This Document
+==========================================+====================+
| Ciphersuite | Reference |
+==========================================+====================+
| TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA | [RFC4346] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA | [RFC5469] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA | [RFC4346] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA | [RFC5469] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 | [RFC4346][RFC6347] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 | [RFC5246][RFC6347] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA | [RFC4346] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA | [RFC5469] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
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| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA | [RFC4162] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA | [RFC4162] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA | [RFC4162] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5288] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5288] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5288] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5288] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
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| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5288] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5288] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
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| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+------------------------------------------+--------------------+
Table 1
Appendix B. ECDH Cipher Suites Whose Use Is Discouraged by This
Document
+=============================================+====================+
| Ciphersuite | Reference |
+=============================================+====================+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | [RFC8422][RFC6347] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | [RFC8422][RFC6347] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | [RFC8422][RFC6347] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5289] |
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+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+--------------------+
Table 2
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Appendix C. DHE Cipher Suites deprecated by This Document
+===========================================+=====================+
| Ciphersuite | Reference |
+===========================================+=====================+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA | [RFC4346] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA | [RFC5469] [RFC8996] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA | [RFC4346] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA | [RFC5469] [RFC8996] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA | [RFC4785] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | [RFC4279][RFC6347] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC4279] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC4279] |
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+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC4279] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA | [RFC4162] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA | [RFC4162] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5288] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5288] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5288] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5288] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
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+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | [RFC7905] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | [RFC7905] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
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Table 3
Appendix D. RSA Cipher Suites Deprecated by This Document
+===========================================+=====================+
| Ciphersuite | Reference |
+===========================================+=====================+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 | [RFC4346][RFC6347] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 | [RFC5246][RFC6347] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | [RFC5246][RFC6347] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 | [RFC4346] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA | [RFC5469] [RFC8996] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA | [RFC4346] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA | [RFC5469] [RFC8996] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA | [RFC4785] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | [RFC4279][RFC6347] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC4279] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC4279] |
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+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC4279] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA | [RFC4162] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5288] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5288] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
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+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | [RFC7905] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
Table 4
Appendix E. TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers Deprecated by This
Document
+=======================+===========+
| Certificate Type | Reference |
+=======================+===========+
| rsa_fixed_dh (3) | [RFC5246] |
+-----------------------+-----------+
| dss_fixed_dh (4) | [RFC5246] |
+-----------------------+-----------+
| rsa_fixed_ecdh (65) | [RFC8422] |
+-----------------------+-----------+
| ecdsa_fixed_ecdh (66) | [RFC8422] |
+-----------------------+-----------+
Table 5
Authors' Addresses
Carrick Bartle
Roblox
Email: cbartle@roblox.com
Nimrod Aviram
Email: nimrod.aviram@gmail.com
Bartle & Aviram Expires 7 March 2025 [Page 21]