datatracker.ietf.org
Sign in
Version 5.4.0, 2014-04-22
Report a bug

Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey-11

Document type: Active Internet-Draft (tls WG)
Document stream: IETF
Last updated: 2014-02-18 (latest revision 2014-01-20)
Intended RFC status: Proposed Standard
Other versions: plain text, xml, pdf, html

IETF State: WG Document
Consensus: Yes
Document shepherd: Joseph Salowey
Shepherd Write-Up: Last changed 2013-11-05

IESG State: RFC Ed Queue
IANA Action State: RFC-Ed-Ack
RFC Editor State: EDIT
Responsible AD: Sean Turner
IESG Note: Joe Salowey (jsalowey@cisco.com) is the Document Shepherd
Send notices to: tls-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey@tools.ietf.org

TLS                                                      P. Wouters, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                   Red Hat
Intended status: Standards Track                      H. Tschofenig, Ed.
Expires: July 22, 2014
                                                              J. Gilmore

                                                               S. Weiler
                                                            SPARTA, Inc.
                                                              T. Kivinen
                                                               AuthenTec
                                                        January 18, 2014

  Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
                    Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
                    draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey-11.txt

Abstract

   This document specifies a new certificate type and two TLS extensions
   for exchanging raw public keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
   Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS).  The new certificate type
   allows raw public keys to be used for authentication.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 22, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Wouters, et al.           Expires July 22, 2014                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft      Using Raw Public Keys in TLS/DTLS       January 2014

   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Structure of the Raw Public Key Extension . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  TLS Client and Server Handshake Behavior  . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Client Hello  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Server Hello  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  TLS Server uses Raw Public Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  TLS Client and Server use Raw Public Keys . . . . . . . .  10
     5.3.  Combined Usage of Raw Public Keys and X.509 Certificate .  11
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix A.  Example Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   Traditionally, TLS client and server public keys are obtained in PKIX
   containers in-band as part of the TLS handshake procedure and are
   validated using trust anchors based on a [PKIX] certification
   authority (CA).  This method can add a complicated trust relationship
   that is difficult to validate.  Examples of such complexity can be
   seen in [Defeating-SSL].  TLS is, however, also commonly used with
   self-signed certificates in smaller deployments where the self-signed
   certificates are distributed to all involved protocol end points out-
   of-band.  This practice does, however, still requires the overhead of
   the certificate generation even though none of the information found

[include full document text]