Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) over Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
draft-ietf-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis-07
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(tsvwg WG)
Expired & archived
|
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Magnus Westerlund , John Preuß Mattsson , Claudio Porfiri | ||
| Last updated | 2024-04-25 (Latest revision 2023-10-23) | ||
| Replaces | draft-westerlund-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Associated WG milestone |
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| Document shepherd | Gorry Fairhurst | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes the usage of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol to protect user messages sent over the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP). It is an improved alternative to the existing RFC 6083. DTLS over SCTP provides mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity protection, and partial replay protection for applications that use SCTP as their transport protocol and allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to give communications privacy and to prevent eavesdropping and detect tampering or message forgery. Applications using DTLS over SCTP can use almost all transport features provided by SCTP and its extensions. This document is an improved alternative to RFC 6083 and removes the 16 kbytes limitation on protected user message size by defining a secure user message fragmentation so that multiple DTLS records can be used to protect a single user message. It further contains a large number of security fixes and improvements. It updates the DTLS versions and SCTP-AUTH HMAC algorithms to use. It mitigates reflection attacks of data and control chunks and replay attacks of data chunks. It simplifies secure implementation by some stricter requirements on the establishment procedures as well as rekeying to align with zero trust principles.
Authors
Magnus Westerlund
John Preuß Mattsson
Claudio Porfiri
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)