IPv6-Mostly Networks: Deployment and Operations Considerations
draft-ietf-v6ops-6mops-04
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Nick Buraglio , Ondřej Caletka , Jen Linkova | ||
| Last updated | 2025-11-21 (Latest revision 2025-10-20) | ||
| Replaces | draft-link-v6ops-6mops | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | In WG Last Call | |
| Associated WG milestone |
|
||
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-v6ops-6mops-04
IPv6 operations N. Buraglio
Internet-Draft Energy Sciences Network
Intended status: Informational O. Caletka
Expires: 23 April 2026 RIPE NCC
J. Linkova
Google
20 October 2025
IPv6-Mostly Networks: Deployment and Operations Considerations
draft-ietf-v6ops-6mops-04
Abstract
This document discusses a deployment scenario called "an IPv6-Mostly
network", when IPv6-only and IPv4-enabled endpoints coexist on the
same network (network segment, VLAN, SSID etc).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. IPv6-only capable Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. IPv6-Only and IPv4-enabled Endpoints Coexistence . . . . 6
4.3. Access to IPv4-only Destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.1. NAT64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.2. 464XLAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.3. Signalling NAT64 Prefix to Hosts . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.4. Signalling DNS and DNS64 to Hosts . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Solution Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. IPv6-Only Compared to Dual-Stack . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. IPv6-Mostly Compared to a Dedicated IPv6-Only Network . . 11
6. Incremental Rollout Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1. Opt-In and Opt-Out Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2. Per-Device and Per-Subnet Incremental Rollout . . . . . . 13
6.3. Rollback Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.1. Address Assignment Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. Extension Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.3. Onlink Communication and Service Discovery . . . . . . . 14
7.4. NAT64 IPv4 Pools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.5. Typical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.5.1. Hosts with Disabled or Disfunctional IPv6 . . . . . . 15
7.5.2. Network Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.5.3. Multiple Addresses per Device . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.5.4. Host Mobility and Renumbering . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.5.5. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.5.6. IPv4 UDP Packets with Zero Checksum . . . . . . . . . 19
7.5.7. Representing IPv6 Addresses by CLAT . . . . . . . . . 19
7.5.8. IPv4-Dependencies in Network Admission Control . . . 20
7.5.9. Custom DNS Configuration on Endpoints . . . . . . . . 20
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
1. Introduction
Most network operators initially deploy IPv6 alongside their existing
IPv4 infrastructure, as the dual-stack approach is seen as a
necessary transition phase, allowing operators to gain experience
with IPv6 while minimizing disruption. Pure IPv6-only networks,
where endpoints are not assigned IPv4 addresses and access to IPv4
destination is provided via some form of address family translation
(such as NAT64 [RFC6146]) remain uncommon outside of the mobile
carrier space.
However, dual-stack networks do not address the core problem driving
IPv6 adoption: IPv4 address exhaustion. They still require the same
amount of IPv4 resources as IPv4-only networks. Even worse, this
dual-stack approach has been demonstrated to be a long-term crutch,
frequently masking problems that would otherwise be exposed and
remedied as normal operational workflows.
The solution is to stop assigning IPv4 addresses to endpoints, or, in
other words, to start deploying IPv6-only networks. To ensure that
IPv6-only endpoints can communicate with IPv4-only ones, IPv6-only
networks provides translation services, such as NAT64 [RFC6146] and
SIIT [RFC7755]. However, even with those translation mechanisms in
place, many systems and applications retain deep IPv4 dependencies,
requiring both IPv4 address assignment to the host and the network to
provide IPv4 routing functionality.
The less control a network operator has over devices and
applications, the more difficult it is to eliminate IPv4 dependencies
and move to IPv6-only. This is particularly challenging in
enterprise networks with legacy IPv4-dependent applications and
public Wi-Fi networks where operators cannot guarantee device
compatibility. As a result, a chicken-and-egg problem arises:
IPv6-only networks seem impractical with so many incompatible
applications, yet applications continue to rely on IPv4 because
IPv6-only networks are rare.
To enable a gradual transition from dual-stack to IPv6-only,
operators need to identify which devices can function in IPv6-only
mode and which cannot. This still leaves the challenge of how to
provide IPv4 addresses only to devices which can not operate without
them. Creating separate network segments for each type of devices
introduces complexity and scalability issues – a major hurdle to
IPv6-only adoption.
A more desirable approach is to deploy an "IPv6-mostly" network that
provides IPv4 on demand. This allows IPv6-capable devices to remain
IPv6-only while the network is seamlessly supplying IPv4 to those
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
that require it. An IPv6-mostly network allows endpoints to operate
at the highest level of their network stack evolution, on demand,
while still allowing for legacy compatibility.
This document explores the requirements, recommendations, and
challenges associated with deploying IPv6-mostly networks in
enterprise and public Wi-Fi environments. While the principles
discussed may be applicable to other network types, this document's
focus remains on these specific use cases.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Terminology
This document reuses most of Terminology section from [RFC8925] .
CLAT: a customer-side translator (CLAT) as specified in [RFC6877] and
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-claton].
Endpoint: A device connected to a network and considered a host From
the operator's perspective. However, some endpoint can also extend
the network to other physical or logical systems, thereby assuming
routing functions. Examples include:
* Personal computers: While primarily a host, such devices might run
virtual systems/containers, and route traffic to them, extending
the network and acting as routers.
* Mobile phone with tethering enabled: Acts as a host on the Wi-Fi
network, but also as a router for tethered devices, potentially
without the operator's knowledge or consent.
NAT44: Network Address Translation from IPv4 to IPv4.
Native IPv4 connectivity: IPv4 connectivity or default gateway
provided by the network without using any form of translation
mechanisms (such as 464XLAT, [RFC6877]).
Network segment: a link (VLAN, a broadcast domain etc) where hosts
share the same IP subnet.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
PREF64: (or NAT64 prefix): An IPv6 prefix used for IPv6 address
synthesis and for network addresses and protocols translation from
IPv6 clients to IPv4 servers, [RFC6146].
4. Solution Overview
In a nutshell, an IPv6-mostly network is very similar to a dual-stack
one with two additional key elements:
* The network provides NAT64 ([RFC6146] ) functionality, enabling
IPv6-only clients to communicate with IPv4-only destinations.
- The network also provides the information about the NAT64
prefix (PREF64), for example via RAs ([RFC8781]), via DNS64
([RFC6147], [RFC7050]), or both. This is to ensure that
clients and the network's NAT64 use the same PREF64 to
translate between IPv6 and IPv4. Section 4.3.3 and
Section 4.3.4 discuss those mechanisms in more detail.
* The DHCPv4 server infrastructure offers DHCPv4 Option 108 as per
[RFC8925]. This is to ensure that IPv6-only capable devices are
not consuming IPv4 addresses. Section 4.2 discusses other
approaches to provide IPv4 addresses on demand.
Upon connecting to an IPv6-mostly network segment, an endpoint
configures its IP stack based on its capabilities:
* IPv4-Only Endpoint: Acquires an IPv4 address through DHCPv4.
* Dual-Stack Endpoint (Not IPv6-only capable): Configures IPv6
addresses using any supported protocol. Additionally, it obtains
an IPv4 address via DHCPv4.
* IPv6-only capable endpoint configures its IPv6 addresses and,
while performing DHCPv4, includes option 108 ([RFC8925] ) into the
Parameter Request List. The DHCP server returns the option and,
as per [RFC8925] , the endpoint forgoes requesting an IPv4
address, remaining in IPv6-only mode.
An IPv6-mostly network segment can support a mix of IPv4-only, dual-
stack, and IPv6-only devices. IPv6-only endpoints utilize the
network-provided NAT64 to reach IPv4-only destinations.
The following sections discussed those solution elements in more
details.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
4.1. IPv6-only capable Endpoints
The term "IPv6-only capable endpoint" lacks a strict technical
definition. It broadly describes a device that can function without
native IPv4 connectivity/IPv4 addresses, providing the same user
experience as if native IPv4 connectivity were present. Examples
include but are not limited to:
* An endpoint capable of communicating only with a limited set of
endpoints, all of which are available over IPv6.
* An endpoint capable of utilizing only IPv6 sockets, employing
NAT64 for accessing IPv4 resources.
* An endpoint implementing CLAT to provide IPv4 connectivity for the
legacy applications.
4.2. IPv6-Only and IPv4-enabled Endpoints Coexistence
One effective way to restrict IPv4 addresses solely to devices that
require them is to enable support for the IPv6-Only Preferred DHCPv4
option (Option 108, [RFC8925]) on the network's DHCP infrastructure.
As most IPv6-only capable devices support Option 108 in their DHCP
clients, enabling Option 108 on the server side would allow those
devices to cease requesting IPv4 addresses.
Certain devices, such as resource-constrained embedded systems, may
operate in IPv6-only mode without specific adjustments if their
communication is limited to IPv6-enabled destinations. Since these
systems often lack Option 108 support, administrators may need
alternative methods to prevent IPv4 address assignment. One approach
is to block IPv4 traffic at the network attachment level (such as a
switchport or wireless access point). This could involve methods
like:
* Static ACL: Applying a static filter with a "deny ip any any"
rule.
* Dynamic ACL via RADIUS: If 802.1x authentication is in use, RADIUS
can provide an ACL blocking all IPv4 traffic.
* Filtering the IPv4 ethertype (0x0800): Some hardware platforms may
allow for low level filtering of ethertype 0x0800 preventing IPv4
from passing into or out of a given switchport.
The ACL-based approach has some scalability implications and
increases operational complexity, therefore it could only be
recommended as a stopgap solution.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
4.3. Access to IPv4-only Destinations
4.3.1. NAT64
IPv6-only endpoints require NAT64 to access IPv4-only destinations.
Quite often operators choose to combine NAT44 and NAT64 functions,
deploying NAT64 at the Internet edge. However, if not all internal
services are IPv6-enabled, then NAT64 is needed to access internal
destinations as well as external ones. In that case it might be
beneficial to deploy NAT64 closer to the users, instead of the
network Internet edge, in order to simplify routing/firewall rules
and reduce latency.
If IPv4-only internal destinations are using [RFC1918] address space
and IPv6-only nodes are expected to communicate with those IPv4-only
destinations, then the operator MUST NOT use the well-known prefix
64:ff9b::/96 for NAT64 (see section 3.1 of [RFC6052]). In that
scenario the operator is required to allocate a network-specific
NAT64 prefix from the operator's address space. ).
Discussion: reports from the field indicate that it's very common for
NAT64 and CLAT implementations to ignore the requirement from section
3.1 of [RFC6052]. Such implementations successfully translate
[RFC1918] IPv4 addresses using the well-known NAT64 prefix.
4.3.2. 464XLAT
Unless the usage of IPv4-only network sockets is prohibited or
mitigated (e.g. by implementing translation mechanisms such as BIH
[RFC6535]) in the operating system, enabling CLAT (Customer-side
translator) on endpoints is essential for seamless operation of
IPv4-only applications in IPv6-only environments. CLAT provides an
IPv4 address and IPv4 default route, ensuring functionality even
without a native IPv4 address from the network. Without CLAT or
similar compatibility layer inside the operating system, IPv4-only
applications would fail, negatively impacting user experience and
increasing support overhead.
Recommendations for Network Administrators controlling the endpoints:
* CLAT + DHCPv4 Option 108: If the network administrator can control
endpoint configuration, CLAT SHOULD be enabled on endpoints
sending DHCPv4 Option 108. This streamlines the transition.
* Option 108 Without CLAT MAY be enabled if the administrator aims
to identify IPv4-only systems/applications, or if all applications
are confirmed to work in IPv6-only mode.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
4.3.3. Signalling NAT64 Prefix to Hosts
Hosts running 464XLAT, translating IPv4 literal to an IPv6 literals
(Section 7.1 of [RFC8305]) or performing local DNS64 functions need
to discover the NAT64 prefix. The network administrator SHOULD
configure the first-hop routers to include PREF64 information in
Router Advertisements as per ([RFC8781] ) even if the network
provides DNS64 (so hosts can use DNS64-based prefix discovery,
[RFC7050]). [RFC9872] discusses this recommendation in more details.
4.3.4. Signalling DNS and DNS64 to Hosts
To provide IPv6-only endpoints with DNS recursive server addresses,
the administrator MUST configure the network to include the DNS
servers IPv6 addresses into RA option, as per [RFC8106].
Traditionally, DNS64 (with NAT64) is used to enable IPv6-only
endpoints to access IPv4-only destinations. However, using DNS64 has
a number of drawbacks, such as:
* DNSSEC Incompatibility: DNS64 responses fail DNSSEC validation.
* Custom Resolvers: Endpoints or applications configured with custom
resolvers or running recursive resolvers locally can not benefit
from the DNS64 provided by the network. Such systems would need
to rely on CLAT or local synthesis instead (Section 7.5.9
discusses this scenario in more details).
* Additional requirements for application: to benefit from DNS64,
applications need to be IPv6-enabled, use DNS (do not use IPv4
literals). Many applications do not satisfy those requirements
and therefore fail if the endpoint does not have an IPv4 address/
native IPv4 connectivity. Existence of such applications is the
main reason why transition to IPv6-only must be incremental (via
IPv6-mostly phase) and requires the vast majority of endpoints to
support CLAT.
Those concerns make DNS64 is suboptimal and undesirtable solution
long-term. To eliminate the needs for DNS64, the network shall
signal PREF64 to endpoints (see Section 4.3.3), and the endpoints
need to use the obtained PREF64 for performing local synthesis and
for CLAT. It should be noted that not every application can benefit
from local synthesis performed by the operating system, as it would
require the application to use DNS (not IP literals). Therefore
DNS64 is only required to support the following cases:
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
* Systems and applications which perform local synthesis but do not
support [RFC8781] for prefix discovery, and can only discover the
NAT64 prefix using via DNS64 [RFC7050].
* IPv6-only devices without CLAT (unless those endpoints are
guaranteed never to need IPv4-only destinations, e.g. in case of a
specialized network segment communicating solely with IPv6-capable
destinations).
On the other hand, using DNS64 bypasses CLAT for IPv6-capable
applications communicating with IPv4-only destinations, making the
communication slightly more efficient. Additionally, it encourages
dual-stack endpoints to utilize the IPv6 and NAT64 path to reach
IPv4-only destinations. This operational pattern is useful for
identifying IPv6-related issues and IPv4 dependencies at an earlier
stage of the IPv6-mostly migration. For that reason administrators
might find it beneficial to run DNS64 even if it is not strictly
necessary, provided the the above mentioned drawbacks are adressed.
5. Solution Analysis
5.1. IPv6-Only Compared to Dual-Stack
IPv6-Mostly networks offer significant advantages over traditional
dual-stack models where endpoints have both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses:
* The deployment of dual-stack networks does not fundamentally
resolve the core issue of IPv4 address exhaustion. The
IPv6-Mostly approach, however, offers a mechanism to significantly
reduce the IPv4 address space allocated to endpoints and reclaim
existing IPv4 space. The degree of possible reduction is
dependent on endpoint capabilities, specifically support of DHCPv4
Option 108 and CLAT. Real-world IPv6-Mostly deployments (2025
data) show that approximately 60-70% of endpoints support
IPv6-only operation. This capability potentially allows for the
use of IPv4 subnets that are 2 to 4 times smaller than those
required for dual-stack. It is important to note that migrating a
dual-stack network to an IPv6-only mode does not reduce the amount
of public IPv4 space required for network elements such as NAT
pools. However, for large networks (e.g., enterprises and
datacenters) facing private IPv4 address exhaustion, the
IPv6-Mostly strategy drastically reduces internal IPv4 demand,
helping to ensure business continuity.
* Controlled and incremental phase-out of IPv4: IPv6-Mostly allows
for the controlled phase out IPv4 from many endpoints,
streamlining operations and improving overall network reliability
at a measured and operator-controlled pace. While IPv6-Mostly
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
deployments do not inherently resolve the IPv4 address exhaustion
issue (as previously noted), the approach effectively paves the
road toward IPv6-only networks.
* Reduced Dependency on DHCPv4: As more devices operate seamlessly
in IPv6-only mode, the criticality of DHCPv4 service diminishes
significantly. This allows operators to scale down DHCPv4
infrastructure or, in some cases, even operate it with less
stringent service level objectives (SLOs), optimizing costs and
resource allocation.
* Simplified troubleshooting due reduced impact of Happy Eyeballs
[RFC8305]: when both the client and the server are dual-stack,
communication can happen either over IPv6 or over IPv4 and the
protocol choice can change over time. This may obscure network
issues or make them intermittent, complicating the
troubleshooting. In IPv6-Mostly network IPv6-only hosts are much
less affected by such an issue. Although modern versions of Happy
Eyeballs algorithm support falling back to IPv4 even in case of
IPv6-only network, the delay before switching to IPv4 is so long
that the fallback does not happen during regular operations. It
should be noted, however, that when an IPv6-only client
communicates with an IPv4-only destination, the traffic may
traverse CLAT or be sent as IPv6 towards the NAT64, depending on
how the specific application is written.
The introduction of NAT64 within the IPv6-Mostly model may appear as
a drawback, as it inherits many of the limitations associated with
NAT44, such as translating flows from different hosts to thesame
public IPv4 address, or scalability challenges caused by stateful
opeation. However, it's important to recognize that most IPv4-only
or dual-stack networks already rely on NAT44 due to IPv4 address
scarcity. For these networks, transitioning to an IPv6-Mostly
architecture would simply require enabling NAT64 functionality on
existing NAT44 devices.
In a dual-stack network, flows originating from IPv6-only capable
endpoints to IPv4-only destinations are, in most cases, translated by
NAT44. Within an IPv6-Mostly environment, this role is fulfilled by
NAT64. Consequently, the overall load on the NAT infrastructure
remains effectively unchanged, with NAT64 essentially replacing NAT44
for a subset of traffic flows.
It is also worth emphasizing that NAT64 is employed solely for
facilitating access to IPv4 resources. As the availability of
IPv6-enabled resources continues to increase, the volume of traffic
traversing NAT64 is expected to diminish proportionally.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
As discussed in Section 7.3 coexistence of IPv6-only and IPv4-only
hosts on the same link might present challenges for onlink service
discovery and onlink peer2peer communications. It might be consider
a disadvantge of IPv6-Moslty model for networks where onlink
communication between IPv4-only and IPv6-only devices is desirable.
5.2. IPv6-Mostly Compared to a Dedicated IPv6-Only Network
Traditional IPv6-only adoption involves separate networks alongside
dual-stack ones. IPv6-Mostly approach offers significant
improvements, such as:
* Enhanced Scalability: Separate IPv6-only networks double the
number of SSIDs in wireless environments, causing channel
congestion and degrading performance. IPv6-Mostly doesn't require
additional SSIDs. Similarly, it allows IPv4 and IPv6-only devices
to coexist on the same wired VLANs, eliminating the need of
additional layer2 segments, VLAN IDs, and their respective layer3
configurations.
* Operational Simplicity: Managing one network segment for all
clients (regardless of IPv4 needs) simplifies operations, improves
user experience (no more confusing SSID choices), and reduces
support tickets related to mismatched connections. For wired
connections dynamic VLAN assignment becomes easier without device-
specific IPv6 capability tracking.
* Optimized IPv4 Consumption: User-selected dual-stack networks
often lead to unnecessary IPv4 use, as users often connect
IPv6-only capable devices to a dual-stack network. IPv6-Mostly
network allocates IPv4 addresses only when devices don't advertise
IPv6-only capability (DHCPv4 Option 108).
* Improved Problem Visibility: User-selected fallback to dual-stack
networks can mask issues with IPv6-only operation, hindering
problem reporting and resolution. IPv6-Mostly forces users to
work through any issues, improving identification and enabling
fixes for smoother long-term transition.
* Flexible, Incremental Transition: IPv6-Mostly allows for gradual
migration on a per-segment or even on per-device basis. Devices
become IPv6-only only when deemed fully compatible with that mode.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
6. Incremental Rollout Considerations
Migrating endpoints to IPv6-only fundamentally changes network
dynamics by removing the IPv4 safety net. This includes the masking
effect of traditional Happy Eyeballs algorithm [RFC6555]. IPv6
connectivity issues become far more prominent, including those
previously hidden within dual-stack environments. Operators should
be prepared to discover and troubleshoot issues in both endpoints and
network infrastructure, even if the dual-stack network appeared
problem-free.
Some rollout considerations are discussed in the following sections.
6.1. Opt-In and Opt-Out Modes
Before user-facing deployment, the administrator SHOULD consider a
dedicated IPv6-mostly proof-of-concept network for early adopters.
While this temporarily sacrifices some IPv6-mostly benefits
(Section 5.2 ), it provides valuable operational experience and early
issue detection. In a nutshell, the recommended approach contains
two phases:
* Opt-In Phase: Invite tech-savvy early adopters to join an
IPv6-mostly network and report issues. While response rates may
be low, dedicated participants provide valuable troubleshooting
data.
* Opt-Out Phase: Incrementally enable PREF64 signalling as well as
Option 108. Allow selective disabling for problematic endpoints,
in extreme case even by providing a separate network or rolling
back IPv6-mostly in that particular subnet. Requiring users to
file a problem report to opt-out provides a mechanism for gaining
visibility into user experience on IPv6-mostly network. This
process facilitates the identification of related issues and
expedites issue resolution.
In some scenarios (see Section 7.5.1 ) the administrator MAY keep a
dual-stack network as a last resort fallback mechanism but SHOULD
prevent usesrs from connecting to it accidentially (e.g. it should be
a hidden SSID with authentication enabled). For recurring temporary
networks, for instance during a conference, it might be a good
practice to change the network SSID of the last resort fallback
network between each event.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
6.2. Per-Device and Per-Subnet Incremental Rollout
Limited control over endpoint configuration necessitates a per-subnet
rollout, incrementally enabling first PREF64 signalling and then
option 108 processing in DHCP.
In most networks all hosts on a given subnet receive the same RAs
(unless mechanisms like per-client RA [RFC8273] are deployed), so
signalling PRE64 via an RA option doesn't allow any per-endpoint opt
out mechanism.
Some operating systems provide a mechanism to enable option 108
processing. In these cases, if the endpoints are managed, per-device
rollout may be possible. Note that some OSes enable Option 108
support by default without providing configuration knobs to turn it
off. Such systems become IPv6-only the moment Option 108 is
activated on the server side.
The following approach is RECOMMENDED:
* PREF64 signalling: Enable PREF64 option for the router
advertisement and/or DNS64 (see above). Especially if DNS64 is
used, this might affect behaviour of some devices as the path via
NAT64 would get generally preferred over native IPv4 path.
Rollback at this stage affects the entire subnet.
* DHCP Server-Side Activation: Enable Option 108 processing. Some
OSes automatically switch to IPv6-only. Rollback at this stage
affects the entire subnet.
* Controlled Endpoint Activation: Enable Option 108 on managed
endpoints with per-device rollback possible.
6.3. Rollback Approach
For quick rollback, the administrator SHOULD start with a minimal
Option 108 value (300 seconds, Section 3.4 of [RFC8925]) and possibly
increase this value as the IPv6-mostly network proves reliable,
reducing the likelihood of full-scale rollback. In most deployments,
the load of DHCP infrastructure caused by each endpoint restarting
the DHCP handshake every 300 seconds would be negligible. However
for large networks containing a high number of IPv6-only capable
clients, the default value of 300 seconds may be too low. Even if
each IPv6-only capable client sends only one DHCPDISCOVER every 300
seconds, the collective traffic can still create a substantial load
on the DHCP infrastructure. Administrators are advised to monitor
this load and adjust the Option 108 value as necessary.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
7. Operational Considerations
7.1. Address Assignment Policy
As outlined in Section 6.3 of [RFC6877] , CLAT requires either a
dedicated IPv6 prefix or, if unavailable, a dedicated IPv6 address.
Currently (2024), all implementations use SLAAC for CLAT address
acquisition. Therefore, to enable CLAT functionality within
IPv6-mostly network segments, first-hop routers MUST be configured to
advertise a Prefix Information Option (PIO, [RFC4861]) containing a
globally routable SLAAC-suitable prefix with the 'Autonomous Address-
Configuration' (A) flag set to one.
7.2. Extension Headers
Being an IPv6-specific concept, IPv6 extension headers are often
neglected or even explictly prohibited by security policies in dual-
stack networks. The issues caused by blockig extension headers might
be masked by the presense of Happy Eyeballs but become highly visible
when there is no IPv4 to fallback to.
The network SHOULD permit at least the following extension headers:
* Fragment Header (Section 4.5 of [RFC8200] ).Section 7.5.5
discusses the fragmentation in more details.
* ESP Header, which is used for IPSec traffic, such as VPN and Wi-Fi
Calling.
7.3. Onlink Communication and Service Discovery
Shared link is often used for automatic discovery of neighboring
devices and their services by means of different protocols like
Multicast DNS [RFC6762]. Many devices and/or services are built on
an assumption that devices on the same link also share the same set
of address families or at least they have one common address family
shared between all of them.
In IPv6-Mostly, this assumption is not valid as there might be both
IPv4-only and IPv6-only devices on the same link. As per Section 20
of [RFC6762], this means that the link has two unrelated ".local."
zones, one for each address family. Discovery of devices across
different addres families is impossible, unless some sort of relay is
deployed on the link.
This problem, however, is limited to networks where client-to-client
onlink communications are desired and permitted by security policies.
For networks where client isolation is enabled (it's often a case for
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
enterprise networks and public WiFi), this issue is not a concern.
If onlink peer2peer communication is required, the operator needs to
ensure all participating devices are either dual-stack or
IPv6-mostly.
7.4. NAT64 IPv4 Pools
It is not uncommon for client IP addresses to be used as a part of an
authentication and access control mechanisms on the server side.
Additionally, webservers are known to use client IP addresses for
session tracking. To ensure that migrating a client from dual-stack
to IPv6-only mode does not impact user experience:
* If NAT44 is employed, then NAT64 and NAT44 must share the same
pool of IPv4 addresses.
* Whenever possible, the same NAT pool address SHOULD be assigned to
all concurrent sessions originating from the same internal host (a
configuration often referred to as 'sticky' NAT).
7.5. Typical Issues
IPv6-mostly networks expose hidden issues by removing the IPv4 safety
net. While implementation bugs vary greatly and are beyond the scope
of this document, this section focus on common problems caused by
configuration, topology, or design choices. It's crucial to note
that these issues likely pre-exist in dual-stack networks, but remain
unnoticed due to IPv4 fallback.
7.5.1. Hosts with Disabled or Disfunctional IPv6
Historically, tech support often advised disabling IPv6 as a quick
workaround, leading to devices with disabled IPv6. Similarly,
corporate IT may have disabled or filtered IPv6 under the assumption
that it's not widely used. Such endpoints requesting Option 108 will
fail to connect in an IPv6-mostly network, as they won't receive IPv4
addresses and IPv6 is disabled.
Administrators controlling endpoints SHOULD ensure those endpoints
have IPv6 enabled and operational before transitioning the network to
IPv6-mostly mode. This includes verifying protocol enablement as
well as validation of any central or discreetly managed host based
firewalls that could potentially interfere with proper IPv6 function
that may be masked by the presence of IPv4, and therefor exp[osed
with its removal.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
7.5.2. Network Extension
IPv4's NAT44 allows endpoints to extend connectivity to downstream
systems without upstream network awareness or permission. This
creates challenges in IPv6-mostly deployments where endpoints lack
IPv4 addresses:
Solutions and trade-offs:
* Using DHCPv6-PD to allocate prefixes to endpoints ([RFC9663]).
Provides downstream systems with IPv6 addresses and native
connectivity.
* Enabling the CLAT function on the endpoint. This scenario is
similar to the Wireline Network Architecture described in
Section 4.1 of [RFC6877] . The downstream systems would receive
IPv4 addresses and their IPv4 traffic would be translated to IPv6
by the endpoint. However this approach leads to the downstream
systems using IPv4 only and not benefiting from end2end IPv6
connectivity. To enable IPv6 benefits, combine this with IPv6
Prefix Delegation as discussed above.
* Bridging and ND Proxy: The endpoint bridges IPv6 traffic and masks
downstream devices behind its MAC address. This can lead to
scalability issues ( Section 7.5.3 ) due to the single MAC being
mapped to many IPv6 addresses.
7.5.3. Multiple Addresses per Device
Unlike IPv4, where endpoints typically have a single IPv4 address per
interface, IPv6 endpoints inherently use multiple addresses:
* Link-local address.
* Temporary address (common on mobile devices for privacy)
* Stable address (for long-term identification)
* CLAT address (in IPv6-mostly/IPv6-only networks)
Endpoints with containers, namespaces, or ND proxy functions may have
even more addresses. This poses challenges for network
infrastructure devices (SAVI switches, wireless access points, etc.)
that map MAC addresses to IPv6 addresses, often with limits to
prevent resource exhaustion or DoS attacks. When the number of IPs
per MAC limit is exceeded, infastructure devices behavior varies
across implementations, leading to inconsistent connectivity loss and
other unexpected behavior: while some systems drop new addresses,
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
others delete older entries, causing previously functional addresses
to lose connectivity. In all those cases endpoints and applications
don't receive explicit signalling about the address becoming
unusable.
This problem, while impacting dual-stack endpoints as well, is much
less visible for dual-stack devices:
* On a dual-stack endpoint Happy Eyeballs might obscure the issue by
falling back to IPv4.
* Using dedicated IPv6 addresses for CLAT instances increases the
number of IPv6 addresses required on IPv6-only nodes compared to
dual-stack ones.
* Some traffic flows (e.g. belonging to IPv4-only applications)
would be using IPv4 on a dual-stack endpoint but go through CLAT
on an IPv6-only one. Such flows would be unaffected on a dual-
stack network but experience an outage if the CLAT address is
blocked by the network.
Allocating prefixes to endpoints via DHCP-PD ([RFC9663]) alows to
eliminate the issue and to address the corresponding scalability
concerns. Operators of large-scale IPv6-mostly networks might
benefit from using DHCPv6 prefix delegation for IPv6-only and
IPv6-enabled endpoints. In that case the administrator also need to
ensure that the first-hop routers set the P-flag [RFC9762] in RAs.
However, the deployment model described in [RFC9663] might not yet be
supported by all endpoints. The network administrator SHOULD ensure
that the deployed network infastructure devices allow sufficient
number of IPv6 addresses to be mapped to a client's MAC and SHOULD
monitor for events, indicating that the limit has been reached (such
as syslog messages, etc).
7.5.4. Host Mobility and Renumbering
Networks employing dynamic VLAN assignment (e.g., based on 802.1x or
MAC-based authentication) can cause endpoints to move between VLANs
and IPv6 subnets. As client operating systems do not always handle
changes in link-layer state (e.g., VLAN changes) correctly, this
mobility often leads to inconsistent IP stack behavior on operating
systems, resulting in the persistence of old subnet addresses and
potential connectivity issues due to incorrect source address
selection. In such networks, the administrator SHOULD configure the
link-local addresses of the first-hop routers (such as link-local
addresses assigned to router interfaces or the corresponding VRRPv3
(Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol, [RFC9568]) virtual link-local IP
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
address) to be unique within the mobility domain (the set of links
the host can move between). For example, if there are two VLANs
using subnets 2001:db8:1:a::/64 and 2001:db8:1:b::/64, the
administrator might configure the virtual router link-local addresses
as 'fe80::2001:db8:1:a' and 'fe80::2001:db8:1:b', respectively.
[I-D.link-6man-gulla] provides further analysis and discusses this
approach in more detail.
7.5.5. Fragmentation
As the basic IPv6 header is 20 bytes longer than the IPv4 header,
transating from IPv4 to IPv6 can result in packets exceeding the path
MTU on the IPv6 side. In that case NAT64 creates IPv6 packets with
the Fragment Header (see Section 4 of [RFC6145] for more details. As
per [RFC6145] , by default the translator fragments IPv4 packets so
that they fit in 1280-byte IPv6 packets. It means that all IPv4
packets larger than 1260 bytes are fragmented (or dropped if the DF
bit is set).
Administrators SHOULD maximize the path MTU on the IPv6 side (from
the translator to IPv6-only hosts) to minimize fragmentation. NAT64
devices SHOULD be configured to use the actual path MTU on the IPv6
side when fragmenting IPv4 packets.
Another common case of IPv6 fragmentation is the use of protocols
like DNS and RADIUS, where the server response needs to be sent as a
single UDP datagram. Network security policies MUST allow IPv6
fragments for permitted UDP traffic (e.g., DNS, RADIUS) where single-
datagram responses are required. Allowing IPv6 fragments for
permitted TCP traffic is RECOMMENDED unless the network
infrastructure reliably performs TCP MSS clamping.
To ensure reliable Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD, [RFC8201]), network
security policies SHOULD permit the passage of ICMPv6 Type 2 (Packet
Too Big, [RFC4443]) messages to and from all IPv6-enabled devices.
This recommendation is fundamentally no different from the
established practice in IPv4 networks, where ICMP Type 3 Code 4
(Fragmentation Needed and DF set) messages are essential for PMTUD.
7.5.5.1. Atomic Fragments
Section 4 of [RFC6145] specified that an IPv4 packet without the
Don't Fragment (DF) bit set, when translated to IPv6, should include
an IPv6 Fragment Header. Such packets are known as atomic fragments.
However, [RFC7915] obsoleted [RFC6145] and deprecated the algorithm
that generates these IPv6 atomic fragments. It has been observed
that certain [RFC7915] non-compliant PLAT implementations continue to
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
generate IPv6 atomic fragments. This behavior causes unintended
connectivity issues, particularly on endpoints where firewalls are
enabled. Administrators should verify that the PLAT devices do not
generate atomic fragments by default. If atomic fragments are
generated, the administrator should configure the PLAT devices to
disable atomic fragments generation, provided a configuration
mechanism is available.
7.5.6. IPv4 UDP Packets with Zero Checksum
Translating IPv4 UDP packet with zero checksum to IPv6 requires the
translator to calculate the checksum and therefore has performance
implication. As per Secton 4.5 of [RFC7915], translators are allowed
to drop IPv4 UDP packet with zero checksum. Additionally,
Section 1.2 of [RFC7915] says: "Fragmented IPv4 UDP packets that do
not contain a UDP checksum (i.e., the UDP checksum field is zero) are
not of significant use on the Internet, and in general will not be
translated by the IP/ICMP translator...However, when the translator
is configured to forward the packet without a UDP checksum, the
fragmented IPv4 UDP packets will be translated."
It has been observed that some systems (such as 3GPP ePDG, Evolved
Packet Data Gateway) might generate IPv4 UDP packets with zero
checksum. Those packets could be dropped by the PLAT devices,
impacting WiFi calling on IPv6-only endpoints connecting to those
ePDGs. As Secton 4.5 of [RFC7915] recommends that the translators
have a configuration knob to calculate an IPv6 checksum and forward
the packet instead of dropping it, the administrator should consider
enabling that option if such issue is encountered.
7.5.7. Representing IPv6 Addresses by CLAT
Certain CLAT implementations face challenges when translating
incoming IPv6 packets with native (non-synthesized) source addresses
(e.g. ICMPv6 packets sent by intermediate hops on the path). This
lack of standardized translation mechanisms can lead to:
* Incomplete Traceroute: Omission of IPv6-only hops between the
endpoint and NAT64 translator, hindering troubleshooting.
* Path MTU Discovery Issues: Potential disruptions in the PMTU
discovery process.
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-icmpext-xlat-v6only-source] proposes a solution for
signalling the actual non-synthesized IPv6 source address while
translating ICMPv6 error messages.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
7.5.8. IPv4-Dependencies in Network Admission Control
Certain layer 2 network devices (e.g., wireless access points,
controllers) may enforce a policy where a host's network access is
contingent upon successful DHCP IPv4 address assignment or tied to
results of DHCP snooping. Consequently, hosts supporting Option 108
may experience network access denial or disconnection, as they are
not assigned IPv4 addresses.
7.5.9. Custom DNS Configuration on Endpoints
In IPv6-mostly networks without PREF64 in RAs, hosts rely on DNS64
([RFC7050] to discover the NAT64 prefix for CLAT operation.
[RFC8880] requires that queries for AAAA resource records of
"ipv4only.arpa." MUST be sent to the recursive resolvers provided by
the network, not to the resolvers configured manually, local
recursive resolvers etc. However some implementations do not comply
with [RFC8880] and, when configured with custom DNS resolvers (e.g.,
public or corporate DNS) may bypass the network-provided DNS64,
preventing NAT64 prefix discovery and hindering CLAT functionality.
Where feasible, administrators SHOULD include PREF64 in RAs within
IPv6-mostly networks to minimize reliance on DNS64. Administrators
need to be aware of the potential for CLAT failures when endpoints
use custom resolvers in environments lacking PREF64.
Similarly, some VPN clients are known to overrride the DNS
configuration on the endpoints, preventing those devices from
discovering the NAT64 prefix via [RFC7050] mechanism. If the network
doesn't provide the NAT64 prefix in RAs or the endpoint doesn't
support [RFC8781], the endpoint might not be able to discover the
NAT64 prefix and therefore would fail to enable CLAT.
8. Security Considerations
The proposed deployment scenario inherits security considerations of
IPv6 (see [RFC9099]). As IPv6-only device can not fall back to IPv4
if IPv6 connectivity is not available or impacted by a malicious
actor. Therefore any attack affecting IPv6 connectivity would have
much more drastic outcome, comparing to dual-stack networks.
By signalling a rogue NAT64 prefix to a host, a malicious actor can:
* cause a DoS attack, if the network does not provide NAT64
functions (for that prefix or at all);
* implement MitM attack by intercepting traffic to the rogue prefix.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
To countermeasure this attack vector, the network administrators
SHOULD configure the first-hop routers to include PREF64 information
in Router Advertisements as per [RFC8781] and ensure that layer 2
security measures such as RA-Guard ([RFC6105]) are in place.
Section 7 of [RFC8781] discusses this topic in more details.
Additionally, [I-D.ietf-v6ops-claton] discusses security implications
of enabling CLAT if native IPv4 connectivity is available and
recommends disabling CLAT in that case.
Security considerations of using DHCP Option 108 are documented in
Section 6 of [RFC8925].
9. Privacy Considerations
This document does not introduce any new privacy considerations.
IPv6-mostly networks have the same privacy considerations as other
Dual-stacked or IPv6-only networks.
10. IANA Considerations
This memo does not introduce any requests to IANA.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6105] Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J.
Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6105, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6105>.
[RFC6146] Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, DOI 10.17487/RFC6146,
April 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6146>.
[RFC6333] Durand, A., Droms, R., Woodyatt, J., and Y. Lee, "Dual-
Stack Lite Broadband Deployments Following IPv4
Exhaustion", RFC 6333, DOI 10.17487/RFC6333, August 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6333>.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
[RFC6555] Wing, D. and A. Yourtchenko, "Happy Eyeballs: Success with
Dual-Stack Hosts", RFC 6555, DOI 10.17487/RFC6555, April
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6555>.
[RFC6877] Mawatari, M., Kawashima, M., and C. Byrne, "464XLAT:
Combination of Stateful and Stateless Translation",
RFC 6877, DOI 10.17487/RFC6877, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6877>.
[RFC7050] Savolainen, T., Korhonen, J., and D. Wing, "Discovery of
the IPv6 Prefix Used for IPv6 Address Synthesis",
RFC 7050, DOI 10.17487/RFC7050, November 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7050>.
[RFC7335] Byrne, C., "IPv4 Service Continuity Prefix", RFC 7335,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7335, August 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7335>.
[RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
[RFC8106] Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli,
"IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration",
RFC 8106, DOI 10.17487/RFC8106, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8106>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8781] Colitti, L. and J. Linkova, "Discovering PREF64 in Router
Advertisements", RFC 8781, DOI 10.17487/RFC8781, April
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8781>.
[RFC8585] Palet Martinez, J., Liu, H. M.-H., and M. Kawashima,
"Requirements for IPv6 Customer Edge Routers to Support
IPv4-as-a-Service", RFC 8585, DOI 10.17487/RFC8585, May
2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8585>.
[RFC8925] Colitti, L., Linkova, J., Richardson, M., and T.
Mrugalski, "IPv6-Only Preferred Option for DHCPv4",
RFC 8925, DOI 10.17487/RFC8925, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8925>.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
[RFC9099] Vyncke, É., Chittimaneni, K., Kaeo, M., and E. Rey,
"Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks",
RFC 9099, DOI 10.17487/RFC9099, August 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9099>.
11.2. Informative References
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.
J., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private
Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918,
February 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
[RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>.
[RFC6052] Bao, C., Huitema, C., Bagnulo, M., Boucadair, M., and X.
Li, "IPv6 Addressing of IPv4/IPv6 Translators", RFC 6052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6052, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6052>.
[RFC6145] Li, X., Bao, C., and F. Baker, "IP/ICMP Translation
Algorithm", RFC 6145, DOI 10.17487/RFC6145, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6145>.
[RFC6147] Bagnulo, M., Sullivan, A., Matthews, P., and I. van
Beijnum, "DNS64: DNS Extensions for Network Address
Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6147,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6147, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6147>.
[RFC6535] Huang, B., Deng, H., and T. Savolainen, "Dual-Stack Hosts
Using "Bump-in-the-Host" (BIH)", RFC 6535,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6535, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6535>.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
[RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.
[RFC7225] Boucadair, M., "Discovering NAT64 IPv6 Prefixes Using the
Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 7225,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7225, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7225>.
[RFC7755] Anderson, T., "SIIT-DC: Stateless IP/ICMP Translation for
IPv6 Data Center Environments", RFC 7755,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7755, February 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7755>.
[RFC7915] Bao, C., Li, X., Baker, F., Anderson, T., and F. Gont,
"IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm", RFC 7915,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7915, June 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7915>.
[RFC8201] McCann, J., Deering, S., Mogul, J., and R. Hinden, Ed.,
"Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", STD 87, RFC 8201,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8201, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8201>.
[RFC8273] Brzozowski, J. and G. Van de Velde, "Unique IPv6 Prefix
per Host", RFC 8273, DOI 10.17487/RFC8273, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8273>.
[RFC8305] Schinazi, D. and T. Pauly, "Happy Eyeballs Version 2:
Better Connectivity Using Concurrency", RFC 8305,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8305, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8305>.
[RFC8880] Cheshire, S. and D. Schinazi, "Special Use Domain Name
'ipv4only.arpa'", RFC 8880, DOI 10.17487/RFC8880, August
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8880>.
[RFC9568] Lindem, A. and A. Dogra, "Virtual Router Redundancy
Protocol (VRRP) Version 3 for IPv4 and IPv6", RFC 9568,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9568, April 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9568>.
[RFC9663] Colitti, L., Linkova, J., Ed., and X. Ma, Ed., "Using
DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation (DHCPv6-PD) to Allocate Unique
IPv6 Prefixes per Client in Large Broadcast Networks",
RFC 9663, DOI 10.17487/RFC9663, October 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9663>.
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
[RFC9762] Colitti, L., Linkova, J., Ma, X., Ed., and D. Lamparter,
"Using Router Advertisements to Signal the Availability of
DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation to Clients", RFC 9762,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9762, June 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9762>.
[RFC9872] Buraglio, N., Jensen, T., and J. Linkova, "Recommendations
for Discovering IPv6 Prefix Used for IPv6 Address
Synthesis", RFC 9872, DOI 10.17487/RFC9872, September
2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9872>.
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-claton]
Colitti, L., Linkova, J., and T. Jensen, "464XLAT
Customer-side Translator (CLAT): Node Behavior and
Recommendations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-v6ops-claton-10, 18 October 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-
claton-10>.
[I-D.link-6man-gulla]
Linkova, J., "Using Prefix-Specific Link-Local Addresses
to Improve SLAAC Robustness", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-link-6man-gulla-01, 3 March 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-link-6man-
gulla-01>.
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-icmpext-xlat-v6only-source]
Lamparter, D. and J. Linkova, "Using Dummy IPv4 Address
and Node Identification Extensions for IP/ICMP translators
(XLATs)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
v6ops-icmpext-xlat-v6only-source-00, 4 July 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-
icmpext-xlat-v6only-source-00>.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Brian Carpenter, Stuart Cheshire, Joe Clarke, Lorenzo
Colitti, Jeremy Duncan, David Farmer, Warren Kumari, Jordi Palet, Tom
Petch, Michael Richardson, Matsuzaki Yoshinobu for the discussions,
the feedback, and all contribution.
Authors' Addresses
Nick Buraglio
Energy Sciences Network
IL
United States of America
Email: buraglio@forwardingplane.net, buraglio@es.net
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft 6mops October 2025
Ondrej Caletka
RIPE NCC
Stationsplein 11
Amsterdam
Netherlands
Email: Ondrej.Caletka@ripe.net
Jen Linkova
Google
1 Darling Island Rd
Pyrmont NSW 2009
Australia
Email: furry13@gmail.com, furry@google.com
Buraglio, et al. Expires 23 April 2026 [Page 26]