Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Profile
draft-jenkins-cnsa2-pkix-profile-01
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Michael J. Jenkins , Alison Becker | ||
| Last updated | 2024-10-21 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-jenkins-cnsa2-pkix-profile-01
Network Working Group M. Jenkins
Internet-Draft A. Becker
Intended status: Informational NSA-CCSS
Expires: 24 April 2025 21 October 2024
Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List Profile
draft-jenkins-cnsa2-pkix-profile-01
Abstract
This document specifies a profile of X.509 v3 Certificates and X.509
v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for applications that use
Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite published by the
United States Government.
The profile applies to the capabilities, configuration, and operation
of all components of US National Security Systems that employ such
X.509 certificates. US National Security Systems are described in
NIST Special Publication 800-59. It is also appropriate for all
other US Government systems that process high-value information.
The profile is made publicly available for use by developers and
operators of these and any other system deployments.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 April 2025.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite . . . . . . 3
4. General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. CNSA Suite Object Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. CNSA Suite Base Certificate Required Values . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1. signature and signatureAlgorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.2. signatureValue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.3. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.4. subjectPublicKeyInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Certificate Extensions for Particular Types of
Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.1. CNSA Suite Self-Signed CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 6
7.2. CNSA Suite Non-Self-Signed CA Certificates . . . . . . . 6
7.3. CNSA Suite End-Entity Signature and Key Establishment
Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. CNSA Suite CRL Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Requirements for Other Revocation Notification Methods . . . 8
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
This document specifies a base profile for X.509 v3 Certificates and
X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for use by applications
that support the United States National Security Agency's Commercial
National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite [annccnsa]. The profile
applies to the capabilities, configuration, and operation of all
components of US National Security Systems that employ such X.509
certificates. US National Security Systems are described in NIST
Special Publication 800-59 [SP80059]. The profile is also
appropriate for all other US Government systems that process high-
value information. It is made publicly available for use by
developers and operators of these and any other system deployments.
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This document does not define any cryptographic algorithm; instead,
it defines a CNSA-compliant profile of "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile" [RFC5280]. It applies to all CNSA Suite solutions that make
use of X.509 v3 Certificates or X.509 v2 CRLs. The reader is assumed
to have familiarity with RFC 5280. All MUST-level requirements of
RFC 5280 apply throughout this profile and are generally not repeated
here. In cases where a MUST-level requirement is repeated for
emphasis, the text notes the requirement is "in adherence with RFC
5280". This profile contains changes that elevate some SHOULD-level
options in RFC 5280 to MUST-level and also contains changes that
elevate some MAY-level options in RFC 5280 to SHOULD-level or MUST-
level. All options from RFC 5280 that are not listed in this profile
remain at the requirement level of RFC 5280.
[EDNOTE: Need to address how prior CNSA guidance will be superseded.]
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite
The National Security Agency (NSA) profiles commercial cryptographic
algorithms and protocols as part of its mission to support secure,
interoperable communications for US Government National Security
Systems. To this end, it publishes guidance both to assist with
transitioning the United States Government to new algorithms and to
provide vendors, and the Internet community in general, with
information concerning their proper use and configuration within the
scope of US Government National Security Systems.
The Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite is the set of
approved commercial algorithms that can be used by vendors and IT
users to meet cybersecurity and interoperability requirements for
NSS. The first suite of CNSA Suite algorithms, “Suite B”,
established a baseline for use of commercial algorithms to protect
classified information. The next suite, “CNSA 1.0”, served as a
bridge between the original set and a fully post-quantum
cryptographic capability. The current suite, “CNSA 2.0”, establishes
fully PQ protection [annccnsa].
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Pursuant to the “National Security Memorandum on Promoting United
States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to
Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems” [NSM-10], the National Institute
for Standards and Technology (NIST) has standardized several post-
quantum asymmetric algorithms. From these, NSA has selected two: ML-
DSA-87 [FIPS204], a standardized version of CRYSTALS-Dilithium, for
signing; and ML-KEM-1024 [FIPS203], a standardized version of
CRYSTALS-Kyber, for key management. With SHA384 (or SHA512), AES-
256, and LMS/XMSS, these comprise the CNSA Suite 2.0.
The NSA is authoring a set of RFCs, including this one, to provide
updated guidance for using CNSA 2.0 algorithms in certain IETF
protocols. These RFCs can be used in conjunction with other RFCs and
cryptographic guidance (e.g., NIST Special Publications) to properly
protect Internet traffic and data-at-rest for US Government National
Security Systems.
4. General Requirements
The goal of this document is to define a base set of requirements for
certificates and CRLs to support interoperability among CNSA Suite
solutions. Specific communities, such as those associated with US
National Security Systems, may define community profiles that further
restrict certificate and CRL contents by mandating the presence of
extensions that are optional in this base profile, defining new
optional or critical extension types, or restricting the values and/
or presence of fields within existing extensions. However,
communications between distinct communities MUST conform with the
requirements specified in this document when interoperability is
desired. Applications may add requirements for additional non-
critical extensions, but they MUST NOT assume that a remote peer will
be able to process them.
Every CNSA Suite certificate MUST use the X.509 v3 format and contain
one of the following:
* A ML-DSA-87 signature verification key.
* A ML-KEM-1024 public encapsulation key.
The signature applied to all CNSA Suite certificates and CRLs MUST be
made with a ML-DSA-87 signing key. The ML-DSA algorithm incorporates
an internal hashing function, so there is no need to apply hashing
algorithm before signing (aka "pre-hashing"). Where an application
or implementation make it more efficient to pre-hash, then the
SHA-384 algorithm SHOULD be used, or the SHA-512 algorithm MAY be
used. No other hashing algorithms comply with CNSA 2.0.
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The reader is also assumed to have familiarity with these documents:
* draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates
[I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates] for the algorithm
identifier, and the syntax and semantics for the Subject Public
Key Information field in certificates that support ML-DSA-87 and
* draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates
[I-D.ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates] for the algorithm identifier,
and the syntax and semantics for the Subject Public Key
Information field in certificates that support ML-KEM-1024.
5. CNSA Suite Object Identifiers
The object identifiers for use of CNSA 2.0 Suite in certificates and
crls are defined in [list of RFCs including draft-ietf-lamps-
dilithium-certificates, draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates]. These
OIDs are used to identify both the algorithm associated with the
public key (as part of the Subject Public Key Info field), and the
signature on a certificate or crl (as part of the signatureAlgorithm
field in a Certificate or CertificateList and part of the signature
field in a TBSCertificate and TBSCertList). They are repeated here
for convenience:
id-ML-DSA-87 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) sigAlgs(3) 19 }
id-alg-ml-kem-1024 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) kems(4) 3 }
6. CNSA Suite Base Certificate Required Values
This section specifies changes to the basic requirements in [RFC5280]
for applications that create or use CNSA Suite certificates. Note
that RFC 5280 has varying mandates for marking extensions as critical
or non-critical. This profile changes some of those mandates for
extensions that are included in CNSA Suite certificates.
6.1. signature and signatureAlgorithm
ML-DSA-87 is indicated by the id-ML-DSA-87 OID in the
AlgorithmIdentifier of the signature field in a TBSCertificate and
TBSCertList, and of the signatureAlgorithm field in a Certificate and
CertificateList.
The parameters MUST be absent in all AlgorithmIdentifiers.
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6.2. signatureValue
ML-DSA digital signature generation is described in [FIPS204]. It is
converted from a byte string to a DER encoded BIT STRING in the
signatureValue field of a Certificate or CertificateList.
6.3. version
For this profile, version MUST be 'v3', with INTEGER value 2.
6.4. subjectPublicKeyInfo
For ML-DSA-87 signature verification keys, the algorithm ID id-ML-
DSA-87 MUST be used.
For ML-KEM-1024 key management keys, the algorithm ID id-alg-ml-
kem-1024 MUST be used.
In either case, the parameters of the AlgorithmIdentifier in this
field MUST be absent.
7. Certificate Extensions for Particular Types of Certificates
Different types of certificates in this profile have different
required and recommended extensions. Those are listed in this
section. Those extensions from RFC 5280 not explicitly listed in
this profile remain at the requirement levels of RFC 5280.
7.1. CNSA Suite Self-Signed CA Certificates
In adherence with [RFC5280], self-signed CA certificates in this
profile MUST contain the subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage, and
basicConstraints extensions.
The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical. The keyCertSign
and cRLSign bits MUST be set. The digitalSignature and
nonRepudiation bits MAY be set. All other bits MUST NOT be set.
In adherence with [RFC5280], the basicConstraints extension MUST be
marked as critical. The cA boolean MUST be set to indicate that the
subject is a CA, and the pathLenConstraint MUST NOT be present.
7.2. CNSA Suite Non-Self-Signed CA Certificates
Non-self-signed CA Certificates in this profile MUST contain the
authorityKeyIdentifier, keyUsage, and basicConstraints extensions.
If there is a policy to be asserted, then the certificatePolicies
extension MUST be included.
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The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical. The keyCertSign
and CRLSign bits MUST be set. The digitalSignature and
nonRepudiation bits MAY be set. All other bits MUST NOT be set.
In adherence with [RFC5280], the basicConstraints extension MUST be
marked as critical. The cA boolean MUST be set to indicate that the
subject is a CA, and the pathLenConstraint subfield is OPTIONAL.
If a policy is asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST be
marked as non-critical, MUST contain the OIDs for the applicable
certificate policies, and SHOULD NOT use the policyQualifiers option.
If a policy is not asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST
be omitted.
Relying party applications conforming to this profile MUST be
prepared to process the policyMappings, policyConstraints, and
inhibitAnyPolicy extensions, regardless of criticality, following the
guidance in [RFC5280] when they appear in non-self-signed CA
certificates.
7.3. CNSA Suite End-Entity Signature and Key Establishment Certificates
In adherence with [RFC5280], end-entity certificates in this profile
MUST contain the authorityKeyIdentifier and keyUsage extensions. If
there is a policy to be asserted, then the certificatePolicies
extension MUST be included. End-entity certificates SHOULD contain
the subjectKeyIdentifier extension.
The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical.
For end-entity digital signature certificates, the keyUsage extension
MUST be set for digitalSignature. The nonRepudiation bit MAY be set.
All other bits in the keyUsage extension MUST NOT be set.
For end-entity key establishment certificates, the keyUsage extension
MUST be set for keyEncipherment. The encipherOnly or decipherOnly
bit MAY be set. All other bits in the keyUsage extension MUST NOT be
set.
If a policy is asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST be
marked as non-critical, MUST contain the OIDs for the applicable
certificate policies, and SHOULD NOT use the policyQualifiers option.
If a policy is not asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST
be omitted.
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8. CNSA Suite CRL Requirements
This CNSA Suite CRL profile is a profile of [RFC5280]. There are
changes in the requirements from [RFC5280] for the signatures on CRLs
of this profile.
The signatures on CRLs in this profile MUST follow the same rules
from this profile that apply to signatures in the certificates. See
Section 4.
9. Requirements for Other Revocation Notification Methods
Revocation notification methods of any type must enable
authentication of the issuing CA as the source of the revocation
information. Specifically, an OCSP response MUST be signed
conformant with Section 4, and with a key that binds the response to
the issuing CA.
10. Security Considerations
This document introduces no security considerations beyond those in
[RFC5280], of which it is a profile.
11. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[annccnsa] National Security Agency, "Announcing the Commercial
National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0", September 1984,
<https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071834/-1/-1/0/
CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS_.PDF>.
[FIPS203] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-
Lattice-Based Key Establishment Mechanism Standard",
Federal Information Processing Standard 203,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203.ipd, August 2023,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.203.ipd.pdf>.
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[FIPS204] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-
Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", Federal
Information Processing Standard 204,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204.ipd, August 2023,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.204.ipd.pdf>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates]
Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B.
Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Algorithm Identifiers for ML-DSA", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-
04, 22 July 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-04>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates]
Turner, S., Kampanakis, P., Massimo, J., and B.
Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -
Algorithm Identifiers for Module-Lattice-Based Key-
Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates-04, 20
September 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates-04>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8603] Jenkins, M. and L. Zieglar, "Commercial National Security
Algorithm (CNSA) Suite Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 8603,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8603, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8603>.
12.2. Informative References
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[NSM-10] United States, The White House, "National Security
Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in
Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable
Cryptographic Systems", NSM 10, May 2022,
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/05/04/national-security-memorandum-on-
promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-
while-mitigating-risks-to-vulnerable-cryptographic-
systems/>.
[SP80059] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Guideline
for Identifying an Information System as a National
Security System", Special Publication 59,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-59, August 2003,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-59/
final>.
Authors' Addresses
Michael Jenkins
NSA Center for Cybersecurity Standards
Email: mjjenki@cyber.nsa.gov
Alison Becker
NSA Center for Cybersecurity Standards
Email: aebecke@uwe.nsa.gov
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