Trusted Traffic

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2018-11-23 (latest revision 2018-05-22)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at


Current methods for managing traffic through content inspection tend to process all sessions similarly. Internet traffic examples like DDoS mitigation require all data to pass through one of a limited number of scrubbing centers, which create both natural choke points and the potential for widespread collateral damage should a center become overloaded. Similar issues exist with email SPAM and malware filtering, traffic shaping, etc. We propose a method to utilize existing HTTP and HTTPS protocols that enables destinations to temporarily confer trust on sources, and for trusted traffic to be routed and processed differently from untrusted traffic.


John Brzozowski (
Kris Beevers (
James Cariello (unknown-email-James-Cariello)
John Colton (unknown-email-John-Colton)
Lutz Jacob (
John Leddy (
Josh Shaul (
Lou Steinberg (

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)