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A SCITT Profile for Verifiable Audit Trails in Algorithmic Trading: The VeritasChain Protocol (VCP)
draft-kamimura-scitt-vcp-03

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author TOKACHI KAMIMURA
Last updated 2026-07-21
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draft-kamimura-scitt-vcp-03
Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust              T. Kamimura
Internet-Draft                       VeritasChain Standards Organization
Intended status: Informational                              21 July 2026
Expires: 22 January 2027

A SCITT Profile for Verifiable Audit Trails in Algorithmic Trading: The
                      VeritasChain Protocol (VCP)
                      draft-kamimura-scitt-vcp-03

Abstract

   This document defines a profile of the SCITT (Supply Chain Integrity,
   Transparency, and Trust) architecture for creating tamper-evident
   audit trails of AI-driven algorithmic trading decisions and
   executions.  The VeritasChain Protocol (VCP) applies the SCITT
   framework to address the specific requirements of financial markets,
   including high-precision timestamps, regulatory compliance
   considerations (EU AI Act, MiFID II), and privacy-preserving
   mechanisms (crypto-shredding) compatible with GDPR.  This profile
   specifies how VCP events are encoded as SCITT Signed Statements,
   registered with Transparency Services, and verified using COSE
   Receipts.  It further defines SCITT conformance profiles for
   interoperability and an ERASURE event type that records crypto-
   shredding operations as immutable audit events.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest version of this document, along with implementation
   resources and test vectors, can be found at
   https://github.com/veritaschain/vcp-spec.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the SCITT Working Group
   mailing list (scitt@ietf.org).

   Changes from -02:

   *  Updated to align with VCP Specification v1.2

   *  Added SCITT Alignment Object and conformance profiles
      (Section 4.4)

   *  Added ERASURE event type recording crypto-shredding operations
      (Section 6.3)

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   *  Corrected the post-quantum SignAlgo registry value from DILITHIUM3
      to DILITHIUM2 (ML-DSA, FIPS 204)

   *  PolicyID examples migrated to the Issuer Domain + Local ID naming
      convention defined in VCP v1.2

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 January 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Relationship to SCITT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  SCITT Terminology Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Event Flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Per-Actor Hash Chain (Optional) . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

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     3.3.  Three-Layer Integrity Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  VCP Event Schema  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Header Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.2.  Payload Object  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.  Security Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.4.  SCITT Alignment Object  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.5.  Event Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Registration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.1.  Policy Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.2.  Validation Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.3.  Tier-Specific Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.4.  Certification Policy Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  Crypto-Shredding for Privacy Compliance . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.1.  Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.2.  VCP-PRIVACY Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.3.  ERASURE Event Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   7.  SCRAPI Integration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.1.  Registration (POST /entries)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.2.  Retrieval (GET /entries/{entry_id}) . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     7.3.  Receipt (GET /entries/{entry_id}/receipt) . . . . . . . .  20
     7.4.  Anchor Status (GET /anchors/{anchor_id})  . . . . . . . .  20
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     8.1.  Integrity Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     8.2.  Quantum Resistance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     8.3.  Timing Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     8.4.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     8.5.  Completeness Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   Appendix A.  Complete VCP Event Example . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   Appendix B.  JSON Schema Reference  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Appendix C.  Changes from draft-kamimura-scitt-vcp-02 . . . . . .  25
   Appendix D.  Changes from draft-kamimura-scitt-vcp-01 . . . . . .  25
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26

1.  Introduction

   The SCITT (Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency, and Trust)
   architecture [I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture] provides a framework for
   creating tamper-evident logs of digital artifacts through
   Transparency Services.  While SCITT was initially designed for
   software supply chain use cases, its core primitives—Signed
   Statements, Receipts, and Transparency Services—are applicable to any
   domain requiring verifiable audit trails.

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   This document specifies a SCITT profile for AI-driven algorithmic
   trading systems in financial markets.  The VeritasChain Protocol
   (VCP) applies the SCITT architecture with domain-specific extensions:

   *  A schema for encoding trading events as SCITT Signed Statements

   *  Registration policies for financial audit trails

   *  Conformance tiers (Silver, Gold, Platinum) with varying
      requirements for timing precision and cryptographic guarantees

   *  Privacy mechanisms compatible with GDPR data erasure requirements

   *  A completeness-aware design that enables omission detection
      through external anchoring

   VCP serves as an "AI Flight Recorder" for algorithmic trading,
   enabling post-incident reconstruction of system behavior with
   cryptographic proof of integrity.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.2.  Relationship to SCITT

   This document is a profile of the SCITT architecture.  It:

   *  REQUIRES compliance with [I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture]

   *  REQUIRES use of SCRAPI [I-D.ietf-scitt-scrapi] for Transparency
      Service interactions

   *  RECOMMENDS COSE Receipts for inclusion proofs

   *  DEFINES domain-specific extensions for financial trading

   This profile does not define a new protocol; it specifies how
   existing SCITT primitives are applied to the financial trading
   domain.

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1.3.  Scope

   This document specifies:

   *  VCP Event schema as SCITT Signed Statement payload

   *  Registration Policy requirements for VCP Transparency Services

   *  Mapping of VCP concepts to SCITT terminology

   *  Three conformance tiers with specific requirements

   *  Crypto-shredding mechanism for privacy compliance

   *  Three-layer integrity architecture

   This document does not specify:

   *  General SCITT architecture (see [I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture])

   *  SCRAPI endpoints (see [I-D.ietf-scitt-scrapi])

   *  COSE Receipt format (see [RFC9052])

   *  Specific regulatory mapping (covered in companion documents)

   *  Mandatory anchoring services (deployment-specific)

2.  Terminology

   This document uses terminology from [I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture].
   The following terms are specific to this profile:

   VCP Event  A single auditable record in the VeritasChain Protocol,
      encoded as a SCITT Signed Statement.  Consists of Header, Payload,
      and Security metadata.

   VCP Issuer  An algorithmic trading system, AI model, or human
      operator that generates VCP Events.  Corresponds to SCITT Issuer.

   VCP Transparency Service  A SCITT Transparency Service configured
      with VCP-specific Registration Policies.  Operates a VCP-compliant
      append-only log.

   VCP Receipt  A COSE Receipt issued by a VCP Transparency Service,
      proving inclusion of a VCP Event in the log.

   Actor  An entity (algorithm, human operator, or system) identified by

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      ActorID that generates VCP Events.

   Crypto-Shredding  A privacy technique where encrypted payload data is
      rendered permanently unrecoverable by destroying the encryption
      key, while preserving the cryptographic integrity proofs (hashes
      and Receipts).

   Conformance Tier  One of three implementation levels (Silver, Gold,
      Platinum) with increasing requirements for timing precision,
      anchoring frequency, and cryptographic guarantees.

   External Anchor  A cryptographic commitment (typically a Merkle root)
      published to an external, independent system (e.g., public
      blockchain, timestamping authority).  External anchoring supports
      omission detection and enables third-party completeness
      verification.

   Policy Identification  A field within the VCP Event that explicitly
      identifies the applicable Registration Policy and conformance
      tier.

2.1.  SCITT Terminology Mapping

   The following table maps VCP concepts to SCITT terminology:

   +==================+==============+================================+
   | VCP Concept      | SCITT        | Notes                          |
   |                  | Equivalent   |                                |
   +==================+==============+================================+
   | VCP Event        | Signed       | VCP Event is the payload of a  |
   |                  | Statement    | Signed Statement               |
   +------------------+--------------+--------------------------------+
   | VCP Issuer       | Issuer       | Trading system or AI model     |
   +------------------+--------------+--------------------------------+
   | VCP Transparency | Transparency | With VCP Registration Policy   |
   | Service          | Service      |                                |
   +------------------+--------------+--------------------------------+
   | VCP Receipt      | Receipt      | COSE Receipt with Merkle       |
   |                  |              | inclusion proof                |
   +------------------+--------------+--------------------------------+
   | Hash Chain       | Append-only  | VCP optionally adds per-Actor  |
   | (Optional)       | Log          | chaining                       |
   +------------------+--------------+--------------------------------+
   | External Anchor  | Merkle Tree  | Periodic commitment supporting |
   |                  | Root         | completeness verification      |
   +------------------+--------------+--------------------------------+

                Table 1: VCP to SCITT Terminology Mapping

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3.  Architecture

   VCP builds upon the SCITT architecture with domain-specific
   extensions for financial trading:

     +------------------+       +-------------------------+
     |   VCP Issuer     |       |  VCP Transparency       |
     | (Trading System) |       |      Service            |
     +--------+---------+       +------------+------------+
              |                              |
              | 1. Create VCP Event          |
              | 2. Sign as COSE_Sign1        |
              |                              |
              +------ Signed Statement ----->|
              |       (via SCRAPI)           |
              |                              | 3. Validate against
              |                              |    Registration Policy
              |                              |
              |                              | 4. Append to Log
              |                              |
              |<-------- VCP Receipt --------+
              |       (COSE Receipt)         |
              |                              |
     +--------+---------+       +------------+------------+
     |    Verifier      |       |   External Anchor       |
     | (Auditor/Regul.) |       | (Timestamp/Blockchain)  |
     +------------------+       +-------------------------+

3.1.  Event Flow

   1.  *Event Generation:* VCP Issuer creates a VCP Event containing
       trading decision or execution data.

   2.  *Signing:* Event is signed using COSE_Sign1 [RFC9052] with the
       Issuer's private key.

   3.  *Registration:* Signed Statement is submitted to VCP Transparency
       Service via SCRAPI POST /entries.

   4.  *Validation:* Transparency Service validates against VCP
       Registration Policy.

   5.  *Logging:* Valid statement is appended to the append-only log.

   6.  *Receipt:* COSE Receipt with Merkle inclusion proof is returned
       to Issuer.

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   7.  *External Anchoring (when deployed):* Merkle root MAY be
       periodically anchored to an external system, enabling omission
       detection by third parties.

3.2.  Per-Actor Hash Chain (Optional)

   VCP MAY maintain per-Actor hash chains in addition to SCITT's global
   append-only log.  When implemented, each VCP Event includes a
   PrevHash field containing the hash of the previous event from the
   same Actor.  This enables efficient verification of a single Actor's
   event sequence without downloading the entire log.

   Note: Per-Actor hash chains are OPTIONAL.  When external anchoring is
   deployed, it provides the primary mechanism for completeness
   verification.  Hash chains serve as a complementary local integrity
   mechanism.

     Actor A:  Event_A1 --hash--> Event_A2 --hash--> Event_A3

     Actor B:  Event_B1 --hash--> Event_B2

     Global Log: [Event_A1, Event_B1, Event_A2, Event_B2, Event_A3, ...]

3.3.  Three-Layer Integrity Architecture

   VCP defines a three-layer architecture that separates concerns and
   clarifies where integrity guarantees originate:

        +=======+===============+===================+=============+
        | Layer | Component     | Guarantee         | Protocol    |
        |       |               |                   | Requirement |
        +=======+===============+===================+=============+
        | Layer | Event         | Individual event  | REQUIRED    |
        | 1     | Integrity     | authenticity via  |             |
        |       |               | digital signature |             |
        +-------+---------------+-------------------+-------------+
        | Layer | Collection    | Merkle tree over  | REQUIRED    |
        | 2     | Integrity     | event collection  |             |
        +-------+---------------+-------------------+-------------+
        | Layer | External      | Merkle root       | OPTIONAL    |
        | 3     | Verifiability | anchored to       | (see note)  |
        |       |               | external system   |             |
        +-------+---------------+-------------------+-------------+

                   Table 2: VCP Three-Layer Architecture

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   Note: Layer 3 (External Verifiability) is OPTIONAL at the protocol
   level.  However, VCP certification policies (VC-Certified program)
   require external anchoring at tier-specific frequencies.  This
   separation allows the protocol to remain flexible while certification
   programs can mandate stronger guarantees.

   External anchoring enables omission detection: without it, a log
   producer could theoretically withhold events before publishing a
   Merkle root.  When deployed, anchoring allows third parties to verify
   that the published root matches the expected state, supporting
   "Verify, Don't Trust" principles.

     Layer 1: Event Integrity
     +--------+    +--------+    +--------+
     | Event1 |    | Event2 |    | Event3 |
     | (sig)  |    | (sig)  |    | (sig)  |
     +---+----+    +---+----+    +---+----+
         |            |            |
         v            v            v
     Layer 2: Collection Integrity (Merkle Tree)
     +------------------------------------------+
     |              Merkle Root                 |
     +---------------------+--------------------+
                           |
                           v (when deployed)
     Layer 3: External Verifiability
     +------------------------------------------+
     | External Anchor (Blockchain/TSA/etc.)    |
     +------------------------------------------+

4.  VCP Event Schema

   A VCP Event is encoded as the payload of a SCITT Signed Statement.
   The payload MUST be a JSON object conforming to the following schema:

4.1.  Header Object

   The Header contains metadata common to all VCP Events:

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   {
     "Header": {
       "EventID": "01961e5f-5c0d-7000-8000-123456789abc",
       "TimestampISO": "2026-03-15T09:30:00.123456789Z",
       "TimestampInt": 1742034600123456789,
       "EventType": "ORD",
       "ActorID": "algo-momentum-001",
       "ChainID": "chain-actor-001",
       "SequenceNum": 42,
       "PolicyID": "org.veritaschain.policy:silver-v1-2"
     }
   }

   EventID  REQUIRED.  UUID v7 [RFC9562] providing time-sortable unique
      identification.

   TimestampISO  REQUIRED.  ISO 8601 timestamp with nanosecond
      precision.

   TimestampInt  REQUIRED.  Integer timestamp in nanoseconds since Unix
      epoch.

   EventType  REQUIRED.  Three-letter code identifying the event type
      (see Section 4.5).

   ActorID  REQUIRED.  Identifier of the entity generating this event.

   ChainID  REQUIRED.  Identifier of the per-Actor hash chain.

   SequenceNum  REQUIRED.  Monotonically increasing sequence number
      within the Actor's chain.

   PolicyID  REQUIRED.  Identifier of the Registration Policy under
      which the event is registered.  Per VCP v1.2 [VCP-SPEC], PolicyID
      SHOULD follow the Issuer Domain + Local ID convention
      (reverse_domain:local_identifier), for example
      "org.veritaschain.policy:gold-v1-2".  Global uniqueness is
      achieved through domain ownership; no central PolicyID registry is
      operated.

4.2.  Payload Object

   The Payload contains domain-specific data organized into modules:

   VCP-TRADE  Trading data: orders, executions, modifications,
      cancellations.

   VCP-RISK  Risk management data: exposure, limits, margin.

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   VCP-GOV  Governance data: algorithm parameters, decision factors,
      operator actions.

   VCP-PRIVACY  Privacy metadata: encryption keys, retention policies.

   {
     "Payload": {
       "VCP-TRADE": {
         "OrderID": "ord-2026-001",
         "Symbol": "AAPL",
         "Side": "BUY",
         "Quantity": "100",
         "Price": "185.50",
         "OrderType": "LIMIT"
       },
       "VCP-GOV": {
         "AlgoID": "momentum-v2.3",
         "DecisionFactors": ["RSI_oversold", "volume_spike"],
         "ConfidenceScore": 0.87
       }
     }
   }

4.3.  Security Object

   The Security object contains integrity and chaining information:

   {
     "Security": {
       "EventHash": "sha256:a1b2c3d4...",
       "PrevHash": "sha256:f6e5d4c3...",
       "MerkleRoot": "sha256:1234abcd...",
       "SignAlgo": "ED25519",
       "AnchorRef": "eth:0x1234...@12345678"
     }
   }

   EventHash  REQUIRED.  SHA-256 hash of the canonicalized Header and
      Payload, computed using JSON Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785].

   PrevHash  OPTIONAL.  Hash of the previous event in this Actor's
      chain.  If present, MUST match the EventHash of the preceding
      event (except for INIT events where it is absent).

   MerkleRoot  OPTIONAL in individual events.  Included in anchor (ANC)
      events when external anchoring is deployed.

   SignAlgo  REQUIRED.  Signature algorithm identifier.  MUST be

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      "ED25519" (default) or "DILITHIUM2", the VCP v1.2 registry value
      for ML-DSA [FIPS-204].  DILITHIUM2 carries EXPERIMENTAL status in
      VCP v1.2 and is intended for testing and hybrid (classical plus
      post-quantum) deployments; it is not a certification requirement.

   AnchorRef  OPTIONAL.  When external anchoring is deployed, contains
      reference to the anchor location (e.g., blockchain transaction ID,
      TSA receipt ID).

4.4.  SCITT Alignment Object

   VCP v1.2 [VCP-SPEC] defines an OPTIONAL SCITTAlignment object carried
   in the Header.  It makes the binding between a VCP Event and its
   SCITT artifacts (Signed Statement, Transparency Service, Receipt)
   explicit and machine-readable.

   Field presence is governed by conformance profiles:

      +================+================+==========================+
      | Profile        | SCITTAlignment | Intended Use             |
      +================+================+==========================+
      | VCP_BASE       | OPTIONAL       | Standard VCP deployment  |
      +----------------+----------------+--------------------------+
      | VCP_SCITT      | REQUIRED       | SCITT Transparency       |
      |                |                | Service interoperability |
      +----------------+----------------+--------------------------+
      | VCP_REGULATORY | RECOMMENDED    | Regulatory reporting     |
      |                |                | scenarios                |
      +----------------+----------------+--------------------------+

              Table 3: SCITT Alignment Conformance Profiles

   Implementations claiming the VCP_SCITT profile MUST include the
   SCITTAlignment object in every registered event; this profile-based
   approach avoids partial-implementation ambiguity.

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   {
     "Header": {
       "SCITTAlignment": {
         "Version": "1.2",
         "ConformanceProfile": "VCP_SCITT",
         "StatementID": "stmt-01961e5f-5c0d-7000",
         "TransparencyServiceID": "ts.veritaschain.example",
         "ReceiptFormat": "COSE_RECEIPT",
         "RegistrationPolicy": {
           "PolicyID": "org.veritaschain.policy:gold-v1-2",
           "Issuer": "org.veritaschain",
           "IssuedAt": 1767225600000000000
         }
       }
     }
   }

   Version  REQUIRED when present.  VCP specification version governing
      the alignment semantics ("1.2").

   ConformanceProfile  REQUIRED when present.  One of "VCP_BASE",
      "VCP_SCITT", or "VCP_REGULATORY".

   StatementID  OPTIONAL.  Identifier of the SCITT Signed Statement
      carrying this event.

   TransparencyServiceID  OPTIONAL.  Identifier of the Transparency
      Service with which the event is registered.  REQUIRED under the
      VCP_SCITT profile.

   ReceiptFormat  OPTIONAL.  Receipt encoding in use; "COSE_RECEIPT"
      designates COSE Receipts as specified by the SCITT architecture
      [I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture].

   RegistrationPolicy  OPTIONAL.  Structured reference to the
      Registration Policy (PolicyID, Issuer, IssuedAt) mirroring the
      Header-level PolicyID.

4.5.  Event Types

     +=========+================+===================================+
     | Code    | Name           | Description                       |
     +=========+================+===================================+
     | INIT    | Initialization | Chain initialization, no PrevHash |
     +---------+----------------+-----------------------------------+
     | SIG     | Signal         | Trading signal generated          |
     +---------+----------------+-----------------------------------+
     | ORD     | Order          | Order submitted                   |

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     +---------+----------------+-----------------------------------+
     | ACK     | Acknowledgment | Order acknowledged by venue       |
     +---------+----------------+-----------------------------------+
     | EXE     | Execution      | Order executed (fill)             |
     +---------+----------------+-----------------------------------+
     | CXL     | Cancellation   | Order cancelled                   |
     +---------+----------------+-----------------------------------+
     | MOD     | Modification   | Order modified                    |
     +---------+----------------+-----------------------------------+
     | RSK     | Risk           | Risk event or limit breach        |
     +---------+----------------+-----------------------------------+
     | ERR     | Error          | System error                      |
     +---------+----------------+-----------------------------------+
     | HBT     | Heartbeat      | Periodic liveness signal          |
     +---------+----------------+-----------------------------------+
     | CLS     | Close          | Position closed                   |
     +---------+----------------+-----------------------------------+
     | ANC     | Anchor         | Merkle anchor event (when         |
     |         |                | anchoring deployed)               |
     +---------+----------------+-----------------------------------+
     | ERASURE | Erasure        | Crypto-shredding record (VCP      |
     |         |                | v1.2, see Section 6.3)            |
     +---------+----------------+-----------------------------------+

                         Table 4: VCP Event Types

5.  Registration Policy

   A VCP Transparency Service MUST enforce a Registration Policy that
   validates incoming Signed Statements.

5.1.  Policy Identification

   The PolicyID field MUST be explicitly included in the VCP Event
   Header.  The Transparency Service MUST validate the registration
   request against the referenced Registration Policy and MUST NOT
   infer, select, or substitute a policy on its own.

   PolicyID values SHOULD follow the Issuer Domain + Local ID convention
   defined in VCP v1.2 [VCP-SPEC]: the reverse DNS notation of the
   Issuer's domain, a colon, and an issuer-defined local identifier.
   Examples:

   *  org.veritaschain.policy:silver-v1-2

   *  org.veritaschain.policy:gold-v1-2

   *  org.veritaschain.policy:platinum-v1-2

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   Uniqueness derives from domain ownership; no central PolicyID
   registry is operated.  Organizations without a domain MAY use a
   "local:" prefix at the cost of weaker uniqueness guarantees.

   Conformance tiers (Silver, Gold, Platinum) represent additional
   verification depth and operational requirements applied on top of the
   same core Registration Policy, and do not define separate or
   incompatible registration policies.

5.2.  Validation Requirements

   The Registration Policy MUST verify:

   1.  *Schema Compliance:* Payload conforms to VCP Event schema.

   2.  *PolicyID Present:* Header contains a valid PolicyID field.

   3.  *Signature Validity:* COSE_Sign1 signature is valid for the
       registered Issuer public key.

   4.  *Timestamp Validity:* TimestampInt is within acceptable bounds
       (not in future, not too old).

   5.  *Chain Integrity (if PrevHash present):* PrevHash matches the
       hash of the most recent event from this Actor.

   6.  *Sequence Monotonicity:* SequenceNum is exactly one greater than
       the previous event's SequenceNum.

5.3.  Tier-Specific Requirements

   This specification distinguishes timestamp resolution from clock
   accuracy.  Nanosecond-resolution timestamps represent the storage
   format capability, while actual clock accuracy is explicitly recorded
   and enforced per tier.

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     +==================+=============+=============+===============+
     | Requirement      | Silver      | Gold        | Platinum      |
     +==================+=============+=============+===============+
     | Timestamp        | Millisecond | Microsecond | Nanosecond    |
     | Resolution       |             |             |               |
     +------------------+-------------+-------------+---------------+
     | Clock Accuracy   | NTP (~10ms) | NTP + drift | PTPv2 (<1μs)  |
     |                  |             | (~1ms)      |               |
     +------------------+-------------+-------------+---------------+
     | Merkle Anchoring | Daily (if   | Hourly (if  | Per-minute    |
     | Frequency        | deployed)   | deployed)   | (if deployed) |
     +------------------+-------------+-------------+---------------+
     | Signature        | Ed25519     | Ed25519     | Ed25519 +     |
     | Algorithm        |             |             | Dilithium     |
     |                  |             |             | (OPTIONAL)    |
     +------------------+-------------+-------------+---------------+
     | Key Storage      | Software    | Software/   | HSM Required  |
     |                  |             | HSM         |               |
     +------------------+-------------+-------------+---------------+
     | PrevHash Chain   | OPTIONAL    | OPTIONAL    | RECOMMENDED   |
     +------------------+-------------+-------------+---------------+

                  Table 5: Conformance Tier Requirements

   Note: Silver tier is NOT intended for regulatory-grade algorithmic
   trading systems subject to MiFID II RTS 25, SEC Rule 17a-4, or
   equivalent clock synchronization requirements.  Silver tier is
   appropriate for development, testing, backtesting analysis, and non-
   regulated trading scenarios.

5.4.  Certification Policy Requirements

   This document does not mandate a specific external anchoring service.
   However, VCP certification programs (e.g., VC-Certified) impose
   additional operational requirements beyond the base protocol:

   *  *VC-Certified Silver:* External anchoring required at minimum
      daily frequency.

   *  *VC-Certified Gold:* External anchoring required at minimum hourly
      frequency.  Multiple independent anchors RECOMMENDED.

   *  *VC-Certified Platinum:* External anchoring required at minimum
      per-minute frequency.  Multiple independent anchors with
      geographic distribution REQUIRED.

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   Certification requirements are defined by the VeritasChain Standards
   Organization and are separate from this protocol specification.
   Implementations MAY be protocol-compliant without obtaining
   certification, and certification policies MAY evolve independently of
   this document.

   When external anchoring is deployed, acceptable anchor targets
   include:

   *  Public blockchains (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum)

   *  Trusted timestamping authorities (TSA) per [RFC3161]

   *  Other append-only public ledgers

6.  Crypto-Shredding for Privacy Compliance

   VCP supports crypto-shredding to enable GDPR-compliant data erasure
   while preserving audit trail integrity.  This mechanism allows
   deletion of personal data without invalidating cryptographic proofs.

6.1.  Mechanism

   1.  *Encryption:* Sensitive payload fields are encrypted with a per-
       record or per-subject Data Encryption Key (DEK).

   2.  *Key Storage:* DEK is stored separately, indexed by SubjectID.

   3.  *Hashing:* EventHash is computed over the encrypted payload,
       preserving integrity.

   4.  *Shredding:* Upon erasure request, DEK is destroyed.  Encrypted
       data becomes unrecoverable.

   5.  *Verification:* Receipt and hash chain remain valid—verifiers can
       confirm event existence and ordering without accessing decrypted
       content.

6.2.  VCP-PRIVACY Module

   {
     "VCP-PRIVACY": {
       "EncryptedFields": ["VCP-TRADE.ClientID", "VCP-TRADE.AccountID"],
       "KeyID": "dek-2026-001-subject-12345",
       "Algorithm": "AES-256-GCM",
       "RetentionPolicy": "GDPR-5Y"
     }
   }

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6.3.  ERASURE Event Type

   VCP v1.2 [VCP-SPEC] introduces the ERASURE event type to reconcile
   erasure obligations (such as GDPR Article 17) with append-only,
   tamper-evident audit trails.  An ERASURE event does not delete or
   rewrite any prior event.  It records, as a new immutable event, that
   the plaintext of specified protected fields has been rendered
   irrecoverable through crypto-shredding (destruction of the per-
   subject Data Encryption Key), while the EventHash, Merkle inclusion,
   and any external anchor of the target events remain verifiable.

      +=======================+=============+======================+
      | Field                 | Requirement | Description          |
      +=======================+=============+======================+
      | ErasureTargetEventIDs | REQUIRED    | Events whose         |
      |                       |             | protected fields are |
      |                       |             | crypto-shredded      |
      +-----------------------+-------------+----------------------+
      | ErasureReason         | REQUIRED    | One of               |
      |                       |             | SUBJECT_REQUEST,     |
      |                       |             | RETENTION_EXPIRED,   |
      |                       |             | LEGAL_ORDER          |
      +-----------------------+-------------+----------------------+
      | KeyDestructionProof   | REQUIRED    | Evidence that the    |
      |                       |             | DEK was destroyed    |
      |                       |             | (for example, an HSM |
      |                       |             | or KMS attestation)  |
      +-----------------------+-------------+----------------------+
      | RetentionExemption    | OPTIONAL    | Legal basis where a  |
      |                       |             | retention obligation |
      |                       |             | overrides erasure    |
      |                       |             | (for example, MiFID  |
      |                       |             | II Article 16(7))    |
      +-----------------------+-------------+----------------------+
      | OperatorID            | REQUIRED    | Actor authorizing    |
      |                       |             | the erasure          |
      +-----------------------+-------------+----------------------+

                      Table 6: ERASURE Event Fields

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   {
     "Header": {
       "EventID": "01983a2b-4c5d-7000-8000-abcdef123456",
       "EventType": "ERASURE",
       "PolicyID": "org.veritaschain.policy:gold-v1-2"
     },
     "Payload": {
       "VCP-PRIVACY": {
         "ErasureTargetEventIDs": [
           "01961e5f-5c0d-7000-8000-123456789abc"
         ],
         "ErasureReason": "SUBJECT_REQUEST",
         "KeyDestructionProof": "kms:destroy:att-9f8e7d6c",
         "OperatorID": "dpo-office-001"
       }
     }
   }

   ERASURE provides a technical mechanism that supports erasure
   obligations; it is not a legal determination.  Whether crypto-
   shredding qualifies as erasure under a given regime is jurisdiction-
   and case-dependent.  Deployments subject to reproduction-oriented
   recordkeeping rules (such as SEC Rule 17a-4 audit-trail controls)
   should note that once a DEK is destroyed the original plaintext is,
   by design, not re-creatable; the RetentionExemption field exists to
   record the governing legal basis in such cases.

7.  SCRAPI Integration

   VCP Transparency Services MUST implement SCRAPI
   [I-D.ietf-scitt-scrapi] with the following VCP-specific
   considerations:

7.1.  Registration (POST /entries)

   VCP Events are submitted as COSE_Sign1 Signed Statements:

   POST /entries HTTP/1.1
   Host: vcp-ts.example.com
   Content-Type: application/cose

   <COSE_Sign1 containing VCP Event payload>

   The Transparency Service validates the VCP Registration Policy and
   returns a COSE Receipt on success.

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7.2.  Retrieval (GET /entries/{entry_id})

   Retrieve a specific VCP Event by its entry ID (derived from EventID).

7.3.  Receipt (GET /entries/{entry_id}/receipt)

   Retrieve the COSE Receipt for a registered VCP Event, containing the
   Merkle inclusion proof.

7.4.  Anchor Status (GET /anchors/{anchor_id})

   When external anchoring is deployed, retrieve the anchor status for a
   Merkle root, including the external reference (e.g., blockchain
   transaction ID).

8.  Security Considerations

8.1.  Integrity Architecture

   VCP's three-layer architecture provides defense in depth:

   *  *Layer 1 (Event Integrity):* Digital signatures on individual
      events prevent forgery.

   *  *Layer 2 (Collection Integrity):* Merkle trees enable efficient
      proof of inclusion.

   *  *Layer 3 (External Verifiability):* When deployed, external
      anchoring supports omission detection by enabling third parties to
      verify published Merkle roots against independent records.

   The optional per-Actor hash chain provides additional local integrity
   guarantees but is not required for external verifiability.

   Mitigations against key compromise:

   *  Frequent Merkle anchoring to external immutable stores (when
      deployed)

   *  HSM-based key storage (Platinum tier requirement)

   *  Key rotation with explicit ROTATE events

8.2.  Quantum Resistance

   Ed25519 signatures are vulnerable to attacks by cryptographically
   relevant quantum computers.  VCP provides crypto-agility to address
   future threats:

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   *  SignAlgo field enables algorithm negotiation and migration

   *  The DILITHIUM2 registry value (ML-DSA [FIPS-204]) holds
      EXPERIMENTAL status in VCP v1.2: available for testing and hybrid
      (classical plus post-quantum) deployments, with Ed25519 remaining
      the default and no certification requirement attached

   *  Hash chain integrity based on SHA-256 provides approximately
      128-bit post-quantum security against Grover's algorithm

   Implementers requiring post-quantum guarantees SHOULD monitor CFRG
   and PQUIP working group outputs for updated guidance on algorithm
   selection and migration timelines.

8.3.  Timing Attacks

   Clock manipulation can enable backdating of events.  Mitigations:

   *  UUID v7 provides embedded timestamp that must match TimestampInt

   *  Transparency Service enforces timestamp bounds

   *  Platinum tier requires PTPv2 synchronization

   *  External anchoring (when deployed) provides independent timestamp
      attestation

8.4.  Privacy Considerations

   VCP Events may contain sensitive trading information.  Operators
   SHOULD:

   *  Use crypto-shredding for personal data subject to GDPR

   *  Implement access controls on Transparency Service queries

   *  Consider encrypted payloads for highly sensitive data

8.5.  Completeness Considerations

   SCITT provides inclusion proofs but does not inherently guarantee
   completeness (i.e., that no events have been omitted).  VCP addresses
   this through a completeness-aware design:

   *  Sequence numbers enable detection of gaps within an Actor's chain

   *  External anchoring (when deployed) enables third-party
      verification that the published Merkle root matches expectations

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   *  Heartbeat events (HBT) provide liveness signals that support
      detection of extended omission periods

   These mechanisms support omission detection but do not provide
   absolute completeness guarantees.  Deployments requiring strong
   completeness assurance SHOULD implement external anchoring and
   consider additional monitoring mechanisms.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions at this time.

   Future versions of this specification may request:

   *  Registration of media type "application/vcp+json"

   *  Establishment of a VCP Event Type registry

   *  COSE algorithm identifiers for VCP-specific extensions

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8785]  Rundgren, A., "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)",
              RFC 8785, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785>.

   [RFC9052]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              RFC 9052, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.

   [RFC9562]  Davis, K., "Universally Unique IDentifiers (UUIDs)",
              RFC 9562, May 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9562>.

   [I-D.ietf-scitt-architecture]
              Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., and C. Fournet, "An
              Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital
              Supply Chains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-

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              ietf-scitt-architecture, 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-scitt-
              architecture>.

   [I-D.ietf-scitt-scrapi]
              Steele, O., "SCITT Reference APIs", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi, 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-scitt-
              scrapi>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3161]  Adams, C., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-
              Stamp Protocol (TSP)", RFC 3161, August 2001,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3161>.

   [RFC6962]  Laurie, B., "Certificate Transparency", RFC 6962, June
              2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6962>.

   [VCP-SPEC] VeritasChain Standards Organization, "VeritasChain
              Protocol (VCP) Specification, Version 1.2", May 2026,
              <https://github.com/veritaschain/vcp-spec/tree/main/spec/
              v1.2>.

   [FIPS-204] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-
              Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA)", NIST
              FIPS 204, August 2024,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final>.

Appendix A.  Complete VCP Event Example

   The following is a complete VCP v1.2 Event encoded as JSON, ready to
   be wrapped in a COSE_Sign1 Signed Statement:

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   {
     "Header": {
       "EventID": "01961e5f-5c0d-7000-8000-123456789abc",
       "TimestampISO": "2026-03-15T09:30:00.123456789Z",
       "TimestampInt": 1742034600123456789,
       "EventType": "ORD",
       "ActorID": "algo-momentum-001",
       "ChainID": "chain-actor-001",
       "SequenceNum": 42,
       "PolicyID": "org.veritaschain.policy:gold-v1-2",
       "SCITTAlignment": {
         "Version": "1.2",
         "ConformanceProfile": "VCP_SCITT",
         "TransparencyServiceID": "ts.veritaschain.example",
         "ReceiptFormat": "COSE_RECEIPT"
       }
     },
     "Payload": {
       "VCP-TRADE": {
         "OrderID": "ord-2026-001",
         "Symbol": "AAPL",
         "Side": "BUY",
         "Quantity": "100",
         "Price": "185.50",
         "OrderType": "LIMIT",
         "TimeInForce": "DAY"
       },
       "VCP-GOV": {
         "AlgoID": "momentum-v2.3",
         "DecisionFactors": ["RSI_oversold", "volume_spike"],
         "ConfidenceScore": 0.87,
         "RiskCheckPassed": true
       }
     },
     "Security": {
       "EventHash": "sha256:a1b2c3...",
       "PrevHash": "sha256:f6e5d4...",
       "SignAlgo": "ED25519"
     }
   }

   Note: PrevHash is OPTIONAL.  AnchorRef would be included after
   external anchoring is performed.

Appendix B.  JSON Schema Reference

   The complete JSON Schema for VCP Events is available at:

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   https://veritaschain.org/schema/vcp-event-v1.2.json

Appendix C.  Changes from draft-kamimura-scitt-vcp-02

   This section summarizes the changes from version -02 to -03.  All
   changes align this profile with VCP Specification v1.2 [VCP-SPEC].

   *  Added the SCITT Alignment Object as an OPTIONAL Header extension,
      together with the VCP_BASE, VCP_SCITT, and VCP_REGULATORY
      conformance profiles (Section 4.4)

   *  Added the ERASURE event type, which records crypto-shredding
      operations as immutable audit events (Section 6.3), and registered
      it in the event type table

   *  Corrected the post-quantum SignAlgo value: -02 listed
      "DILITHIUM3", which does not exist in the VCP SignAlgo registry;
      the registry value is "DILITHIUM2" (ML-DSA, FIPS 204), holding
      EXPERIMENTAL status in v1.2

   *  Migrated PolicyID examples from the provisional "urn:vcp:policy"
      form to the Issuer Domain + Local ID convention defined in VCP
      v1.2, and removed the corresponding URN-namespace item from IANA
      Considerations

   *  Updated the complete event example (Appendix A) and the JSON
      Schema reference (Appendix B) to v1.2

Appendix D.  Changes from draft-kamimura-scitt-vcp-01

   This section summarizes the changes from version -01 to -02:

   *  Updated title to explicitly indicate this is a SCITT profile

   *  Updated to align with VCP Specification v1.1

   *  Clarified that external anchoring is a certification policy
      requirement, not a protocol-level mandate (new Section 5.4)

   *  PrevHash changed from REQUIRED to OPTIONAL

   *  Added Three-Layer Architecture section (Section 3.3)

   *  Added PolicyID as a REQUIRED field in the Header

   *  Added Completeness Considerations section (Section 8.5)

   *  Clarified that this profile does not define a new protocol

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   *  Removed unused informative references

Acknowledgements

   The authors thank the members of the VeritasChain Standards
   Organization Technical Committee for their contributions to this
   specification.  This work builds upon the SCITT architecture
   developed by the IETF SCITT Working Group, and the Certificate
   Transparency work in [RFC6962].

   Special thanks to the SCITT WG participants who provided feedback on
   draft-kamimura-scitt-vcp-01, which informed the improvements in this
   version.

Author's Address

   TOKACHI KAMIMURA
   VeritasChain Standards Organization
   Japan
   Email: kamimura@veritaschain.org
   URI:   https://veritaschain.org

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