Suppressing CA Certificates in TLS 1.3
draft-kampanakis-tls-scas-latest-03
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Panos Kampanakis , Cameron Bytheway , Bas Westerbaan , Martin Thomson | ||
| Last updated | 2023-07-09 (Latest revision 2023-01-05) | ||
| Replaces | draft-thomson-tls-sic | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
A TLS client or server that has access to the complete set of published intermediate certificates can inform its peer to avoid sending certificate authority certificates, thus reducing the size of the TLS handshake.
Authors
Panos Kampanakis
Cameron Bytheway
Bas Westerbaan
Martin Thomson
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)