Bootstrapping Key Infrastructure over EAP
draft-lear-eap-teap-brski-03

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Last updated 2019-07-05
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Network Working Group                                            E. Lear
Internet-Draft                                                  O. Friel
Intended status: Standards Track                           N. Cam-Winget
Expires: January 6, 2020                                   Cisco Systems
                                                              D. Harkins
                                                           HP Enterprise
                                                           July 05, 2019

               Bootstrapping Key Infrastructure over EAP
                      draft-lear-eap-teap-brski-03

Abstract

   In certain environments, in order for a device to establish any layer
   three communications, it is necessary for that device to be properly
   credentialed.  This is a relatively easy problem to solve when a
   device is associated with a human being and has both input and
   display functions.  It is less easy when the human, input, and
   display functions are not present.  To address this case, this memo
   specifies extensions to the Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol
   (TEAP) method that leverages Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
   Infrastructures (BRSKI) in order to provide a credential to a device
   at layer two.  The basis of this work is that a manufacturer will
   introduce the device and the local deployment through cryptographic
   means.  In this sense the same trust model as BRSKI is used.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2020.

Lear, et al.             Expires January 6, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               BRSKI TEAP EAP                    July 2019

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  TEAP BRSKI Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  BRSKI Bootstrap and Enroll Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Discovery of Trusted MASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Executing BRSKI in a TEAP Tunnel  . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  PKI Certificate Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  TEAP Tunnel Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.2.  BRSKI Trust Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Certificate Expiration Times  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Channel and Crypto Binding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Protocol Flows  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.1.  TEAP Server Grants Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.2.  TEAP Server Instructs Client to Perform BRSKI Flow  . . .  14
     6.3.  TEAP Server Instructs Client to Reenroll  . . . . . . . .  18
     6.4.  Out of Band Reenroll  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   7.  TEAP TLV Formats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     7.1.  BRSKI TLVs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       7.1.1.  BRSKI-RequestVoucher TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       7.1.2.  BRSKI-Voucher TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       7.1.3.  CSR-Attributes TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.2.  Existing TEAP TLV Specifications  . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       7.2.1.  PKCS#10 TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.3.  TLV Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   8.  Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
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