Time To End The War on Network Protection
draft-lear-network-helps-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2016-10-29
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text xml pdf html bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Network Working Group                                            E. Lear
Internet-Draft                                          October 29, 2016
Intended status: Informational
Expires: May 2, 2017

               Time To End The War on Network Protection
                      draft-lear-network-helps-01

Abstract

   Since the Edward Snowden's release of secret information, some in the
   IETF have taken an approach that the network is such a useful tool
   that it is also an enemy.  With several high visibility attacks that
   have been based on low end systems (Things), it is now clear that not
   only is the network not the enemy, but that it is required to protect
   the system as a whole.  When the network has at least some
   information about a device, we get a second chance to limit attacks
   against the device and, in some cases, a third chance to limit
   attacks from the device.  This memo discusses ways in which network
   protection assists in protection of devices, and some caveats around
   that protection, and suggests considerations implementers and
   protocol developers should consider as connectivity continues to
   expand to new applications.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 2, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Lear                       Expires May 2, 2017                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft          Network Protection Helps            October 2016

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  What might be shared (and why)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Application-layer information sharing in flight . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Transport Layer information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  IP Layer Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  Sharing of Device Profile Information . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  How Information Sharing Could Stop Some Attacks . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  DVRs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Electrical Grid Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Mobile Medical Devices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Mobile Phones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Encryption and Sharing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Example MUD File for a DVR . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   In June of 2013 Edward Snowden released a vast trove of secret NSA
   documents that demonstrated numerous vulnerabilities of the Internet
   architecture, that included collection of aggregate information,
   tapping of communication lines, hacking of devices in transit, and
   other means.  Many of these vulnerabilities were known to be possible
   in theory, although the scale of such an attack was unprecedented.

   The Internet Architecture Board held a plenary meeting in November
   2013 in which we openly discussed these attacks, and what we would do
   about them.  The result was [RFC7258], which states that pervasive
Show full document text