OAuth 2.0 Delegated Authorization
draft-li-oauth-delegated-authorization-00
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| Authors | Li Ruochen , Haiguang Wang , Peter Chunchi Liu , Tieyan Li | ||
| Last updated | 2025-10-20 | ||
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draft-li-oauth-delegated-authorization-00
oauth R. Li
Internet-Draft H. Wang
Intended status: Informational Huawei Int. Pte Ltd
Expires: 23 April 2026 C. Liu
Huawei Technologies
T. Li
Huawei Int. Pte Ltd
20 October 2025
OAuth 2.0 Delegated Authorization
draft-li-oauth-delegated-authorization-00
Abstract
Delegated authorization enables a client to delegate a subset of its
granted privileges to a subordinate access token (also known as a
delegated access token). This mechanism allows the client to
securely delegate authorization to a delegated party while
maintaining fine-grained control over delegated permissions.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-li-oauth-delegated-
authorization/.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Delegated Party Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Delegated Party Metadata Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Delegated Party Metadata Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. WWW-Authenticate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Acquiring Delegation Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Authorization Code Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Other Grant Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Creating Delegated Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Using Delegated Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Verification of Delegated Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.1. Local Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.2. Token Introspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12.1. Well-Known URIs Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12.2. OAuth Parameters Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12.3. OAuth Access Token Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.4. HTTP Field Name Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.5. OAuth Delegated Party Metadata Registry . . . . . . . . 14
12.5.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.5.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Token Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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A.1. Example 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.2. Example 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix B. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B.1. Delegating Subset of Access Rights to Specialized AI
Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B.2. Third-Party Analytics Platform Integrated in an Enterprise
SaaS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Introduction
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] provides a framework for authorizing third-party
applications to access protected resources on behalf of a resource
owner. However, in existing implementations, access tokens issued to
clients often contain excessive permissions that exceed actual
requirements, creating security vulnerabilities and potential data
exposure risks.
This specification extends OAuth 2.0 with a delegated authorization
framework that enables clients to create subordinate access tokens
with restricted permissions. This approach addresses the problem of
over-privileged access tokens by implementing a two-token
architecture that decouples initial authorization from final resource
access.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Terminology
This specification uses the following terms defined in OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749]: authorization server, client, resource server, and
resource owner.
The following additional terms are used throughout this document:
*Delegated Party (DP)*: An entity (e.g., a service, component, or
application) authorized by the client to access protected
resources on behalf of the resource owner.
*Delegated Resource*: A resource or API endpoint hosted by the
delegated party that requires access to the resource owner’s
protected data at a target resource server.
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*Delegation Token*: A token issued by the authorization server for
the client that enables the client to create delegated access
tokens.
*Delegated Access Token*: A token created by the client using the
delegation token, with permissions being a subset of the
delegation token's privileges and a more limited lifespan.
*Delegation Key*: A cryptographic key bound to the delegation token,
used by the client to sign or encrypt delegated access tokens.
The delegation key is presented in the token request as the
delegation_key parameter.
4. Overview
The delegated authorization framework introduces a hierarchical token
structure where a client can obtain a delegation token from an
authorization server and use it to issue subordinate access tokens
with reduced permissions. This enables fine-grained access control
while maintaining the security properties of the original
authorization grant.
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+-----------+ 1. Authorization +---------------+
| | Request | |
| +----------------------> |
| | | Resource |
| | 2. Authorization | Owner |
| | Grant | |
| <----------------------+ |
| | +---------------+
| Client |
| | 3. Authorization +---------------+
| | Grant | |
| +----------------------> |
| | | Authorization |
| | 4. Delegation | Server |
| | Token | |
| <----------------------+ |
+--^-----+--+ +---------------+
| |5. Delegated
6. Delegated | | Access
Resource| | Token
| |
+--+-----v--+ 5. Delegated +---------------+
| | Access Token | |
| +----------------------> |
| Delegated | | Resource |
| Party | 6. Protected | Server |
| | Resource | |
| <----------------------+ |
+-----------+ +---------------+
Figure 1: Delegated Authorization Framework Architecture
1. The client requests authorization from the resource owner. The
client indicates in the authorization request that the requested
authorization grant is for delegated authorization.
2. The client receives an authorization grant.
3. The client requests a delegation token by authenticating with the
authorization server and presenting the authorization grant and
its delegation key as defined in Section 3.
4. The authorization server authenticates the client and validates
the authorization grant, and if valid, issues a delegation token.
5. The client calls the delegated party's API, presenting the
delegated access token generated from the delegation token. The
delegated access token is issued by the client using the
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delegation key. The delegated party requests the target
protected resource from the resource server and presents the
delegated access token.
6. The resource server validates the delegated access token, and if
valid, serves the resource. The delegated party receives the
resource, optionally transforms it into a service-specific
response (also known as delegated resource), and returns it to
the client.
Both delegation token and delegated access token can be JSON Web
Tokens (JWTs) [RFC7519] or CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) [RFC8392].
5. Delegated Party Metadata
Before the OAuth 2.0 client retrieves a delegation token and
generates a delegated access token for the delegated party, the
client needs to obtain the authorization server endpoint and the
permissions needed by the delegated party. Such information can be
manually configured into the client, or it can be dynamically
discovered through delegated party metadata.
Delegated party metadata enables OAuth 2.0 clients to obtain
information needed to interact with a delegated party. The structure
of the metadata format is similar to "OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server
Metadata" [RFC8414] and "OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata"
[RFC9728].
The delegated party metadata is retrieved from a well-known [RFC8615]
location as a JSON [RFC8259] document. By default, the well-known
URI string used is /.well-known/oauth-delegated-party.
5.1. Delegated Party Metadata Attributes
*resources*: *RECOMMENDED*. JSON array containing a list of target
protected resources' resource identifiers, as defined in
[RFC9728]. Either this attribute or *authorization_servers*
defined below MUST be present.
*authorization_servers*: *OPTIONAL*. JSON array containing a list of
OAuth authorization server issuer identifiers, as defined in
[RFC8414]. Either this attribute or *resources* defined above
MUST be present.
*permissions_supported*: *RECOMMENDED*. JSON object indicating the
permissions the delegated party may request. The scopes attribute
lists supported scope values [RFC6749]; the authorization_details
attribute lists supported rich authorization request objects as
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defined in [RFC9396]. These guide the client in constructing
valid authorization and token requests. Either the scopes
attribute or the authorization_details attribute must be present.
*api_permissions*: *RECOMMENDED*. JSON object mapping API endpoints
(resource identifiers) to the permissions required to access them.
Each value can include scopes and/or authorization_details to
specify the permissions needed for that endpoint/resource.
*delegated_party_documentation*: *OPTIONAL*: URL of a page
containing human-readable information that developers might want
or need to know when using the delegated party. The value of this
field MAY be internationalized.
5.2. Delegated Party Metadata Example
The following is a non-normative example delegated party metadata:
{
"resources": [
"https://res1.example.com",
"https://res2.example.net"
],
"authorization_servers": [
"https://as1.example.com",
"https://as2.example.net"
],
"permissions_supported": {
"scopes": ["profile:read", "profile:write", "email:read", "email:write"],
"authorization_details": [
{
"type": "payment",
"actions": ["initiate", "status", "cancel"],
"instructedAmount": {
"notMoreThan": {
"currency": "USD",
"amount": "500.00"
}
}
}
]
},
"api_permissions": {
"/emails/list": {
"scopes": ["email:read"]
},
"/balance/transfer": {
"authorization_details": [
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{
"type": "payment",
"actions": ["initiate"],
"instructedAmount": {
"notMoreThan": {
"currency": "USD",
"amount": "500.00"
}
}
}
]
},
"/balance/transfer/status": {
"authorization_details": [
{
"type": "payment",
"actions": ["status"]
}
]
},
"/balance/transfer/cancel": {
"authorization_details": [
{
"type": "payment",
"actions": ["cancel"]
}
]
}
},
"delegated_party_documentation": "https://dp.example.com/dp_documentation.html"
}
5.3. WWW-Authenticate
Upon receipt of a request for a delegated resource that lacks
credentials, the delegated party can reply with a challenge using the
401 (Unauthorized) status code ([RFC9110] Section 15.5.2) and the
WWW-Authenticate header field ([RFC9110] Section 11.6.1).
This specification introduces a new parameter in the WWW-Authenticate
HTTP response header field to indicate the delegated party metadata
URL:
*delegated_party_metadata*: The URL of the delegated party metadata.
The response below is an example of a WWW-Authenticate header that
includes the delegated party metadata URL. NOTE: '\' line wrapping
per [RFC8792].
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HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer delegated_party_metadata=\
"https://dp.example.com/.well-known/oauth-delegated-party"
6. Acquiring Delegation Tokens
The client requests a delegation token using standard OAuth 2.0 grant
types with additional parameters to distinguish delegation requests
from standard token requests.
6.1. Authorization Code Grant
For authorization code grant type, the client MUST include a
delegation=true parameter in the authorization request to indicate
that the client is requesting a delegation token instead of an OAuth
2.0 access token.
Additionally, the authorization request MUST include either a scope
parameter (as defined in [RFC6749] Section 3.3), an
authorization_details parameter (as defined in "Rich Authorization
Requests" [RFC9396]), or both, that define the permissions granted to
the requested delegation token.
In the token request, the client MUST include a delegation_key
parameter with the value of the delegation key. This is normally a
public key for digital signature. It can be extended to support
encryption public keys, or secret keys for MAC or symmetric
encryption.
Additionally, the client MAY include in the token request either a
scope parameter, an authorization_details parameter, or both. The
client MAY also include a delegation=true parameter in the token
request.
In the token response, the authorization server MUST include an
access_token attribute whose value is the delegation token, and MUST
include a token_type attribute valued "Delegation", and MAY include a
refresh_token attribute which is the refresh token for obtaining a
new delegation token via the refresh token grant.
Other procedures of the authorization code grant are as described in
[RFC6749]. Use of Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) [RFC7636] is
RECOMMENDED.
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6.2. Other Grant Types
Other OAuth 2.0 grant types, such as the refresh token grant or
client credentials grant, MAY support delegated authorization by
including the delegation and delegation_key parameters when
applicable. The authorization server MUST validate that the client
is authorized to request delegation tokens using the given grant
type.
7. Creating Delegated Access Tokens
The client creates delegated access tokens by:
1. Validating the delegation token's validity and permissions.
2. Generating a subordinate access token with (optionally) reduced
privileges.
3. Applying cryptographic protection using the delegation key
(digital signature, encryption or MAC).
The client MUST include the delegation token in the delegation_token
attribute of the delegated access token.
The client MUST ensure that the delegated access token's scope,
lifetime, audience, and other claims do not exceed those of the
delegation token. The client MAY generate single-use delegated
access tokens that the resource server or authorization server only
consider valid when validating it for the first time.
The client is RECOMMENDED to "sender-constrain" the delegated access
tokens by binding the delegated access tokens with public keys or
certificates where the corresponding private keys are owned by the
delegated parties, via techniques similar to OAuth 2.0 mTLS [RFC8705]
or OAuth 2.0 DPoP [RFC9449].
8. Using Delegated Access Tokens
When the client accesses a delegated resource on the delegated party,
the client MUST include the delegated access token as a bearer token
[RFC6750] in the Delegated-Authorization header, used by the target
resource server to verify requests from the delegated party. The
Delegated-Authorization header MAY be used in combination with an
Authorization header used by the delegated party to verify the
request from the client.
For example:
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GET /dp-resource HTTP/1.1
Host: delegated-party.example.com
Authorization: Bearer mF_9.B5g1234
Delegated-Authorization: Bearer mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM
Upon receiving a delegated resource request with a Delegated-
Authorization header, the delegated party sends a request to the
target resource server for the respective target resource. The
delegated party MUST include the received delegated access token as a
bearer token in the Authorization header.
For example:
GET /target-resource HTTP/1.1
Host: resource.example.com
Authorization: Bearer mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM
9. Verification of Delegated Access Tokens
Resource servers verify delegated access tokens through either local
validation using pre-configured public keys or remote validation via
token introspection [RFC7662] at the authorization server.
9.1. Local Verification
The resource server verifies delegated access tokens by:
1. The resource server is pre-configured with the authorization
server's public key, or it fetches the public key via the
authorization server's JWKS endpoint [RFC7517].
2. Checking the digital signature of the delegation token (part of
the delegated access token) against the authorization server's
public key.
3. Checking the digital signature of the delegated access token
against the delegation key bound to the delegation token.
4. Verifying the delegated access token's permissions and validity
are within the scope of the delegation token.
5. Verifying the delegated access token is within validity period,
and the delegated access token's permissions cover the resource
request.
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9.2. Token Introspection
The resource server sends the delegated access token to the
authorization server via the token introspection endpoint. The
authorization server verifies the delegated access token against its
keys.
10. Security Considerations
This specification extends OAuth 2.0 to support delegated
authorization through hierarchical token issuance. While this
enables fine-grained privilege delegation, it also introduces new
trust and security considerations.
* Delegation tokens MUST NOT be sent to resource servers without
subordinate delegated access tokens. Resource servers and
authorization servers MUST NOT treat delegation tokens as regular
OAuth access tokens.
* Clients MUST protect the delegation key, as compromise allows an
attacker to mint valid delegated access tokens within the scope of
the delegation token.
* Delegated access tokens SHOULD have short lifetimes and be bound
to specific audiences, methods, and sender keys (e.g., via DPoP or
mTLS) to mitigate replay and token leakage risks. Resource
servers MUST validate both the delegation token and the delegated
access token, ensuring the latter does not exceed the former’s
permissions.
* Token introspection CAN be used in scenarios where the tokens are
kept opaque from the delegated party and the resource server. If
employed, token introspection responses MUST NOT reveal sensitive
internal information. Authorization servers SHOULD enforce rate
limiting and audit token issuance and validation activities.
11. Operational Considerations
Deployments of this specification should consider the following
operational aspects:
* *Key Management*: Clients MUST securely store and rotate
delegation keys. Authorization servers SHOULD support key
rotation for delegation tokens and provide mechanisms to revoke
compromised keys.
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* *Token Lifetimes*: Delegation tokens SHOULD have longer lifetimes
than delegated access tokens to reduce authorization server load,
and SHOULD be refreshable using refresh tokens.
* *Metadata Caching*: Delegated party metadata at the well-known URI
/.well-known/oauth-delegated-party can be cached by clients; a
reasonable default TTL (e.g., 24 hours) is RECOMMENDED.
* *Error Handling*: Delegated parties and resource servers SHOULD
provide clear error responses (e.g., invalid token, insufficient
scope) without exposing implementation details.
* *Interoperability*: Implementers SHOULD ensure compatibility with
existing OAuth 2.0 features such as PKCE, Rich Authorization
Requests, and sender-constrained tokens.
12. IANA Considerations
12.1. Well-Known URIs Registry
This specification registers the following entry in the "Well-Known
URIs" registry:
* *URI suffix*: oauth-delegated-party
* *Reference*: [this document]
* *Status*: permanent
* *Change controller*: IETF
* *Related information*: (none)
12.2. OAuth Parameters Registry
This specification registers the following parameters in the "OAuth
Parameters" registry:
*Delegation:*
* *Name*: delegation
* *Parameter Usage Location*: authorization request, token request
* *Change Controller*: IETF
* *Reference*: [this document]
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*Delegation Key:*
* *Name*: delegation_key
* *Parameter Usage Location*: token request
* *Change Controller*: IETF
* *Reference*: [this document]
12.3. OAuth Access Token Types Registry
This specification registers the following parameters in the "OAuth
Access Token Types" registry:
* *Name*: Delegation
* *Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters*: (none)
* *HTTP Authentication Scheme(s)*: Bearer
* *Change Controller*: IETF
* *Reference*: [this document]
12.4. HTTP Field Name Registry
This specification registers the following parameters in the
"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name" registry:
* *Field Name*: Delegated-Authorization
* *Status*: permanent
* *Structured Type*: (none)
* *Reference*: [this document]
12.5. OAuth Delegated Party Metadata Registry
This specification establishes the "OAuth Delegated Party Metadata"
registry for OAuth 2.0 dalagated party metadata names. The registry
records the dalagated party metadata parameter and a reference to the
specification that defines it.
12.5.1. Registration Template
*Metadata Name*: The name requested (e.g., "resource"). This name
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is case sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in
a case-insensitive manner unless the designated experts state that
there is a compelling reason to allow an exception.
*Metadata Description*: Brief description of the metadata (e.g.,
"Resource identifier URL").
*Change Controller*: For IETF Stream RFCs, list "IETF". For others,
give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g.,
postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be
included.
*Specification Document(s)*: Reference to the document or documents
that specify the parameter, preferably including URIs that can be
used to retrieve copies of the documents. An indication of the
relevant sections may also be included but is not required.
12.5.2. Initial Registry Contents
*Resources:*
* *Metadata Name*: resources
* *Metadata Description*: JSON array containing a list of target
protected resources' resource identifier URLs
* *Change Controller*: IETF
* *Specification Document(s)*: [this document]
*Authorization Servers:*
* *Metadata Name*: authorization_servers
* *Metadata Description*: JSON array containing a list of
authorization server issuer identifiers
* *Change Controller*: IETF
* *Specification Document(s)*: [this document]
*Supported Permissions:*
* *Metadata Name*: permissions_supported
* *Metadata Description*: JSON object indicating the permissions the
delegated party may request
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* *Change Controller*: IETF
* *Specification Document(s)*: [this document]
*API Permissions:*
* *Metadata Name*: api_permissions
* *Metadata Description*: JSON object mapping API endpoints
(resource identifiers) to the permissions required to access them
* *Change Controller*: IETF
* *Specification Document(s)*: [this document]
*Delegated Party Documentation:*
* *Metadata Name*: delegated_party_documentation
* *Metadata Description*: URL of a page containing human-readable
information that developers might want or need to know when using
the delegated party
* *Change Controller*: IETF
* *Specification Document(s)*: [this document]
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6750>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
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[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7516>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[RFC7636] Sakimura, N., Ed., Bradley, J., and N. Agarwal, "Proof Key
for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients", RFC 7636,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7636, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7636>.
[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8392>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8414>.
[RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8615>.
[RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T.
Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication
and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8705>.
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[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[RFC9396] Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0
Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, May 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9396>.
[RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T.,
Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449,
September 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9449>.
[RFC9700] Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
"Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security", BCP 240,
RFC 9700, DOI 10.17487/RFC9700, January 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700>.
[RFC9728] Jones, M.B., Hunt, P., and A. Parecki, "OAuth 2.0
Protected Resource Metadata", RFC 9728,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9728, April 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9728>.
13.2. Informative References
[RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
"Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8792>.
Appendix A. Token Format
The example tokens in this section are shown in Flattened JSON
Serialization [RFC7515] [RFC7516], un-base64url-encoded/unencrypted,
and with comments for ease of reading. When used as JWTs [RFC7519],
they should be represented in Compact Serialization [RFC7515]
[RFC7516]. Similarly, they can be represented as CWTs [RFC8392].
A.1. Example 1
In this example, the delegation token is a JWS token signed with
HS256, and the delegated access token is a JWS token signed with
RS256.
*Delegation Token*:
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{
"protected": {
"_comment": "to be base64url-encoded",
"alg": "HS256",
"typ": "JWT",
"kid": "as-key-1"
},
"payload": {
"_comment": "to be base64url-encoded",
"iss": "https://as1.example.com",
"sub": "user@example.com",
"aud": "https://res1.example.com",
"iat": 1760946495,
"exp": 1763538495,
"scope": "email:read email:send",
"delegation_key": {
"kty": "RSA",
"n": "xoGV-drpIhwQ9Q3M5ouoA4Y76j4r0c2YcJoPT2qUd8UxV1PZH61TGZUbdUAdQLqi7Pik3GwTk34b6Xxb2-UkW3zoaBx_2FXXfVWwSVbfxi4RCbFP-rWGlbyYTRILj6CJM5JXI8VQdcSF8yfPZVytw-aKU-5k4RddKxgyMwkWNCShWPa_H2WRsDzcy88pE-8q1cg6hbaq5GTywdiSeGWrjMYebQqIN-V63bX2aiOHhFvPVpEoI7AlxlrQd7aJtFwfuRl-0FxJH-2ITrnHFZaFAdoJqvFSD3OKZNkECBpuDL-DHcZUZfEyr4Rvb3WB0iuHHfHXzhbzqAt3NbZalmdQNw",
"e": "AQAB"
}
},
"signature": "1gR7TSa8ft8Wt4ZA9HuLFTYW2uAw86X2pFRrq9jDoQQ"
}
*Delegated Access Token*:
{
"protected": {
"_comment": "to be base64url-encoded",
"alg": "RS256",
"typ": "JWT",
"kid": "delegation-key-1"
},
"payload": {
"_comment": "to be base64url-encoded",
"iss": "user@example.com",
"sub": "https://dp1.example.com",
"aud": "https://res1.example.com",
"iat": 1760950095,
"exp": 1760953695,
"scope": "email:read",
"delegationToken": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCIsImtpZCI6ImFzLWtleS0xIn0.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.1gR7TSa8ft8Wt4ZA9HuLFTYW2uAw86X2pFRrq9jDoQQ"
},
"signature": "r5O4a3d3NMN7vZlOB9P4qPLbHyy12bZH5Ha3DZATa8NUdHYPJBMieiS1tqbhwfnTvwcSR_0Ac42dRHDrk8MWPkCl_9-bfYNvf9eGrcwSRn7889-pleH-QphxZG4Tsr8m2WlGM8VFnC9sjkhqGvmM9ZdC02GEaiptU9D859QU3-u-tvRdSgrHXeuLY2a3hgpWnj0j4gfgpug-VSvNB26vqCWwM4mwMGWYUPDabBaPp-KL38_M1T7q4wvFE0_KLvTSdozMe1ngkLewvSTBrnW1rULhXFk54j381wQ_ovaJhM1aAbWshb1AMzu-aiv0EZJjB1XlgORVh-KbId01TZQLwA"
}
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A.2. Example 2
In this example, the delegation token is a JWE token encrypted with
A128CBC-HS256, and the delegated access token is a JWS token signed
with ES256.
*Delegation Token*:
{
"protected": {
"_comment": "to be base64url-encoded",
"alg": "dir",
"enc": "A128CBC-HS256",
"typ": "JWT",
"kid": "as-key-2"
},
"iv": "s99tD84KH1_kgbA2ArpUZg",
"ciphertext": {
"_comment": "to be encrypted",
"iss": "https://as1.example.com",
"sub": "user@example.com",
"aud": "https://res1.example.com",
"iat": 1760946495,
"exp": 1763538495,
"scope": "email:read email:send",
"delegation_key": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "iZgQ3t5EK4rVdkex6LAGfxB0deOHtE3-vb-OBxoFv88",
"y": "RQVYHkEWrTR6jckD7iHXnRRs60-u9ikSfVnM4epiOLY"
}
},
"tag": "9Z4ONkwLwv3szT-eIKa4uQ"
}
*Delegated Access Token*:
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{
"protected": {
"_comment": "to be base64url-encoded",
"alg": "ES256",
"typ": "JWT",
"kid": "delegation-key-2"
},
"payload": {
"_comment": "to be base64url-encoded",
"iss": "user@example.com",
"sub": "https://dp1.example.com",
"aud": "https://res1.example.com",
"iat": 1760950095,
"exp": 1760953695,
"scope": "email:read",
"delegationToken": "eyJhbGciOiJkaXIiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2IiwidHlwIjoiSldUIiwia2lkIjoiYXMta2V5LTIifQ..s99tD84KH1_kgbA2ArpUZg.DS5aM1uuKpFFacu7rIvKOYnA-6BRPy6jyZ-3uF8bpplWJkCQmsAi8KqS-qTZuHWNfIWw7ulK-a8rWhfPPfLrgdXky6Ujc_3vm5YXRXmwxlaNJlhr2LexPXsTX2wA_3aIo9c0b5kQB2MHqeI5ucJDSdERCV2AaQTgl7vRmJhZ_FAY5cnd2URHEsqnm5usrywzGMLw5CnXg2MBl1jWxiHp-PmzOmRPHks4jFV2es2jjr-yB5PlX2d-OBCU2hauM_JjtnYOhByiXmAVVE6XKjJHXYM-d5q3JheTDg5gA4f1Io38_r2KA3pW07CF94Nx3i7VRxaFRSVYuNxlEhUx0vxOIlwRBa3_ZOK4Kkg-og66ADs73RuBg91cCthbr63NfIdEXmmYKG2Nx3DehojbVKZQrg.9Z4ONkwLwv3szT-eIKa4uQ"
},
"signature": "hlxIMOUb_Wdjh53VPcvuXBwTDiGzC7O8-ofV2LAvkws-LRIqKF6WRZ3KoPG1iTEDDhel3XXAGCyfRFCMXH3KiQ"
}
Appendix B. Use Cases
B.1. Delegating Subset of Access Rights to Specialized AI Agents
Enterprise Identity and Access Management systems often employ Role
Based Access Control (RBAC) or Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC),
assigning a set of minimal permissions to the employee based on its
role, department, or other attributes. AI Agent can be an employee's
personal assistant, or a virtual employee of a certain department in
general. An Agent's delegated permissions CAN be long-termed, but
MUST NOT be a direct inheritance of all its owner's access right.
Rather, they SHOULD be a subset of its owner, bound to specfic
service/API/database/codebase according to its specialty and
dedicated workflow.
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+==================+===========================================+
| Role | Service / Component |
+==================+===========================================+
| Resource Owner | an enterprise, individual or a department |
+------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Client | agent's client application |
+------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Delegated Party | CI-CD agent, test agent, DEV agent, |
| | research agent |
+------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Authorization | enterprise IAM system |
| Server | |
+------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Resource Server | enterprise IT systems |
+------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Target Protected | DEV/STAGE/PROD environments, internal |
| Resource | knowledge database |
+------------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 1: AI Agents
B.2. Third-Party Analytics Platform Integrated in an Enterprise SaaS
In this scenario, a corporate customer uses a Software-as-a-Service
(SaaS) Customer Relationship Management (CRM) application. The
customer wishes to gain business insights by granting a specialized
third-party analytics platform limited access to its CRM data.
The CRM application obtains a delegation token from the enterprise's
identity provider. It then creates a narrowly scoped delegated
access token for the analytics service. This token only permits read
access to a predefined, non-sensitive subset of customer data (e.g.,
names and identifiers, but not personal email addresses). The
analytics platform uses this token to pull data, generates an
aggregated business intelligence report, and delivers it back to the
CRM application for the corporate customer to view.
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+===========================+======================================+
| Role | Service / Component |
+===========================+======================================+
| Resource Owner | company A (the tenant) |
+---------------------------+--------------------------------------+
| Client | SaaS CRM application |
+---------------------------+--------------------------------------+
| Delegated Party | analytics service |
+---------------------------+--------------------------------------+
| Authorization Server | enterprise IdP |
+---------------------------+--------------------------------------+
| Resource Server | CRM application server |
+---------------------------+--------------------------------------+
| Target Protected Resource | CRM application's data retrieval API |
+---------------------------+--------------------------------------+
Table 2: Enterprise-SaaS
Authors' Addresses
Ruochen Li
Huawei Int. Pte Ltd
Email: li.ruochen@h-partners.com
Haiguang Wang
Huawei Int. Pte Ltd
Email: wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com
Chunchi Peter Liu
Huawei Technologies
Email: liuchunchi@huawei.com
Tieyan Li
Huawei Int. Pte Ltd
Email: Li.Tieyan@huawei.com
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