CBOR Encoded Certificate Revocation Management
draft-liao-cose-c509-revocation-01
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Lijun Liao , Marco Tiloca , Joel Höglund , Rikard Höglund , Shahid Raza | ||
| Last updated | 2026-11-02 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources |
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
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| On agenda | cose at IETF-127 | ||
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draft-liao-cose-c509-revocation-01
COSE Working Group L. Liao
Internet-Draft NIO Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track M. Tiloca
Expires: 6 May 2027 J. Höglund
R. Höglund
RISE AB
S. Raza
University of Glasgow
2 November 2026
CBOR Encoded Certificate Revocation Management
draft-liao-cose-c509-revocation-01
Abstract
This document specifies CBOR-encoded PKI structures for use with C509
certificates (draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert), X.509 certificates
(RFC 5280), and future certificate types. It defines C509 CRL and
C509 OCSP, compact CBOR encodings of X.509 Certificate Revocation
Lists (RFC 5280) and OCSP messages (RFC 6960), respectively. The
structures defined in this document are certificate-type agnostic and
can be used with C509 certificates, X.509 certificates, or future
certificate types without modification. C509 OCSP improves on RFC
6960 by signing a wider set of fields to prevent algorithm-
substitution and certificate-chain substitution attacks, replacing
plaintext serial numbers with hashes to preserve requestor privacy,
replacing the two-hash issuer identity with a single certificate
hash, and identifying all participants (requestor, responder, issuer)
by a uniform certificate hash rather than type-specific fields. C509
CRL and C509 OCSP are not wire-format-compatible with their DER-
encoded X.509 counterparts and cannot be converted to or from them
without semantic interpretation. Additionally, this document
specifies the PEM representation of the C509 structures following the
framework of [RFC7468].
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liao-cose-c509-revocation/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the CBOR Object Signing
and Encryption (cose) Working Group mailing list
(mailto:cose@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cose/. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cose/.
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Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/lijun-nio/idc509rev.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Alternative Certificate Status Checking Mechanisms . . . . . 8
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Common Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Encoding of Time Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. C509 CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. C509 CRL CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.3. Field Encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.3.1. CRLInfoData and C509CRLInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.3.2. crlType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.3.3. signatureAlgorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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6.3.4. authoritySubject and authorityKeyIdentifier . . . . . 13
6.3.5. crlNumber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.3.6. thisUpdate and nextUpdate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.3.7. baseCrlNumber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.3.8. reasonCode Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.3.9. revokedCertsList and PerIssuerRevokedCerts . . . . . 15
6.3.9.1. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.3.9.2. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3.10. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.3.11. Per-Issuer Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.3.11.1. expiredCertsOnCRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.3.12. CRL Entry Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.3.13. signatureValue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.4. PEM Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. C509 OCSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.2. Hash Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.3. Identification of Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.4. C509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.4.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.4.2. Field Encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.4.2.1. ocspRequestType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.4.2.2. issuerCertHash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.4.2.3. PerIssuerOCSPRequests, PerIssuerOCSPRequest,
SingleCertRequests and SingleCertRequest . . . . . 27
7.4.2.4. C509UnsignedOCSPRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.4.2.5. C509SignedOCSPRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.4.2.6. C509SimpleOCSPRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.4.3. PEM Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.5. C509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.5.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.5.2. Field Encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.5.2.1. C509ErrorOCSPResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.5.2.2. C509BasicOCSPResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.5.2.3. C509SimpleOCSPResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.5.2.4. nonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.5.2.5. responderCertHash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.5.2.6. responderCerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.5.2.7. signatureAlgorithm and signatureValue . . . . . . 35
7.5.2.8. producedAt, thisUpdate, nextUpdate . . . . . . . 35
7.5.2.9. extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.5.2.10. PerIssuerOCSPResponses and
PerIssuerOCSPResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.5.2.11. SingleCertResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.5.2.12. Per-Issuer OCSP Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.5.2.13. OCSP Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.5.3. PEM Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.6. Certificate Type Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
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7.7. OCSP Stapling in TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.1. Implementation #1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.2. Implementation #2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
9.1. Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
9.2. Truncated Hash Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
9.3. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
9.4. Freshness and Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
9.5. Completeness of CRLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
9.6. Parsing and Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.1. C509 CRL Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.2. C509 OCSP Request Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.3. C509 OCSP Response Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.4. Extension Identifiers Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.5. TLS CertificateStatusType Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10.6. PEM Label Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
10.7. Media Type Application Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
10.7.1. Media Type application/c509-crl+cbor . . . . . . . . 50
10.7.2. Media Type application/c509-crlinfo+cbor . . . . . . 51
10.7.3. Media Type application/c509-ocspreq+cbor . . . . . . 52
10.7.4. Media Type application/c509-ocspresp+cbor . . . . . 53
10.8. CoAP Content-Formats Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
10.9. Expert Review Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
A.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
A.2. Helper Keys and Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
A.2.1. CA Private Key and Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . 60
A.2.1.1. CA Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
A.2.1.2. CA Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
A.2.2. CRL Signer Private Key and Certificate . . . . . . . 61
A.2.2.1. CRL Signer Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.2.2.2. CRL Signer Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
A.2.3. OCSP Requestor Private Key and Certificate . . . . . 63
A.2.3.1. OCSP Requestor Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A.2.3.2. OCSP Requestor Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A.2.4. OCSP Responder Private Key and Certificate . . . . . 64
A.2.4.1. OCSP Responder Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.2.4.2. OCSP Responder Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.3. CRL Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.3.1. CRL Example Without Revoked Certificates . . . . . . 66
A.3.1.1. X.509 CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.3.1.2. C509 CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.3.2. CRL Example With Revoked Certificates . . . . . . . . 67
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A.3.2.1. X.509 CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
A.3.2.2. C509 CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
A.3.3. Delta CRL Example With Revoked Certificates . . . . . 71
A.3.3.1. X.509 CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
A.3.3.2. C509 CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
A.3.4. Indirect CRL Example With Revoked Certificates . . . 73
A.3.4.1. X.509 CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
A.3.4.2. C509 CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
A.4. OCSP Request Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A.4.1. Simple OCSP Request Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A.4.1.1. X.509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A.4.1.2. C509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A.4.2. Unsigned OCSP Request Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
A.4.2.1. X.509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
A.4.2.2. C509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
A.4.3. Signed OCSP Request Example Without Requestor's
Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
A.4.3.1. X.509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
A.4.3.2. C509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
A.4.4. Signed OCSP Request Example With Requestor's
Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.4.4.1. X.509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.4.4.2. C509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.4.5. Signed OCSP Request Example With Requestor's
Certificate Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
A.4.5.1. X.509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
A.4.5.2. C509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
A.5. OCSP Response Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.5.1. Error OCSP Response Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A.5.1.1. X.509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A.5.1.2. C509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A.5.2. Simple OCSP Response Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A.5.2.1. X.509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.5.2.2. C509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.5.3. Basic OCSP Response Example Without Responder's
Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A.5.3.1. X.509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A.5.3.2. C509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
A.5.4. Basic OCSP Response Example With Responder's
Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A.5.4.1. X.509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A.5.4.2. C509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A.5.5. Basic OCSP Response Example With Responder's
Certificate Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A.5.5.1. X.509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A.5.5.2. C509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Appendix B. Document Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
B.1. Version -00 to -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
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Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
1. Introduction
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for constrained environments
[RFC7228] requires compact certificate representations and compact
revocation information. [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert] defines
C509 certificates, a CBOR encoding of X.509 certificates [RFC5280]
that reduces certificate size by over 50% for typical constrained-
device profiles. However, revocation mechanisms such as Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
messages have not yet received the same treatment.
CRLs as defined in [RFC5280] can be large, especially when many
certificates have been revoked or when CRL extensions add overhead.
In the complementary OCSP mechanism defined in [RFC6960], OCSP
responses carry per-certificate status information and may be
exchanged during TLS [RFC9846] and DTLS [RFC9147] handshakes via OCSP
stapling [RFC6066], directly affecting handshake latency.
Note on terminology: The label "C509" is used for consistency with
the C509 certificate encoding and to promote a cohesive C509 PKI
ecosystem (C509 certificates, CRLs, OCSP, and related tooling).
Although this document uses "C509" in its names, the encodings and
protocols defined here are certificate-type agnostic and apply
equally to X.509 certificates and other certificate types; see
Section 7.6.
This document specifies:
* *C509 CRL* -- a natively signed CBOR [RFC8949] encoding of X.509
CRLs ([RFC5280], Section 5). The signature is computed over the
CBOR Sequence [RFC8742] TBSCertList; no ASN.1 encoding is
involved. Three key improvements are made over [RFC5280]:
- Reduce the search complexity for a given certificate serial
number from O(n) to O(log(n)):
o Replace the implicit certificateIssuer mechanism with
explicit per-issuer grouping.
o Use a dedicated list for the removeFromCRL revocation
entries.
o Use fixed-length entry encoding.
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- Define a new standalone C509CRLInfo structure to carry CRL
information without the (large) revocation list itself.
- Define dedicated fields for the common extensions to simplify
the encoding: crlNumber, authorityKeyIdentifier,
deltaCRLIndicator.
* *C509 OCSP* -- a CBOR encoding of OCSP requests and responses
([RFC6960]). The encoding compresses common fields while
preserving semantic equivalence. Four key improvements are made
over [RFC6960]:
- The signature in signed requests and responses is computed over
a wider set of fields than in [RFC6960], including the
signature algorithm and the certificate chain, preventing
algorithm-substitution and certificate-chain substitution
attacks.
- Certificate serial numbers in requests and responses are
replaced by hashes (serialNumberHash), providing privacy
against passive observers who do not already know the queried
serial numbers.
- The issuer is identified by a single hash over the issuer
certificate (issuerCertHash) rather than by the two-hash
CertID, reducing per-issuer overhead.
- All participants (requestor, responder, issuer) are identified
by a hash over their certificate (requestorCertHash,
responderCertHash, issuerCertHash) rather than by a plaintext
Subject distinguished name or SubjectKeyIdentifier, avoiding
structural CHOICE types such as the X.509 ResponderID (byName
or byKey) and simplifying support for different certificate
types (e.g., C509, X.509, or future types) because the same
hash applies regardless of the certificate encoding.
The CRL and OCSP structures defined in this document are certificate-
type agnostic: they can be used with C509 certificates, X.509
certificates, or any future certificate type without modification;
see Section 7.6.
C509 CRL and C509 OCSP apply the same compression techniques as C509
certificates: static fields are elided, OIDs are replaced with short
integers, time values are compressed to POSIX timestamps, and
redundant encoding is removed. Implementers may use the CBOR
playground [CborMe] to inspect encoded examples.
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C509 CRL and C509 OCSP are not wire-format-compatible with their DER-
encoded counterparts defined in [RFC5280] and [RFC6960]. Systems
that use C509 CRL or C509 OCSP must explicitly support these CBOR-
encoded formats; they cannot be transparently substituted for or
derived from the corresponding DER-encoded structures.
C509 CRL and C509 OCSP are designed to be compatible with certificate
profiles for constrained deployments, such as [RFC7925].
2. Alternative Certificate Status Checking Mechanisms
This section considers both widely deployed certificate-status
mechanisms and closely related prior work for constrained
environments. Several such mechanisms can be used to check
certificate status, but none of them replaces the work in this
document.
* *X.509 CRLs and OCSP* ([RFC5280], [RFC6960]) provide the baseline
revocation mechanisms, but their DER encodings are not compact
enough for constrained deployments and are not certificate-type
agnostic. This document keeps their semantics while defining CBOR
encodings that are smaller and easier to process.
* *OCSP stapling* ([RFC6066], [RFC9846]) reduces client latency by
having the server provide a fresh OCSP response, but it does not
define a revocation status format of its own. It still depends on
the underlying OCSP message structure, so it cannot replace a
compact, standalone status representation.
* *Short-lived certificates* reduce reliance on revocation, but they
do not provide revocation status when certificates must remain
valid for longer periods or must be withdrawn immediately after
compromise. They also shift the problem to more frequent issuance
and renewal rather than eliminating status checking.
* *CRLSets* [CRLSets] are a browser-distributed revocation blocklist
rather than a general-purpose revocation protocol. They cover
only a limited subset of certificates and are tied to a specific
browser ecosystem, so they cannot provide complete, interoperable
status checking for arbitrary C509, X.509, or future certificate
types.
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* *CRLite* [CRLite] compresses revocation information into a
browser-oriented filter-based representation, which is useful for
client-side deployment at scale. However, it is not a wire-format
replacement for CRLs or OCSP, does not preserve the full per-
certificate status structures defined here, and is not a
certificate-type-agnostic status format that other implementations
can exchange directly.
* *Compact CBOR revocation for IoT (TinyOCSP and CCRL)* [TinyOCSP]
are prior research mechanisms that reduce OCSP and CRL overhead
for low-power IoT, confirming the feasibility and benefits of
CBOR-based revocation on constrained hardware. They are a
precursor to this work. However, they were specified as point
solutions rather than as interoperable, certificate-type-agnostic
wire formats aligned with the C509 certificate encoding
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]; this document generalizes those
mechanisms into complete C509 CRL and C509 OCSP structures usable
with C509, X.509, and future certificate types.
The compactness benefit over the DER-encoded baselines is concrete
and substantial. For the representative profiles in the worked
examples (Appendix A), C509 CRLs are 18% to 52% smaller than the
equivalent X.509 CRLs (for example, a CRL carrying revoked
certificates is reduced from 335 to 177 bytes, a 47% reduction), and
C509 OCSP messages are 40% to 73% smaller (for example, a Simple OCSP
request from 150 to 51 bytes, and a Basic OCSP response without the
responder's certificate from 837 to 248 bytes); see Table 14.
These alternatives are useful in specific deployments, but they do
not provide the CBOR-based, certificate-type-agnostic revocation
structures defined here for C509, X.509, and future certificate
types.
3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses the terminology from [RFC5280], [RFC6960],
[RFC7228], [RFC8610], [RFC8742], [RFC8949], and [RFC9682]. Unless
otherwise stated, "CBOR" refers to deterministically encoded CBOR as
specified in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of [RFC8949].
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4. Common Types
The following types are imported from
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]: Name, Extension, Extensions,
Defined, COSE_C509, and AlgorithmIdentifier. Additionally, the
following type is imported from [RFC9360]: COSE_X509.
This document further defines the following constrained aliases for
use in all CDDL definitions:
uint8 = uint .le 255
uint32 = 0..4294967295 ; 2^32 - 1
uint63 = 0..9223372036854775807 ; 2^63 - 1
int16 = -32768..32767
IntAlgorithmIdentifier = int16
IntExtension = ( extensionID: IntExtensionID, extensionValue: Defined )
IntExtensionID = 1..9223372036854775807 / ; 2^32 - 1
-9223372036854775807..-1 ; -(2^32 - 1)
IntExtensions = [ * IntExtension ]
The CDDL definitions in this document are split into three files:
c509common.cddl (the definitions above), c509crl.cddl (Section 6),
and c509ocsp.cddl (Section 7). Both c509crl.cddl and c509ocsp.cddl
depend on c509common.cddl and on the types imported from
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert] and [RFC9360].
IntAlgorithmIdentifier is the int-only instantiation of
AlgorithmIdentifier from [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]. It is
used throughout this document wherever an algorithm identifier
appears in the wire encoding.
IntExtension is the instantiation of Extension from
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert] with an integer extensionID. As in
C509 certificates ([I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert],
Section 3.1.10), the absolute value of extensionID is the value from
the "C509 Extensions" registry, and its sign indicates whether the
extension is critical: critical extensions are encoded with a
negative sign and non-critical extensions with a positive sign. It
is used throughout this document wherever a single extension appears
in the wire encoding.
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IntExtensions is the instantiation of Extensions from
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert] where all embedded Extension
entries are IntExtension entries. An IntExtensions field with no
extensions is encoded as an empty array.
5. Encoding of Time Fields
Time fields are encoded as unwrapped CBOR epoch-based date/time
(~time). The value MUST be a non-negative integer. In POSIX time
[POSIX], leap seconds are ignored; a leap second has the same POSIX
time as the second before it.
6. C509 CRL
6.1. Overview
A C509 CRL is a natively signed CBOR [RFC8949] encoding of an X.509
v2 CRL as defined in [RFC5280], Section 5. The signature is computed
over the CBOR Sequence [RFC8742] TBSCertList; no ASN.1 encoding is
involved. A C509 CRL preserves the semantics of the corresponding
DER-encoded X.509 CRL for the subset of RFC 5280 structures supported
by this document.
A C509 CRL is not wire-format-compatible with a DER-encoded X.509
CRL. The two formats cannot be mechanically converted to or from
each other without semantic interpretation of the contained data.
6.2. C509 CRL CDDL
The following CDDL defines the top-level C509CRL structure and the
TBSCertList sequence:
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C509CRL = [
TBSCertList,
signatureValue : any,
]
TBSCertList = (
CRLInfoData,
revokedCertsList : [+ PerIssuerRevokedCerts] / null
)
C509CRLInfo = [ CRLInfoData ]
CRLInfoData = (
crlType : 0, ; int16
signatureAlgorithm : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
authoritySubject : Name / #6.121(bytes),
authorityKeyIdentifier : bytes,
crlNumber : CRLNumber,
thisUpdate : ~time,
nextUpdate : uint63 / null,
baseCrlNumber : CRLNumber / null,
crlExtensions : IntExtensions,
)
CRLNumber = 1..9223372036854775807
PerIssuerRevokedCerts = (
issuer : Name / #6.121(bytes) / null,
revokedCertsControl : RevokedCertsControl / null,
extensions : IntExtensions,
revokedCerts : bytes .size (1..2147483647) / null,
removedFromCRLCerts : bytes .size (1..2147483647) / null,
)
RevokedCertsControl = [
flags : uint32,
serialNumberLength : 1..20,
dateLength : uint .le 8,
baseDate : ~time,
]
Figure 1: CDDL for C509CRL
6.3. Field Encodings
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6.3.1. CRLInfoData and C509CRLInfo
CRLInfoData is a CDDL group that carries all CRL fields except
revokedCertsList. C509CRLInfo is the standalone CBOR array form of
CRLInfoData; it can be used to convey CRL information (crlType,
signature algorithm, issuer identity, CRL number, validity window,
base CRL number, extensions) without the potentially large revocation
list. TBSCertList embeds CRLInfoData and adds revokedCertsList.
6.3.2. crlType
The crlType field serves as the discriminator for C509CRL:
+=======+=========+
| Value | Type |
+=======+=========+
| 0 | C509CRL |
+-------+---------+
Table 1: CRL types
Future specifications may define additional types by assigning new
integer values.
6.3.3. signatureAlgorithm
Encoded identically to the int choice of issuerSignatureAlgorithm in
C509 certificates (see [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert],
Section 3.1.3). Algorithm integer values are from the same registry
used for C509 certificates.
Unlike in [RFC5280], where the signature algorithm appears outside
the TBSCertList and is therefore not covered by the CRL signature,
signatureAlgorithm is part of CRLInfoData within TBSCertList and is
therefore covered by the signature. This prevents algorithm-
substitution attacks on the CRL.
6.3.4. authoritySubject and authorityKeyIdentifier
The authoritySubject and authorityKeyIdentifier fields identify the
CRL authority.
The authoritySubject field identifies the subject of the CRL issuer.
When the CRL is issued by a C509 CA, authoritySubject is a Name value
identical to the subject field of the authority C509 certificate.
When the CRL is issued by an X.509 CA (e.g., in a hybrid deployment
where a legacy CA issues a C509-format CRL), authoritySubject is
encoded as #6.121(bytes) (tag 121 is alternative 0), where the byte
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string contains the DER-encoded Name from the subject field of the
issuing X.509 CA certificate ([X.690]). Since the Name structure may
also be bytes, the DER-encoded subject is wrapped in a 121-tagged
structure.
The authorityKeyIdentifier field is identical to the value of the
authority's subjectKeyIdentifier extension. This field corresponds
to the X.509 CRL extension authorityKeyIdentifier ([RFC5280],
Section 5.2.1). It is promoted to a dedicated field because it MUST
be present in conforming X.509 CRLs and because making it explicit
simplifies the structure and reduces encoded size compared to
representing it as a generic extension.
6.3.5. crlNumber
The crlNumber field is encoded as a positive integer (CRLNumber, from
1 to 2^63 - 1). It corresponds to the cRLNumber extension in
[RFC5280], Section 5.2.3, which this document replaces with a
dedicated field. The value is monotonically increasing for both full
and delta CRLs.
6.3.6. thisUpdate and nextUpdate
The thisUpdate field is encoded as described in Section 5. The
nextUpdate field is encoded as a uint63 representing the number of
seconds from thisUpdate until the next CRL is expected to be issued.
It is encoded as null when no next update time is known.
6.3.7. baseCrlNumber
The baseCrlNumber field is encoded as null for a full CRL. For a
delta CRL, it contains the CRL number of the corresponding base full
CRL. It corresponds to the deltaCRLIndicator extension in [RFC5280],
Section 5.2.4, which this document replaces with a dedicated field.
6.3.8. reasonCode Encoding
The reasonCode ENUMERATED value is encoded as one unsigned byte. The
byte values are aligned with the ENUMERATED values of the CRLReason
type defined in [RFC5280], Section 5.3.1; a C509 revocationReason
byte value equals the corresponding ASN.1 ENUMERATED integer value
for the same reason code.
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+======+======================+
| Byte | reasonCode |
+======+======================+
| 0x00 | unspecified |
+------+----------------------+
| 0x01 | keyCompromise |
+------+----------------------+
| 0x02 | cACompromise |
+------+----------------------+
| 0x03 | affiliationChanged |
+------+----------------------+
| 0x04 | superseded |
+------+----------------------+
| 0x05 | cessationOfOperation |
+------+----------------------+
| 0x06 | certificateHold |
+------+----------------------+
| - | removeFromCRL |
+------+----------------------+
| 0x09 | privilegeWithdrawn |
+------+----------------------+
| 0x0A | aACompromise |
+------+----------------------+
Table 2: reasonCode encoding
removeFromCRL (enumeration value 0x08) is not encoded in
revokedCerts. Certificates removed from the CRL are instead
indicated in the removedFromCRLCerts field of PerIssuerRevokedCerts.
6.3.9. revokedCertsList and PerIssuerRevokedCerts
6.3.9.1. Design Considerations
In X.509 CRLs ([RFC5280], Section 5.3.3), an indirect CRL uses the
certificateIssuer CRL entry extension to indicate that a revocation
entry -- and all subsequent entries -- belong to a different issuer.
This mechanism has two significant drawbacks:
* It is implicit and positional, making it difficult to parse
correctly and error-prone to implement.
* It is impossible to represent an issuer that has no currently
revoked certificates (e.g., to carry per-issuer extensions or to
explicitly indicate that the issuer is known but has an empty
revocation list), because there is no entry to attach the
certificateIssuer extension to.
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PerIssuerRevokedCerts solves both problems by introducing an explicit
intermediate structure that groups all revocation information for one
issuer. The issuer is identified directly in the issuer field of the
structure rather than being inferred from the position of a CRL entry
extension. This makes the grouping unambiguous and easy to parse,
and it allows an issuer to appear in the list even when it has no
revoked certificates.
A second design problem in X.509 CRLs is that each revocation entry
has variable length because:
* the serial number length differs between certificates,
* the revocation date uses different encodings depending on whether
the date falls before or after 2050,
* optional per-entry extensions (e.g., reason code) may or may not
be present.
This variable-length layout makes it impossible to determine whether
a given serial number is present in the list without scanning every
entry sequentially, resulting in O(n) lookup time.
In this document, the revokedCertsControl structure introduces fixed
parameters (serialNumberLength, dateLength) that make every entry
within revokedCerts exactly the same size. The flags field can
additionally indicate that entries are sorted in ascending order by
serial number, enabling binary search and reducing lookup time to
O(log(n)). Using a compact byte-string concatenation rather than a
CBOR array of structured items further reduces encoded size and
accelerates parsing. Furthermore, certificates removed from the CRL
(delta CRL removeFromCRL entries in X.509) are kept in a dedicated
removedFromCRLCerts field rather than mixed into revokedCerts. This
keeps revokedCerts free of removal noise, reducing its size and
allowing implementations to process currently revoked and removed
entries independently.
6.3.9.2. Fields
The revokedCertsList field is either a CBOR array of one or more
PerIssuerRevokedCerts entries, each describing the revocation state
for certificates issued by one issuer, or CBOR null. Since
PerIssuerRevokedCerts is a CDDL group, the fields of each entry are
inlined in the array rather than wrapped in a nested array; an array
with n entries therefore contains 5n elements. revokedCertsList MUST
be encoded as CBOR null when all of the following conditions hold: no
certificates are currently revoked, no certificates have been removed
from the CRL, the only issuer that would appear is the CRL's own
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authoritySubject (i.e., the issuer field is null), and there are no
non-empty per-issuer extensions.
Each PerIssuerRevokedCerts entry describes revoked certificates for
one issuer using the following fields:
* The issuer field identifies the issuer of the certificates covered
by this PerIssuerRevokedCerts entry. When the issuer is a C509
CA, it is encoded as a Name value identical to the issuer field of
the covered C509 certificates. When the issuer is an X.509 CA, it
is encoded as #6.121(bytes) (tag 121 is alternative 0), where the
byte string contains the DER-encoded Name from the issuer field of
the covered X.509 certificates ([X.690]). If the issuer is
identical to the CRL's authoritySubject field, it MUST be encoded
as CBOR null.
* The revokedCertsControl field defines the controls for
interpreting removedFromCRLCerts and revokedCerts. If either
removedFromCRLCerts or revokedCerts is non-null,
revokedCertsControl MUST NOT be null. If both removedFromCRLCerts
and revokedCerts are null, revokedCertsControl MUST be null to
reduce CRL size.
- The flags field is an unsigned integer encoding boolean control
bits for crlType = 0: bit 0 indicates whether entries in
revokedCerts are sorted in ascending order by the integer value
of the certificate serial number; bit 1 indicates whether each
entry contains a reason code. Bits greater than 1 are reserved
for crlType = 0 and MUST be zero and MUST be ignored by
receivers. Future crlType values defined in successor
documents may assign additional bit meanings.
- The serialNumberLength field defines the length, in bytes, of a
certificate serial number. It MUST be greater than 0. It is
the smallest value that can encode all certificate serial
numbers without leading zeros.
Each certificate serial number is encoded as a fixed-length
big-endian integer of length serialNumberLength. If the
encoded value is shorter than serialNumberLength, it is left-
padded with zeros.
- The dateLength field defines the length, in bytes, of the big-
endian encoded revocation-date offset relative to baseDate. A
value of 0 means that no revocation date is included in
revokedCerts entries. This is permitted in C509-native
deployments where the revocation date is not required -- for
example, when minimizing revocation data is more important than
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recording the revocation time. Implementations that need to
convert a C509 CRL to an RFC 5280 DER-encoded CRL MUST set
dateLength to a non-zero value, since [RFC5280], Section 5.1
requires a revocationDate in every CRL entry. When dateLength
is non-zero, the offset MUST fit within the specified byte
length without leading zero bytes.
- The baseDate field is a reference time used to compute
revocation and removal dates, encoded as described in
Section 5. It MUST be greater than or equal to the issuer
certificate's notBefore, which ensures that all stored offsets
are non-negative. It is RECOMMENDED to set baseDate to the
earliest revocation date and removal-from-CRL date among all
entries in this CRL, as this minimizes the magnitude of stored
offsets and reduces encoding size. Any time between the issuer
certificate's notBefore (inclusive) and that earliest date
(inclusive) is a conformant value. Revocation dates in
revokedCerts and removal dates in removedFromCRLCerts are
stored as non-negative offsets, in seconds, from baseDate.
* The extensions field contains per-issuer extensions.
* The revokedCerts field is a CBOR byte string containing the
concatenated byte sequence of revoked-certificate entries. Each
entry is the concatenation of:
- a big-endian encoded certificate serial number of length
serialNumberLength;
- a big-endian encoded revocation-date offset from baseDate, in
seconds, of length dateLength (absent when dateLength is 0);
and
- an optional reason code (1 byte if bit 1 of flags is set,
absent otherwise).
If there are no entries, this field MUST be encoded as CBOR null
instead of a zero-length byte string.
The revocation date for a given entry is recovered by adding the
stored offset to baseDate. When dateLength is 0, no revocation
date is stored and no date recovery is possible.
Revoked-certificate entries have fixed length. If bit 0 of flags
is set, entries are sorted in ascending order, enabling binary
search for a given serial number in O(log(n)) time.
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* The removedFromCRLCerts field contains a concatenated byte
sequence of entries for certificates removed from the CRL since
publication of the CRL with crlNumber = baseCrlNumber. Each entry
is the concatenation of:
- a big-endian encoded certificate serial number of length
serialNumberLength; and
- a big-endian encoded removal-date offset from baseDate, in
seconds, of length dateLength (absent when dateLength is 0).
If there are no entries, this field MUST be encoded as CBOR null
instead of a zero-length byte string.
The removal date for a given entry is recovered by adding the
stored offset to baseDate. When dateLength is 0, no removal date
is stored and no date recovery is possible.
Removed-certificate entries have fixed length. If bit 0 of flags
is set, entries are sorted in ascending order, enabling binary
search for a given serial number in O(log(n)) time.
6.3.10. CRL Extensions
The crlExtensions field contains extensions for the CRL. This
document does not define any new CRL-level extensions.
Table 3 lists X.509 CRL extensions and their equivalents.
+====+==========================+==========+======================+
|Code| Extension |Reference |Equivalent |
+====+==========================+==========+======================+
|- | authorityKeyIdentifier |[RFC5280],|field |
| | |Section |authorityKeyIdentifier|
| | |5.2.1 | |
+----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
|- | issuerAltName |[RFC5280],|- |
| | |Section | |
| | |5.2.2 | |
+----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
|- | cRLNumber |[RFC5280],|field crlNumber |
| | |Section | |
| | |5.2.3 | |
+----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
|- | deltaCRLIndicator |[RFC5280],|field baseCrlNumber |
| | |Section | |
| | |5.2.4 | |
+----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
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|- | issuingDistributionPoint |[RFC5280],|- |
| | |Section | |
| | |5.2.5 | |
+----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
|- | freshestCRL |[RFC5280],|- |
| | |Section | |
| | |5.2.6 | |
+----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
|- | authorityInfoAccess |[RFC5280],|- |
| | |Section | |
| | |5.2.7 | |
+----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
|- | orderedList |OID |bit 0 of flags |
| | |2.5.29.56 |(ascSerialNum); - |
| | |(ITU-T |(ascRevDate) |
| | |X.509, | |
| | |Section | |
| | |9.5.2.5) | |
+----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
|- | toBeRevoked |OID |- |
| | |2.5.29.58 | |
| | |(ITU-T | |
| | |X.509, | |
| | |Section | |
| | |9.5.2.6) | |
+----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
|- | revokedGroups |OID |- |
| | |2.5.29.59 | |
| | |(ITU-T | |
| | |X.509, | |
| | |Section | |
| | |9.5.2.7) | |
+----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
Table 3: CRL extensions and their equivalents
6.3.11. Per-Issuer Extensions
The extensions field of PerIssuerRevokedCerts contains per-issuer
extensions. This document defines one per-issuer extension
(expiredCertsOnCRL, see Section 6.3.11.1).
Table 4 lists per-issuer extensions defined in this document.
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+======+===================+=========================+============+
| Code | Extension | Reference | Equivalent |
+======+===================+=========================+============+
| TBD4 | expiredCertsOnCRL | OID 2.5.29.60 (ITU-T | - |
| | | X.509, Section 9.5.2.8) | |
+------+-------------------+-------------------------+------------+
Table 4: Per-issuer extensions and their equivalents
6.3.11.1. expiredCertsOnCRL
The expiredCertsOnCRL extension indicates that this CRL includes
revocation information for certificates that have already expired.
The extension value is a time value indicating the earliest
expiration date of certificates included on the CRL; certificates
that expired on or after this date are listed even if they are
expired when the CRL is generated.
The extension value MUST be encoded as follows.
ExpiredCertsOnCRL = ~time
The value is encoded as described in Section 5. When this extension
is present, a relying party processing expired certificates (for
example, for audit or archiving purposes) SHOULD use the indicated
date to determine the extent of historical revocation coverage.
6.3.12. CRL Entry Extensions
Table 5 lists X.509 CRL entry extensions. No corresponding extension
is defined in this document.
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+======+=====================+==============+=======================+
| Code | Extension | Reference | Equivalent |
+======+=====================+==============+=======================+
| - | reasonCode | [RFC5280], | fields |
| | | Section | removedFromCRLCerts |
| | | 5.3.1 / | and revokedCerts |
| | | ITU-T | |
| | | X.509, | |
| | | Section | |
| | | 9.6.2.1 | |
+------+---------------------+--------------+-----------------------+
| - | holdInstructionCode | [RFC3280], | - |
| | | Section | |
| | | 5.3.2 / | |
| | | ITU-T | |
| | | X.509, | |
| | | Section | |
| | | 9.6.2.2 | |
+------+---------------------+--------------+-----------------------+
| - | invalidityDate | [RFC5280], | - |
| | | Section | |
| | | 5.3.2 / | |
| | | ITU-T | |
| | | X.509, | |
| | | Section | |
| | | 9.6.2.3 | |
+------+---------------------+--------------+-----------------------+
| - | certificateIssuer | [RFC5280], | field issuer within |
| | | Section | PerIssuerRevokedCerts |
| | | 5.3.3 / | |
| | | ITU-T | |
| | | X.509, | |
| | | Section | |
| | | 9.6.2.4 | |
+------+---------------------+--------------+-----------------------+
Table 5: CRL entry extensions defined for X.509 CRLs
6.3.13. signatureValue
Encoded identically to signatureValue in C509 certificates (see
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], Section 3.1.12).
6.4. PEM Representation
The CBOR-encoded C509CRL is first Base64-encoded and then wrapped
between "-----BEGIN C509 CRL-----" and "-----END C509 CRL-----",
following the framework of [RFC7468].
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-----BEGIN C509 CRL-----
(base64-encoded CBOR C509CRL)
-----END C509 CRL-----
Figure 2: C509 CRL PEM Encoding
7. C509 OCSP
7.1. Overview
C509 OCSP defines CBOR encodings for OCSP requests and OCSP responses
as defined in [RFC6960]. The encoding follows the same compression
principles as C509 CRL and C509 certificates.
C509 OCSP requests and responses are not wire-format-compatible with
DER-encoded OCSP messages as defined in [RFC6960]. The two formats
cannot be mechanically converted to or from each other without
semantic interpretation of the contained data.
C509OCSPRequest and C509OCSPResponse are designed to be extensible.
The first field of every message is ocspRequestType or
ocspResponseType, an integer that identifies the structure type.
Future specifications may define additional types by assigning new
integer values, enabling new request or response structures to be
introduced without modifying the existing types.
7.2. Hash Algorithms
The hashAlgorithm field of C509 OCSP requests and responses
identifies the hash algorithm used to compute all hashes within the
enclosing structure. Its value is the integer identifier of a hash
algorithm from the "COSE Algorithms" registry [IANA.cose], e.g., -16
for SHA-256, -43 for SHA-384, and -44 for SHA-512 [RFC9054]. Any
hash algorithm in that registry can be used, subject to the
restrictions below; for example, SHA3-256 or SM3 can be used once
they are registered.
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The hash algorithm MUST produce an output of at least 20 bytes, so
that HashId20 values can be derived (see Section 7.3). Consequently,
SHA-256/64 (-15) MUST NOT be used. Other truncated hash algorithms,
such as SHA-512/256 (-17), SHOULD NOT be used: this document already
defines the truncated identifiers HashId8 and HashId20, so using a
truncated hash algorithm provides no benefit. SHA-1 (-14) MUST NOT
be used either, since it is not collision resistant. For SHAKE128
(-18) and SHAKE256 (-45), the output length is as specified in
[RFC9054], i.e., 256 and 512 bits, respectively. For an extendable-
output function whose output length is not fixed by its registration,
such as TurboSHAKE128 (-261) and TurboSHAKE256 (-262) [RFC9861], the
output length is the length of the identifier being computed, i.e., 8
bytes for HashId8 and 20 bytes for HashId20.
7.3. Identification of Certificates
To reduce OCSP message size, this document defines two truncated-hash
identifier types used to refer to certificates compactly:
* HashId8: the leading 8 bytes of the hash value computed using the
enclosing hashAlgorithm. HashId8 is used to identify issuer
certificates and the certificates of OCSP requestors and
responders in request and response structures where a short
identifier provides sufficient uniqueness in the deployment
context.
* HashId20: the leading 20 bytes of the hash value computed using
the enclosing hashAlgorithm. HashId20 is intended for identifying
certificate serial numbers (the serialNumberHash field) when
higher uniqueness is required to minimize collision risk. When
derived from a secure hash (e.g., SHA-256 or SHA3-256) and treated
as a random output, it gives ~2^160 preimage work and ~2^80
collision resistance (birthday bound) for the truncated value.
Since the relying party verifies a certificate's signature before
querying OCSP, an adversary needs to construct a different
certificate that (a) validates under the same issuer chain and (b)
has a serial number whose hash truncation equals an existing
certificate's HashId20. Such a construction is practically
infeasible.
HashId8 = bytes .size 8
HashId20 = bytes .size 20
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HashId20 is used to carry the hash of the certificate serial number
of the target certificate, computed using the hashAlgorithm of the
enclosing structure. The serial number is encoded in big-endian byte
order without a leading zero byte (as in C509 certificates) before
hashing. In X.509, a CertificateSerialNumber INTEGER is DER-encoded
with a leading zero byte when the most-significant bit is set; that
leading zero MUST be stripped before computing the hash.
Using a hash rather than the plain serial number preserves the
privacy of the requestor: an observer cannot determine which
certificate is being queried without already knowing the serial
number.
7.4. C509 OCSP Request
7.4.1. CDDL
C509OCSPRequest = C509UnsignedOCSPRequest /
C509SignedOCSPRequest /
C509SimpleOCSPRequest
C509UnsignedOCSPRequest = [
ocspRequestType : 0, ; int16
hashAlgorithm : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
nonce : bytes .size (16..32) / null,
extensions : IntExtensions,
requests : PerIssuerOCSPRequests
]
TBSOCSPRequest = (
ocspRequestType : 1, ; int16
signatureAlgorithm : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
hashAlgorithm : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
nonce : bytes .size (16..32) / null,
requestorCertHash : HashId8,
extensions : IntExtensions,
requests : PerIssuerOCSPRequests,
requestorCerts : COSE_C509 / #6.121(COSE_X509) / null,
)
C509SignedOCSPRequest = [
TBSOCSPRequest,
signatureValue : any,
]
C509SimpleOCSPRequest = [
ocspRequestType : 2, ; int16
hashAlgorithm : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
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nonce : bytes .size (16..32) / null,
issuerCertHash : HashId8,
serialNumberHash : HashId20,
extensions : IntExtensions
]
PerIssuerOCSPRequests = [ + PerIssuerOCSPRequest ]
PerIssuerOCSPRequest = (
issuerCertHash : HashId8,
extensions : IntExtensions,
singleRequests : SingleCertRequests,
)
SingleCertRequests = [ + SingleCertRequest ]
SingleCertRequest = (
serialNumberHash : HashId20,
extensions : IntExtensions,
)
Figure 3: CDDL for C509OCSPRequest
7.4.2. Field Encodings
7.4.2.1. ocspRequestType
The ocspRequestType field serves as the discriminator for
C509OCSPRequest:
+=======+=========================+
| Value | Type |
+=======+=========================+
| 0 | C509UnsignedOCSPRequest |
+-------+-------------------------+
| 1 | C509SignedOCSPRequest |
+-------+-------------------------+
| 2 | C509SimpleOCSPRequest |
+-------+-------------------------+
Table 6: OCSP request types
7.4.2.2. issuerCertHash
The issuerCertHash field appears in PerIssuerOCSPRequest,
PerIssuerOCSPResponse, C509SimpleOCSPRequest, and
TBSSimpleOCSPResponse. It contains a hash of the issuer certificate:
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* issuerCertHash: hash computed over the deterministically encoded
certificate, i.e., the CBOR-encoded C509Certificate or the DER-
encoded ([X.690]) X.509 certificate. For a CBOR re-encoded X.509
certificate (c509CertificateType = 3, see
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], Section 3.1.1), the hash MUST
be computed over the DER-encoded X.509 certificate, not over its
C509 encoding, since such a certificate may have more than one
conformant CBOR encoding (see [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert],
Section 3.4). The hash algorithm is specified by the
hashAlgorithm field of the enclosing request or response
structure.
In X.509 OCSP ([RFC6960], Section 4.1.1), the CertID structure
identifies the issuer using two separate hashes: issuerNameHash (a
hash of the DER-encoded issuer name) and issuerKeyHash (a hash of the
issuer's public key bit string). This two-hash approach was designed
for interoperability with DER-encoded X.509 structures, but it
doubles the per-issuer overhead in the message. In C509 OCSP, the
issuer is identified by a single hash of the issuer certificate
(issuerCertHash), which is simpler, smaller, and unambiguous.
Implementations that need to cross-reference a C509 issuerCertHash
with an RFC 6960 DER-encoded CertID must recompute the respective
hash inputs; the values are not directly comparable.
7.4.2.3. PerIssuerOCSPRequests, PerIssuerOCSPRequest,
SingleCertRequests and SingleCertRequest
PerIssuerOCSPRequests is a list of PerIssuerOCSPRequest entries. In
X.509 OCSP ([RFC6960], Section 4.1.1), every Request entry embeds a
full CertID containing the issuer identity fields (hashAlgorithm,
issuerNameHash, issuerKeyHash) alongside the serialNumber. When
multiple certificates from the same issuer are queried in a single
request, these issuer fields are repeated verbatim for every entry,
wasting space. PerIssuerOCSPRequest solves this by grouping all
single-certificate requests for the same issuer under one entry: the
issuerCertHash field is encoded once and shared across all
SingleCertRequest entries in the singleRequests list, eliminating the
per-entry duplication. Since PerIssuerOCSPRequest and
SingleCertRequest are CDDL groups, the fields of each entry are
inlined in the enclosing array rather than wrapped in a nested array.
* The extensions field contains per-issuer extensions that apply to
all single-certificate requests in this PerIssuerOCSPRequest
entry; see Section 7.5.2.12.
* The singleRequests field is a list of SingleCertRequest entries
for certificates from this issuer.
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Each SingleCertRequest contains:
* The serialNumberHash field is the truncated hash of the
certificate serial number of the target certificate, computed
using the hashAlgorithm of the enclosing request structure. The
serial number is encoded in big-endian byte order without a
leading zero byte (as in C509 certificates) before hashing. Using
a hash rather than the plain serial number preserves the privacy
of the requestor: an observer cannot determine which certificate
is being queried without already knowing the serial number.
* The extensions field contains extensions for the single request;
see Section 7.5.2.13.
7.4.2.4. C509UnsignedOCSPRequest
* The ocspRequestType field MUST be 0.
* The hashAlgorithm field specifies the hash algorithm used to
compute issuerCertHash and serialNumberHash. The algorithm is
encoded as specified in Section 7.2.
* The nonce field contains the request nonce, or MUST be null when
no nonce is present. The nonce MUST be generated by a
cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator and MUST be
between 16 and 32 bytes long. An OCSP server MUST reject a
request whose nonce is shorter than 16 bytes or longer than 32
bytes by returning a C509ErrorOCSPResponse with responseStatus set
to malformedRequest (1).
* The extensions field contains request-level extensions; see
Section 7.5.2.13.
* The requests field is a list of PerIssuerOCSPRequest entries, each
grouping target certificates by issuer; see Section 7.4.2.3.
7.4.2.5. C509SignedOCSPRequest
* The ocspRequestType field MUST be 1.
* The signatureAlgorithm field specifies the signature algorithm, as
defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], Section 3.1.3.
* The hashAlgorithm field specifies the hash algorithm used to
compute requestorCertHash, issuerCertHash, and serialNumberHash.
The algorithm is encoded as specified in Section 7.2.
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* The nonce field is as defined for C509UnsignedOCSPRequest
(Section 7.4.2.4).
* The requestorCertHash field is a hash of the signer's certificate,
computed using hashAlgorithm. When requestorCerts is not null, it
carries the corresponding certificate chain so that the receiver
can verify the identity of the requestor.
* The extensions field contains request-level extensions; see
Section 7.5.2.13.
* The requests field is as defined for C509UnsignedOCSPRequest
(Section 7.4.2.4).
* The requestorCerts field contains a sorted certificate chain
starting with the signer's certificate, or MUST be null if no
certificates are transported. When the signer holds a C509
certificate chain, the value is COSE_C509. When the signer holds
an X.509 certificate chain, the value is #6.121(COSE_X509),
wrapping a COSE_X509 chain with CBOR tag 121 (alternative 0).
* The signatureValue field is the signature computed over the CBOR
Sequence of the TBSOCSPRequest group.
7.4.2.6. C509SimpleOCSPRequest
C509SimpleOCSPRequest is a compact request format for querying the
status of a single certificate. Unlike C509UnsignedOCSPRequest,
which uses a two-level PerIssuerOCSPRequests / SingleCertRequest
grouping to batch multiple serial numbers across one or more issuers,
C509SimpleOCSPRequest flattens the structure into a single CBOR array
for the common case of a one-certificate query.
* The ocspRequestType field MUST be 2.
* The hashAlgorithm field specifies the hash algorithm used to
compute issuerCertHash and serialNumberHash. The algorithm is
encoded as specified in Section 7.2.
* The nonce field is as defined for C509UnsignedOCSPRequest
(Section 7.4.2.4).
* The issuerCertHash field identifies the issuer of the target
certificate; see Section 7.4.2.2.
* The serialNumberHash field is the hash of the certificate serial
number of the target certificate, computed as in Section 7.3.
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* The extensions field contains request-level extensions; see
Section 7.5.2.13.
7.4.3. PEM Representation
The CBOR-encoded C509 OCSP request is first Base64-encoded and then
wrapped between "-----BEGIN C509 OCSP REQUEST-----" and "-----END
C509 OCSP REQUEST-----", following the framework of [RFC7468].
-----BEGIN C509 OCSP REQUEST-----
(base64-encoded CBOR C509 OCSP Request)
-----END C509 OCSP REQUEST-----
Figure 4: C509 OCSP Request PEM Encoding
7.5. C509 OCSP Response
7.5.1. CDDL
C509OCSPResponse = C509ErrorOCSPResponse /
C509BasicOCSPResponse /
C509SimpleOCSPResponse
C509ErrorOCSPResponse = [
ocspResponseType : 0, ; int16
responseStatus : -128..127
]
TBSBasicOCSPResponse = (
ocspResponseType : 1, ; int16
signatureAlgorithm : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
hashAlgorithm : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
nonce : bytes .size (16..32) / null,
responderCertHash : HashId8,
producedAt : ~time,
extensions : IntExtensions,
responses : PerIssuerOCSPResponses,
responderCerts : COSE_C509 / #6.121(COSE_X509) / null,
)
C509BasicOCSPResponse = [
TBSBasicOCSPResponse,
signatureValue : any
]
TBSSimpleOCSPResponse = (
ocspResponseType : 2, ; int16
signatureAlgorithm : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
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hashAlgorithm : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
nonce : bytes .size (16..32) / null,
responderCertHash : HashId8,
issuerCertHash : HashId8,
serialNumberHash : HashId20,
certStatus : CertStatus,
producedAt : ~time,
thisUpdate : nint / 0,
nextUpdate : uint63 / null,
extensions : IntExtensions,
responderCerts : COSE_C509 / #6.121(COSE_X509) / null,
)
C509SimpleOCSPResponse = [
TBSSimpleOCSPResponse,
signatureValue : any
]
PerIssuerOCSPResponses = [ + PerIssuerOCSPResponse ]
PerIssuerOCSPResponse = (
issuerCertHash : HashId8,
extensions : IntExtensions,
singleResponses : SingleCertResponses,
)
SingleCertResponses = [ + SingleCertResponse ]
SingleCertResponse = (
serialNumberHash : HashId20,
certStatus : CertStatus,
thisUpdate : nint / 0,
nextUpdate : uint63 / null,
extensions : IntExtensions,
)
CertStatus = 0 ; good
/ 1 ; not-issued (issuer recognized,
; serial number not issued)
/ 2 ; unknown (issuer not recognized)
/ RevokedInfo
RevokedInfo = [
revocationTime : ~time,
revocationReason : uint8,
]
Figure 5: CDDL for C509OCSPResponse
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7.5.2. Field Encodings
7.5.2.1. C509ErrorOCSPResponse
If the OCSP server cannot process the OCSP query, it returns a
C509ErrorOCSPResponse. The ocspResponseType value MUST be 0, and
responseStatus has the following enumerated values, as in [RFC6960],
Section 4.2.1:
+=====+==================+
| int | responseStatus |
+=====+==================+
| - | successful |
+-----+------------------+
| 1 | malformedRequest |
+-----+------------------+
| 2 | internalError |
+-----+------------------+
| 3 | tryLater |
+-----+------------------+
| 5 | sigRequired |
+-----+------------------+
| 6 | unauthorized |
+-----+------------------+
Table 7:
responseStatus values
7.5.2.2. C509BasicOCSPResponse
The ocspResponseType field of C509BasicOCSPResponse is 1,
distinguishing it from C509ErrorOCSPResponse. It corresponds to
BasicOCSPResponse in [RFC6960].
TBSBasicOCSPResponse is the group of fields to be signed. The
signatureValue field is the only field outside the signed group.
Covering signatureAlgorithm and responderCerts within the signed
content prevents algorithm-substitution and certificate-chain
substitution attacks; this design goes beyond the protections offered
by the DER-encoded BasicOCSPResponse defined in [RFC6960].
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7.5.2.3. C509SimpleOCSPResponse
C509SimpleOCSPResponse is a compact signed response for a single-
certificate status query. It is the response counterpart to
C509SimpleOCSPRequest (see Section 7.4.2.6). Unlike
C509BasicOCSPResponse, which uses a two-level PerIssuerOCSPResponses
/ SingleCertResponse grouping to carry status for multiple
certificates across one or more issuers, C509SimpleOCSPResponse
flattens the structure into a single signed CBOR array for the common
case of a one-certificate response.
TBSSimpleOCSPResponse is the group of fields to be signed. The
signatureValue field is the only field outside the signed group.
Covering signatureAlgorithm, responderCertHash, and responderCerts
within the signed content prevents algorithm-substitution and
certificate-chain substitution attacks.
* The ocspResponseType field MUST be 2, which discriminates
C509SimpleOCSPResponse from C509ErrorOCSPResponse and
C509BasicOCSPResponse.
* The signatureAlgorithm field specifies the signature algorithm, as
defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], Section 3.1.3. It
is part of TBSSimpleOCSPResponse and is therefore covered by the
signature.
* The hashAlgorithm field specifies the hash algorithm used to
compute responderCertHash, issuerCertHash, and serialNumberHash.
The algorithm is encoded as specified in Section 7.2.
* The nonce field contains the request nonce, or MUST be null when
no nonce is present. If present, it MUST have the same value as
the nonce in the corresponding C509SimpleOCSPRequest.
* The responderCertHash field identifies the OCSP responder; see
Section 7.5.2.5.
* The issuerCertHash field identifies the issuer of the queried
certificate; see Section 7.4.2.2.
* The serialNumberHash field is the hash of the certificate serial
number of the target certificate, computed as in Section 7.3.
* The certStatus field encodes the revocation status; see
Section 7.5.2.11.
* The producedAt field is the time at which this response was
produced, encoded as described in Section 5.
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* The thisUpdate field is encoded as a non-positive integer (nint /
0) representing the number of seconds from producedAt at which the
indicated status is known to be correct. It MUST be 0 or
negative, since the status cannot be known at a time in the future
relative to the time the response was produced.
* The nextUpdate field is encoded as a uint63 representing the
number of seconds from producedAt until the next response update
is expected, or null if the update time is unknown.
* The extensions field contains response-level extensions; see
Section 7.5.2.13.
* The responderCerts field carries the certificate chain starting
with the responder certificate identified by responderCertHash;
see Section 7.5.2.6.
* The signatureValue field is the signature computed over the CBOR
Sequence of the TBSSimpleOCSPResponse group.
7.5.2.4. nonce
If present, this field MUST have the same value as the nonce in the
corresponding request.
7.5.2.5. responderCertHash
responderCertHash is a truncated hash over the responder's
certificate, computed using the same hashAlgorithm as issuerCertHash.
In X.509 OCSP ([RFC6960]), the responder is identified by a
ResponderID CHOICE that carries either a distinguished name or a
public-key hash. C509 OCSP replaces this with a single hash over the
entire responder certificate, which is consistent with the
issuerCertHash design for issuer identification.
7.5.2.6. responderCerts
When present, the responderCerts field carries the certificate chain
starting with the responder certificate identified by
responderCertHash. When the responder holds a C509 certificate
chain, the value is COSE_C509. When the responder holds an X.509
certificate chain, the value is #6.121(COSE_X509), wrapping a
COSE_X509 chain with CBOR tag 121 (alternative 0). The field is part
of TBSBasicOCSPResponse or TBSSimpleOCSPResponse and is therefore
covered by the signature, which prevents certificate-chain
substitution attacks.
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7.5.2.7. signatureAlgorithm and signatureValue
* signatureAlgorithm: the signature algorithm used to compute
signatureValue, as defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert],
Section 3.1.3. It is part of the TBSBasicOCSPResponse or
TBSSimpleOCSPResponse group and is therefore covered by the
signature.
* signatureValue: the signature computed over the CBOR Sequence of
the TBSBasicOCSPResponse or TBSSimpleOCSPResponse group.
7.5.2.8. producedAt, thisUpdate, nextUpdate
The producedAt field is encoded as described in Section 5. The
thisUpdate field is encoded as a non-positive integer (nint / 0)
representing the number of seconds from producedAt at which the
indicated status is known to be correct; it MUST be 0 or negative,
since the status cannot be known at a time in the future relative to
when the response was produced. The nextUpdate field is encoded as a
uint63 representing the number of seconds from producedAt until the
next update is expected to be available. nextUpdate may be null,
which indicates an unknown update time.
7.5.2.9. extensions
See Section 7.5.2.13.
7.5.2.10. PerIssuerOCSPResponses and PerIssuerOCSPResponse
PerIssuerOCSPResponses is a list of PerIssuerOCSPResponse entries.
For the same reason as on the request side (see Section 7.4.2.3), the
issuerCertHash field is encoded once per issuer and shared across all
SingleCertResponse entries in the singleResponses list, avoiding the
per-entry repetition that would occur if the issuer identity were
embedded in every individual response entry. PerIssuerOCSPResponse
groups single responses for certificates issued by the same issuer;
the issuer is identified by issuerCertHash (see Section 7.4.2.2). As
on the request side, PerIssuerOCSPResponse and SingleCertResponse are
CDDL groups whose fields are inlined in the enclosing array.
* The extensions field contains per-issuer extensions that apply to
all single-certificate responses in this PerIssuerOCSPResponse
entry; see Section 7.5.2.12.
* The singleResponses field contains one SingleCertResponse for each
queried certificate issued by that issuer.
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7.5.2.11. SingleCertResponse
7.5.2.11.1. serialNumberHash
This field contains the truncated hash of the serial number of the
certificate being queried, computed as in Section 7.3.
7.5.2.11.2. extensions
See Section 7.5.2.13.
7.5.2.11.3. certStatus
CertStatus is encoded either as an integer (for good, not-issued, and
unknown) or as a RevokedInfo array:
* 0: good -- the certificate is not revoked.
* 1: not-issued -- the issuer is recognized but the serial number is
unknown.
* 2: unknown -- the responder does not recognize the issuer
identified by issuerCertHash.
* RevokedInfo: revoked -- an array carrying revocationTime and
revocationReason. The revocationReason field is encoded as
specified in Section 6.3.8. When the revocation reason is not
known, revocationReason MUST be set to 0 (unspecified).
The integer values are chosen to align with the ASN.1 IMPLICIT tag
numbers of CertStatus in [RFC6960]: good uses ASN.1 tag 0 and unknown
uses ASN.1 tag 2. The ASN.1 revoked alternative uses ASN.1 tag 1;
since C509 represents the revoked status as the explicit RevokedInfo
array, the integer value 1 becomes available. It is assigned to the
not-issued status, which was introduced in [RFC6960], Section 4.4.8
to distinguish unrecognized serial numbers from unrecognized issuers,
thereby maintaining a contiguous integer range for the non-revoked
statuses.
7.5.2.12. Per-Issuer OCSP Extensions
PerIssuerOCSPRequest.extensions and PerIssuerOCSPResponse.extensions
carry per-issuer extensions.
Table 8 lists the per-issuer extensions defined in this document.
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+================+===========+============+==========+
| Code | Extension | Applied in | Comments |
+================+===========+============+==========+
| (none defined) | | | |
+----------------+-----------+------------+----------+
Table 8: Per-issuer OCSP extensions
7.5.2.13. OCSP Extensions
Table 9 describes the OCSP extensions defined in [RFC6960] and
[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp] and their mapping in this document.
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+====+==========+=================================+==========+============+
|Code|Extension |RFC Reference |Applied in|Replaced in |
| | | | |this |
| | | | |document |
+====+==========+=================================+==========+============+
| - |nonce |[RFC6960], Section 4.4.1 |Request |field nonce |
| | | |Extension,| |
| | | |Response | |
| | | |Extension | |
+----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
| - |CRL |[RFC6960], Section 4.4.2 |Single |- |
| |References| |Response | |
| | | |Extension | |
+----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
|TBD2|Acceptable|[RFC6960], Section 4.4.3 |Request |- |
| |Response | |Extension | |
| |Types | | | |
+----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
| - |Archive |[RFC6960], Section 4.4.4 |Response |- |
| |Cutoff | |Extension | |
+----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
| - |Service |[RFC6960], Section 4.4.5 |Request |- |
| |Locator | |Extension | |
+----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
|TBD3|Preferred |[RFC6960], Section 4.4.7 |Request |- |
| |Signature | |Extension | |
| |Algorithms| | | |
+----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
| - |Extended |[RFC6960], Section 4.4.8 |Response |cert status |
| |Revoked | |Extension |not-issued |
| |Definition| | |(for serial |
| | | | |numbers not |
| | | | |issued by a |
| | | | |recognized |
| | | | |issuer) and |
| | | | |unknown (for|
| | | | |unrecognized|
| | | | |issuers) |
+----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
|TBD6|TN Query |[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp]|Single |- |
| | | |Request | |
| | | |Extension | |
+----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
Table 9: OCSP extensions and their mapping
This document defines the following extension values:
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* Acceptable Response Types: The extension value MUST be encoded as
follows.
AcceptableResponseTypes = [ + int]
The integers in AcceptableResponseTypes form a sorted list of
preferred C509OCSPResponse types, in descending order of preference,
that the requestor is willing to accept. This document defines types
0 (C509ErrorOCSPResponse), 1 (C509BasicOCSPResponse), and 2
(C509SimpleOCSPResponse). Type 0 (C509ErrorOCSPResponse) is always
implicitly supported and does not need to be listed. When this
extension is absent, an OCSP server responding to a
C509UnsignedOCSPRequest or C509SignedOCSPRequest MUST reply with a
C509BasicOCSPResponse (type 1); an OCSP server responding to a
C509SimpleOCSPRequest MUST reply with a C509SimpleOCSPResponse (type
2). If AcceptableResponseTypes contains type 2 but not type 1, and
the corresponding request contains entries for two or more
certificates, the server SHALL return a C509ErrorOCSPResponse with
responseStatus set to malformedRequest (1), since
C509SimpleOCSPResponse can only carry status for a single
certificate.
* Preferred Signature Algorithms: The extension value MUST be
encoded as follows.
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm = (
sigIdentifier : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
pubKeyAlgIdentifiers : [ 2* IntAlgorithmIdentifier ]
/ IntAlgorithmIdentifier
/ null,
)
PreferredSignatureAlgorithms = [ + PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ]
The sigIdentifier field carries the signature algorithm identifier.
The pubKeyAlgIdentifiers field carries the public key algorithm
identifier and MUST be one of:
* a CBOR array of two or more IntAlgorithmIdentifier values, sorted
in descending order of preference, when the requestor is willing
to accept any of the listed public key algorithms as a match for
this signature algorithm preference (e.g., to express hybrid or
multi-algorithm key policies); the first entry in the array
represents the most preferred public key algorithm,
* a single IntAlgorithmIdentifier value, when exactly one public key
algorithm is acceptable, or
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* null, when the public key algorithm is unconstrained or implied by
sigIdentifier.
PreferredSignatureAlgorithms MUST be sorted in descending order of
preference; the first entry represents the most preferred algorithm
combination. Since PreferredSignatureAlgorithm is a CDDL group, the
fields of each entry are inlined in the array rather than wrapped in
a nested array.
* TN Query: The extension value MUST be encoded as follows.
TNQuery = text .size (1..15)
The TNQuery extension carries a telephone number string conforming to
the TelephoneNumber ASN.1 type ([RFC8226], Section 3). When included
in single request extensions, it specifies the telephone number for
which the OCSP query is being performed (typically the number from
the "orig" field of a PASSporT being validated).
This extension is allowed only in the single-request extensions per
[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp].
7.5.3. PEM Representation
The CBOR-encoded C509 OCSP response is first Base64-encoded and then
wrapped between "-----BEGIN C509 OCSP RESPONSE-----" and "-----END
C509 OCSP RESPONSE-----", following the framework of [RFC7468].
-----BEGIN C509 OCSP RESPONSE-----
(base64-encoded CBOR C509 OCSP Response)
-----END C509 OCSP RESPONSE-----
Figure 6: C509 OCSP Response PEM Encoding
7.6. Certificate Type Interoperability
C509 OCSP uses a single set of request and response structures that
handles both C509 and X.509 certificates without modification. All
participants (requestor, responder, issuer) are identified by a hash
over their certificate rather than by type-specific fields such as a
Subject distinguished name, SubjectKeyIdentifier, or the X.509
ResponderID CHOICE (byName or byKey). Because a hash applies
uniformly regardless of the certificate encoding, the same OCSP
structures accommodate C509 certificates (CBOR-encoded), X.509
certificates (DER-encoded), and any future certificate types.
The only per-type differences are in how identity hashes are computed
and how certificate chains are carried:
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+===================+======================+=====================+
| Field | C509 certificate | X.509 certificate |
+===================+======================+=====================+
| issuerCertHash | Hash of CBOR-encoded | Hash of DER-encoded |
| | C509Certificate | X.509 certificate |
+-------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
| requestorCertHash | Hash of CBOR-encoded | Hash of DER-encoded |
| | C509Certificate | X.509 certificate |
+-------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
| responderCertHash | Hash of CBOR-encoded | Hash of DER-encoded |
| | C509Certificate | X.509 certificate |
+-------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
| requestorCerts / | COSE_C509 | #6.121(COSE_X509) |
| responderCerts | | |
+-------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
Table 10: Per-type differences in C509 OCSP identity fields
In this table, "C509 certificate" refers to a natively signed C509
certificate (c509CertificateType = 2). A CBOR re-encoded X.509
certificate (c509CertificateType = 3) is treated as an X.509
certificate: its identity hash MUST be computed over the DER-encoded
X.509 certificate.
In a hybrid deployment where the responder holds an X.509
certificate, responderCertHash contains the hash of the DER-encoded
X.509 certificate and responderCerts carries a #6.121(COSE_X509)
chain. In a deployment using C509 certificates throughout, all
identity hashes are computed over CBOR-encoded certificates and
certificate chains are carried as COSE_C509. The hashAlgorithm field
at the top level of each request or response structure governs all
hashes within that structure.
7.7. OCSP Stapling in TLS
In standard TLS certificate status stapling (see the status_request
extension, [RFC9846]), the stapled OCSP response is a DER-encoded
OCSPResponse. To allow C509 OCSP stapling, this document defines a
new TLS CertificateStatusType value (see [RFC6066], Section 8):
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+=======+===========+===============+
| Value | Name | Reference |
+=======+===========+===============+
| TBD1 | c509_ocsp | This document |
+-------+-----------+---------------+
Table 11: TLS
CertificateStatusType for C509
OCSP
When CertificateStatusType is c509_ocsp, the status field contains a
CBOR-encoded C509OCSPResponse instead of a DER-encoded OCSPResponse.
8. Implementation Status
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication.
When deleting this section, please also delete RFC 7942 from the
references of this document.
(Boilerplate as per Section 2.1 of [RFC7942]:)
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist.
According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".
8.1. Implementation #1
* Organization: RISE AB
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* Implementation: c509rev, available in the c509rev directory of the
GitHub repository of this document (https://github.com/lijun-nio/
idc509rev)
* Description: A reference implementation of the C509 CRL and C509
OCSP structures specified in this document, written in Rust.
* Implementation's level of maturity: Prototype. Intended for
testing and reference purposes, not for production use.
* Coverage:
- C509 CRL, including the compact revokedCertsList encoding with
fixed-length revoked-certificate and removed-from-CRL entries.
- C509 OCSP requests of all defined types (simple, unsigned, and
signed). The signed-request variants carrying the requestor's
certificate or certificate chain are supported only as an
opaque pass-through.
- C509 OCSP responses of all defined types (error, basic, and
simple).
- The hash algorithms SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512, including
truncated identity hashes.
- Time encoding, including the delta encodings used in OCSP.
- Signing and signature verification with Ed25519 and ECDSA with
secp256r1 and SHA-256.
- PEM textual representation of C509 CRLs and C509 OCSP messages,
as specified in this document.
- Names are supported only in the single common-name text form.
* Version compatibility: draft-liao-cose-c509-revocation-00
* Interoperability: The encoder output matches the examples in this
document byte for byte (for signed objects, the to-be-signed
part), and all examples successfully round-trip through decoding
and re-encoding. No interoperability testing with independent
implementations has been performed yet.
* Licensing: See the repository of this document.
* Contact: Joel Höglund (joel.hoglund@ri.se)
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8.2. Implementation #2
* Organization: NIO Inc.
* Implementation: Internal project, not publicly available
* Description: An implementation of the C509 CRL and C509 OCSP
structures specified in this document, written in Java.
* Implementation's level of maturity: Prototype.
* Coverage: All structures and features specified in this document.
* Version compatibility: draft-liao-cose-c509-revocation-00
* Interoperability: This implementation was used to produce the
examples in the appendices of this document.
* Licensing: Internal use only.
* Contact: Lijun Liao (lijun.liao@nio.io)
9. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [RFC5280], [RFC6960],
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], and [RFC8949], Section 10 apply.
This section covers the considerations specific to this document.
9.1. Signature Verification
The signatures of C509 CRLs and of signed C509 OCSP messages cover
all fields except signatureValue, including signatureAlgorithm and
requestorCerts or responderCerts. This prevents algorithm and
certificate-chain substitution, but does not replace the validation
of [RFC5280] and [RFC6960]: the verifier MUST check that
signatureAlgorithm matches the signer's public key, MUST validate the
signer's certificate chain (a transported chain is only a hint for
path construction), and MUST verify that the signer is authorized, as
specified in [RFC6960], Section 4.2.2.2 for OCSP responses and in
[RFC5280], Section 6.3 for CRLs. The signature SHOULD be verified
over the bytes as received rather than over a re-encoding.
C509ErrorOCSPResponse and C509CRLInfo (Section 6.3.1) are not signed.
An error response MUST NOT be interpreted as status information about
any certificate. A C509CRLInfo MUST NOT be used for revocation or
freshness decisions unless it was obtained over a channel that
authenticates the CRL issuer.
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9.2. Truncated Hash Identifiers
HashId8 (Section 7.3) only selects a certificate and does not
authenticate it; security relies on the signature verification in
Section 9.1. A relying party MUST match a response to its request
using hash values it has computed itself from the certificates it
holds. A receiver that finds several certificates matching a HashId8
MUST NOT assume that a particular one is intended. An OCSP responder
for which an issuerCertHash matches more than one of its issuers, or
a serialNumberHash matches more than one serial number, MUST NOT
return the status good for that entry.
Since serial numbers are chosen by the CA, an attacker cannot mount a
collision attack on serialNumberHash; making the status of one
certificate appear as that of another requires a second preimage of
about 2^160 operations. The serial number MUST be normalized as
specified in Section 7.3 before hashing; otherwise, a revoked
certificate is not found.
9.3. Privacy
serialNumberHash hides the queried certificate only from observers
that do not know its serial number. Serial numbers are not secret,
and the hash is unsalted, so an observer with a set of candidate
serial numbers can identify the queried certificate and link repeated
queries; issuerCertHash reveals the issuer. Where this matters,
requests and responses SHOULD be protected, e.g., by DTLS or OSCORE,
or OCSP stapling (Section 7.7) SHOULD be used.
9.4. Freshness and Replay
A relying party MUST check the validity interval of an OCSP response
([RFC6960], Section 4.2.2.1) and, if it sent a nonce, that the
response carries the same nonce. Without a nonce, a response can be
replayed until it expires; relying parties without a reliable clock
SHOULD use nonces.
The nonce is 16 to 32 bytes long (Section 7.4.2.4), whereas [RFC8954]
requires new clients to use 32 octets in the Nonce extension of
[RFC6960]. A replay succeeds only if the attacker has obtained, from
the OCSP responder, a response for the nonce that the relying party
later chooses. With N such responses and M requests, the probability
is about N * M / 2^128 for a 16-byte nonce, i.e., about 2^-48 even
for N = M = 2^40, and the attack can be neither performed offline nor
accelerated by a quantum computer. A 32-byte nonce adds no practical
security but 16 bytes to each request and response, which is
significant on constrained links.
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A relying party MUST NOT use a CRL after thisUpdate + nextUpdate,
SHOULD reject a CRL whose crlNumber is lower than that of a CRL
previously accepted for the same scope, and MUST combine a delta CRL
only with a full CRL whose crlNumber is at least baseCrlNumber
([RFC5280], Section 5.2.4).
9.5. Completeness of CRLs
* Certificates whose serial number is not a positive integer of at
most 20 bytes, as required by [RFC5280], Section 4.1.2.2, are not
supported by this document; C509 CRLs cannot list some of them,
and relying parties MUST reject them.
* When dateLength is 0, no revocation date is available, and a
listed certificate MUST be treated as revoked at all times.
* When bit 1 of flags is not set, no reason code is available, and
the reason MUST be treated as unspecified.
* The issuer MUST be compared in the representation that matches the
certificate type (Name or tag 121 with a DER-encoded name).
Implementations MUST reject a CRL in which the length of revokedCerts
or removedFromCRLCerts is not a multiple of the entry length. An
implementation that uses binary search based on bit 0 of flags MUST
verify that the entries are sorted, since otherwise a revoked
certificate can be missed.
9.6. Parsing and Denial of Service
Messages are parsed before their signature is verified, and unsigned
requests are never authenticated. Implementations MUST reject input
that does not conform to the CDDL, SHOULD limit message sizes and the
number of entries, and MUST reject input for which computing an
absolute time from a base time and an offset overflows.
Answering a request may require a signature, and responses are larger
than requests, which exposes OCSP responders to resource exhaustion
and to abuse for traffic amplification over UDP ([RFC7252],
Section 11.3). OCSP responders SHOULD rate-limit requests and MAY
require signed requests.
A stapled C509OCSPResponse (Section 7.7) MUST be validated as if
obtained directly from the OCSP responder.
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10. IANA Considerations
This document has the following actions for IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[RFC-XXXX]"
with the RFC number of this specification and delete this paragraph.
10.1. C509 CRL Types Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "C509 CRL Types"
under the registry group "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509)". The fields of
the registry are Value, Description, and Reference, where Value is an
integer in the interval [-32768, 32767], and the other columns are
text strings. It is mandatory to specify content in all columns.
For values in the interval [-24, 23], the registration procedure is
"IETF Review with Expert Review", and for all other values, the
registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of
the registry are:
+-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+=======+===============================+===================+
| 0 | C509CRL | [[this document]] |
+-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
Figure 7: C509 CRL Types
10.2. C509 OCSP Request Types Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "C509 OCSP Request
Types" under the registry group "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509)". The
fields of the registry are Value, Description, and Reference, where
Value is an integer in the interval [-32768, 32767], and the other
columns are text strings. It is mandatory to specify content in all
columns. For values in the interval [-24, 23], the registration
procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review", and for all other
values, the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial
contents of the registry are:
+-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+=======+===============================+===================+
| 0 | C509 Unsigned OCSP Request | [[this document]] |
+-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
| 1 | C509 Signed OCSP Request | [[this document]] |
+-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
| 2 | C509 Simple OCSP Request | [[this document]] |
+-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
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Figure 8: C509 OCSP Request Types
10.3. C509 OCSP Response Types Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "C509 OCSP Response
Types" under the registry group "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509)". The
fields of the registry are Value, Description, and Reference, where
Value is an integer in the interval [-32768, 32767], and the other
columns are text strings. It is mandatory to specify content in all
columns. For values in the interval [-24, 23], the registration
procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review", and for all other
values, the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial
contents of the registry are:
+-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+=======+===============================+===================+
| 0 | C509 Error OCSP Response | [[this document]] |
+-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
| 1 | C509 Basic OCSP Response | [[this document]] |
+-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
| 2 | C509 Simple OCSP Response | [[this document]] |
+-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
Figure 9: C509 OCSP Response Types
10.4. Extension Identifiers Registry
IANA is requested to assign the new values shown in Figure 10 in the
"C509 Extensions" registry under the new registry group "CBOR Encoded
X.509 (C509)" defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert].
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+-------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Value | Extension |
+=======+==========================================================+
| TBD2 | Name: Acceptable Response Types |
| | Identifiers: id-pkix-ocsp-response |
| | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.4 |
| | DER: 06 09 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 04 |
| | Comments: RFC 6960 |
| | extensionValue: AcceptableResponseTypes |
| | Reference: [[this document]] |
+-------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| TBD3 | Name: Preferred Signature Algorithms |
| | Identifiers: id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs |
| | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.8 |
| | DER: 06 09 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 08 |
| | Comments: RFC 6960 |
| | extensionValue: PreferredSignatureAlgorithms |
| | Reference: [[this document]] |
+-------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| TBD4 | Name: Expired Certificates on CRL |
| | Identifiers: id-ce-expiredCertsOnCRL |
| | OID: 2.5.29.60 |
| | DER: 06 03 55 1D 3C |
| | Comments: ITU-T X.509, Section 9.5.2.8 |
| | extensionValue: ExpiredCertsOnCRL |
| | Reference: [[this document]] |
+-------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| TBD6 | Name: TN Query |
| | Identifiers: id-pkix-ocsp-stir-tn |
| | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.10 |
| | DER: 06 09 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 0A |
| | Comments: draft-ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp |
| | extensionValue: TNQuery |
| | Reference: [[this document]] |
+-------+----------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 10: C509 extension identifier allocation requests
10.5. TLS CertificateStatusType Registry
IANA is requested to assign the value shown in Table 12 in the "TLS
Certificate Status Types" registry under "Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Extensions":
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+=======+=============+============+=========+
| Value | Description | Reference | Comment |
+=======+=============+============+=========+
| TBD1 | c509_ocsp | [RFC-XXXX] | N/A |
+-------+-------------+------------+---------+
Table 12: TLS CertificateStatusType
allocation request
10.6. PEM Label Registry
IANA is requested to register the following entries in the "Textual
Encoding Label" registry under the registry group "PKIX Parameters"
[RFC7468]:
+====================+============+
| Label | Reference |
+====================+============+
| C509 CRL | [RFC-XXXX] |
+--------------------+------------+
| C509 OCSP REQUEST | [RFC-XXXX] |
+--------------------+------------+
| C509 OCSP RESPONSE | [RFC-XXXX] |
+--------------------+------------+
Table 13: PEM Label Registrations
10.7. Media Type Application Registry
IANA is requested to assign the following entries in the
"application" registry in the registry group "Media Types" with this
document as reference.
10.7.1. Media Type application/c509-crl+cbor
When the application/c509-crl+cbor media type is used, the data is a
C509CRL structure. A stored file format is defined with "magic
number" TBD11 using the reserved CBOR tag 55799 and the Content-
Format TBD7, enveloped as described in [RFC9277], Section 2.2.
Subtype name: c509-crl+cbor
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
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Security considerations: See Section 9 of [RFC-XXXX].
Interoperability considerations: N/A
Published specification: [RFC-XXXX]
Applications that use this media type: Any MIME-compliant transport
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information:
* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
* Magic number(s): TBD11
* File extension(s): .c509
* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information:
iesg@ietf.org
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: N/A
Author: COSE WG
Change controller: IETF
10.7.2. Media Type application/c509-crlinfo+cbor
When the application/c509-crlinfo+cbor media type is used, the data
is a C509CRLInfo structure. A stored file format is defined with
"magic number" TBD12 using the reserved CBOR tag 55799 and the
Content-Format TBD8, enveloped as described in [RFC9277],
Section 2.2.
Subtype name: c509-crlinfo+cbor
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: See Section 9 of [RFC-XXXX].
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Interoperability considerations: N/A
Published specification: [RFC-XXXX]
Applications that use this media type: Any MIME-compliant transport
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information:
* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
* Magic number(s): TBD12
* File extension(s): .c509
* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information:
iesg@ietf.org
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: N/A
Author: COSE WG
Change controller: IETF
10.7.3. Media Type application/c509-ocspreq+cbor
When the application/c509-ocspreq+cbor media type is used, the data
is a C509OCSPRequest structure. A stored file format is defined with
"magic number" TBD13 using the reserved CBOR tag 55799 and the
Content-Format TBD9, enveloped as described in [RFC9277],
Section 2.2.
Subtype name: c509-ocspreq+cbor
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: See Section 9 of [RFC-XXXX].
Interoperability considerations: N/A
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Published specification: [RFC-XXXX]
Applications that use this media type: OCSP clients
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information:
* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
* Magic number(s): TBD13
* File extension(s): .c509
* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information:
iesg@ietf.org
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: N/A
Author: COSE WG
Change controller: IETF
10.7.4. Media Type application/c509-ocspresp+cbor
When the application/c509-ocspresp+cbor media type is used, the data
is a C509OCSPResponse structure. A stored file format is defined
with "magic number" TBD14 using the reserved CBOR tag 55799 and the
Content-Format TBD10, enveloped as described in [RFC9277],
Section 2.2.
Subtype name: c509-ocspresp+cbor
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: See Section 9 of [RFC-XXXX].
Interoperability considerations: N/A
Published specification: [RFC-XXXX]
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Applications that use this media type: OCSP servers
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information:
* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
* Magic number(s): TBD14
* File extension(s): .c509
* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information:
iesg@ietf.org
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: N/A
Author: COSE WG
Change controller: IETF
10.8. CoAP Content-Formats Registry
IANA is requested to add entries for "application/c509-crl+cbor",
"application/c509-crlinfo+cbor", "application/c509-ocspreq+cbor" and
"application/c509-ocspresp+cbor" to the "CoAP Content-Formats"
registry in the registry group "Constrained RESTful Environments
(CoRE) Parameters".
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+-------------------------+---------+-------+------------+
| Content | Content | ID | Reference |
| Type | Coding | | |
+=========================+=========+=======+============+
| application/ | - | TBD7 | [[this |
| c509-crl+cbor | | | document]] |
+-------------------------+---------+-------+------------+
| application/ | | TBD8 | [[this |
| c509-crlinfo+cbor | - | | document]] |
+-------------------------+---------+-------+------------+
| application/ | - | TBD9 | [[this |
| c509-ocspreq+cbor | | | document]] |
+-------------------------+---------+-------+------------+
| application/ | - | TBD10 | [[this |
| c509-ocspresp+cbor | | | document]] |
+-------------------------+---------+-------+------------+
10.9. Expert Review Guidelines
TODO
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]
Mattsson, J. P., Selander, G., Raza, S., Höglund, J.,
Furuhed, M., and L. Liao, "CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates
(C509 Certificates)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-21, 24 September 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
cbor-encoded-cert-21>.
[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp]
Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "OCSP Usage for Secure
Telephone Identity Certificates", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp-14, 10
June 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp-14>.
[IANA.cose]
IANA, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
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[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6066>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960>.
[RFC7120] Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code
Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, DOI 10.17487/RFC7120, January
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7120>.
[RFC7468] Josefsson, S. and S. Leonard, "Textual Encodings of PKIX,
PKCS, and CMS Structures", RFC 7468, DOI 10.17487/RFC7468,
April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7468>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8226] Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8226>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>.
[RFC8742] Bormann, C., "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)
Sequences", RFC 8742, DOI 10.17487/RFC8742, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8742>.
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[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8949>.
[RFC9054] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Hash Algorithms", RFC 9054, DOI 10.17487/RFC9054, August
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9054>.
[RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9147>.
[RFC9277] Richardson, M. and C. Bormann, "On Stable Storage for
Items in Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)",
RFC 9277, DOI 10.17487/RFC9277, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9277>.
[RFC9360] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Header Parameters for Carrying and Referencing X.509
Certificates", RFC 9360, DOI 10.17487/RFC9360, February
2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9360>.
[RFC9682] Bormann, C., "Updates to the Concise Data Definition
Language (CDDL) Grammar", RFC 9682, DOI 10.17487/RFC9682,
November 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9682>.
[RFC9846] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, July 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9846>.
11.2. Informative References
[CborMe] Bormann, C., "CBOR Playground", May 2018,
<https://cbor.me/>.
[CRLite] "mozilla/crlite", n.d.,
<https://github.com/mozilla/crlite>.
[CRLSets] "CRLSets - The Chromium Projects", n.d.,
<https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/
crlsets/>.
[POSIX] "IEEE Standard for Information Technology--Portable
Operating System Interface (POSIX(TM)) Base
Specifications, Issue 7", January 2018,
<https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/>.
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[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3280, May 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3280>.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7228>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7252>.
[RFC7925] Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7925>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.
[RFC8954] Sahni, M., Ed., "Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
Nonce Extension", RFC 8954, DOI 10.17487/RFC8954, November
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8954>.
[RFC9861] Viguier, B., Wong, D., Ed., Van Assche, G., Ed., Dang, Q.,
Ed., and J. Daemen, Ed., "KangarooTwelve and TurboSHAKE",
RFC 9861, DOI 10.17487/RFC9861, October 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9861>.
[TinyOCSP] Höglund, J., Furuhed, M., and S. Raza, "Lightweight
certificate revocation for low-power IoT with end-to-end
security", Journal of Information Security and
Applications 73:103424, DOI 10.1016/j.jisa.2023.103424,
2023, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2023.103424>.
[X.690] "ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding
Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", n.d.,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690>.
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Appendix A. Examples
A.1. Overview
+==========+==================+============+============+===========+
| Section | Description | size(X509) | size(C509) | Size |
| | | | | Reduction |
+==========+==================+============+============+===========+
| Appendix | CRL Example | 147 | 120 | 18% |
| A.3.1 | Without Revoked | | | |
| | Certificates | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Appendix | CRL Example | 335 | 177 | 47% |
| A.3.2 | With Revoked | | | |
| | Certificates | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Appendix | Delta CRL | 335 | 160 | 52% |
| A.3.3 | Example With | | | |
| | Revoked | | | |
| | Certificates | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Appendix | Indirect CRL | 409 | 202 | 51% |
| A.3.4 | Example With | | | |
| | Revoked | | | |
| | Certificates | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Appendix | Simple OCSP | 150 | 51 | 66% |
| A.4.1 | Request Example | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Appendix | Unsigned OCSP | 475 | 132 | 72% |
| A.4.2 | Request Example | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Appendix | Signed OCSP | 584 | 209 | 64% |
| A.4.3 | Request Example | | | |
| | Without | | | |
| | Requestor's | | | |
| | Certificate | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Appendix | Signed OCSP | 1035 | 420 | 59% |
| A.4.4 | Request Example | | | |
| | With | | | |
| | Requestor's | | | |
| | Certificate | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Appendix | Signed OCSP | 1371 | 625 | 54% |
| A.4.5 | Request Example | | | |
| | With | | | |
| | Requestor's | | | |
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| | Certificate | | | |
| | Chain | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Appendix | Error OCSP | 5 | 3 | 40% |
| A.5.1 | Response | | | |
| | Example | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Appendix | Simple OCSP | 336 | 140 | 58% |
| A.5.2 | Response | | | |
| | Example | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Appendix | Basic OCSP | 837 | 248 | 70% |
| A.5.3 | Response | | | |
| | Example Without | | | |
| | Responder's | | | |
| | Certificate | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Appendix | Basic OCSP | 1181 | 446 | 62% |
| A.5.4 | Response | | | |
| | Example With | | | |
| | Responder's | | | |
| | Certificate | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Appendix | Basic OCSP | 1517 | 651 | 57% |
| A.5.5 | Response | | | |
| | Example With | | | |
| | Responder's | | | |
| | Certificate | | | |
| | Chain | | | |
+----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
Table 14: Size comparison in examples
A.2. Helper Keys and Certificates
A.2.1. CA Private Key and Certificate
A.2.1.1. CA Private Key
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEIDP+AdMbqXudBAN3YNAwoR0i3nl4IuoSSA6Hazy2oAKc
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
A.2.1.2. CA Certificate
A.2.1.2.1. Plain Hex
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8B0241010C73746573742063726C6F6373702D726F6F7463611A677485801A6B36EC
7F6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63610C58205EF8A355A001A7C50D2349470120
8131A4BB2AB920D40BFB0EE1F6AB28FF74008801542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C390
05D492450E1056211860230107542DA3A403F7D2F4E0B3D8031A73BA8A839F557F0F
5840E50465D60C02A2111EF3FC6E44F2A36008765B552351F9A3F5B2AA7C76F1F05D
259847A4F4250B2E4B0AE2099762A2596D3CC1DB2CCD180AA0A2D0E191310B0F
A.2.1.2.2. Textual Representation
Certificate
TBSCertificate
Certificate Type: 2
Serial Number
01
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Issuer : CN=test crlocsp-rootca
Subject: CN=test crlocsp-ca
Validity
Not Before: 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z
Not After : 2026-12-31T23:59:59Z
Subject Public Key Info:
algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Raw public key
5e:f8:a3:55:a0:01:a7:c5:0d:23:49:47:01:20:81:31:
a4:bb:2a:b9:20:d4:0b:fb:0e:e1:f6:ab:28:ff:74:00
Extensions
SubjectKeyIdentifier (1)
2f:45:e7:8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:
45:0e:10:56
KeyUsage (2), critical
0x60: [keyCertSign, cRLSign]
BasicConstraints (4), critical
CA: true, pathLenConstraint: 1
AuthorityKeyIdentifier (7)
Key Identifier
2d:a3:a4:03:f7:d2:f4:e0:b3:d8:03:1a:73:ba:8a:83:
9f:55:7f:0f
Signature Value
e5:04:65:d6:0c:02:a2:11:1e:f3:fc:6e:44:f2:a3:60:
08:76:5b:55:23:51:f9:a3:f5:b2:aa:7c:76:f1:f0:5d:
25:98:47:a4:f4:25:0b:2e:4b:0a:e2:09:97:62:a2:59:
6d:3c:c1:db:2c:cd:18:0a:a0:a2:d0:e1:91:31:0b:0f
A.2.2. CRL Signer Private Key and Certificate
A.2.2.1. CRL Signer Private Key
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-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEIOJ3HnsrBJ5g5Pb5oy7qlvijr3Wfx3ywAUvnmRV4354s
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
A.2.2.2. CRL Signer Certificate
A.2.2.2.1. Plain Hex
8B024212340C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A69570A806A63
726C2D7369676E65720C5820C9BA1EC496DACB97AED087ADE390F398FBD477871EE9
203817EC0E31902789FF86015409E433582556550A27DB4A19BCE2D660884722B621
184007542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E10565840D46E6A8F9FD53417
F36DFE56CBB8CACE0FC3E59ACBE72CD9916B3E4C5022D06D16CC9BF9AC54394037C9
5433644194FAE18FF783381959584A21BDC0E1C6CB0B
A.2.2.2.2. Textual Representation
Certificate
TBSCertificate
Certificate Type: 2
Serial Number
12:34
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Issuer : CN=test crlocsp-ca
Subject: CN=crl-signer
Validity
Not Before: 2025-01-02T00:00:00Z
Not After : 2026-01-02T00:00:00Z
Subject Public Key Info:
algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Raw public key
c9:ba:1e:c4:96:da:cb:97:ae:d0:87:ad:e3:90:f3:98:
fb:d4:77:87:1e:e9:20:38:17:ec:0e:31:90:27:89:ff
Extensions
SubjectKeyIdentifier (1)
09:e4:33:58:25:56:55:0a:27:db:4a:19:bc:e2:d6:60:
88:47:22:b6
KeyUsage (2), critical
0x40: [cRLSign]
AuthorityKeyIdentifier (7)
Key Identifier
2f:45:e7:8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:
45:0e:10:56
Signature Value
d4:6e:6a:8f:9f:d5:34:17:f3:6d:fe:56:cb:b8:ca:ce:
0f:c3:e5:9a:cb:e7:2c:d9:91:6b:3e:4c:50:22:d0:6d:
16:cc:9b:f9:ac:54:39:40:37:c9:54:33:64:41:94:fa:
e1:8f:f7:83:38:19:59:58:4a:21:bd:c0:e1:c6:cb:0b
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A.2.3. OCSP Requestor Private Key and Certificate
A.2.3.1. OCSP Requestor Private Key
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEIDoXZF67Rh+ENmXzefN4vLk/o2fK5q/otI2G1xQYtThH
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
A.2.3.2. OCSP Requestor Certificate
A.2.3.2.1. Plain Hex
8B024212360C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A69570A806E6F
6373702D726571756573746F720C582004530B1764EDD4B4E33AB44AF0F838961C00
7176D74B6A3546ECB7FD57320DD3860154DD51BDB2A2C791C062D4027856DBACF526
07F0BE210107542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E10565840F8C6183ECF
8C3EFD50DD4942D172814C46EC0FC01DD586A597178DF864A0D9DA86B7CA17FC9F77
2FF04C80E98B60D5B4B62408A277A5B70D0D2A3F5ED5442D07
A.2.3.2.2. Textual Representation
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Certificate
TBSCertificate
Certificate Type: 2
Serial Number
12:36
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Issuer : CN=test crlocsp-ca
Subject: CN=ocsp-requestor
Validity
Not Before: 2025-01-02T00:00:00Z
Not After : 2026-01-02T00:00:00Z
Subject Public Key Info:
algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Raw public key
04:53:0b:17:64:ed:d4:b4:e3:3a:b4:4a:f0:f8:38:96:
1c:00:71:76:d7:4b:6a:35:46:ec:b7:fd:57:32:0d:d3
Extensions
SubjectKeyIdentifier (1)
dd:51:bd:b2:a2:c7:91:c0:62:d4:02:78:56:db:ac:f5:
26:07:f0:be
KeyUsage (2), critical
0x1: [digitalSignature]
AuthorityKeyIdentifier (7)
Key Identifier
2f:45:e7:8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:
45:0e:10:56
Signature Value
f8:c6:18:3e:cf:8c:3e:fd:50:dd:49:42:d1:72:81:4c:
46:ec:0f:c0:1d:d5:86:a5:97:17:8d:f8:64:a0:d9:da:
86:b7:ca:17:fc:9f:77:2f:f0:4c:80:e9:8b:60:d5:b4:
b6:24:08:a2:77:a5:b7:0d:0d:2a:3f:5e:d5:44:2d:07
A.2.4. OCSP Responder Private Key and Certificate
A.2.4.1. OCSP Responder Private Key
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEII5swSxWTjlZinUj+5kie//qjgBbzupdc0lmaHF9NkXl
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
A.2.4.2. OCSP Responder Certificate
A.2.4.2.1. Plain Hex
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8B024212350C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A69570A806E6F
6373702D726573706F6E6465720C582081947BBC248AAC79738211A8D75BF92CB777
D994073DF23AE06380EF2C573976880154B5B4CAF35401D06151DF9629DB579DC8CC
A453A8210107542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E105627095840A01B0C
BF3E34A4762D05404FD08A7AEC103035358314686D72B6159078C76E1D88597F3753
1886A3F52F256FD722192B289D6844014467F1F17F05ACBB7B660A
A.2.4.2.2. Textual Representation
Certificate
TBSCertificate
Certificate Type: 2
Serial Number
12:35
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Issuer : CN=test crlocsp-ca
Subject: CN=ocsp-responder
Validity
Not Before: 2025-01-02T00:00:00Z
Not After : 2026-01-02T00:00:00Z
Subject Public Key Info:
algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Raw public key
81:94:7b:bc:24:8a:ac:79:73:82:11:a8:d7:5b:f9:2c:
b7:77:d9:94:07:3d:f2:3a:e0:63:80:ef:2c:57:39:76
Extensions
SubjectKeyIdentifier (1)
b5:b4:ca:f3:54:01:d0:61:51:df:96:29:db:57:9d:c8:
cc:a4:53:a8
KeyUsage (2), critical
0x1: [digitalSignature]
AuthorityKeyIdentifier (7)
Key Identifier
2f:45:e7:8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:
45:0e:10:56
ExtendedKeyUsage (8), critical
OCSPSigning (9)
Signature Value
a0:1b:0c:bf:3e:34:a4:76:2d:05:40:4f:d0:8a:7a:ec:
10:30:35:35:83:14:68:6d:72:b6:15:90:78:c7:6e:1d:
88:59:7f:37:53:18:86:a3:f5:2f:25:6f:d7:22:19:2b:
28:9d:68:44:01:44:67:f1:f1:7f:05:ac:bb:7b:66:0a
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A.3. CRL Examples
A.3.1. CRL Example Without Revoked Certificates
* Size reduction: 18%
* Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.1.2
* Direct CRL
* Full CRL
* No revoked certificates
* Note that the X.509 CRL and the C509 CRL are not convertible.
A.3.1.1. X.509 CRL
PEM content (147 bytes):
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
MIGQMEQCAQEwBQYDK2VwMBoxGDAWBgNVBAMMD3Rlc3QgY3Jsb2NzcC1jYRcNMjUw
MTAyMDAwMDAwWhcNMjUwMTA5MDAwMDAwWjAFBgMrZXADQQBeSb215S+/7HT9HjQN
zeuuETZAjRIwCLxCIZatpkiov3ndsI7fjXcabny/kx9d5Ce39o3RcDG3QiDDdWOi
R5UK
-----END X509 CRL-----
A.3.1.2. C509 CRL
Plain Hex (120 bytes):
8B000C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D6361542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005
D492450E1056011A6775D7001A00093A80F680F6584013834F4E38AA9F0DC5B8D21C
8650C776A6D961C31C894C36A71A6433F5ED7D30E67F787F13C7E4C349B2848A181F
DBBCE361A14C220021C4A267367AD5F1D90D
Textual Representation
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C509CRL
TBSCertList
CRL Type: C509CRL (0)
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Authority Subject: CN=test crlocsp-ca
Authority Key Identifier:
2F:45:E7:8D:2C:AE:DF:36:8C:DF:53:C3:90:05:D4:92:
45:0E:10:56
CRL Number: 1
This Update: 2025-01-02T00:00:00Z
Next Update: 2025-01-09T00:00:00Z
Base CRL Number: <null>
Extensions: <empty>
revokedCertsList: <null>
Signature Value
13:83:4f:4e:38:aa:9f:0d:c5:b8:d2:1c:86:50:c7:76:
a6:d9:61:c3:1c:89:4c:36:a7:1a:64:33:f5:ed:7d:30:
e6:7f:78:7f:13:c7:e4:c3:49:b2:84:8a:18:1f:db:bc:
e3:61:a1:4c:22:00:21:c4:a2:67:36:7a:d5:f1:d9:0d
Annotated hex
0: 8B # C509CRL=array[11]
1: 00 # [0]. crlType=0
2: 0C # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
3: 6F # [2]. authoritySubject=char[15]
4: 746573742063726C6F6373702D6361 # "test crlocsp-ca"
19: 54 # [3]. authorityKeyIdentifier=byte[20]
20: 2F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E1056
40: 01 # [4]. crlNumber=1
41: 1A 6775D700 # [5]. thisUpdate=1735776000:
# 2025-01-02T00:00:00Z
46: 1A 00093A80 # [6]. nextUpdate=604800: 2025-01-09T00:00:00Z
51: F6 # [7]. baseCrlNumber=<null>
52: 80 # [8]. crlExtensions=array[0]
53: F6 # [9]. revokedCertsList: <null>
54: 58 40 # [10]. signature value=byte[64]
56: 13834F4E38AA9F0DC5B8D21C8650C776A6D961C31C894C36A71A6433F5
85: ED7D30E67F787F13C7E4C349B2848A181FDBBCE361A14C220021C4A267
114: 367AD5F1D90D
A.3.2. CRL Example With Revoked Certificates
* Size reduction: 47%
* Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.1.2
* Direct CRL
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* Full CRL
* With revoked certificates
* With Per-Issuer Extension ExpiredCertsOnCRL
* Note that the X.509 CRL and the C509 CRL are not convertible.
A.3.2.1. X.509 CRL
PEM content (335 bytes):
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
MIIBSzCB/gIBATAFBgMrZXAwGjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPdGVzdCBjcmxvY3NwLWNhFw0y
NTAxMDcwMDEyMzRaFw0yNTAxMTQwMDEyMzRaMIG3MCECAhEiFw0yNTAxMDYwMDEy
MzRaMAwwCgYDVR0VBAMKAQYwIQICEjQXDTI1MDEwMTAwMTIzNFowDDAKBgNVHRUE
AwoBATAhAgIzRBcNMjUwMTA0MDAxMjM0WjAMMAoGA1UdFQQDCgEGMCECAlVmFw0y
NTAxMDIwMDEyMzRaMAwwCgYDVR0VBAMKAQYwEwICVngXDTI1MDEwNTAwMTIzNFow
FAIDAJq8Fw0yNTAxMDMwMDEyMzRaMAUGAytlcANBAAK0jdEbZtlvJDmhKAJQTklZ
WqS7xaN9gHvLC/8lvmqsSdY8T/1YbdkVGCyKsWuDSBGVFtrM2DrBzSDarRKctwY=
-----END X509 CRL-----
A.3.2.2. C509 CRL
Plain Hex (177 bytes):
8B000C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D6361542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005
D492450E1056021A677C71721A00093A80F68085F6840302031A677488728218571A
677485805824112206978006123400000001334403F4800655660151800656780546
00009ABC02A30000F6584070BB7A38065FBCABFE615170F05A9A9FE83DC892D5F735
812B2A053AF4B300EB466BABB4F1A387CDCE90D8302C680B77AA61566423D7C235F7
BD31344CF7F405
Textual Representation
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C509CRL
TBSCertList
CRL Type: C509CRL (0)
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Authority Subject: CN=test crlocsp-ca
Authority Key Identifier:
2F:45:E7:8D:2C:AE:DF:36:8C:DF:53:C3:90:05:D4:92:
45:0E:10:56
CRL Number: 2
This Update: 2025-01-07T00:12:34Z
Next Update: 2025-01-14T00:12:34Z
Base CRL Number: <null>
Extensions: <empty>
revokedCertsList:
PerIssuerRevokedCerts[0]
Issuer: <null>
RevokedCertsControl
Flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
Serial number length: 2
Date length: 3
Base date: 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z
Extensions
ExpiredCertsOnCRL (87)
2025-01-01T00:00:00Z
RevokedCerts:
0x1122, 2025-01-06T00:12:34Z, certificateHold
0x1234, 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z, keyCompromise
0x3344, 2025-01-04T00:12:34Z, certificateHold
0x5566, 2025-01-02T00:12:34Z, certificateHold
0x5678, 2025-01-05T00:12:34Z, unspecified
0x9ABC, 2025-01-03T00:12:34Z, unspecified
RemovedFromCRLCerts: <null>
Signature Value
70:bb:7a:38:06:5f:bc:ab:fe:61:51:70:f0:5a:9a:9f:
e8:3d:c8:92:d5:f7:35:81:2b:2a:05:3a:f4:b3:00:eb:
46:6b:ab:b4:f1:a3:87:cd:ce:90:d8:30:2c:68:0b:77:
aa:61:56:64:23:d7:c2:35:f7:bd:31:34:4c:f7:f4:05
Annotated hex
0: 8B # C509CRL=array[11]
1: 00 # [0]. crlType=0
2: 0C # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
3: 6F # [2]. authoritySubject=char[15]
4: 746573742063726C6F6373702D6361 # "test crlocsp-ca"
19: 54 # [3]. authorityKeyIdentifier=byte[20]
20: 2F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E1056
40: 02 # [4]. crlNumber=2
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41: 1A 677C7172 # [5]. thisUpdate=1736208754:
# 2025-01-07T00:12:34Z
46: 1A 00093A80 # [6]. nextUpdate=604800: 2025-01-14T00:12:34Z
51: F6 # [7]. baseCrlNumber=<null>
52: 80 # [8]. crlExtensions=array[0]
53: 85 # [9]. revokedCertsList=array[5]
#---PerIssuerRevokedCerts[0]---
54: F6 # [0]. issuer=<null>
55: 84 # [1]. revokedCertsControl=array[4]
56: 03 # [0]. flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
57: 02 # [1]. serialNumberLength=2
58: 03 # [2]. dateLength=3
59: 1A 67748872 # [3]. baseDate=1735690354:
# 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z
64: 82 # [2]. extensions=array[2]
#---extension[0]---
65: 18 57 # [0]. type=ExpiredCertsOnCRL (87)
67: 1A 67748580 # [1]. value=1735689600:
# 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z
72: 58 24 # [3]. revokedCerts=byte[36], 6 entries
#---entries[0]---
74: 1122 # CSN=1122
76: 069780 # date=069780: 2025-01-06T00:12:34Z
79: 06 # reason=6: certificateHold
#---entries[1]---
80: 1234 # CSN=1234
82: 000000 # date=000000: 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z
85: 01 # reason=1: keyCompromise
#---entries[2]---
86: 3344 # CSN=3344
88: 03F480 # date=03F480: 2025-01-04T00:12:34Z
91: 06 # reason=6: certificateHold
#---entries[3]---
92: 5566 # CSN=5566
94: 015180 # date=015180: 2025-01-02T00:12:34Z
97: 06 # reason=6: certificateHold
#---entries[4]---
98: 5678 # CSN=5678
100: 054600 # date=054600: 2025-01-05T00:12:34Z
103: 00 # reason=0: unspecified
#---entries[5]---
104: 9ABC # CSN=9ABC
106: 02A300 # date=02A300: 2025-01-03T00:12:34Z
109: 00 # reason=0: unspecified
110: F6 # [4]. removedFromCRLCerts=<null>
111: 58 40 # [10]. signature value=byte[64]
113: 70BB7A38065FBCABFE615170F05A9A9FE83DC892D5F735812B2A053AF4
142: B300EB466BABB4F1A387CDCE90D8302C680B77AA61566423D7C235F7BD
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171: 31344CF7F405
A.3.3. Delta CRL Example With Revoked Certificates
* Size reduction: 52%
* Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.1.2
* Direct CRL
* Delta CRL
* With revoked certificates
* With entries removed from the CRL since the last full CRL
* Note that the X.509 CRL and the C509 CRL are not convertible.
A.3.3.1. X.509 CRL
PEM content (335 bytes):
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
MIIBSzCB/gIBATAFBgMrZXAwGjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPdGVzdCBjcmxvY3NwLWNhFw0y
NTAxMDgwMDEyMzRaFw0yNTAxMTAwMDEyMzRaMIG3MCECAjQSFw0yNTAxMDcxMjEy
MzRaMAwwCgYDVR0VBAMKAQEwEwICeFYXDTI1MDEwODAwMTAzNFowFAIDALyaFw0y
NTAxMDgwMDA4MzRaMCECAhEiFw0yNTAxMDcxMzEyMzRaMAwwCgYDVR0VBAMKAQgw
IQICM0QXDTI1MDEwNzE0MTIzNFowDDAKBgNVHRUEAwoBCDAhAgJVZhcNMjUwMTA3
MTUxMjM0WjAMMAoGA1UdFQQDCgEIMAUGAytlcANBAKxSjqeefzjGdniA3bQCg3rL
d7rrJnfh8GfsWdawC9BHjK1G336hRYaxwLOtyQS4Mn80jjSwrN+bXg10spSA4gA=
-----END X509 CRL-----
A.3.3.2. C509 CRL
Plain Hex (160 bytes):
8B000C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D6361542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005
D492450E1056031A677DC2F21A0002A300028085F6840302021A677D1A32804F3412
0000017856A84800BC9AA7D0004C11220E1033441C2055662A305840369C3E6412E9
D0537CD39EA1DA40C68C32B4EC0E5678650D6AF73677A5A0CF37F1CDE75D663DE374
9101F4354CCD6D8D05773887650046932B583C5365D7EB0B
Textual Representation
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C509CRL
TBSCertList
CRL Type: C509CRL (0)
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Authority Subject: CN=test crlocsp-ca
Authority Key Identifier:
2F:45:E7:8D:2C:AE:DF:36:8C:DF:53:C3:90:05:D4:92:
45:0E:10:56
CRL Number: 3
This Update: 2025-01-08T00:12:34Z
Next Update: 2025-01-10T00:12:34Z
Base CRL Number: 2
Extensions: <empty>
revokedCertsList:
PerIssuerRevokedCerts[0]
Issuer: <null>
RevokedCertsControl
Flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
Serial number length: 2
Date length: 2
Base date: 2025-01-07T12:12:34Z
Extensions: <empty>
RevokedCerts:
0x3412, 2025-01-07T12:12:34Z, keyCompromise
0x7856, 2025-01-08T00:10:34Z, unspecified
0xBC9A, 2025-01-08T00:08:34Z, unspecified
RemovedFromCRLCerts:
0x1122, 2025-01-07T13:12:34Z
0x3344, 2025-01-07T14:12:34Z
0x5566, 2025-01-07T15:12:34Z
Signature Value
36:9c:3e:64:12:e9:d0:53:7c:d3:9e:a1:da:40:c6:8c:
32:b4:ec:0e:56:78:65:0d:6a:f7:36:77:a5:a0:cf:37:
f1:cd:e7:5d:66:3d:e3:74:91:01:f4:35:4c:cd:6d:8d:
05:77:38:87:65:00:46:93:2b:58:3c:53:65:d7:eb:0b
Annotated hex
0: 8B # C509CRL=array[11]
1: 00 # [0]. crlType=0
2: 0C # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
3: 6F # [2]. authoritySubject=char[15]
4: 746573742063726C6F6373702D6361 # "test crlocsp-ca"
19: 54 # [3]. authorityKeyIdentifier=byte[20]
20: 2F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E1056
40: 03 # [4]. crlNumber=3
41: 1A 677DC2F2 # [5]. thisUpdate=1736295154:
# 2025-01-08T00:12:34Z
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46: 1A 0002A300 # [6]. nextUpdate=172800: 2025-01-10T00:12:34Z
51: 02 # [7]. baseCrlNumber=2
52: 80 # [8]. crlExtensions=array[0]
53: 85 # [9]. revokedCertsList=array[5]
#---PerIssuerRevokedCerts[0]---
54: F6 # [0]. issuer=<null>
55: 84 # [1]. revokedCertsControl=array[4]
56: 03 # [0]. flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
57: 02 # [1]. serialNumberLength=2
58: 02 # [2]. dateLength=2
59: 1A 677D1A32 # [3]. baseDate=1736251954:
# 2025-01-07T12:12:34Z
64: 80 # [2]. extensions=array[0]
65: 4F # [3]. revokedCerts=byte[15], 3 entries
#---entries[0]---
66: 3412 # CSN=3412
68: 0000 # date=0000: 2025-01-07T12:12:34Z
70: 01 # reason=1: keyCompromise
#---entries[1]---
71: 7856 # CSN=7856
73: A848 # date=A848: 2025-01-08T00:10:34Z
75: 00 # reason=0: unspecified
#---entries[2]---
76: BC9A # CSN=BC9A
78: A7D0 # date=A7D0: 2025-01-08T00:08:34Z
80: 00 # reason=0: unspecified
81: 4C # [4]. removedFromCRLCerts=byte[12], 3
# entries
#---entries[0]---
82: 1122 # CSN=1122
84: 0E10 # date=0E10: 2025-01-07T13:12:34Z
#---entries[1]---
86: 3344 # CSN=3344
88: 1C20 # date=1C20: 2025-01-07T14:12:34Z
#---entries[2]---
90: 5566 # CSN=5566
92: 2A30 # date=2A30: 2025-01-07T15:12:34Z
94: 58 40 # [10]. signature value=byte[64]
96: 369C3E6412E9D0537CD39EA1DA40C68C32B4EC0E5678650D6AF73677A5
125: A0CF37F1CDE75D663DE3749101F4354CCD6D8D05773887650046932B58
154: 3C5365D7EB0B
A.3.4. Indirect CRL Example With Revoked Certificates
* Size reduction: 51%
* Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.2.2
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* Indirect CRL
* Full CRL
* With revoked certificates
* With two issuers
* Note that the X.509 CRL and the C509 CRL are not convertible.
A.3.4.1. X.509 CRL
PEM content (409 bytes):
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
A.3.4.2. C509 CRL
Plain Hex (202 bytes):
8B000C6A63726C2D7369676E65725409E433582556550A27DB4A19BCE2D660884722
B6041A677C71721A00093A80F6808A6F746573742063726C6F6373702D6361840302
031A6774887280521234000000015678054600009ABC02A30000F66A6578616D706C
65204341840302031A6775D9F28052112205460006334402A30006556600000006F6
5840F00D6270F91486A7F378D06F01A807E64E086BB366BE3A1592CE4A64BFFD621F
30E2AB93766B4F8818116AB7DA7BEDF7C3EBCBDEAC6D0455F5F5669712006205
Textual Representation
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C509CRL
TBSCertList
CRL Type: C509CRL (0)
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Authority Subject: CN=crl-signer
Authority Key Identifier:
09:E4:33:58:25:56:55:0A:27:DB:4A:19:BC:E2:D6:60:
88:47:22:B6
CRL Number: 4
This Update: 2025-01-07T00:12:34Z
Next Update: 2025-01-14T00:12:34Z
Base CRL Number: <null>
Extensions: <empty>
revokedCertsList:
PerIssuerRevokedCerts[0]
Issuer: CN=test crlocsp-ca
RevokedCertsControl
Flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
Serial number length: 2
Date length: 3
Base date: 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z
Extensions: <empty>
RevokedCerts:
0x1234, 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z, keyCompromise
0x5678, 2025-01-05T00:12:34Z, unspecified
0x9ABC, 2025-01-03T00:12:34Z, unspecified
RemovedFromCRLCerts: <null>
PerIssuerRevokedCerts[1]
Issuer: CN=example CA
RevokedCertsControl
Flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
Serial number length: 2
Date length: 3
Base date: 2025-01-02T00:12:34Z
Extensions: <empty>
RevokedCerts:
0x1122, 2025-01-06T00:12:34Z, certificateHold
0x3344, 2025-01-04T00:12:34Z, certificateHold
0x5566, 2025-01-02T00:12:34Z, certificateHold
RemovedFromCRLCerts: <null>
Signature Value
f0:0d:62:70:f9:14:86:a7:f3:78:d0:6f:01:a8:07:e6:
4e:08:6b:b3:66:be:3a:15:92:ce:4a:64:bf:fd:62:1f:
30:e2:ab:93:76:6b:4f:88:18:11:6a:b7:da:7b:ed:f7:
c3:eb:cb:de:ac:6d:04:55:f5:f5:66:97:12:00:62:05
Annotated hex
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0: 8B # C509CRL=array[11]
1: 00 # [0]. crlType=0
2: 0C # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
3: 6A # [2]. authoritySubject=char[10]
4: 63726C2D7369676E6572 # "crl-signer"
14: 54 # [3]. authorityKeyIdentifier=byte[20]
15: 09E433582556550A27DB4A19BCE2D660884722B6
35: 04 # [4]. crlNumber=4
36: 1A 677C7172 # [5]. thisUpdate=1736208754:
# 2025-01-07T00:12:34Z
41: 1A 00093A80 # [6]. nextUpdate=604800: 2025-01-14T00:12:34Z
46: F6 # [7]. baseCrlNumber=<null>
47: 80 # [8]. crlExtensions=array[0]
48: 8A # [9]. revokedCertsList=array[10]
#---PerIssuerRevokedCerts[0]---
49: 6F # [0]. issuer=char[15]
50: 746573742063726C6F6373702D6361 # "test crlocsp-ca"
65: 84 # [1]. revokedCertsControl=array[4]
66: 03 # [0]. flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
67: 02 # [1]. serialNumberLength=2
68: 03 # [2]. dateLength=3
69: 1A 67748872 # [3]. baseDate=1735690354:
# 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z
74: 80 # [2]. extensions=array[0]
75: 52 # [3]. revokedCerts=byte[18], 3 entries
#---entries[0]---
76: 1234 # CSN=1234
78: 000000 # date=000000: 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z
81: 01 # reason=1: keyCompromise
#---entries[1]---
82: 5678 # CSN=5678
84: 054600 # date=054600: 2025-01-05T00:12:34Z
87: 00 # reason=0: unspecified
#---entries[2]---
88: 9ABC # CSN=9ABC
90: 02A300 # date=02A300: 2025-01-03T00:12:34Z
93: 00 # reason=0: unspecified
94: F6 # [4]. removedFromCRLCerts=<null>
#---PerIssuerRevokedCerts[1]---
95: 6A # [5]. issuer=char[10]
96: 6578616D706C65204341 # "example CA"
106: 84 # [6]. revokedCertsControl=array[4]
107: 03 # [0]. flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
108: 02 # [1]. serialNumberLength=2
109: 03 # [2]. dateLength=3
110: 1A 6775D9F2 # [3]. baseDate=1735776754:
# 2025-01-02T00:12:34Z
115: 80 # [7]. extensions=array[0]
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116: 52 # [8]. revokedCerts=byte[18], 3 entries
#---entries[0]---
117: 1122 # CSN=1122
119: 054600 # date=054600: 2025-01-06T00:12:34Z
122: 06 # reason=6: certificateHold
#---entries[1]---
123: 3344 # CSN=3344
125: 02A300 # date=02A300: 2025-01-04T00:12:34Z
128: 06 # reason=6: certificateHold
#---entries[2]---
129: 5566 # CSN=5566
131: 000000 # date=000000: 2025-01-02T00:12:34Z
134: 06 # reason=6: certificateHold
135: F6 # [9]. removedFromCRLCerts=<null>
136: 58 40 # [10]. signature value=byte[64]
138: F00D6270F91486A7F378D06F01A807E64E086BB366BE3A1592CE4A64BF
167: FD621F30E2AB93766B4F8818116AB7DA7BEDF7C3EBCBDEAC6D0455F5F5
196: 669712006205
A.4. OCSP Request Examples
A.4.1. Simple OCSP Request Example
* Size reduction: 66%
* Simple OCSP Request (C509SimpleOCSPRequest)
* Note that the X.509 OCSP Request and the C509 OCSP Request are not
convertible.
A.4.1.1. X.509 OCSP Request
PEM content (150 bytes):
-----BEGIN OCSP REQUEST-----
MIGTMIGQMGswaTBnMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQQgMlOOdIW9N65FTx8NK5dV11i5H26O
Onrzl6D0AGBcb/gEIMwRyHQKBQnsTaFM5YhucjZMD2O2DtY0fxPBbuclt2aiAhQS
NBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNKIhMB8wHQYJKwYBBQUHMAECBBARERERERERERER
ERERERER
-----END OCSP REQUEST-----
A.4.1.2. C509 OCSP Request
Plain Hex (51 bytes):
86022F501111111111111111111111111111111148A01C73A5F3B063345410652787
FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D80
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Textual Representation
C509SimpleOCSPRequest
Type: C509SimpleOCSPRequest (2)
Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
IssuerCertHash:
a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
SerialNumberHash:
10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
5a:6f:0d:8d
Nonce
11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
Extensions: <empty>
Annotated hex
0: 86 # C509OCSPRequest=array[6]
1: 02 # [0]. ocspRequestType=C509SimpleOCSPRequest
# (2)
2: 2F # [1]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
3: 50 # [2]. nonce=byte[16]
4: 11111111111111111111111111111111
20: 48 # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
21: A01C73A5F3B06334
29: 54 # [4]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
30: 10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
50: 80 # [5]. extensions=array[0]
A.4.2. Unsigned OCSP Request Example
* Size reduction: 72%
* Unsigned OCSP Request (C509UnsignedOCSPRequest)
* Note that the X.509 OCSP Request and the C509 OCSP Request are not
convertible.
A.4.2.1. X.509 OCSP Request
PEM content (475 bytes):
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-----BEGIN OCSP REQUEST-----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-----END OCSP REQUEST-----
A.4.2.2. C509 OCSP Request
Plain Hex (132 bytes):
85002F5011111111111111111111111111111111808648A01C73A5F3B06334808654
10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D805475D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E7
48DFD53A8B9D176D8054D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B67840080482222
222222222222808254D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B80
Textual Representation
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C509UnsignedOCSPRequest
Type: C509UnsignedOCSPRequest (0)
Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
Nonce
11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
Requests
OcspPerIssuerRequest
issuerCertHash
a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
extensions: <empty>
singleRequests
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
5a:6f:0d:8d
Extensions: <empty>
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
8b:9d:17:6d
Extensions: <empty>
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
5b:67:84:00
Extensions: <empty>
OcspPerIssuerRequest
issuerCertHash
22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
extensions: <empty>
singleRequests
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
ce:41:7e:3b
Extensions: <empty>
Extensions: <empty>
Annotated hex
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0: 85 # C509OCSPRequest=array[5]
1: 00 # [0]. ocspRequestType=C509UnsignedOCSPRequest
# (0)
2: 2F # [1]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
3: 50 # [2]. nonce=byte[16]
4: 11111111111111111111111111111111
20: 80 # [3]. extensions=array[0]
21: 86 # [4]. requests=array[6]
#---PerIssuerRequests[0]---
22: 48 # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
23: A01C73A5F3B06334
31: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
32: 86 # [2]. singleRequests=array[6]
#---SingleCertRequests[0]---
33: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
34: 10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
54: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertRequests[1]---
55: 54 # [2]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
56: 75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
76: 80 # [3]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertRequests[2]---
77: 54 # [4]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
78: D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
98: 80 # [5]. extensions=array[0]
#---PerIssuerRequests[1]---
99: 48 # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
100: 2222222222222222
108: 80 # [4]. extensions=array[0]
109: 82 # [5]. singleRequests=array[2]
#---SingleCertRequests[0]---
110: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
111: D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
131: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
A.4.3. Signed OCSP Request Example Without Requestor's Certificate
* Size reduction: 64%
* Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.3.2
* Signed OCSP Request (C509SignedOCSPRequest) without requestor's
certificate
* Note that the X.509 OCSP Request and the C509 OCSP Request are not
convertible.
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A.4.3.1. X.509 OCSP Request
PEM content (584 bytes):
-----BEGIN OCSP REQUEST-----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-----END OCSP REQUEST-----
A.4.3.2. C509 OCSP Request
Plain Hex (209 bytes):
89010C2F50111111111111111111111111111111114844F0528B56F35AD9808648A0
1C73A5F3B0633480865410652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D805475D8
BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D8054D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A
51605B67840080482222222222222222808254D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAEC
F6CE417E3B80F658407B840FABA2179AC564A97BA369436F05316FE45FFA28B773FB
33397123BA7AB17605572D7B638B26127E1B86FB452C5B4F1FEAE1638D5D328AF893
B77A7D1106
Textual Representation
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C509SignedOCSPRequest
TBSOCSPRequest
Type: C509SignedOCSPRequest (1)
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
RequestorCertHash
44:f0:52:8b:56:f3:5a:d9
Nonce
11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
Extensions: <empty>
Requests
OcspPerIssuerRequest
issuerCertHash
a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
extensions: <empty>
singleRequests
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
5a:6f:0d:8d
Extensions: <empty>
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
8b:9d:17:6d
Extensions: <empty>
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
5b:67:84:00
Extensions: <empty>
OcspPerIssuerRequest
issuerCertHash
22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
extensions: <empty>
singleRequests
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
ce:41:7e:3b
Extensions: <empty>
Requestor Certs: null
Signature Value
7b:84:0f:ab:a2:17:9a:c5:64:a9:7b:a3:69:43:6f:05:
31:6f:e4:5f:fa:28:b7:73:fb:33:39:71:23:ba:7a:b1:
76:05:57:2d:7b:63:8b:26:12:7e:1b:86:fb:45:2c:5b:
4f:1f:ea:e1:63:8d:5d:32:8a:f8:93:b7:7a:7d:11:06
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Annotated hex
0: 89 # C509OCSPRequest=array[9]
1: 01 # [0]. ocspRequestType=C509SignedOCSPRequest
# (1)
2: 0C # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
3: 2F # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
4: 50 # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
5: 11111111111111111111111111111111
21: 48 # [4]. requestorCertHash=byte[8]
22: 44F0528B56F35AD9
30: 80 # [5]. extensions=array[0]
31: 86 # [6]. requests=array[6]
#---PerIssuerRequests[0]---
32: 48 # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
33: A01C73A5F3B06334
41: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
42: 86 # [2]. singleRequests=array[6]
#---SingleCertRequests[0]---
43: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
44: 10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
64: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertRequests[1]---
65: 54 # [2]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
66: 75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
86: 80 # [3]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertRequests[2]---
87: 54 # [4]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
88: D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
108: 80 # [5]. extensions=array[0]
#---PerIssuerRequests[1]---
109: 48 # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
110: 2222222222222222
118: 80 # [4]. extensions=array[0]
119: 82 # [5]. singleRequests=array[2]
#---SingleCertRequests[0]---
120: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
121: D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
141: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
142: F6 # [7]. requestorCerts=<null>
143: 58 40 # [8]. signatureValue=byte[64]
145: 7B840FABA2179AC564A97BA369436F05316FE45FFA28B773FB33397123
174: BA7AB17605572D7B638B26127E1B86FB452C5B4F1FEAE1638D5D328AF8
203: 93B77A7D1106
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A.4.4. Signed OCSP Request Example With Requestor's Certificate
* Size reduction: 59%
* Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.3.2
* Signed OCSP Request (C509SignedOCSPRequest) with embedded
requestor's certificate
* Note that the X.509 OCSP Request and the C509 OCSP Request are not
convertible.
A.4.4.1. X.509 OCSP Request
PEM content (1035 bytes):
-----BEGIN OCSP REQUEST-----
MIIEBzCCAnGhHaQbMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMMDm9jc3AtcmVxdWVzdG9yMIIBrDBpMGcw
CwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAyU450hb03rkVPHw0rl1XXWLkfbo46evOXoPQAYFxv+AQg
zBHIdAoFCexNoUzliG5yNkwPY7YO1jR/E8Fu5yW3ZqICFBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0
EjQSNBI0MGkwZzALBglghkgBZQMEAgEEIDJTjnSFvTeuRU8fDSuXVddYuR9ujjp6
85eg9ABgXG/4BCDMEch0CgUJ7E2hTOWIbnI2TA9jtg7WNH8TwW7nJbdmogIUNFY0
VjRWNFY0VjRWNFY0VjRWNFYwaTBnMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQQgMlOOdIW9N65FTx8N
K5dV11i5H26OOnrzl6D0AGBcb/gEIMwRyHQKBQnsTaFM5YhucjZMD2O2DtY0fxPB
buclt2aiAhRWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeDBpMGcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAz
MzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMwQgRERERERERERERERERERE
REREREREREREREREREREREQCFCIzIjMiMyIzIjMiMyIzIjMiMyIzooGfMIGcMBoG
CSsGAQUFBzABBAQNMAsGCSsGAQUFBzABATBfBgkrBgEFBQcwAQgEUjBQMAcwBQYD
K2VwMCEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcwIjAKBggqhkjO
PQQDAjAUBgcqhkjOPQIBBgkrJAMDAggBAQcwHQYJKwYBBQUHMAECBBARERERERER
ERERERERERERoIIBjjCCAYowBQYDK2VwA0EAnqnZjVvfg50lAZOGBiSExUCuMKja
IHCZKykPyiVpW8ECz2Ejd8NiIQ/pnXvzTRvbQz1i7y+figq4L4YZYGfjAaCCATww
ggE4MIIBNDCB56ADAgECAgISNjAFBgMrZXAwGjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPdGVzdCBjcmxv
Y3NwLWNhMB4XDTI1MDEwMjAwMDAwMFoXDTI2MDEwMjAwMDAwMFowGTEXMBUGA1UE
AwwOb2NzcC1yZXF1ZXN0b3IwKjAFBgMrZXADIQAEUwsXZO3UtOM6tErw+DiWHABx
dtdLajVG7Lf9VzIN06NSMFAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLE21FmKGxtqhtplEK6lZNgSl+T5
MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIHgDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTZfXfmNML3ADAMpY/IdzZbFVAH
ojAFBgMrZXADQQCY+ZIhXpHFm+r/HrfqPv0rqn4dvQHRKwN3gZhZyWeQP/nP6vYx
W73WoQgSSbXiyYVCHNASdBpZljgSyNJ6NX0C
-----END OCSP REQUEST-----
A.4.4.2. C509 OCSP Request
Plain Hex (420 bytes):
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89010C2F50111111111111111111111111111111114844F0528B56F35AD984185D82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Textual Representation
C509SignedOCSPRequest
TBSOCSPRequest
Type: C509SignedOCSPRequest (1)
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
RequestorCertHash
44:f0:52:8b:56:f3:5a:d9
Nonce
11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
Extensions
AcceptOCSPResponseTypes (93)
C509ErrorOCSPResponse (0)
C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
preferredSignatureAlgorithms (94)
Preferred Signature Algorithm:
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Preferred Signature Algorithm:
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-sha256 (0)
Public Key Algorithms:
EC public key on curve secp256r1 (1)
EC public key on curve brainpoolp256r1 (24)
Requests
OcspPerIssuerRequest
issuerCertHash
a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
extensions: <empty>
singleRequests
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
5a:6f:0d:8d
Extensions: <empty>
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SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
8b:9d:17:6d
Extensions: <empty>
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
5b:67:84:00
Extensions: <empty>
OcspPerIssuerRequest
issuerCertHash
22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
extensions: <empty>
singleRequests
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
ce:41:7e:3b
Extensions: <empty>
Requestor Certs
C509Certificate
8b:02:42:12:36:0c:6f:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:
63:73:70:2d:63:61:1a:67:75:d7:00:1a:69:57:0a:80:
6e:6f:63:73:70:2d:72:65:71:75:65:73:74:6f:72:0c:
58:20:04:53:0b:17:64:ed:d4:b4:e3:3a:b4:4a:f0:f8:
38:96:1c:00:71:76:d7:4b:6a:35:46:ec:b7:fd:57:32:
0d:d3:86:01:54:dd:51:bd:b2:a2:c7:91:c0:62:d4:02:
78:56:db:ac:f5:26:07:f0:be:21:01:07:54:2f:45:e7:
8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:45:0e:10:
56:58:40:f8:c6:18:3e:cf:8c:3e:fd:50:dd:49:42:d1:
72:81:4c:46:ec:0f:c0:1d:d5:86:a5:97:17:8d:f8:64:
a0:d9:da:86:b7:ca:17:fc:9f:77:2f:f0:4c:80:e9:8b:
60:d5:b4:b6:24:08:a2:77:a5:b7:0d:0d:2a:3f:5e:d5:
44:2d:07
Signature Value
75:c6:5f:02:81:99:ff:c8:84:b6:a0:e3:e4:f9:ed:c3:
80:a0:37:b1:e9:b5:86:8c:74:f5:a0:ce:bc:cd:f6:c7:
d0:c0:d6:9b:1b:b6:97:64:14:44:4e:15:6d:72:e1:2e:
2f:f9:36:78:25:13:51:6b:02:b4:a1:e4:0e:b1:3d:01
Annotated hex
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0: 89 # C509OCSPRequest=array[9]
1: 01 # [0]. ocspRequestType=C509SignedOCSPRequest
# (1)
2: 0C # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
3: 2F # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
4: 50 # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
5: 11111111111111111111111111111111
21: 48 # [4]. requestorCertHash=byte[8]
22: 44F0528B56F35AD9
30: 84 # [5]. extensions=array[4]
#---extension[0]---
31: 18 5D # [0]. type=AcceptOCSPResponseTypes (93)
33: 82 # [1]. value=array[2]
34: 00 # [0]. C509ErrorOCSPResponse (0)
35: 01 # [1]. C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
#---extension[1]---
36: 18 5E # [2]. type=preferredSignatureAlgorithms
# (94)
38: 84 # [3]. value=array[4]
#---preferredSignatureAlgorithms[0]---
39: 0C # [0]. sigIdentifier=Ed25519 (12)
40: F6 # [1]. pubKeyAlgIdentifiers=<null>
#---preferredSignatureAlgorithms[1]---
41: 00 # [2]. sigIdentifier=ecdsa-with-sha256 (0)
42: 82 # [3]. pubKeyAlgIdentifiers=array[2]
43: 01 # [0]. pubKeyAlgIdentifier=EC public key
# on curve secp256r1 (1)
44: 18 18 # [1]. pubKeyAlgIdentifier=EC public key
# on curve brainpoolp256r1 (24)
46: 86 # [6]. requests=array[6]
#---PerIssuerRequests[0]---
47: 48 # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
48: A01C73A5F3B06334
56: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
57: 86 # [2]. singleRequests=array[6]
#---SingleCertRequests[0]---
58: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
59: 10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
79: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertRequests[1]---
80: 54 # [2]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
81: 75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
101: 80 # [3]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertRequests[2]---
102: 54 # [4]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
103: D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
123: 80 # [5]. extensions=array[0]
#---PerIssuerRequests[1]---
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124: 48 # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
125: 2222222222222222
133: 80 # [4]. extensions=array[0]
134: 82 # [5]. singleRequests=array[2]
#---SingleCertRequests[0]---
135: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
136: D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
156: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
157: 58 C3 # [7]. requestorCerts(COSE_C509)=byte[195]
159: 8B024212360C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A69
188: 570A806E6F6373702D726571756573746F720C582004530B1764EDD4B4
217: E33AB44AF0F838961C007176D74B6A3546ECB7FD57320DD3860154DD51
246: BDB2A2C791C062D4027856DBACF52607F0BE210107542F45E78D2CAEDF
275: 368CDF53C39005D492450E10565840F8C6183ECF8C3EFD50DD4942D172
304: 814C46EC0FC01DD586A597178DF864A0D9DA86B7CA17FC9F772FF04C80
333: E98B60D5B4B62408A277A5B70D0D2A3F5ED5442D07
354: 58 40 # [8]. signatureValue=byte[64]
356: 75C65F028199FFC884B6A0E3E4F9EDC380A037B1E9B5868C74F5A0CEBC
385: CDF6C7D0C0D69B1BB6976414444E156D72E12E2FF936782513516B02B4
414: A1E40EB13D01
A.4.5. Signed OCSP Request Example With Requestor's Certificate Chain
* Size reduction: 54%
* Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.3.2
* Signed OCSP Request (C509SignedOCSPRequest) with embedded
requestor's certificate chain (2 certificates)
* Note that the X.509 OCSP Request and the C509 OCSP Request are not
convertible.
A.4.5.1. X.509 OCSP Request
PEM content (1371 bytes):
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-----BEGIN OCSP REQUEST-----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-----END OCSP REQUEST-----
A.4.5.2. C509 OCSP Request
Plain Hex (625 bytes):
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89010C2F50111111111111111111111111111111114844F0528B56F35AD984185D82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Textual Representation
C509SignedOCSPRequest
TBSOCSPRequest
Type: C509SignedOCSPRequest (1)
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
RequestorCertHash
44:f0:52:8b:56:f3:5a:d9
Nonce
11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
Extensions
AcceptOCSPResponseTypes (93)
C509ErrorOCSPResponse (0)
C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
preferredSignatureAlgorithms (94)
Preferred Signature Algorithm:
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Preferred Signature Algorithm:
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-sha256 (0)
Public Key Algorithms:
EC public key on curve secp256r1 (1)
EC public key on curve brainpoolp256r1 (24)
Requests
OcspPerIssuerRequest
issuerCertHash
a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
extensions: <empty>
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singleRequests
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
5a:6f:0d:8d
Extensions: <empty>
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
8b:9d:17:6d
Extensions: <empty>
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
5b:67:84:00
Extensions: <empty>
OcspPerIssuerRequest
issuerCertHash
22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
extensions: <empty>
singleRequests
SingleCertRequest
SerialNumberHash:
d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
ce:41:7e:3b
Extensions: <empty>
Requestor Certs
C509Certificate
8b:02:42:12:36:0c:6f:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:
63:73:70:2d:63:61:1a:67:75:d7:00:1a:69:57:0a:80:
6e:6f:63:73:70:2d:72:65:71:75:65:73:74:6f:72:0c:
58:20:04:53:0b:17:64:ed:d4:b4:e3:3a:b4:4a:f0:f8:
38:96:1c:00:71:76:d7:4b:6a:35:46:ec:b7:fd:57:32:
0d:d3:86:01:54:dd:51:bd:b2:a2:c7:91:c0:62:d4:02:
78:56:db:ac:f5:26:07:f0:be:21:01:07:54:2f:45:e7:
8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:45:0e:10:
56:58:40:f8:c6:18:3e:cf:8c:3e:fd:50:dd:49:42:d1:
72:81:4c:46:ec:0f:c0:1d:d5:86:a5:97:17:8d:f8:64:
a0:d9:da:86:b7:ca:17:fc:9f:77:2f:f0:4c:80:e9:8b:
60:d5:b4:b6:24:08:a2:77:a5:b7:0d:0d:2a:3f:5e:d5:
44:2d:07
C509Certificate
8b:02:41:01:0c:73:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:63:
73:70:2d:72:6f:6f:74:63:61:1a:67:74:85:80:1a:6b:
36:ec:7f:6f:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:63:73:70:
2d:63:61:0c:58:20:5e:f8:a3:55:a0:01:a7:c5:0d:23:
49:47:01:20:81:31:a4:bb:2a:b9:20:d4:0b:fb:0e:e1:
f6:ab:28:ff:74:00:88:01:54:2f:45:e7:8d:2c:ae:df:
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36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:45:0e:10:56:21:18:60:
23:01:07:54:2d:a3:a4:03:f7:d2:f4:e0:b3:d8:03:1a:
73:ba:8a:83:9f:55:7f:0f:58:40:e5:04:65:d6:0c:02:
a2:11:1e:f3:fc:6e:44:f2:a3:60:08:76:5b:55:23:51:
f9:a3:f5:b2:aa:7c:76:f1:f0:5d:25:98:47:a4:f4:25:
0b:2e:4b:0a:e2:09:97:62:a2:59:6d:3c:c1:db:2c:cd:
18:0a:a0:a2:d0:e1:91:31:0b:0f
Signature Value
8e:c4:d2:0a:1c:15:6b:2f:db:61:d8:2d:39:ef:9d:54:
cc:bf:fe:42:ea:c1:ac:ad:de:cd:20:78:7d:97:9a:38:
82:3b:bb:1a:64:58:c2:2f:07:e6:48:70:73:76:9f:b9:
b5:25:44:7a:43:b0:c9:c3:bc:de:79:04:55:de:c5:08
Annotated hex
0: 89 # C509OCSPRequest=array[9]
1: 01 # [0]. ocspRequestType=C509SignedOCSPRequest
# (1)
2: 0C # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
3: 2F # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
4: 50 # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
5: 11111111111111111111111111111111
21: 48 # [4]. requestorCertHash=byte[8]
22: 44F0528B56F35AD9
30: 84 # [5]. extensions=array[4]
#---extension[0]---
31: 18 5D # [0]. type=AcceptOCSPResponseTypes (93)
33: 82 # [1]. value=array[2]
34: 00 # [0]. C509ErrorOCSPResponse (0)
35: 01 # [1]. C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
#---extension[1]---
36: 18 5E # [2]. type=preferredSignatureAlgorithms
# (94)
38: 84 # [3]. value=array[4]
#---preferredSignatureAlgorithms[0]---
39: 0C # [0]. sigIdentifier=Ed25519 (12)
40: F6 # [1]. pubKeyAlgIdentifiers=<null>
#---preferredSignatureAlgorithms[1]---
41: 00 # [2]. sigIdentifier=ecdsa-with-sha256 (0)
42: 82 # [3]. pubKeyAlgIdentifiers=array[2]
43: 01 # [0]. pubKeyAlgIdentifier=EC public key
# on curve secp256r1 (1)
44: 18 18 # [1]. pubKeyAlgIdentifier=EC public key
# on curve brainpoolp256r1 (24)
46: 86 # [6]. requests=array[6]
#---PerIssuerRequests[0]---
47: 48 # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
48: A01C73A5F3B06334
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56: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
57: 86 # [2]. singleRequests=array[6]
#---SingleCertRequests[0]---
58: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
59: 10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
79: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertRequests[1]---
80: 54 # [2]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
81: 75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
101: 80 # [3]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertRequests[2]---
102: 54 # [4]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
103: D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
123: 80 # [5]. extensions=array[0]
#---PerIssuerRequests[1]---
124: 48 # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
125: 2222222222222222
133: 80 # [4]. extensions=array[0]
134: 82 # [5]. singleRequests=array[2]
#---SingleCertRequests[0]---
135: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
136: D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
156: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
157: 82 # [7]. requestorCerts(COSE_C509)=array[2]
158: 58 C3 # [0]. C509CertData=byte[195]
160: 8B024212360C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A
188: 69570A806E6F6373702D726571756573746F720C582004530B1764ED
216: D4B4E33AB44AF0F838961C007176D74B6A3546ECB7FD57320DD38601
244: 54DD51BDB2A2C791C062D4027856DBACF52607F0BE210107542F45E7
272: 8D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E10565840F8C6183ECF8C3EFD50
300: DD4942D172814C46EC0FC01DD586A597178DF864A0D9DA86B7CA17FC
328: 9F772FF04C80E98B60D5B4B62408A277A5B70D0D2A3F5ED5442D07
355: 58 CA # [1]. C509CertData=byte[202]
357: 8B0241010C73746573742063726C6F6373702D726F6F7463611A6774
385: 85801A6B36EC7F6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63610C58205EF8
413: A355A001A7C50D23494701208131A4BB2AB920D40BFB0EE1F6AB28FF
441: 74008801542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E1056211860
469: 230107542DA3A403F7D2F4E0B3D8031A73BA8A839F557F0F5840E504
497: 65D60C02A2111EF3FC6E44F2A36008765B552351F9A3F5B2AA7C76F1
525: F05D259847A4F4250B2E4B0AE2099762A2596D3CC1DB2CCD180AA0A2
553: D0E191310B0F
559: 58 40 # [8]. signatureValue=byte[64]
561: 8EC4D20A1C156B2FDB61D82D39EF9D54CCBFFE42EAC1ACADDECD20787D
590: 979A38823BBB1A6458C22F07E6487073769FB9B525447A43B0C9C3BCDE
619: 790455DEC508
A.5. OCSP Response Examples
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A.5.1. Error OCSP Response Example
* Size reduction: 40%
* Error Response (C509ErrorOCSPResponse)
A.5.1.1. X.509 OCSP Response
PEM content (5 bytes):
-----BEGIN OCSP RESPONSE-----
MAMKAQY=
-----END OCSP RESPONSE-----
A.5.1.2. C509 OCSP Response
Plain Hex (3 bytes):
820006
Textual Representation
C509ErrorResponse
Type: C509ErrorOCSPResponse (0)
Status: unauthorized (6)
Annotated hex
0: 82 # C509OCSPResponse=array[2]
1: 00 # [0]. ocspResponseType=C509ErrorOCSPResponse
# (0)
2: 06 # [1]. responseStatus=unauthorized (6)
A.5.2. Simple OCSP Response Example
* Size reduction: 58%
* Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.4.2
* Simple OCSP Response (C509SimpleOCSPResponse) without responder's
certificate
* Note that the X.509 OCSP Response and the C509 OCSP Response are
not convertible.
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A.5.2.1. X.509 OCSP Response
PEM content (336 bytes):
-----BEGIN OCSP RESPONSE-----
MIIBTAoBAKCCAUUwggFBBgkrBgEFBQcwAQEEggEyMIIBLjCB4aIWBBTq5ZqK6ar0
EEsV5Q6O4BcVF3QYrxgPMjAyNTAzMDMwMDAwMDBaMIGSMIGPMGcwCwYJYIZIAWUD
BAIBBCAyU450hb03rkVPHw0rl1XXWLkfbo46evOXoPQAYFxv+AQgzBHIdAoFCexN
oUzliG5yNkwPY7YO1jR/E8Fu5yW3ZqICFBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0gAAY
DzIwMjUwMzAyMTYwMDAwWqARGA8yMDI1MDMwMzA3MDAwMFqhITAfMB0GCSsGAQUF
BzABAgQQERERERERERERERERERERETAFBgMrZXADQQAoVz6mB1JqePHWA2adyeK4
ElU3cwbFiAepAQkUhmtUT9vU4J4mc/QxA39Ja36kVABy8+f62xw0f+5v3G9LTS0M
-----END OCSP RESPONSE-----
A.5.2.2. C509 OCSP Response
Plain Hex (140 bytes):
8E020C2F5011111111111111111111111111111111480600867838E3311A48A01C73
A5F3B063345410652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D001A67C4F1003970
7F19627080F6584052D9F137BC08E4D17C3C1A0412EF70F6C4BA7124EB998F3B0A53
AAF62F84FD18BF9AB24AEC7CE9C73717A816BFA1E3E9B0BEE6FA1DD588F0A2C838DF
DED37404
Textual Representation
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C509SimpleOCSPResponse
TBSSimpleOCSPResponse
Type: C509SimpleOCSPResponse (2)
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
Nonce
11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
ResponderCertHash
06:00:86:78:38:e3:31:1a
IssuerCertHash
a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
SerialNumberHash
10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
5a:6f:0d:8d
Cert Status: good
ProducedAt: 2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
Responder Certs: null
Signature Value
52:d9:f1:37:bc:08:e4:d1:7c:3c:1a:04:12:ef:70:f6:
c4:ba:71:24:eb:99:8f:3b:0a:53:aa:f6:2f:84:fd:18:
bf:9a:b2:4a:ec:7c:e9:c7:37:17:a8:16:bf:a1:e3:e9:
b0:be:e6:fa:1d:d5:88:f0:a2:c8:38:df:de:d3:74:04
Annotated hex
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0: 8E # C509OCSPResponse=array[14]
1: 02 # [0]. ocspResponseType=C509SimpleOCSPResponse
# (2)
2: 0C # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
3: 2F # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
4: 50 # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
5: 11111111111111111111111111111111
21: 48 # [4]. responderCertHash=byte[8]
22: 0600867838E3311A
30: 48 # [5]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
31: A01C73A5F3B06334
39: 54 # [6]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
40: 10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
60: 00 # [7]. certStatus=good (0)
61: 1A 67C4F100 # [8]. producedAt=1740960000:
# 2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
66: 39 707F # [9]. thisUpdate=-28800: 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
69: 19 6270 # [10]. nextUpdate=25200: 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
72: 80 # [11]. extensions=array[0]
73: F6 # [12]. responderCerts=<null>
74: 58 40 # [13]. signatureValue=byte[64]
76: 52D9F137BC08E4D17C3C1A0412EF70F6C4BA7124EB998F3B0A53AAF62F
105: 84FD18BF9AB24AEC7CE9C73717A816BFA1E3E9B0BEE6FA1DD588F0A2C8
134: 38DFDED37404
A.5.3. Basic OCSP Response Example Without Responder's Certificate
* Size reduction: 70%
* Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.4.2
* Basic OCSP Response (C509BasicOCSPResponse) without responder's
certificate
* Note that the X.509 OCSP Response and the C509 OCSP Response are
not convertible.
A.5.3.1. X.509 OCSP Response
PEM content (837 bytes):
Liao, et al. Expires 6 May 2027 [Page 98]
Internet-Draft C509 Revocation November 2026
-----BEGIN OCSP RESPONSE-----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-----END OCSP RESPONSE-----
A.5.3.2. C509 OCSP Response
Plain Hex (248 bytes):
8A010C2F5011111111111111111111111111111111480600867838E3311A1A67C4F1
00808648A01C73A5F3B06334808F5410652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D
8D0039707F196270805475D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D0139707F
1962708054D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400821A67C32F00043970
7F19627080482222222222222222808554D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE
417E3B0239707F19627080F658401BB7E5C65F7D65260A4FB127BE66B1DB3E7C9F16
DC2969D5F67DFCF25DCCF1EE09ED28441F92B5242AF60F760AE4029EC5C74DB7C042
3A941F869358C71FF800
Textual Representation
C509BasicOCSPResponse
TBSBasicOCSPResponse
Type: C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
Nonce
11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
ResponderCertHash
06:00:86:78:38:e3:31:1a
ProducedAt: 2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
Responses
Liao, et al. Expires 6 May 2027 [Page 99]
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OcspPerIssuerResponse
IssuerCertHash
a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
Extensions: <empty>
SingleResponses
SingleCertResponse
SerialNumberHash:
10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
5a:6f:0d:8d
Cert Status: good
This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
SingleCertResponse
SerialNumberHash:
75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
8b:9d:17:6d
Cert Status: not-issued
This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
SingleCertResponse
SerialNumberHash:
d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
5b:67:84:00
Cert Status: revoked (superseded)
Revoked at 2025-03-01T16:00:00Z
This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
OcspPerIssuerResponse
IssuerCertHash
22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
Extensions: <empty>
SingleResponses
SingleCertResponse
SerialNumberHash:
d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
ce:41:7e:3b
Cert Status: unknown
This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
Responder Certs: null
Signature Value
1b:b7:e5:c6:5f:7d:65:26:0a:4f:b1:27:be:66:b1:db:
3e:7c:9f:16:dc:29:69:d5:f6:7d:fc:f2:5d:cc:f1:ee:
09:ed:28:44:1f:92:b5:24:2a:f6:0f:76:0a:e4:02:9e:
Liao, et al. Expires 6 May 2027 [Page 100]
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c5:c7:4d:b7:c0:42:3a:94:1f:86:93:58:c7:1f:f8:00
Annotated hex
0: 8A # C509OCSPResponse=array[10]
1: 01 # [0]. ocspResponseType=C509BasicOCSPResponse
# (1)
2: 0C # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
3: 2F # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
4: 50 # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
5: 11111111111111111111111111111111
21: 48 # [4]. responderCertHash=byte[8]
22: 0600867838E3311A
30: 1A 67C4F100 # [5]. producedAt=1740960000:
# 2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
35: 80 # [6]. extensions=array[0]
36: 86 # [7]. responses=array[6]
#---PerIssuerResponses[0]---
37: 48 # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
38: A01C73A5F3B06334
46: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
47: 8F # [2]. singleResponses=array[15]
#---SingleCertResponses[0]---
48: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
49: 10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
69: 00 # [1]. certStatus=good (0)
70: 39 707F # [2]. thisUpdate=-28800:
# 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
73: 19 6270 # [3]. nextUpdate=25200:
# 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
76: 80 # [4]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertResponses[1]---
77: 54 # [5]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
78: 75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
98: 01 # [6]. certStatus=not-issued (1)
99: 39 707F # [7]. thisUpdate=-28800:
# 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
102: 19 6270 # [8]. nextUpdate=25200:
# 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
105: 80 # [9]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertResponses[2]---
106: 54 # [10]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
107: D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
127: 82 # [11]. certStatus=array[2]
128: 1A 67C32F00 # [0]. revocationTime=1740844800:
# 2025-03-01T16:00:00Z
133: 04 # [1]. revocationReason=superseded (4)
134: 39 707F # [12]. thisUpdate=-28800:
Liao, et al. Expires 6 May 2027 [Page 101]
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# 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
137: 19 6270 # [13]. nextUpdate=25200:
# 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
140: 80 # [14]. extensions=array[0]
#---PerIssuerResponses[1]---
141: 48 # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
142: 2222222222222222
150: 80 # [4]. extensions=array[0]
151: 85 # [5]. singleResponses=array[5]
#---SingleCertResponses[0]---
152: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
153: D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
173: 02 # [1]. certStatus=unknown (2)
174: 39 707F # [2]. thisUpdate=-28800:
# 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
177: 19 6270 # [3]. nextUpdate=25200:
# 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
180: 80 # [4]. extensions=array[0]
181: F6 # [8]. responderCerts=<null>
182: 58 40 # [9]. signature value=byte[64]
184: 1BB7E5C65F7D65260A4FB127BE66B1DB3E7C9F16DC2969D5F67DFCF25D
213: CCF1EE09ED28441F92B5242AF60F760AE4029EC5C74DB7C0423A941F86
242: 9358C71FF800
A.5.4. Basic OCSP Response Example With Responder's Certificate
* Size reduction: 62%
* Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.4.2
* Basic OCSP Response (C509BasicOCSPResponse) with embedded
responder's certificate
* Note that the X.509 OCSP Response and the C509 OCSP Response are
not convertible.
A.5.4.1. X.509 OCSP Response
PEM content (1181 bytes):
Liao, et al. Expires 6 May 2027 [Page 102]
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-----BEGIN OCSP RESPONSE-----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-----END OCSP RESPONSE-----
A.5.4.2. C509 OCSP Response
Plain Hex (446 bytes):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Textual Representation
Liao, et al. Expires 6 May 2027 [Page 103]
Internet-Draft C509 Revocation November 2026
C509BasicOCSPResponse
TBSBasicOCSPResponse
Type: C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
Nonce
11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
ResponderCertHash
06:00:86:78:38:e3:31:1a
ProducedAt: 2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
Responses
OcspPerIssuerResponse
IssuerCertHash
a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
Extensions: <empty>
SingleResponses
SingleCertResponse
SerialNumberHash:
10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
5a:6f:0d:8d
Cert Status: good
This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
SingleCertResponse
SerialNumberHash:
75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
8b:9d:17:6d
Cert Status: not-issued
This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
SingleCertResponse
SerialNumberHash:
d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
5b:67:84:00
Cert Status: revoked (superseded)
Revoked at 2025-03-01T16:00:00Z
This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
OcspPerIssuerResponse
IssuerCertHash
22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
Extensions: <empty>
SingleResponses
SingleCertResponse
Liao, et al. Expires 6 May 2027 [Page 104]
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SerialNumberHash:
d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
ce:41:7e:3b
Cert Status: unknown
This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
Responder Certs
C509Certificate
8b:02:42:12:35:0c:6f:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:
63:73:70:2d:63:61:1a:67:75:d7:00:1a:69:57:0a:80:
6e:6f:63:73:70:2d:72:65:73:70:6f:6e:64:65:72:0c:
58:20:81:94:7b:bc:24:8a:ac:79:73:82:11:a8:d7:5b:
f9:2c:b7:77:d9:94:07:3d:f2:3a:e0:63:80:ef:2c:57:
39:76:88:01:54:b5:b4:ca:f3:54:01:d0:61:51:df:96:
29:db:57:9d:c8:cc:a4:53:a8:21:01:07:54:2f:45:e7:
8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:45:0e:10:
56:27:09:58:40:a0:1b:0c:bf:3e:34:a4:76:2d:05:40:
4f:d0:8a:7a:ec:10:30:35:35:83:14:68:6d:72:b6:15:
90:78:c7:6e:1d:88:59:7f:37:53:18:86:a3:f5:2f:25:
6f:d7:22:19:2b:28:9d:68:44:01:44:67:f1:f1:7f:05:
ac:bb:7b:66:0a
Signature Value
c8:b1:c1:48:15:bd:49:60:4e:7a:99:43:9c:84:b5:50:
fe:d5:f9:4c:ff:35:e8:23:8c:d5:3c:ea:91:d5:8a:0d:
46:27:d2:ea:08:00:eb:ea:3e:14:53:c0:e7:1b:17:5b:
44:14:66:e3:43:1f:b2:35:a1:bd:6e:43:03:10:9b:03
Annotated hex
0: 8A # C509OCSPResponse=array[10]
1: 01 # [0]. ocspResponseType=C509BasicOCSPResponse
# (1)
2: 0C # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
3: 2F # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
4: 50 # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
5: 11111111111111111111111111111111
21: 48 # [4]. responderCertHash=byte[8]
22: 0600867838E3311A
30: 1A 67C4F100 # [5]. producedAt=1740960000:
# 2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
35: 80 # [6]. extensions=array[0]
36: 86 # [7]. responses=array[6]
#---PerIssuerResponses[0]---
37: 48 # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
38: A01C73A5F3B06334
46: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
47: 8F # [2]. singleResponses=array[15]
Liao, et al. Expires 6 May 2027 [Page 105]
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#---SingleCertResponses[0]---
48: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
49: 10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
69: 00 # [1]. certStatus=good (0)
70: 39 707F # [2]. thisUpdate=-28800:
# 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
73: 19 6270 # [3]. nextUpdate=25200:
# 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
76: 80 # [4]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertResponses[1]---
77: 54 # [5]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
78: 75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
98: 01 # [6]. certStatus=not-issued (1)
99: 39 707F # [7]. thisUpdate=-28800:
# 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
102: 19 6270 # [8]. nextUpdate=25200:
# 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
105: 80 # [9]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertResponses[2]---
106: 54 # [10]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
107: D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
127: 82 # [11]. certStatus=array[2]
128: 1A 67C32F00 # [0]. revocationTime=1740844800:
# 2025-03-01T16:00:00Z
133: 04 # [1]. revocationReason=superseded (4)
134: 39 707F # [12]. thisUpdate=-28800:
# 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
137: 19 6270 # [13]. nextUpdate=25200:
# 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
140: 80 # [14]. extensions=array[0]
#---PerIssuerResponses[1]---
141: 48 # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
142: 2222222222222222
150: 80 # [4]. extensions=array[0]
151: 85 # [5]. singleResponses=array[5]
#---SingleCertResponses[0]---
152: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
153: D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
173: 02 # [1]. certStatus=unknown (2)
174: 39 707F # [2]. thisUpdate=-28800:
# 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
177: 19 6270 # [3]. nextUpdate=25200:
# 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
180: 80 # [4]. extensions=array[0]
181: 58 C5 # [8]. responderCerts(COSE_C509)=byte[197]
183: 8B024212350C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A69
212: 570A806E6F6373702D726573706F6E6465720C582081947BBC248AAC79
241: 738211A8D75BF92CB777D994073DF23AE06380EF2C573976880154B5B4
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270: CAF35401D06151DF9629DB579DC8CCA453A8210107542F45E78D2CAEDF
299: 368CDF53C39005D492450E105627095840A01B0CBF3E34A4762D05404F
328: D08A7AEC103035358314686D72B6159078C76E1D88597F37531886A3F5
357: 2F256FD722192B289D6844014467F1F17F05ACBB7B660A
380: 58 40 # [9]. signature value=byte[64]
382: C8B1C14815BD49604E7A99439C84B550FED5F94CFF35E8238CD53CEA91
411: D58A0D4627D2EA0800EBEA3E1453C0E71B175B441466E3431FB235A1BD
440: 6E4303109B03
A.5.5. Basic OCSP Response Example With Responder's Certificate Chain
* Size reduction: 57%
* Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.4.2
* Basic OCSP Response (C509BasicOCSPResponse) with embedded
responder's certificate chain (2 certificates)
* Note that the X.509 OCSP Response and the C509 OCSP Response are
not convertible.
A.5.5.1. X.509 OCSP Response
PEM content (1517 bytes):
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-----BEGIN OCSP RESPONSE-----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-----END OCSP RESPONSE-----
A.5.5.2. C509 OCSP Response
Plain Hex (651 bytes):
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8A010C2F5011111111111111111111111111111111480600867838E3311A1A67C4F1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Textual Representation
C509BasicOCSPResponse
TBSBasicOCSPResponse
Type: C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
Nonce
11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
ResponderCertHash
06:00:86:78:38:e3:31:1a
ProducedAt: 2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
Responses
OcspPerIssuerResponse
IssuerCertHash
a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
Extensions: <empty>
SingleResponses
SingleCertResponse
SerialNumberHash:
10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
5a:6f:0d:8d
Cert Status: good
This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
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SingleCertResponse
SerialNumberHash:
75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
8b:9d:17:6d
Cert Status: not-issued
This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
SingleCertResponse
SerialNumberHash:
d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
5b:67:84:00
Cert Status: revoked (superseded)
Revoked at 2025-03-01T16:00:00Z
This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
OcspPerIssuerResponse
IssuerCertHash
22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
Extensions: <empty>
SingleResponses
SingleCertResponse
SerialNumberHash:
d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
ce:41:7e:3b
Cert Status: unknown
This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
Extensions: <empty>
Responder Certs
C509Certificate
8b:02:42:12:35:0c:6f:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:
63:73:70:2d:63:61:1a:67:75:d7:00:1a:69:57:0a:80:
6e:6f:63:73:70:2d:72:65:73:70:6f:6e:64:65:72:0c:
58:20:81:94:7b:bc:24:8a:ac:79:73:82:11:a8:d7:5b:
f9:2c:b7:77:d9:94:07:3d:f2:3a:e0:63:80:ef:2c:57:
39:76:88:01:54:b5:b4:ca:f3:54:01:d0:61:51:df:96:
29:db:57:9d:c8:cc:a4:53:a8:21:01:07:54:2f:45:e7:
8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:45:0e:10:
56:27:09:58:40:a0:1b:0c:bf:3e:34:a4:76:2d:05:40:
4f:d0:8a:7a:ec:10:30:35:35:83:14:68:6d:72:b6:15:
90:78:c7:6e:1d:88:59:7f:37:53:18:86:a3:f5:2f:25:
6f:d7:22:19:2b:28:9d:68:44:01:44:67:f1:f1:7f:05:
ac:bb:7b:66:0a
C509Certificate
8b:02:41:01:0c:73:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:63:
73:70:2d:72:6f:6f:74:63:61:1a:67:74:85:80:1a:6b:
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36:ec:7f:6f:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:63:73:70:
2d:63:61:0c:58:20:5e:f8:a3:55:a0:01:a7:c5:0d:23:
49:47:01:20:81:31:a4:bb:2a:b9:20:d4:0b:fb:0e:e1:
f6:ab:28:ff:74:00:88:01:54:2f:45:e7:8d:2c:ae:df:
36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:45:0e:10:56:21:18:60:
23:01:07:54:2d:a3:a4:03:f7:d2:f4:e0:b3:d8:03:1a:
73:ba:8a:83:9f:55:7f:0f:58:40:e5:04:65:d6:0c:02:
a2:11:1e:f3:fc:6e:44:f2:a3:60:08:76:5b:55:23:51:
f9:a3:f5:b2:aa:7c:76:f1:f0:5d:25:98:47:a4:f4:25:
0b:2e:4b:0a:e2:09:97:62:a2:59:6d:3c:c1:db:2c:cd:
18:0a:a0:a2:d0:e1:91:31:0b:0f
Signature Value
8a:e4:aa:b9:1f:e2:32:b3:6a:e8:74:ce:31:0b:e7:64:
49:62:6b:17:7c:2e:59:6a:21:e3:de:cd:a9:e7:b9:dc:
70:22:91:c6:da:f1:9a:f5:ad:e2:36:ee:34:b3:89:96:
cf:48:03:bc:65:69:03:74:92:eb:41:f7:ad:e8:d5:05
Annotated hex
0: 8A # C509OCSPResponse=array[10]
1: 01 # [0]. ocspResponseType=C509BasicOCSPResponse
# (1)
2: 0C # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
3: 2F # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
4: 50 # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
5: 11111111111111111111111111111111
21: 48 # [4]. responderCertHash=byte[8]
22: 0600867838E3311A
30: 1A 67C4F100 # [5]. producedAt=1740960000:
# 2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
35: 80 # [6]. extensions=array[0]
36: 86 # [7]. responses=array[6]
#---PerIssuerResponses[0]---
37: 48 # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
38: A01C73A5F3B06334
46: 80 # [1]. extensions=array[0]
47: 8F # [2]. singleResponses=array[15]
#---SingleCertResponses[0]---
48: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
49: 10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
69: 00 # [1]. certStatus=good (0)
70: 39 707F # [2]. thisUpdate=-28800:
# 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
73: 19 6270 # [3]. nextUpdate=25200:
# 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
76: 80 # [4]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertResponses[1]---
77: 54 # [5]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
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78: 75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
98: 01 # [6]. certStatus=not-issued (1)
99: 39 707F # [7]. thisUpdate=-28800:
# 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
102: 19 6270 # [8]. nextUpdate=25200:
# 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
105: 80 # [9]. extensions=array[0]
#---SingleCertResponses[2]---
106: 54 # [10]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
107: D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
127: 82 # [11]. certStatus=array[2]
128: 1A 67C32F00 # [0]. revocationTime=1740844800:
# 2025-03-01T16:00:00Z
133: 04 # [1]. revocationReason=superseded (4)
134: 39 707F # [12]. thisUpdate=-28800:
# 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
137: 19 6270 # [13]. nextUpdate=25200:
# 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
140: 80 # [14]. extensions=array[0]
#---PerIssuerResponses[1]---
141: 48 # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
142: 2222222222222222
150: 80 # [4]. extensions=array[0]
151: 85 # [5]. singleResponses=array[5]
#---SingleCertResponses[0]---
152: 54 # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
153: D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
173: 02 # [1]. certStatus=unknown (2)
174: 39 707F # [2]. thisUpdate=-28800:
# 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
177: 19 6270 # [3]. nextUpdate=25200:
# 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
180: 80 # [4]. extensions=array[0]
181: 82 # [8]. responderCerts(COSE_C509)=array[2]
182: 58 C5 # [0]. C509CertData=byte[197]
184: 8B024212350C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A
212: 69570A806E6F6373702D726573706F6E6465720C582081947BBC248A
240: AC79738211A8D75BF92CB777D994073DF23AE06380EF2C5739768801
268: 54B5B4CAF35401D06151DF9629DB579DC8CCA453A8210107542F45E7
296: 8D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E105627095840A01B0CBF3E34A4
324: 762D05404FD08A7AEC103035358314686D72B6159078C76E1D88597F
352: 37531886A3F52F256FD722192B289D6844014467F1F17F05ACBB7B66
380: 0A
381: 58 CA # [1]. C509CertData=byte[202]
383: 8B0241010C73746573742063726C6F6373702D726F6F7463611A6774
411: 85801A6B36EC7F6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63610C58205EF8
439: A355A001A7C50D23494701208131A4BB2AB920D40BFB0EE1F6AB28FF
467: 74008801542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E1056211860
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495: 230107542DA3A403F7D2F4E0B3D8031A73BA8A839F557F0F5840E504
523: 65D60C02A2111EF3FC6E44F2A36008765B552351F9A3F5B2AA7C76F1
551: F05D259847A4F4250B2E4B0AE2099762A2596D3CC1DB2CCD180AA0A2
579: D0E191310B0F
585: 58 40 # [9]. signature value=byte[64]
587: 8AE4AAB91FE232B36AE874CE310BE76449626B177C2E596A21E3DECDA9
616: E7B9DC702291C6DAF19AF5ADE236EE34B38996CF4803BC6569037492EB
645: 41F7ADE8D505
Appendix B. Document Updates
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
B.1. Version -00 to -01
* Added the section "Alternative Certificate Status Checking
Mechanisms".
* Constrained the value ranges of integer fields in the CDDL.
* Replaced the "C509 Hash Algorithms" registry with the "COSE
Algorithms" registry.
* Specified the PEM representation of C509 CRL and C509 OCSP
messages.
* Added the registries for C509 CRL types and C509 OCSP request and
response types.
* Added the section "Implementation Status".
* Added the section "Security Considerations".
* Clarifications and editorial improvements.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank xxx for reviewing and commenting on intermediate
versions of the draft.
Authors' Addresses
Lijun Liao
NIO Inc.
China
Email: lijun.liao@nio.io
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Marco Tiloca
RISE AB
Sweden
Email: marco.tiloca@ri.se
Joel Höglund
RISE AB
Sweden
Email: joel.hoglund@ri.se
Rikard Höglund
RISE AB
Sweden
Email: rikard.hoglund@ri.se
Shahid Raza
University of Glasgow
United Kingdom
Email: shahid.raza@glasgow.ac.uk
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