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CBOR Encoded Certificate Revocation Management
draft-liao-cose-c509-revocation-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Lijun Liao , Marco Tiloca , Joel Höglund , Rikard Höglund , Shahid Raza
Last updated 2026-11-02
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draft-liao-cose-c509-revocation-01
COSE Working Group                                               L. Liao
Internet-Draft                                                  NIO Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                               M. Tiloca
Expires: 6 May 2027                                           J. Höglund
                                                              R. Höglund
                                                                 RISE AB
                                                                 S. Raza
                                                   University of Glasgow
                                                         2 November 2026

             CBOR Encoded Certificate Revocation Management
                   draft-liao-cose-c509-revocation-01

Abstract

   This document specifies CBOR-encoded PKI structures for use with C509
   certificates (draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert), X.509 certificates
   (RFC 5280), and future certificate types.  It defines C509 CRL and
   C509 OCSP, compact CBOR encodings of X.509 Certificate Revocation
   Lists (RFC 5280) and OCSP messages (RFC 6960), respectively.  The
   structures defined in this document are certificate-type agnostic and
   can be used with C509 certificates, X.509 certificates, or future
   certificate types without modification.  C509 OCSP improves on RFC
   6960 by signing a wider set of fields to prevent algorithm-
   substitution and certificate-chain substitution attacks, replacing
   plaintext serial numbers with hashes to preserve requestor privacy,
   replacing the two-hash issuer identity with a single certificate
   hash, and identifying all participants (requestor, responder, issuer)
   by a uniform certificate hash rather than type-specific fields.  C509
   CRL and C509 OCSP are not wire-format-compatible with their DER-
   encoded X.509 counterparts and cannot be converted to or from them
   without semantic interpretation.  Additionally, this document
   specifies the PEM representation of the C509 structures following the
   framework of [RFC7468].

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liao-cose-c509-revocation/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the CBOR Object Signing
   and Encryption (cose) Working Group mailing list
   (mailto:cose@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cose/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cose/.

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   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/lijun-nio/idc509rev.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Alternative Certificate Status Checking Mechanisms  . . . . .   8
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Common Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Encoding of Time Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  C509 CRL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.2.  C509 CRL CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.3.  Field Encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       6.3.1.  CRLInfoData and C509CRLInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       6.3.2.  crlType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       6.3.3.  signatureAlgorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

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       6.3.4.  authoritySubject and authorityKeyIdentifier . . . . .  13
       6.3.5.  crlNumber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.3.6.  thisUpdate and nextUpdate . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.3.7.  baseCrlNumber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.3.8.  reasonCode Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.3.9.  revokedCertsList and PerIssuerRevokedCerts  . . . . .  15
         6.3.9.1.  Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
         6.3.9.2.  Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.3.10. CRL Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       6.3.11. Per-Issuer Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
         6.3.11.1.  expiredCertsOnCRL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       6.3.12. CRL Entry Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       6.3.13. signatureValue  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     6.4.  PEM Representation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   7.  C509 OCSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     7.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     7.2.  Hash Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     7.3.  Identification of Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     7.4.  C509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       7.4.1.  CDDL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       7.4.2.  Field Encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
         7.4.2.1.  ocspRequestType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
         7.4.2.2.  issuerCertHash  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
         7.4.2.3.  PerIssuerOCSPRequests, PerIssuerOCSPRequest,
                 SingleCertRequests and SingleCertRequest  . . . . .  27
         7.4.2.4.  C509UnsignedOCSPRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
         7.4.2.5.  C509SignedOCSPRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
         7.4.2.6.  C509SimpleOCSPRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       7.4.3.  PEM Representation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     7.5.  C509 OCSP Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       7.5.1.  CDDL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       7.5.2.  Field Encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
         7.5.2.1.  C509ErrorOCSPResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
         7.5.2.2.  C509BasicOCSPResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
         7.5.2.3.  C509SimpleOCSPResponse  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
         7.5.2.4.  nonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
         7.5.2.5.  responderCertHash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
         7.5.2.6.  responderCerts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
         7.5.2.7.  signatureAlgorithm and signatureValue . . . . . .  35
         7.5.2.8.  producedAt, thisUpdate, nextUpdate  . . . . . . .  35
         7.5.2.9.  extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
         7.5.2.10. PerIssuerOCSPResponses and
                 PerIssuerOCSPResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
         7.5.2.11. SingleCertResponse  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
         7.5.2.12. Per-Issuer OCSP Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . .  36
         7.5.2.13. OCSP Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       7.5.3.  PEM Representation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     7.6.  Certificate Type Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . .  40

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     7.7.  OCSP Stapling in TLS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
   8.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     8.1.  Implementation #1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     8.2.  Implementation #2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
     9.1.  Signature Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
     9.2.  Truncated Hash Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     9.3.  Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     9.4.  Freshness and Replay  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     9.5.  Completeness of CRLs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
     9.6.  Parsing and Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     10.1.  C509 CRL Types Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     10.2.  C509 OCSP Request Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     10.3.  C509 OCSP Response Types Registry  . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     10.4.  Extension Identifiers Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     10.5.  TLS CertificateStatusType Registry . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     10.6.  PEM Label Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     10.7.  Media Type Application Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       10.7.1.  Media Type application/c509-crl+cbor . . . . . . . .  50
       10.7.2.  Media Type application/c509-crlinfo+cbor . . . . . .  51
       10.7.3.  Media Type application/c509-ocspreq+cbor . . . . . .  52
       10.7.4.  Media Type application/c509-ocspresp+cbor  . . . . .  53
     10.8.  CoAP Content-Formats Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     10.9.  Expert Review Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   Appendix A.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     A.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     A.2.  Helper Keys and Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
       A.2.1.  CA Private Key and Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . .  60
         A.2.1.1.  CA Private Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
         A.2.1.2.  CA Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
       A.2.2.  CRL Signer Private Key and Certificate  . . . . . . .  61
         A.2.2.1.  CRL Signer Private Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
         A.2.2.2.  CRL Signer Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
       A.2.3.  OCSP Requestor Private Key and Certificate  . . . . .  63
         A.2.3.1.  OCSP Requestor Private Key  . . . . . . . . . . .  63
         A.2.3.2.  OCSP Requestor Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . .  63
       A.2.4.  OCSP Responder Private Key and Certificate  . . . . .  64
         A.2.4.1.  OCSP Responder Private Key  . . . . . . . . . . .  64
         A.2.4.2.  OCSP Responder Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     A.3.  CRL Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
       A.3.1.  CRL Example Without Revoked Certificates  . . . . . .  66
         A.3.1.1.  X.509 CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
         A.3.1.2.  C509 CRL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
       A.3.2.  CRL Example With Revoked Certificates . . . . . . . .  67

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         A.3.2.1.  X.509 CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
         A.3.2.2.  C509 CRL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
       A.3.3.  Delta CRL Example With Revoked Certificates . . . . .  71
         A.3.3.1.  X.509 CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
         A.3.3.2.  C509 CRL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
       A.3.4.  Indirect CRL Example With Revoked Certificates  . . .  73
         A.3.4.1.  X.509 CRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
         A.3.4.2.  C509 CRL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
     A.4.  OCSP Request Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
       A.4.1.  Simple OCSP Request Example . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
         A.4.1.1.  X.509 OCSP Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
         A.4.1.2.  C509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
       A.4.2.  Unsigned OCSP Request Example . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
         A.4.2.1.  X.509 OCSP Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
         A.4.2.2.  C509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
       A.4.3.  Signed OCSP Request Example Without Requestor's
               Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
         A.4.3.1.  X.509 OCSP Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
         A.4.3.2.  C509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
       A.4.4.  Signed OCSP Request Example With Requestor's
               Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
         A.4.4.1.  X.509 OCSP Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
         A.4.4.2.  C509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
       A.4.5.  Signed OCSP Request Example With Requestor's
               Certificate Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
         A.4.5.1.  X.509 OCSP Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
         A.4.5.2.  C509 OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90
     A.5.  OCSP Response Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  94
       A.5.1.  Error OCSP Response Example . . . . . . . . . . . . .  95
         A.5.1.1.  X.509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  95
         A.5.1.2.  C509 OCSP Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  95
       A.5.2.  Simple OCSP Response Example  . . . . . . . . . . . .  95
         A.5.2.1.  X.509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  96
         A.5.2.2.  C509 OCSP Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  96
       A.5.3.  Basic OCSP Response Example Without Responder's
               Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  98
         A.5.3.1.  X.509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  98
         A.5.3.2.  C509 OCSP Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  99
       A.5.4.  Basic OCSP Response Example With Responder's
               Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
         A.5.4.1.  X.509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
         A.5.4.2.  C509 OCSP Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
       A.5.5.  Basic OCSP Response Example With Responder's
               Certificate Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
         A.5.5.1.  X.509 OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
         A.5.5.2.  C509 OCSP Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
   Appendix B.  Document Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
     B.1.  Version -00 to -01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

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   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

1.  Introduction

   Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for constrained environments
   [RFC7228] requires compact certificate representations and compact
   revocation information.  [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert] defines
   C509 certificates, a CBOR encoding of X.509 certificates [RFC5280]
   that reduces certificate size by over 50% for typical constrained-
   device profiles.  However, revocation mechanisms such as Certificate
   Revocation Lists (CRLs) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
   messages have not yet received the same treatment.

   CRLs as defined in [RFC5280] can be large, especially when many
   certificates have been revoked or when CRL extensions add overhead.
   In the complementary OCSP mechanism defined in [RFC6960], OCSP
   responses carry per-certificate status information and may be
   exchanged during TLS [RFC9846] and DTLS [RFC9147] handshakes via OCSP
   stapling [RFC6066], directly affecting handshake latency.

   Note on terminology: The label "C509" is used for consistency with
   the C509 certificate encoding and to promote a cohesive C509 PKI
   ecosystem (C509 certificates, CRLs, OCSP, and related tooling).
   Although this document uses "C509" in its names, the encodings and
   protocols defined here are certificate-type agnostic and apply
   equally to X.509 certificates and other certificate types; see
   Section 7.6.

   This document specifies:

   *  *C509 CRL* -- a natively signed CBOR [RFC8949] encoding of X.509
      CRLs ([RFC5280], Section 5).  The signature is computed over the
      CBOR Sequence [RFC8742] TBSCertList; no ASN.1 encoding is
      involved.  Three key improvements are made over [RFC5280]:

      -  Reduce the search complexity for a given certificate serial
         number from O(n) to O(log(n)):

         o  Replace the implicit certificateIssuer mechanism with
            explicit per-issuer grouping.

         o  Use a dedicated list for the removeFromCRL revocation
            entries.

         o  Use fixed-length entry encoding.

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      -  Define a new standalone C509CRLInfo structure to carry CRL
         information without the (large) revocation list itself.

      -  Define dedicated fields for the common extensions to simplify
         the encoding: crlNumber, authorityKeyIdentifier,
         deltaCRLIndicator.

   *  *C509 OCSP* -- a CBOR encoding of OCSP requests and responses
      ([RFC6960]).  The encoding compresses common fields while
      preserving semantic equivalence.  Four key improvements are made
      over [RFC6960]:

      -  The signature in signed requests and responses is computed over
         a wider set of fields than in [RFC6960], including the
         signature algorithm and the certificate chain, preventing
         algorithm-substitution and certificate-chain substitution
         attacks.

      -  Certificate serial numbers in requests and responses are
         replaced by hashes (serialNumberHash), providing privacy
         against passive observers who do not already know the queried
         serial numbers.

      -  The issuer is identified by a single hash over the issuer
         certificate (issuerCertHash) rather than by the two-hash
         CertID, reducing per-issuer overhead.

      -  All participants (requestor, responder, issuer) are identified
         by a hash over their certificate (requestorCertHash,
         responderCertHash, issuerCertHash) rather than by a plaintext
         Subject distinguished name or SubjectKeyIdentifier, avoiding
         structural CHOICE types such as the X.509 ResponderID (byName
         or byKey) and simplifying support for different certificate
         types (e.g., C509, X.509, or future types) because the same
         hash applies regardless of the certificate encoding.

   The CRL and OCSP structures defined in this document are certificate-
   type agnostic: they can be used with C509 certificates, X.509
   certificates, or any future certificate type without modification;
   see Section 7.6.

   C509 CRL and C509 OCSP apply the same compression techniques as C509
   certificates: static fields are elided, OIDs are replaced with short
   integers, time values are compressed to POSIX timestamps, and
   redundant encoding is removed.  Implementers may use the CBOR
   playground [CborMe] to inspect encoded examples.

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   C509 CRL and C509 OCSP are not wire-format-compatible with their DER-
   encoded counterparts defined in [RFC5280] and [RFC6960].  Systems
   that use C509 CRL or C509 OCSP must explicitly support these CBOR-
   encoded formats; they cannot be transparently substituted for or
   derived from the corresponding DER-encoded structures.

   C509 CRL and C509 OCSP are designed to be compatible with certificate
   profiles for constrained deployments, such as [RFC7925].

2.  Alternative Certificate Status Checking Mechanisms

   This section considers both widely deployed certificate-status
   mechanisms and closely related prior work for constrained
   environments.  Several such mechanisms can be used to check
   certificate status, but none of them replaces the work in this
   document.

   *  *X.509 CRLs and OCSP* ([RFC5280], [RFC6960]) provide the baseline
      revocation mechanisms, but their DER encodings are not compact
      enough for constrained deployments and are not certificate-type
      agnostic.  This document keeps their semantics while defining CBOR
      encodings that are smaller and easier to process.

   *  *OCSP stapling* ([RFC6066], [RFC9846]) reduces client latency by
      having the server provide a fresh OCSP response, but it does not
      define a revocation status format of its own.  It still depends on
      the underlying OCSP message structure, so it cannot replace a
      compact, standalone status representation.

   *  *Short-lived certificates* reduce reliance on revocation, but they
      do not provide revocation status when certificates must remain
      valid for longer periods or must be withdrawn immediately after
      compromise.  They also shift the problem to more frequent issuance
      and renewal rather than eliminating status checking.

   *  *CRLSets* [CRLSets] are a browser-distributed revocation blocklist
      rather than a general-purpose revocation protocol.  They cover
      only a limited subset of certificates and are tied to a specific
      browser ecosystem, so they cannot provide complete, interoperable
      status checking for arbitrary C509, X.509, or future certificate
      types.

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   *  *CRLite* [CRLite] compresses revocation information into a
      browser-oriented filter-based representation, which is useful for
      client-side deployment at scale.  However, it is not a wire-format
      replacement for CRLs or OCSP, does not preserve the full per-
      certificate status structures defined here, and is not a
      certificate-type-agnostic status format that other implementations
      can exchange directly.

   *  *Compact CBOR revocation for IoT (TinyOCSP and CCRL)* [TinyOCSP]
      are prior research mechanisms that reduce OCSP and CRL overhead
      for low-power IoT, confirming the feasibility and benefits of
      CBOR-based revocation on constrained hardware.  They are a
      precursor to this work.  However, they were specified as point
      solutions rather than as interoperable, certificate-type-agnostic
      wire formats aligned with the C509 certificate encoding
      [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]; this document generalizes those
      mechanisms into complete C509 CRL and C509 OCSP structures usable
      with C509, X.509, and future certificate types.

   The compactness benefit over the DER-encoded baselines is concrete
   and substantial.  For the representative profiles in the worked
   examples (Appendix A), C509 CRLs are 18% to 52% smaller than the
   equivalent X.509 CRLs (for example, a CRL carrying revoked
   certificates is reduced from 335 to 177 bytes, a 47% reduction), and
   C509 OCSP messages are 40% to 73% smaller (for example, a Simple OCSP
   request from 150 to 51 bytes, and a Basic OCSP response without the
   responder's certificate from 837 to 248 bytes); see Table 14.

   These alternatives are useful in specific deployments, but they do
   not provide the CBOR-based, certificate-type-agnostic revocation
   structures defined here for C509, X.509, and future certificate
   types.

3.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document uses the terminology from [RFC5280], [RFC6960],
   [RFC7228], [RFC8610], [RFC8742], [RFC8949], and [RFC9682].  Unless
   otherwise stated, "CBOR" refers to deterministically encoded CBOR as
   specified in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of [RFC8949].

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4.  Common Types

   The following types are imported from
   [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]: Name, Extension, Extensions,
   Defined, COSE_C509, and AlgorithmIdentifier.  Additionally, the
   following type is imported from [RFC9360]: COSE_X509.

   This document further defines the following constrained aliases for
   use in all CDDL definitions:

   uint8 = uint .le 255

   uint32 = 0..4294967295             ; 2^32 - 1

   uint63 = 0..9223372036854775807    ; 2^63 - 1

   int16 = -32768..32767

   IntAlgorithmIdentifier = int16

   IntExtension = ( extensionID: IntExtensionID, extensionValue: Defined )

   IntExtensionID = 1..9223372036854775807 / ;   2^32 - 1
                    -9223372036854775807..-1  ; -(2^32 - 1)

   IntExtensions = [ * IntExtension ]

   The CDDL definitions in this document are split into three files:
   c509common.cddl (the definitions above), c509crl.cddl (Section 6),
   and c509ocsp.cddl (Section 7).  Both c509crl.cddl and c509ocsp.cddl
   depend on c509common.cddl and on the types imported from
   [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert] and [RFC9360].

   IntAlgorithmIdentifier is the int-only instantiation of
   AlgorithmIdentifier from [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert].  It is
   used throughout this document wherever an algorithm identifier
   appears in the wire encoding.

   IntExtension is the instantiation of Extension from
   [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert] with an integer extensionID.  As in
   C509 certificates ([I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert],
   Section 3.1.10), the absolute value of extensionID is the value from
   the "C509 Extensions" registry, and its sign indicates whether the
   extension is critical: critical extensions are encoded with a
   negative sign and non-critical extensions with a positive sign.  It
   is used throughout this document wherever a single extension appears
   in the wire encoding.

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   IntExtensions is the instantiation of Extensions from
   [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert] where all embedded Extension
   entries are IntExtension entries.  An IntExtensions field with no
   extensions is encoded as an empty array.

5.  Encoding of Time Fields

   Time fields are encoded as unwrapped CBOR epoch-based date/time
   (~time).  The value MUST be a non-negative integer.  In POSIX time
   [POSIX], leap seconds are ignored; a leap second has the same POSIX
   time as the second before it.

6.  C509 CRL

6.1.  Overview

   A C509 CRL is a natively signed CBOR [RFC8949] encoding of an X.509
   v2 CRL as defined in [RFC5280], Section 5.  The signature is computed
   over the CBOR Sequence [RFC8742] TBSCertList; no ASN.1 encoding is
   involved.  A C509 CRL preserves the semantics of the corresponding
   DER-encoded X.509 CRL for the subset of RFC 5280 structures supported
   by this document.

   A C509 CRL is not wire-format-compatible with a DER-encoded X.509
   CRL.  The two formats cannot be mechanically converted to or from
   each other without semantic interpretation of the contained data.

6.2.  C509 CRL CDDL

   The following CDDL defines the top-level C509CRL structure and the
   TBSCertList sequence:

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   C509CRL = [
     TBSCertList,
     signatureValue : any,
   ]

   TBSCertList = (
     CRLInfoData,
     revokedCertsList       : [+ PerIssuerRevokedCerts] / null
   )

   C509CRLInfo = [ CRLInfoData ]

   CRLInfoData = (
     crlType                : 0, ; int16
     signatureAlgorithm     : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
     authoritySubject       : Name / #6.121(bytes),
     authorityKeyIdentifier : bytes,
     crlNumber              : CRLNumber,
     thisUpdate             : ~time,
     nextUpdate             : uint63 / null,
     baseCrlNumber          : CRLNumber / null,
     crlExtensions          : IntExtensions,
   )

   CRLNumber = 1..9223372036854775807

   PerIssuerRevokedCerts = (
     issuer                 : Name / #6.121(bytes) / null,
     revokedCertsControl    : RevokedCertsControl / null,
     extensions             : IntExtensions,
     revokedCerts           : bytes .size (1..2147483647) / null,
     removedFromCRLCerts    : bytes .size (1..2147483647) / null,
   )

   RevokedCertsControl = [
     flags               : uint32,
     serialNumberLength  : 1..20,
     dateLength          : uint .le 8,
     baseDate            : ~time,
   ]

                         Figure 1: CDDL for C509CRL

6.3.  Field Encodings

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6.3.1.  CRLInfoData and C509CRLInfo

   CRLInfoData is a CDDL group that carries all CRL fields except
   revokedCertsList.  C509CRLInfo is the standalone CBOR array form of
   CRLInfoData; it can be used to convey CRL information (crlType,
   signature algorithm, issuer identity, CRL number, validity window,
   base CRL number, extensions) without the potentially large revocation
   list.  TBSCertList embeds CRLInfoData and adds revokedCertsList.

6.3.2.  crlType

   The crlType field serves as the discriminator for C509CRL:

                            +=======+=========+
                            | Value | Type    |
                            +=======+=========+
                            |   0   | C509CRL |
                            +-------+---------+

                             Table 1: CRL types

   Future specifications may define additional types by assigning new
   integer values.

6.3.3.  signatureAlgorithm

   Encoded identically to the int choice of issuerSignatureAlgorithm in
   C509 certificates (see [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert],
   Section 3.1.3).  Algorithm integer values are from the same registry
   used for C509 certificates.

   Unlike in [RFC5280], where the signature algorithm appears outside
   the TBSCertList and is therefore not covered by the CRL signature,
   signatureAlgorithm is part of CRLInfoData within TBSCertList and is
   therefore covered by the signature.  This prevents algorithm-
   substitution attacks on the CRL.

6.3.4.  authoritySubject and authorityKeyIdentifier

   The authoritySubject and authorityKeyIdentifier fields identify the
   CRL authority.

   The authoritySubject field identifies the subject of the CRL issuer.
   When the CRL is issued by a C509 CA, authoritySubject is a Name value
   identical to the subject field of the authority C509 certificate.
   When the CRL is issued by an X.509 CA (e.g., in a hybrid deployment
   where a legacy CA issues a C509-format CRL), authoritySubject is
   encoded as #6.121(bytes) (tag 121 is alternative 0), where the byte

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   string contains the DER-encoded Name from the subject field of the
   issuing X.509 CA certificate ([X.690]).  Since the Name structure may
   also be bytes, the DER-encoded subject is wrapped in a 121-tagged
   structure.

   The authorityKeyIdentifier field is identical to the value of the
   authority's subjectKeyIdentifier extension.  This field corresponds
   to the X.509 CRL extension authorityKeyIdentifier ([RFC5280],
   Section 5.2.1).  It is promoted to a dedicated field because it MUST
   be present in conforming X.509 CRLs and because making it explicit
   simplifies the structure and reduces encoded size compared to
   representing it as a generic extension.

6.3.5.  crlNumber

   The crlNumber field is encoded as a positive integer (CRLNumber, from
   1 to 2^63 - 1).  It corresponds to the cRLNumber extension in
   [RFC5280], Section 5.2.3, which this document replaces with a
   dedicated field.  The value is monotonically increasing for both full
   and delta CRLs.

6.3.6.  thisUpdate and nextUpdate

   The thisUpdate field is encoded as described in Section 5.  The
   nextUpdate field is encoded as a uint63 representing the number of
   seconds from thisUpdate until the next CRL is expected to be issued.
   It is encoded as null when no next update time is known.

6.3.7.  baseCrlNumber

   The baseCrlNumber field is encoded as null for a full CRL.  For a
   delta CRL, it contains the CRL number of the corresponding base full
   CRL.  It corresponds to the deltaCRLIndicator extension in [RFC5280],
   Section 5.2.4, which this document replaces with a dedicated field.

6.3.8.  reasonCode Encoding

   The reasonCode ENUMERATED value is encoded as one unsigned byte.  The
   byte values are aligned with the ENUMERATED values of the CRLReason
   type defined in [RFC5280], Section 5.3.1; a C509 revocationReason
   byte value equals the corresponding ASN.1 ENUMERATED integer value
   for the same reason code.

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                      +======+======================+
                      | Byte | reasonCode           |
                      +======+======================+
                      | 0x00 | unspecified          |
                      +------+----------------------+
                      | 0x01 | keyCompromise        |
                      +------+----------------------+
                      | 0x02 | cACompromise         |
                      +------+----------------------+
                      | 0x03 | affiliationChanged   |
                      +------+----------------------+
                      | 0x04 | superseded           |
                      +------+----------------------+
                      | 0x05 | cessationOfOperation |
                      +------+----------------------+
                      | 0x06 | certificateHold      |
                      +------+----------------------+
                      |  -   | removeFromCRL        |
                      +------+----------------------+
                      | 0x09 | privilegeWithdrawn   |
                      +------+----------------------+
                      | 0x0A | aACompromise         |
                      +------+----------------------+

                        Table 2: reasonCode encoding

   removeFromCRL (enumeration value 0x08) is not encoded in
   revokedCerts.  Certificates removed from the CRL are instead
   indicated in the removedFromCRLCerts field of PerIssuerRevokedCerts.

6.3.9.  revokedCertsList and PerIssuerRevokedCerts

6.3.9.1.  Design Considerations

   In X.509 CRLs ([RFC5280], Section 5.3.3), an indirect CRL uses the
   certificateIssuer CRL entry extension to indicate that a revocation
   entry -- and all subsequent entries -- belong to a different issuer.
   This mechanism has two significant drawbacks:

   *  It is implicit and positional, making it difficult to parse
      correctly and error-prone to implement.

   *  It is impossible to represent an issuer that has no currently
      revoked certificates (e.g., to carry per-issuer extensions or to
      explicitly indicate that the issuer is known but has an empty
      revocation list), because there is no entry to attach the
      certificateIssuer extension to.

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   PerIssuerRevokedCerts solves both problems by introducing an explicit
   intermediate structure that groups all revocation information for one
   issuer.  The issuer is identified directly in the issuer field of the
   structure rather than being inferred from the position of a CRL entry
   extension.  This makes the grouping unambiguous and easy to parse,
   and it allows an issuer to appear in the list even when it has no
   revoked certificates.

   A second design problem in X.509 CRLs is that each revocation entry
   has variable length because:

   *  the serial number length differs between certificates,

   *  the revocation date uses different encodings depending on whether
      the date falls before or after 2050,

   *  optional per-entry extensions (e.g., reason code) may or may not
      be present.

   This variable-length layout makes it impossible to determine whether
   a given serial number is present in the list without scanning every
   entry sequentially, resulting in O(n) lookup time.

   In this document, the revokedCertsControl structure introduces fixed
   parameters (serialNumberLength, dateLength) that make every entry
   within revokedCerts exactly the same size.  The flags field can
   additionally indicate that entries are sorted in ascending order by
   serial number, enabling binary search and reducing lookup time to
   O(log(n)).  Using a compact byte-string concatenation rather than a
   CBOR array of structured items further reduces encoded size and
   accelerates parsing.  Furthermore, certificates removed from the CRL
   (delta CRL removeFromCRL entries in X.509) are kept in a dedicated
   removedFromCRLCerts field rather than mixed into revokedCerts.  This
   keeps revokedCerts free of removal noise, reducing its size and
   allowing implementations to process currently revoked and removed
   entries independently.

6.3.9.2.  Fields

   The revokedCertsList field is either a CBOR array of one or more
   PerIssuerRevokedCerts entries, each describing the revocation state
   for certificates issued by one issuer, or CBOR null.  Since
   PerIssuerRevokedCerts is a CDDL group, the fields of each entry are
   inlined in the array rather than wrapped in a nested array; an array
   with n entries therefore contains 5n elements.  revokedCertsList MUST
   be encoded as CBOR null when all of the following conditions hold: no
   certificates are currently revoked, no certificates have been removed
   from the CRL, the only issuer that would appear is the CRL's own

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   authoritySubject (i.e., the issuer field is null), and there are no
   non-empty per-issuer extensions.

   Each PerIssuerRevokedCerts entry describes revoked certificates for
   one issuer using the following fields:

   *  The issuer field identifies the issuer of the certificates covered
      by this PerIssuerRevokedCerts entry.  When the issuer is a C509
      CA, it is encoded as a Name value identical to the issuer field of
      the covered C509 certificates.  When the issuer is an X.509 CA, it
      is encoded as #6.121(bytes) (tag 121 is alternative 0), where the
      byte string contains the DER-encoded Name from the issuer field of
      the covered X.509 certificates ([X.690]).  If the issuer is
      identical to the CRL's authoritySubject field, it MUST be encoded
      as CBOR null.

   *  The revokedCertsControl field defines the controls for
      interpreting removedFromCRLCerts and revokedCerts.  If either
      removedFromCRLCerts or revokedCerts is non-null,
      revokedCertsControl MUST NOT be null.  If both removedFromCRLCerts
      and revokedCerts are null, revokedCertsControl MUST be null to
      reduce CRL size.

      -  The flags field is an unsigned integer encoding boolean control
         bits for crlType = 0: bit 0 indicates whether entries in
         revokedCerts are sorted in ascending order by the integer value
         of the certificate serial number; bit 1 indicates whether each
         entry contains a reason code.  Bits greater than 1 are reserved
         for crlType = 0 and MUST be zero and MUST be ignored by
         receivers.  Future crlType values defined in successor
         documents may assign additional bit meanings.

      -  The serialNumberLength field defines the length, in bytes, of a
         certificate serial number.  It MUST be greater than 0.  It is
         the smallest value that can encode all certificate serial
         numbers without leading zeros.

         Each certificate serial number is encoded as a fixed-length
         big-endian integer of length serialNumberLength.  If the
         encoded value is shorter than serialNumberLength, it is left-
         padded with zeros.

      -  The dateLength field defines the length, in bytes, of the big-
         endian encoded revocation-date offset relative to baseDate.  A
         value of 0 means that no revocation date is included in
         revokedCerts entries.  This is permitted in C509-native
         deployments where the revocation date is not required -- for
         example, when minimizing revocation data is more important than

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         recording the revocation time.  Implementations that need to
         convert a C509 CRL to an RFC 5280 DER-encoded CRL MUST set
         dateLength to a non-zero value, since [RFC5280], Section 5.1
         requires a revocationDate in every CRL entry.  When dateLength
         is non-zero, the offset MUST fit within the specified byte
         length without leading zero bytes.

      -  The baseDate field is a reference time used to compute
         revocation and removal dates, encoded as described in
         Section 5.  It MUST be greater than or equal to the issuer
         certificate's notBefore, which ensures that all stored offsets
         are non-negative.  It is RECOMMENDED to set baseDate to the
         earliest revocation date and removal-from-CRL date among all
         entries in this CRL, as this minimizes the magnitude of stored
         offsets and reduces encoding size.  Any time between the issuer
         certificate's notBefore (inclusive) and that earliest date
         (inclusive) is a conformant value.  Revocation dates in
         revokedCerts and removal dates in removedFromCRLCerts are
         stored as non-negative offsets, in seconds, from baseDate.

   *  The extensions field contains per-issuer extensions.

   *  The revokedCerts field is a CBOR byte string containing the
      concatenated byte sequence of revoked-certificate entries.  Each
      entry is the concatenation of:

      -  a big-endian encoded certificate serial number of length
         serialNumberLength;

      -  a big-endian encoded revocation-date offset from baseDate, in
         seconds, of length dateLength (absent when dateLength is 0);
         and

      -  an optional reason code (1 byte if bit 1 of flags is set,
         absent otherwise).

      If there are no entries, this field MUST be encoded as CBOR null
      instead of a zero-length byte string.

      The revocation date for a given entry is recovered by adding the
      stored offset to baseDate.  When dateLength is 0, no revocation
      date is stored and no date recovery is possible.

      Revoked-certificate entries have fixed length.  If bit 0 of flags
      is set, entries are sorted in ascending order, enabling binary
      search for a given serial number in O(log(n)) time.

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   *  The removedFromCRLCerts field contains a concatenated byte
      sequence of entries for certificates removed from the CRL since
      publication of the CRL with crlNumber = baseCrlNumber.  Each entry
      is the concatenation of:

      -  a big-endian encoded certificate serial number of length
         serialNumberLength; and

      -  a big-endian encoded removal-date offset from baseDate, in
         seconds, of length dateLength (absent when dateLength is 0).

      If there are no entries, this field MUST be encoded as CBOR null
      instead of a zero-length byte string.

      The removal date for a given entry is recovered by adding the
      stored offset to baseDate.  When dateLength is 0, no removal date
      is stored and no date recovery is possible.

      Removed-certificate entries have fixed length.  If bit 0 of flags
      is set, entries are sorted in ascending order, enabling binary
      search for a given serial number in O(log(n)) time.

6.3.10.  CRL Extensions

   The crlExtensions field contains extensions for the CRL.  This
   document does not define any new CRL-level extensions.

   Table 3 lists X.509 CRL extensions and their equivalents.

    +====+==========================+==========+======================+
    |Code| Extension                |Reference |Equivalent            |
    +====+==========================+==========+======================+
    |-   | authorityKeyIdentifier   |[RFC5280],|field                 |
    |    |                          |Section   |authorityKeyIdentifier|
    |    |                          |5.2.1     |                      |
    +----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
    |-   | issuerAltName            |[RFC5280],|-                     |
    |    |                          |Section   |                      |
    |    |                          |5.2.2     |                      |
    +----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
    |-   | cRLNumber                |[RFC5280],|field crlNumber       |
    |    |                          |Section   |                      |
    |    |                          |5.2.3     |                      |
    +----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
    |-   | deltaCRLIndicator        |[RFC5280],|field baseCrlNumber   |
    |    |                          |Section   |                      |
    |    |                          |5.2.4     |                      |
    +----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+

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    |-   | issuingDistributionPoint |[RFC5280],|-                     |
    |    |                          |Section   |                      |
    |    |                          |5.2.5     |                      |
    +----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
    |-   | freshestCRL              |[RFC5280],|-                     |
    |    |                          |Section   |                      |
    |    |                          |5.2.6     |                      |
    +----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
    |-   | authorityInfoAccess      |[RFC5280],|-                     |
    |    |                          |Section   |                      |
    |    |                          |5.2.7     |                      |
    +----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
    |-   | orderedList              |OID       |bit 0 of flags        |
    |    |                          |2.5.29.56 |(ascSerialNum); -     |
    |    |                          |(ITU-T    |(ascRevDate)          |
    |    |                          |X.509,    |                      |
    |    |                          |Section   |                      |
    |    |                          |9.5.2.5)  |                      |
    +----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
    |-   | toBeRevoked              |OID       |-                     |
    |    |                          |2.5.29.58 |                      |
    |    |                          |(ITU-T    |                      |
    |    |                          |X.509,    |                      |
    |    |                          |Section   |                      |
    |    |                          |9.5.2.6)  |                      |
    +----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+
    |-   | revokedGroups            |OID       |-                     |
    |    |                          |2.5.29.59 |                      |
    |    |                          |(ITU-T    |                      |
    |    |                          |X.509,    |                      |
    |    |                          |Section   |                      |
    |    |                          |9.5.2.7)  |                      |
    +----+--------------------------+----------+----------------------+

               Table 3: CRL extensions and their equivalents

6.3.11.  Per-Issuer Extensions

   The extensions field of PerIssuerRevokedCerts contains per-issuer
   extensions.  This document defines one per-issuer extension
   (expiredCertsOnCRL, see Section 6.3.11.1).

   Table 4 lists per-issuer extensions defined in this document.

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    +======+===================+=========================+============+
    | Code | Extension         | Reference               | Equivalent |
    +======+===================+=========================+============+
    | TBD4 | expiredCertsOnCRL | OID 2.5.29.60 (ITU-T    | -          |
    |      |                   | X.509, Section 9.5.2.8) |            |
    +------+-------------------+-------------------------+------------+

            Table 4: Per-issuer extensions and their equivalents

6.3.11.1.  expiredCertsOnCRL

   The expiredCertsOnCRL extension indicates that this CRL includes
   revocation information for certificates that have already expired.
   The extension value is a time value indicating the earliest
   expiration date of certificates included on the CRL; certificates
   that expired on or after this date are listed even if they are
   expired when the CRL is generated.

   The extension value MUST be encoded as follows.

   ExpiredCertsOnCRL = ~time

   The value is encoded as described in Section 5.  When this extension
   is present, a relying party processing expired certificates (for
   example, for audit or archiving purposes) SHOULD use the indicated
   date to determine the extent of historical revocation coverage.

6.3.12.  CRL Entry Extensions

   Table 5 lists X.509 CRL entry extensions.  No corresponding extension
   is defined in this document.

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   +======+=====================+==============+=======================+
   | Code | Extension           | Reference    | Equivalent            |
   +======+=====================+==============+=======================+
   | -    | reasonCode          | [RFC5280],   | fields                |
   |      |                     | Section      | removedFromCRLCerts   |
   |      |                     | 5.3.1 /      | and revokedCerts      |
   |      |                     | ITU-T        |                       |
   |      |                     | X.509,       |                       |
   |      |                     | Section      |                       |
   |      |                     | 9.6.2.1      |                       |
   +------+---------------------+--------------+-----------------------+
   | -    | holdInstructionCode | [RFC3280],   | -                     |
   |      |                     | Section      |                       |
   |      |                     | 5.3.2 /      |                       |
   |      |                     | ITU-T        |                       |
   |      |                     | X.509,       |                       |
   |      |                     | Section      |                       |
   |      |                     | 9.6.2.2      |                       |
   +------+---------------------+--------------+-----------------------+
   | -    | invalidityDate      | [RFC5280],   | -                     |
   |      |                     | Section      |                       |
   |      |                     | 5.3.2 /      |                       |
   |      |                     | ITU-T        |                       |
   |      |                     | X.509,       |                       |
   |      |                     | Section      |                       |
   |      |                     | 9.6.2.3      |                       |
   +------+---------------------+--------------+-----------------------+
   | -    | certificateIssuer   | [RFC5280],   | field issuer within   |
   |      |                     | Section      | PerIssuerRevokedCerts |
   |      |                     | 5.3.3 /      |                       |
   |      |                     | ITU-T        |                       |
   |      |                     | X.509,       |                       |
   |      |                     | Section      |                       |
   |      |                     | 9.6.2.4      |                       |
   +------+---------------------+--------------+-----------------------+

            Table 5: CRL entry extensions defined for X.509 CRLs

6.3.13.  signatureValue

   Encoded identically to signatureValue in C509 certificates (see
   [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], Section 3.1.12).

6.4.  PEM Representation

   The CBOR-encoded C509CRL is first Base64-encoded and then wrapped
   between "-----BEGIN C509 CRL-----" and "-----END C509 CRL-----",
   following the framework of [RFC7468].

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   -----BEGIN C509 CRL-----
   (base64-encoded CBOR C509CRL)
   -----END C509 CRL-----

                      Figure 2: C509 CRL PEM Encoding

7.  C509 OCSP

7.1.  Overview

   C509 OCSP defines CBOR encodings for OCSP requests and OCSP responses
   as defined in [RFC6960].  The encoding follows the same compression
   principles as C509 CRL and C509 certificates.

   C509 OCSP requests and responses are not wire-format-compatible with
   DER-encoded OCSP messages as defined in [RFC6960].  The two formats
   cannot be mechanically converted to or from each other without
   semantic interpretation of the contained data.

   C509OCSPRequest and C509OCSPResponse are designed to be extensible.
   The first field of every message is ocspRequestType or
   ocspResponseType, an integer that identifies the structure type.
   Future specifications may define additional types by assigning new
   integer values, enabling new request or response structures to be
   introduced without modifying the existing types.

7.2.  Hash Algorithms

   The hashAlgorithm field of C509 OCSP requests and responses
   identifies the hash algorithm used to compute all hashes within the
   enclosing structure.  Its value is the integer identifier of a hash
   algorithm from the "COSE Algorithms" registry [IANA.cose], e.g., -16
   for SHA-256, -43 for SHA-384, and -44 for SHA-512 [RFC9054].  Any
   hash algorithm in that registry can be used, subject to the
   restrictions below; for example, SHA3-256 or SM3 can be used once
   they are registered.

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   The hash algorithm MUST produce an output of at least 20 bytes, so
   that HashId20 values can be derived (see Section 7.3).  Consequently,
   SHA-256/64 (-15) MUST NOT be used.  Other truncated hash algorithms,
   such as SHA-512/256 (-17), SHOULD NOT be used: this document already
   defines the truncated identifiers HashId8 and HashId20, so using a
   truncated hash algorithm provides no benefit.  SHA-1 (-14) MUST NOT
   be used either, since it is not collision resistant.  For SHAKE128
   (-18) and SHAKE256 (-45), the output length is as specified in
   [RFC9054], i.e., 256 and 512 bits, respectively.  For an extendable-
   output function whose output length is not fixed by its registration,
   such as TurboSHAKE128 (-261) and TurboSHAKE256 (-262) [RFC9861], the
   output length is the length of the identifier being computed, i.e., 8
   bytes for HashId8 and 20 bytes for HashId20.

7.3.  Identification of Certificates

   To reduce OCSP message size, this document defines two truncated-hash
   identifier types used to refer to certificates compactly:

   *  HashId8: the leading 8 bytes of the hash value computed using the
      enclosing hashAlgorithm.  HashId8 is used to identify issuer
      certificates and the certificates of OCSP requestors and
      responders in request and response structures where a short
      identifier provides sufficient uniqueness in the deployment
      context.

   *  HashId20: the leading 20 bytes of the hash value computed using
      the enclosing hashAlgorithm.  HashId20 is intended for identifying
      certificate serial numbers (the serialNumberHash field) when
      higher uniqueness is required to minimize collision risk.  When
      derived from a secure hash (e.g., SHA-256 or SHA3-256) and treated
      as a random output, it gives ~2^160 preimage work and ~2^80
      collision resistance (birthday bound) for the truncated value.
      Since the relying party verifies a certificate's signature before
      querying OCSP, an adversary needs to construct a different
      certificate that (a) validates under the same issuer chain and (b)
      has a serial number whose hash truncation equals an existing
      certificate's HashId20.  Such a construction is practically
      infeasible.

   HashId8   = bytes .size 8
   HashId20  = bytes .size 20

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   HashId20 is used to carry the hash of the certificate serial number
   of the target certificate, computed using the hashAlgorithm of the
   enclosing structure.  The serial number is encoded in big-endian byte
   order without a leading zero byte (as in C509 certificates) before
   hashing.  In X.509, a CertificateSerialNumber INTEGER is DER-encoded
   with a leading zero byte when the most-significant bit is set; that
   leading zero MUST be stripped before computing the hash.

   Using a hash rather than the plain serial number preserves the
   privacy of the requestor: an observer cannot determine which
   certificate is being queried without already knowing the serial
   number.

7.4.  C509 OCSP Request

7.4.1.  CDDL

   C509OCSPRequest = C509UnsignedOCSPRequest /
                     C509SignedOCSPRequest /
                     C509SimpleOCSPRequest

   C509UnsignedOCSPRequest = [
     ocspRequestType    : 0, ; int16
     hashAlgorithm      : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
     nonce              : bytes .size (16..32) / null,
     extensions         : IntExtensions,
     requests           : PerIssuerOCSPRequests
   ]

   TBSOCSPRequest = (
     ocspRequestType    : 1, ; int16
     signatureAlgorithm : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
     hashAlgorithm      : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
     nonce              : bytes .size (16..32) / null,
     requestorCertHash  : HashId8,
     extensions         : IntExtensions,
     requests           : PerIssuerOCSPRequests,
     requestorCerts     : COSE_C509 / #6.121(COSE_X509) / null,
   )

   C509SignedOCSPRequest = [
     TBSOCSPRequest,
     signatureValue     : any,
   ]

   C509SimpleOCSPRequest = [
     ocspRequestType    : 2, ; int16
     hashAlgorithm      : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,

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     nonce              : bytes .size (16..32) / null,
     issuerCertHash     : HashId8,
     serialNumberHash   : HashId20,
     extensions         : IntExtensions
   ]

   PerIssuerOCSPRequests = [ + PerIssuerOCSPRequest ]

   PerIssuerOCSPRequest = (
     issuerCertHash   : HashId8,
     extensions       : IntExtensions,
     singleRequests   : SingleCertRequests,
   )

   SingleCertRequests  = [ + SingleCertRequest ]

   SingleCertRequest = (
     serialNumberHash : HashId20,
     extensions       : IntExtensions,
   )

                     Figure 3: CDDL for C509OCSPRequest

7.4.2.  Field Encodings

7.4.2.1.  ocspRequestType

   The ocspRequestType field serves as the discriminator for
   C509OCSPRequest:

                    +=======+=========================+
                    | Value | Type                    |
                    +=======+=========================+
                    |   0   | C509UnsignedOCSPRequest |
                    +-------+-------------------------+
                    |   1   | C509SignedOCSPRequest   |
                    +-------+-------------------------+
                    |   2   | C509SimpleOCSPRequest   |
                    +-------+-------------------------+

                        Table 6: OCSP request types

7.4.2.2.  issuerCertHash

   The issuerCertHash field appears in PerIssuerOCSPRequest,
   PerIssuerOCSPResponse, C509SimpleOCSPRequest, and
   TBSSimpleOCSPResponse.  It contains a hash of the issuer certificate:

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   *  issuerCertHash: hash computed over the deterministically encoded
      certificate, i.e., the CBOR-encoded C509Certificate or the DER-
      encoded ([X.690]) X.509 certificate.  For a CBOR re-encoded X.509
      certificate (c509CertificateType = 3, see
      [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], Section 3.1.1), the hash MUST
      be computed over the DER-encoded X.509 certificate, not over its
      C509 encoding, since such a certificate may have more than one
      conformant CBOR encoding (see [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert],
      Section 3.4).  The hash algorithm is specified by the
      hashAlgorithm field of the enclosing request or response
      structure.

   In X.509 OCSP ([RFC6960], Section 4.1.1), the CertID structure
   identifies the issuer using two separate hashes: issuerNameHash (a
   hash of the DER-encoded issuer name) and issuerKeyHash (a hash of the
   issuer's public key bit string).  This two-hash approach was designed
   for interoperability with DER-encoded X.509 structures, but it
   doubles the per-issuer overhead in the message.  In C509 OCSP, the
   issuer is identified by a single hash of the issuer certificate
   (issuerCertHash), which is simpler, smaller, and unambiguous.
   Implementations that need to cross-reference a C509 issuerCertHash
   with an RFC 6960 DER-encoded CertID must recompute the respective
   hash inputs; the values are not directly comparable.

7.4.2.3.  PerIssuerOCSPRequests, PerIssuerOCSPRequest,
          SingleCertRequests and SingleCertRequest

   PerIssuerOCSPRequests is a list of PerIssuerOCSPRequest entries.  In
   X.509 OCSP ([RFC6960], Section 4.1.1), every Request entry embeds a
   full CertID containing the issuer identity fields (hashAlgorithm,
   issuerNameHash, issuerKeyHash) alongside the serialNumber.  When
   multiple certificates from the same issuer are queried in a single
   request, these issuer fields are repeated verbatim for every entry,
   wasting space.  PerIssuerOCSPRequest solves this by grouping all
   single-certificate requests for the same issuer under one entry: the
   issuerCertHash field is encoded once and shared across all
   SingleCertRequest entries in the singleRequests list, eliminating the
   per-entry duplication.  Since PerIssuerOCSPRequest and
   SingleCertRequest are CDDL groups, the fields of each entry are
   inlined in the enclosing array rather than wrapped in a nested array.

   *  The extensions field contains per-issuer extensions that apply to
      all single-certificate requests in this PerIssuerOCSPRequest
      entry; see Section 7.5.2.12.

   *  The singleRequests field is a list of SingleCertRequest entries
      for certificates from this issuer.

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   Each SingleCertRequest contains:

   *  The serialNumberHash field is the truncated hash of the
      certificate serial number of the target certificate, computed
      using the hashAlgorithm of the enclosing request structure.  The
      serial number is encoded in big-endian byte order without a
      leading zero byte (as in C509 certificates) before hashing.  Using
      a hash rather than the plain serial number preserves the privacy
      of the requestor: an observer cannot determine which certificate
      is being queried without already knowing the serial number.

   *  The extensions field contains extensions for the single request;
      see Section 7.5.2.13.

7.4.2.4.  C509UnsignedOCSPRequest

   *  The ocspRequestType field MUST be 0.

   *  The hashAlgorithm field specifies the hash algorithm used to
      compute issuerCertHash and serialNumberHash.  The algorithm is
      encoded as specified in Section 7.2.

   *  The nonce field contains the request nonce, or MUST be null when
      no nonce is present.  The nonce MUST be generated by a
      cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator and MUST be
      between 16 and 32 bytes long.  An OCSP server MUST reject a
      request whose nonce is shorter than 16 bytes or longer than 32
      bytes by returning a C509ErrorOCSPResponse with responseStatus set
      to malformedRequest (1).

   *  The extensions field contains request-level extensions; see
      Section 7.5.2.13.

   *  The requests field is a list of PerIssuerOCSPRequest entries, each
      grouping target certificates by issuer; see Section 7.4.2.3.

7.4.2.5.  C509SignedOCSPRequest

   *  The ocspRequestType field MUST be 1.

   *  The signatureAlgorithm field specifies the signature algorithm, as
      defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], Section 3.1.3.

   *  The hashAlgorithm field specifies the hash algorithm used to
      compute requestorCertHash, issuerCertHash, and serialNumberHash.
      The algorithm is encoded as specified in Section 7.2.

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   *  The nonce field is as defined for C509UnsignedOCSPRequest
      (Section 7.4.2.4).

   *  The requestorCertHash field is a hash of the signer's certificate,
      computed using hashAlgorithm.  When requestorCerts is not null, it
      carries the corresponding certificate chain so that the receiver
      can verify the identity of the requestor.

   *  The extensions field contains request-level extensions; see
      Section 7.5.2.13.

   *  The requests field is as defined for C509UnsignedOCSPRequest
      (Section 7.4.2.4).

   *  The requestorCerts field contains a sorted certificate chain
      starting with the signer's certificate, or MUST be null if no
      certificates are transported.  When the signer holds a C509
      certificate chain, the value is COSE_C509.  When the signer holds
      an X.509 certificate chain, the value is #6.121(COSE_X509),
      wrapping a COSE_X509 chain with CBOR tag 121 (alternative 0).

   *  The signatureValue field is the signature computed over the CBOR
      Sequence of the TBSOCSPRequest group.

7.4.2.6.  C509SimpleOCSPRequest

   C509SimpleOCSPRequest is a compact request format for querying the
   status of a single certificate.  Unlike C509UnsignedOCSPRequest,
   which uses a two-level PerIssuerOCSPRequests / SingleCertRequest
   grouping to batch multiple serial numbers across one or more issuers,
   C509SimpleOCSPRequest flattens the structure into a single CBOR array
   for the common case of a one-certificate query.

   *  The ocspRequestType field MUST be 2.

   *  The hashAlgorithm field specifies the hash algorithm used to
      compute issuerCertHash and serialNumberHash.  The algorithm is
      encoded as specified in Section 7.2.

   *  The nonce field is as defined for C509UnsignedOCSPRequest
      (Section 7.4.2.4).

   *  The issuerCertHash field identifies the issuer of the target
      certificate; see Section 7.4.2.2.

   *  The serialNumberHash field is the hash of the certificate serial
      number of the target certificate, computed as in Section 7.3.

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   *  The extensions field contains request-level extensions; see
      Section 7.5.2.13.

7.4.3.  PEM Representation

   The CBOR-encoded C509 OCSP request is first Base64-encoded and then
   wrapped between "-----BEGIN C509 OCSP REQUEST-----" and "-----END
   C509 OCSP REQUEST-----", following the framework of [RFC7468].

   -----BEGIN C509 OCSP REQUEST-----
   (base64-encoded CBOR C509 OCSP Request)
   -----END C509 OCSP REQUEST-----

                  Figure 4: C509 OCSP Request PEM Encoding

7.5.  C509 OCSP Response

7.5.1.  CDDL

   C509OCSPResponse = C509ErrorOCSPResponse /
                      C509BasicOCSPResponse /
                      C509SimpleOCSPResponse

   C509ErrorOCSPResponse = [
     ocspResponseType  : 0,  ; int16
     responseStatus    : -128..127
   ]

   TBSBasicOCSPResponse = (
     ocspResponseType   : 1, ; int16
     signatureAlgorithm : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
     hashAlgorithm      : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
     nonce              : bytes .size (16..32) / null,
     responderCertHash  : HashId8,
     producedAt         : ~time,
     extensions         : IntExtensions,
     responses          : PerIssuerOCSPResponses,
     responderCerts     : COSE_C509 / #6.121(COSE_X509) / null,
   )

   C509BasicOCSPResponse = [
     TBSBasicOCSPResponse,
     signatureValue     : any
   ]

   TBSSimpleOCSPResponse = (
     ocspResponseType   : 2, ; int16
     signatureAlgorithm : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,

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     hashAlgorithm      : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
     nonce              : bytes .size (16..32) / null,
     responderCertHash  : HashId8,
     issuerCertHash     : HashId8,
     serialNumberHash   : HashId20,
     certStatus         : CertStatus,
     producedAt         : ~time,
     thisUpdate         : nint / 0,
     nextUpdate         : uint63 / null,
     extensions         : IntExtensions,
     responderCerts     : COSE_C509 / #6.121(COSE_X509) / null,
   )

   C509SimpleOCSPResponse = [
     TBSSimpleOCSPResponse,
     signatureValue     : any
   ]

   PerIssuerOCSPResponses = [ + PerIssuerOCSPResponse ]

   PerIssuerOCSPResponse = (
     issuerCertHash   : HashId8,
     extensions       : IntExtensions,
     singleResponses  : SingleCertResponses,
   )

   SingleCertResponses = [ + SingleCertResponse ]

   SingleCertResponse = (
     serialNumberHash : HashId20,
     certStatus       : CertStatus,
     thisUpdate       : nint / 0,
     nextUpdate       : uint63 / null,
     extensions       : IntExtensions,
   )

   CertStatus = 0        ; good
              / 1        ; not-issued (issuer recognized,
                         ;   serial number not issued)
              / 2        ; unknown (issuer not recognized)
              / RevokedInfo

   RevokedInfo = [
     revocationTime   : ~time,
     revocationReason : uint8,
   ]

                    Figure 5: CDDL for C509OCSPResponse

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7.5.2.  Field Encodings

7.5.2.1.  C509ErrorOCSPResponse

   If the OCSP server cannot process the OCSP query, it returns a
   C509ErrorOCSPResponse.  The ocspResponseType value MUST be 0, and
   responseStatus has the following enumerated values, as in [RFC6960],
   Section 4.2.1:

                        +=====+==================+
                        | int | responseStatus   |
                        +=====+==================+
                        |  -  | successful       |
                        +-----+------------------+
                        |  1  | malformedRequest |
                        +-----+------------------+
                        |  2  | internalError    |
                        +-----+------------------+
                        |  3  | tryLater         |
                        +-----+------------------+
                        |  5  | sigRequired      |
                        +-----+------------------+
                        |  6  | unauthorized     |
                        +-----+------------------+

                                 Table 7:
                          responseStatus values

7.5.2.2.  C509BasicOCSPResponse

   The ocspResponseType field of C509BasicOCSPResponse is 1,
   distinguishing it from C509ErrorOCSPResponse.  It corresponds to
   BasicOCSPResponse in [RFC6960].

   TBSBasicOCSPResponse is the group of fields to be signed.  The
   signatureValue field is the only field outside the signed group.
   Covering signatureAlgorithm and responderCerts within the signed
   content prevents algorithm-substitution and certificate-chain
   substitution attacks; this design goes beyond the protections offered
   by the DER-encoded BasicOCSPResponse defined in [RFC6960].

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7.5.2.3.  C509SimpleOCSPResponse

   C509SimpleOCSPResponse is a compact signed response for a single-
   certificate status query.  It is the response counterpart to
   C509SimpleOCSPRequest (see Section 7.4.2.6).  Unlike
   C509BasicOCSPResponse, which uses a two-level PerIssuerOCSPResponses
   / SingleCertResponse grouping to carry status for multiple
   certificates across one or more issuers, C509SimpleOCSPResponse
   flattens the structure into a single signed CBOR array for the common
   case of a one-certificate response.

   TBSSimpleOCSPResponse is the group of fields to be signed.  The
   signatureValue field is the only field outside the signed group.
   Covering signatureAlgorithm, responderCertHash, and responderCerts
   within the signed content prevents algorithm-substitution and
   certificate-chain substitution attacks.

   *  The ocspResponseType field MUST be 2, which discriminates
      C509SimpleOCSPResponse from C509ErrorOCSPResponse and
      C509BasicOCSPResponse.

   *  The signatureAlgorithm field specifies the signature algorithm, as
      defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], Section 3.1.3.  It
      is part of TBSSimpleOCSPResponse and is therefore covered by the
      signature.

   *  The hashAlgorithm field specifies the hash algorithm used to
      compute responderCertHash, issuerCertHash, and serialNumberHash.
      The algorithm is encoded as specified in Section 7.2.

   *  The nonce field contains the request nonce, or MUST be null when
      no nonce is present.  If present, it MUST have the same value as
      the nonce in the corresponding C509SimpleOCSPRequest.

   *  The responderCertHash field identifies the OCSP responder; see
      Section 7.5.2.5.

   *  The issuerCertHash field identifies the issuer of the queried
      certificate; see Section 7.4.2.2.

   *  The serialNumberHash field is the hash of the certificate serial
      number of the target certificate, computed as in Section 7.3.

   *  The certStatus field encodes the revocation status; see
      Section 7.5.2.11.

   *  The producedAt field is the time at which this response was
      produced, encoded as described in Section 5.

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   *  The thisUpdate field is encoded as a non-positive integer (nint /
      0) representing the number of seconds from producedAt at which the
      indicated status is known to be correct.  It MUST be 0 or
      negative, since the status cannot be known at a time in the future
      relative to the time the response was produced.

   *  The nextUpdate field is encoded as a uint63 representing the
      number of seconds from producedAt until the next response update
      is expected, or null if the update time is unknown.

   *  The extensions field contains response-level extensions; see
      Section 7.5.2.13.

   *  The responderCerts field carries the certificate chain starting
      with the responder certificate identified by responderCertHash;
      see Section 7.5.2.6.

   *  The signatureValue field is the signature computed over the CBOR
      Sequence of the TBSSimpleOCSPResponse group.

7.5.2.4.  nonce

   If present, this field MUST have the same value as the nonce in the
   corresponding request.

7.5.2.5.  responderCertHash

   responderCertHash is a truncated hash over the responder's
   certificate, computed using the same hashAlgorithm as issuerCertHash.
   In X.509 OCSP ([RFC6960]), the responder is identified by a
   ResponderID CHOICE that carries either a distinguished name or a
   public-key hash.  C509 OCSP replaces this with a single hash over the
   entire responder certificate, which is consistent with the
   issuerCertHash design for issuer identification.

7.5.2.6.  responderCerts

   When present, the responderCerts field carries the certificate chain
   starting with the responder certificate identified by
   responderCertHash.  When the responder holds a C509 certificate
   chain, the value is COSE_C509.  When the responder holds an X.509
   certificate chain, the value is #6.121(COSE_X509), wrapping a
   COSE_X509 chain with CBOR tag 121 (alternative 0).  The field is part
   of TBSBasicOCSPResponse or TBSSimpleOCSPResponse and is therefore
   covered by the signature, which prevents certificate-chain
   substitution attacks.

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7.5.2.7.  signatureAlgorithm and signatureValue

   *  signatureAlgorithm: the signature algorithm used to compute
      signatureValue, as defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert],
      Section 3.1.3.  It is part of the TBSBasicOCSPResponse or
      TBSSimpleOCSPResponse group and is therefore covered by the
      signature.

   *  signatureValue: the signature computed over the CBOR Sequence of
      the TBSBasicOCSPResponse or TBSSimpleOCSPResponse group.

7.5.2.8.  producedAt, thisUpdate, nextUpdate

   The producedAt field is encoded as described in Section 5.  The
   thisUpdate field is encoded as a non-positive integer (nint / 0)
   representing the number of seconds from producedAt at which the
   indicated status is known to be correct; it MUST be 0 or negative,
   since the status cannot be known at a time in the future relative to
   when the response was produced.  The nextUpdate field is encoded as a
   uint63 representing the number of seconds from producedAt until the
   next update is expected to be available.  nextUpdate may be null,
   which indicates an unknown update time.

7.5.2.9.  extensions

   See Section 7.5.2.13.

7.5.2.10.  PerIssuerOCSPResponses and PerIssuerOCSPResponse

   PerIssuerOCSPResponses is a list of PerIssuerOCSPResponse entries.
   For the same reason as on the request side (see Section 7.4.2.3), the
   issuerCertHash field is encoded once per issuer and shared across all
   SingleCertResponse entries in the singleResponses list, avoiding the
   per-entry repetition that would occur if the issuer identity were
   embedded in every individual response entry.  PerIssuerOCSPResponse
   groups single responses for certificates issued by the same issuer;
   the issuer is identified by issuerCertHash (see Section 7.4.2.2).  As
   on the request side, PerIssuerOCSPResponse and SingleCertResponse are
   CDDL groups whose fields are inlined in the enclosing array.

   *  The extensions field contains per-issuer extensions that apply to
      all single-certificate responses in this PerIssuerOCSPResponse
      entry; see Section 7.5.2.12.

   *  The singleResponses field contains one SingleCertResponse for each
      queried certificate issued by that issuer.

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7.5.2.11.  SingleCertResponse

7.5.2.11.1.  serialNumberHash

   This field contains the truncated hash of the serial number of the
   certificate being queried, computed as in Section 7.3.

7.5.2.11.2.  extensions

   See Section 7.5.2.13.

7.5.2.11.3.  certStatus

   CertStatus is encoded either as an integer (for good, not-issued, and
   unknown) or as a RevokedInfo array:

   *  0: good -- the certificate is not revoked.

   *  1: not-issued -- the issuer is recognized but the serial number is
      unknown.

   *  2: unknown -- the responder does not recognize the issuer
      identified by issuerCertHash.

   *  RevokedInfo: revoked -- an array carrying revocationTime and
      revocationReason.  The revocationReason field is encoded as
      specified in Section 6.3.8.  When the revocation reason is not
      known, revocationReason MUST be set to 0 (unspecified).

   The integer values are chosen to align with the ASN.1 IMPLICIT tag
   numbers of CertStatus in [RFC6960]: good uses ASN.1 tag 0 and unknown
   uses ASN.1 tag 2.  The ASN.1 revoked alternative uses ASN.1 tag 1;
   since C509 represents the revoked status as the explicit RevokedInfo
   array, the integer value 1 becomes available.  It is assigned to the
   not-issued status, which was introduced in [RFC6960], Section 4.4.8
   to distinguish unrecognized serial numbers from unrecognized issuers,
   thereby maintaining a contiguous integer range for the non-revoked
   statuses.

7.5.2.12.  Per-Issuer OCSP Extensions

   PerIssuerOCSPRequest.extensions and PerIssuerOCSPResponse.extensions
   carry per-issuer extensions.

   Table 8 lists the per-issuer extensions defined in this document.

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          +================+===========+============+==========+
          |      Code      | Extension | Applied in | Comments |
          +================+===========+============+==========+
          | (none defined) |           |            |          |
          +----------------+-----------+------------+----------+

                   Table 8: Per-issuer OCSP extensions

7.5.2.13.  OCSP Extensions

   Table 9 describes the OCSP extensions defined in [RFC6960] and
   [I-D.ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp] and their mapping in this document.

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   +====+==========+=================================+==========+============+
   |Code|Extension |RFC Reference                    |Applied in|Replaced in |
   |    |          |                                 |          |this        |
   |    |          |                                 |          |document    |
   +====+==========+=================================+==========+============+
   | -  |nonce     |[RFC6960], Section 4.4.1         |Request   |field nonce |
   |    |          |                                 |Extension,|            |
   |    |          |                                 |Response  |            |
   |    |          |                                 |Extension |            |
   +----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
   | -  |CRL       |[RFC6960], Section 4.4.2         |Single    |-           |
   |    |References|                                 |Response  |            |
   |    |          |                                 |Extension |            |
   +----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
   |TBD2|Acceptable|[RFC6960], Section 4.4.3         |Request   |-           |
   |    |Response  |                                 |Extension |            |
   |    |Types     |                                 |          |            |
   +----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
   | -  |Archive   |[RFC6960], Section 4.4.4         |Response  |-           |
   |    |Cutoff    |                                 |Extension |            |
   +----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
   | -  |Service   |[RFC6960], Section 4.4.5         |Request   |-           |
   |    |Locator   |                                 |Extension |            |
   +----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
   |TBD3|Preferred |[RFC6960], Section 4.4.7         |Request   |-           |
   |    |Signature |                                 |Extension |            |
   |    |Algorithms|                                 |          |            |
   +----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
   | -  |Extended  |[RFC6960], Section 4.4.8         |Response  |cert status |
   |    |Revoked   |                                 |Extension |not-issued  |
   |    |Definition|                                 |          |(for serial |
   |    |          |                                 |          |numbers not |
   |    |          |                                 |          |issued by a |
   |    |          |                                 |          |recognized  |
   |    |          |                                 |          |issuer) and |
   |    |          |                                 |          |unknown (for|
   |    |          |                                 |          |unrecognized|
   |    |          |                                 |          |issuers)    |
   +----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+
   |TBD6|TN Query  |[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp]|Single    |-           |
   |    |          |                                 |Request   |            |
   |    |          |                                 |Extension |            |
   +----+----------+---------------------------------+----------+------------+

                 Table 9: OCSP extensions and their mapping

   This document defines the following extension values:

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   *  Acceptable Response Types: The extension value MUST be encoded as
      follows.

   AcceptableResponseTypes = [ + int]

   The integers in AcceptableResponseTypes form a sorted list of
   preferred C509OCSPResponse types, in descending order of preference,
   that the requestor is willing to accept.  This document defines types
   0 (C509ErrorOCSPResponse), 1 (C509BasicOCSPResponse), and 2
   (C509SimpleOCSPResponse).  Type 0 (C509ErrorOCSPResponse) is always
   implicitly supported and does not need to be listed.  When this
   extension is absent, an OCSP server responding to a
   C509UnsignedOCSPRequest or C509SignedOCSPRequest MUST reply with a
   C509BasicOCSPResponse (type 1); an OCSP server responding to a
   C509SimpleOCSPRequest MUST reply with a C509SimpleOCSPResponse (type
   2).  If AcceptableResponseTypes contains type 2 but not type 1, and
   the corresponding request contains entries for two or more
   certificates, the server SHALL return a C509ErrorOCSPResponse with
   responseStatus set to malformedRequest (1), since
   C509SimpleOCSPResponse can only carry status for a single
   certificate.

   *  Preferred Signature Algorithms: The extension value MUST be
      encoded as follows.

   PreferredSignatureAlgorithm = (
     sigIdentifier        : IntAlgorithmIdentifier,
     pubKeyAlgIdentifiers : [ 2* IntAlgorithmIdentifier ]
                            / IntAlgorithmIdentifier
                            / null,
   )

   PreferredSignatureAlgorithms = [ + PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ]

   The sigIdentifier field carries the signature algorithm identifier.
   The pubKeyAlgIdentifiers field carries the public key algorithm
   identifier and MUST be one of:

   *  a CBOR array of two or more IntAlgorithmIdentifier values, sorted
      in descending order of preference, when the requestor is willing
      to accept any of the listed public key algorithms as a match for
      this signature algorithm preference (e.g., to express hybrid or
      multi-algorithm key policies); the first entry in the array
      represents the most preferred public key algorithm,

   *  a single IntAlgorithmIdentifier value, when exactly one public key
      algorithm is acceptable, or

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   *  null, when the public key algorithm is unconstrained or implied by
      sigIdentifier.

   PreferredSignatureAlgorithms MUST be sorted in descending order of
   preference; the first entry represents the most preferred algorithm
   combination.  Since PreferredSignatureAlgorithm is a CDDL group, the
   fields of each entry are inlined in the array rather than wrapped in
   a nested array.

   *  TN Query: The extension value MUST be encoded as follows.

   TNQuery = text .size (1..15)

   The TNQuery extension carries a telephone number string conforming to
   the TelephoneNumber ASN.1 type ([RFC8226], Section 3).  When included
   in single request extensions, it specifies the telephone number for
   which the OCSP query is being performed (typically the number from
   the "orig" field of a PASSporT being validated).

   This extension is allowed only in the single-request extensions per
   [I-D.ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp].

7.5.3.  PEM Representation

   The CBOR-encoded C509 OCSP response is first Base64-encoded and then
   wrapped between "-----BEGIN C509 OCSP RESPONSE-----" and "-----END
   C509 OCSP RESPONSE-----", following the framework of [RFC7468].

   -----BEGIN C509 OCSP RESPONSE-----
   (base64-encoded CBOR C509 OCSP Response)
   -----END C509 OCSP RESPONSE-----

                 Figure 6: C509 OCSP Response PEM Encoding

7.6.  Certificate Type Interoperability

   C509 OCSP uses a single set of request and response structures that
   handles both C509 and X.509 certificates without modification.  All
   participants (requestor, responder, issuer) are identified by a hash
   over their certificate rather than by type-specific fields such as a
   Subject distinguished name, SubjectKeyIdentifier, or the X.509
   ResponderID CHOICE (byName or byKey).  Because a hash applies
   uniformly regardless of the certificate encoding, the same OCSP
   structures accommodate C509 certificates (CBOR-encoded), X.509
   certificates (DER-encoded), and any future certificate types.

   The only per-type differences are in how identity hashes are computed
   and how certificate chains are carried:

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    +===================+======================+=====================+
    | Field             | C509 certificate     | X.509 certificate   |
    +===================+======================+=====================+
    | issuerCertHash    | Hash of CBOR-encoded | Hash of DER-encoded |
    |                   | C509Certificate      | X.509 certificate   |
    +-------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
    | requestorCertHash | Hash of CBOR-encoded | Hash of DER-encoded |
    |                   | C509Certificate      | X.509 certificate   |
    +-------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
    | responderCertHash | Hash of CBOR-encoded | Hash of DER-encoded |
    |                   | C509Certificate      | X.509 certificate   |
    +-------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
    | requestorCerts /  | COSE_C509            | #6.121(COSE_X509)   |
    | responderCerts    |                      |                     |
    +-------------------+----------------------+---------------------+

       Table 10: Per-type differences in C509 OCSP identity fields

   In this table, "C509 certificate" refers to a natively signed C509
   certificate (c509CertificateType = 2).  A CBOR re-encoded X.509
   certificate (c509CertificateType = 3) is treated as an X.509
   certificate: its identity hash MUST be computed over the DER-encoded
   X.509 certificate.

   In a hybrid deployment where the responder holds an X.509
   certificate, responderCertHash contains the hash of the DER-encoded
   X.509 certificate and responderCerts carries a #6.121(COSE_X509)
   chain.  In a deployment using C509 certificates throughout, all
   identity hashes are computed over CBOR-encoded certificates and
   certificate chains are carried as COSE_C509.  The hashAlgorithm field
   at the top level of each request or response structure governs all
   hashes within that structure.

7.7.  OCSP Stapling in TLS

   In standard TLS certificate status stapling (see the status_request
   extension, [RFC9846]), the stapled OCSP response is a DER-encoded
   OCSPResponse.  To allow C509 OCSP stapling, this document defines a
   new TLS CertificateStatusType value (see [RFC6066], Section 8):

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                   +=======+===========+===============+
                   | Value | Name      | Reference     |
                   +=======+===========+===============+
                   |  TBD1 | c509_ocsp | This document |
                   +-------+-----------+---------------+

                               Table 11: TLS
                       CertificateStatusType for C509
                                    OCSP

   When CertificateStatusType is c509_ocsp, the status field contains a
   CBOR-encoded C509OCSPResponse instead of a DER-encoded OCSPResponse.

8.  Implementation Status

   This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication.
   When deleting this section, please also delete RFC 7942 from the
   references of this document.

   (Boilerplate as per Section 2.1 of [RFC7942]:)

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.

   According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups
   to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
   running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
   and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
   It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
   they see fit".

8.1.  Implementation #1

   *  Organization: RISE AB

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   *  Implementation: c509rev, available in the c509rev directory of the
      GitHub repository of this document (https://github.com/lijun-nio/
      idc509rev)

   *  Description: A reference implementation of the C509 CRL and C509
      OCSP structures specified in this document, written in Rust.

   *  Implementation's level of maturity: Prototype.  Intended for
      testing and reference purposes, not for production use.

   *  Coverage:

      -  C509 CRL, including the compact revokedCertsList encoding with
         fixed-length revoked-certificate and removed-from-CRL entries.

      -  C509 OCSP requests of all defined types (simple, unsigned, and
         signed).  The signed-request variants carrying the requestor's
         certificate or certificate chain are supported only as an
         opaque pass-through.

      -  C509 OCSP responses of all defined types (error, basic, and
         simple).

      -  The hash algorithms SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512, including
         truncated identity hashes.

      -  Time encoding, including the delta encodings used in OCSP.

      -  Signing and signature verification with Ed25519 and ECDSA with
         secp256r1 and SHA-256.

      -  PEM textual representation of C509 CRLs and C509 OCSP messages,
         as specified in this document.

      -  Names are supported only in the single common-name text form.

   *  Version compatibility: draft-liao-cose-c509-revocation-00

   *  Interoperability: The encoder output matches the examples in this
      document byte for byte (for signed objects, the to-be-signed
      part), and all examples successfully round-trip through decoding
      and re-encoding.  No interoperability testing with independent
      implementations has been performed yet.

   *  Licensing: See the repository of this document.

   *  Contact: Joel Höglund (joel.hoglund@ri.se)

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8.2.  Implementation #2

   *  Organization: NIO Inc.

   *  Implementation: Internal project, not publicly available

   *  Description: An implementation of the C509 CRL and C509 OCSP
      structures specified in this document, written in Java.

   *  Implementation's level of maturity: Prototype.

   *  Coverage: All structures and features specified in this document.

   *  Version compatibility: draft-liao-cose-c509-revocation-00

   *  Interoperability: This implementation was used to produce the
      examples in the appendices of this document.

   *  Licensing: Internal use only.

   *  Contact: Lijun Liao (lijun.liao@nio.io)

9.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of [RFC5280], [RFC6960],
   [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], and [RFC8949], Section 10 apply.
   This section covers the considerations specific to this document.

9.1.  Signature Verification

   The signatures of C509 CRLs and of signed C509 OCSP messages cover
   all fields except signatureValue, including signatureAlgorithm and
   requestorCerts or responderCerts.  This prevents algorithm and
   certificate-chain substitution, but does not replace the validation
   of [RFC5280] and [RFC6960]: the verifier MUST check that
   signatureAlgorithm matches the signer's public key, MUST validate the
   signer's certificate chain (a transported chain is only a hint for
   path construction), and MUST verify that the signer is authorized, as
   specified in [RFC6960], Section 4.2.2.2 for OCSP responses and in
   [RFC5280], Section 6.3 for CRLs.  The signature SHOULD be verified
   over the bytes as received rather than over a re-encoding.

   C509ErrorOCSPResponse and C509CRLInfo (Section 6.3.1) are not signed.
   An error response MUST NOT be interpreted as status information about
   any certificate.  A C509CRLInfo MUST NOT be used for revocation or
   freshness decisions unless it was obtained over a channel that
   authenticates the CRL issuer.

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9.2.  Truncated Hash Identifiers

   HashId8 (Section 7.3) only selects a certificate and does not
   authenticate it; security relies on the signature verification in
   Section 9.1.  A relying party MUST match a response to its request
   using hash values it has computed itself from the certificates it
   holds.  A receiver that finds several certificates matching a HashId8
   MUST NOT assume that a particular one is intended.  An OCSP responder
   for which an issuerCertHash matches more than one of its issuers, or
   a serialNumberHash matches more than one serial number, MUST NOT
   return the status good for that entry.

   Since serial numbers are chosen by the CA, an attacker cannot mount a
   collision attack on serialNumberHash; making the status of one
   certificate appear as that of another requires a second preimage of
   about 2^160 operations.  The serial number MUST be normalized as
   specified in Section 7.3 before hashing; otherwise, a revoked
   certificate is not found.

9.3.  Privacy

   serialNumberHash hides the queried certificate only from observers
   that do not know its serial number.  Serial numbers are not secret,
   and the hash is unsalted, so an observer with a set of candidate
   serial numbers can identify the queried certificate and link repeated
   queries; issuerCertHash reveals the issuer.  Where this matters,
   requests and responses SHOULD be protected, e.g., by DTLS or OSCORE,
   or OCSP stapling (Section 7.7) SHOULD be used.

9.4.  Freshness and Replay

   A relying party MUST check the validity interval of an OCSP response
   ([RFC6960], Section 4.2.2.1) and, if it sent a nonce, that the
   response carries the same nonce.  Without a nonce, a response can be
   replayed until it expires; relying parties without a reliable clock
   SHOULD use nonces.

   The nonce is 16 to 32 bytes long (Section 7.4.2.4), whereas [RFC8954]
   requires new clients to use 32 octets in the Nonce extension of
   [RFC6960].  A replay succeeds only if the attacker has obtained, from
   the OCSP responder, a response for the nonce that the relying party
   later chooses.  With N such responses and M requests, the probability
   is about N * M / 2^128 for a 16-byte nonce, i.e., about 2^-48 even
   for N = M = 2^40, and the attack can be neither performed offline nor
   accelerated by a quantum computer.  A 32-byte nonce adds no practical
   security but 16 bytes to each request and response, which is
   significant on constrained links.

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   A relying party MUST NOT use a CRL after thisUpdate + nextUpdate,
   SHOULD reject a CRL whose crlNumber is lower than that of a CRL
   previously accepted for the same scope, and MUST combine a delta CRL
   only with a full CRL whose crlNumber is at least baseCrlNumber
   ([RFC5280], Section 5.2.4).

9.5.  Completeness of CRLs

   *  Certificates whose serial number is not a positive integer of at
      most 20 bytes, as required by [RFC5280], Section 4.1.2.2, are not
      supported by this document; C509 CRLs cannot list some of them,
      and relying parties MUST reject them.

   *  When dateLength is 0, no revocation date is available, and a
      listed certificate MUST be treated as revoked at all times.

   *  When bit 1 of flags is not set, no reason code is available, and
      the reason MUST be treated as unspecified.

   *  The issuer MUST be compared in the representation that matches the
      certificate type (Name or tag 121 with a DER-encoded name).

   Implementations MUST reject a CRL in which the length of revokedCerts
   or removedFromCRLCerts is not a multiple of the entry length.  An
   implementation that uses binary search based on bit 0 of flags MUST
   verify that the entries are sorted, since otherwise a revoked
   certificate can be missed.

9.6.  Parsing and Denial of Service

   Messages are parsed before their signature is verified, and unsigned
   requests are never authenticated.  Implementations MUST reject input
   that does not conform to the CDDL, SHOULD limit message sizes and the
   number of entries, and MUST reject input for which computing an
   absolute time from a base time and an offset overflows.

   Answering a request may require a signature, and responses are larger
   than requests, which exposes OCSP responders to resource exhaustion
   and to abuse for traffic amplification over UDP ([RFC7252],
   Section 11.3).  OCSP responders SHOULD rate-limit requests and MAY
   require signed requests.

   A stapled C509OCSPResponse (Section 7.7) MUST be validated as if
   obtained directly from the OCSP responder.

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10.  IANA Considerations

   This document has the following actions for IANA.

   Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[RFC-XXXX]"
   with the RFC number of this specification and delete this paragraph.

10.1.  C509 CRL Types Registry

   IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "C509 CRL Types"
   under the registry group "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509)".  The fields of
   the registry are Value, Description, and Reference, where Value is an
   integer in the interval [-32768, 32767], and the other columns are
   text strings.  It is mandatory to specify content in all columns.
   For values in the interval [-24, 23], the registration procedure is
   "IETF Review with Expert Review", and for all other values, the
   registration procedure is "Expert Review".  The initial contents of
   the registry are:

       +-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
       | Value | Description                   | Reference         |
       +=======+===============================+===================+
       |     0 | C509CRL                       | [[this document]] |
       +-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+

                          Figure 7: C509 CRL Types

10.2.  C509 OCSP Request Types Registry

   IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "C509 OCSP Request
   Types" under the registry group "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509)".  The
   fields of the registry are Value, Description, and Reference, where
   Value is an integer in the interval [-32768, 32767], and the other
   columns are text strings.  It is mandatory to specify content in all
   columns.  For values in the interval [-24, 23], the registration
   procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review", and for all other
   values, the registration procedure is "Expert Review".  The initial
   contents of the registry are:

       +-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
       | Value | Description                   | Reference         |
       +=======+===============================+===================+
       |     0 | C509 Unsigned OCSP Request    | [[this document]] |
       +-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
       |     1 | C509 Signed OCSP Request      | [[this document]] |
       +-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
       |     2 | C509 Simple OCSP Request      | [[this document]] |
       +-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+

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                     Figure 8: C509 OCSP Request Types

10.3.  C509 OCSP Response Types Registry

   IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "C509 OCSP Response
   Types" under the registry group "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509)".  The
   fields of the registry are Value, Description, and Reference, where
   Value is an integer in the interval [-32768, 32767], and the other
   columns are text strings.  It is mandatory to specify content in all
   columns.  For values in the interval [-24, 23], the registration
   procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review", and for all other
   values, the registration procedure is "Expert Review".  The initial
   contents of the registry are:

       +-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
       | Value | Description                   | Reference         |
       +=======+===============================+===================+
       |     0 | C509 Error OCSP Response      | [[this document]] |
       +-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
       |     1 | C509 Basic OCSP Response      | [[this document]] |
       +-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+
       |     2 | C509 Simple OCSP Response     | [[this document]] |
       +-------+-------------------------------+-------------------+

                     Figure 9: C509 OCSP Response Types

10.4.  Extension Identifiers Registry

   IANA is requested to assign the new values shown in Figure 10 in the
   "C509 Extensions" registry under the new registry group "CBOR Encoded
   X.509 (C509)" defined in [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert].

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   +-------+----------------------------------------------------------+
   | Value | Extension                                                |
   +=======+==========================================================+
   | TBD2  | Name:            Acceptable Response Types               |
   |       | Identifiers:     id-pkix-ocsp-response                   |
   |       | OID:             1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.4                    |
   |       | DER:             06 09 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 04        |
   |       | Comments:        RFC 6960                                |
   |       | extensionValue:  AcceptableResponseTypes                 |
   |       | Reference:       [[this document]]                       |
   +-------+----------------------------------------------------------+
   | TBD3  | Name:            Preferred Signature Algorithms          |
   |       | Identifiers:     id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs              |
   |       | OID:             1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.8                    |
   |       | DER:             06 09 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 08        |
   |       | Comments:        RFC 6960                                |
   |       | extensionValue:  PreferredSignatureAlgorithms            |
   |       | Reference:       [[this document]]                       |
   +-------+----------------------------------------------------------+
   | TBD4  | Name:            Expired Certificates on CRL             |
   |       | Identifiers:     id-ce-expiredCertsOnCRL                 |
   |       | OID:             2.5.29.60                               |
   |       | DER:             06 03 55 1D 3C                          |
   |       | Comments:        ITU-T X.509, Section 9.5.2.8            |
   |       | extensionValue:  ExpiredCertsOnCRL                       |
   |       | Reference:       [[this document]]                       |
   +-------+----------------------------------------------------------+
   | TBD6  | Name:            TN Query                                |
   |       | Identifiers:     id-pkix-ocsp-stir-tn                    |
   |       | OID:             1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.10                   |
   |       | DER:             06 09 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 0A        |
   |       | Comments:        draft-ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp       |
   |       | extensionValue:  TNQuery                                 |
   |       | Reference:       [[this document]]                       |
   +-------+----------------------------------------------------------+

          Figure 10: C509 extension identifier allocation requests

10.5.  TLS CertificateStatusType Registry

   IANA is requested to assign the value shown in Table 12 in the "TLS
   Certificate Status Types" registry under "Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) Extensions":

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              +=======+=============+============+=========+
              | Value | Description | Reference  | Comment |
              +=======+=============+============+=========+
              |  TBD1 | c509_ocsp   | [RFC-XXXX] | N/A     |
              +-------+-------------+------------+---------+

                   Table 12: TLS CertificateStatusType
                            allocation request

10.6.  PEM Label Registry

   IANA is requested to register the following entries in the "Textual
   Encoding Label" registry under the registry group "PKIX Parameters"
   [RFC7468]:

                    +====================+============+
                    | Label              | Reference  |
                    +====================+============+
                    | C509 CRL           | [RFC-XXXX] |
                    +--------------------+------------+
                    | C509 OCSP REQUEST  | [RFC-XXXX] |
                    +--------------------+------------+
                    | C509 OCSP RESPONSE | [RFC-XXXX] |
                    +--------------------+------------+

                     Table 13: PEM Label Registrations

10.7.  Media Type Application Registry

   IANA is requested to assign the following entries in the
   "application" registry in the registry group "Media Types" with this
   document as reference.

10.7.1.  Media Type application/c509-crl+cbor

   When the application/c509-crl+cbor media type is used, the data is a
   C509CRL structure.  A stored file format is defined with "magic
   number" TBD11 using the reserved CBOR tag 55799 and the Content-
   Format TBD7, enveloped as described in [RFC9277], Section 2.2.

   Subtype name: c509-crl+cbor

   Required parameters: N/A

   Optional parameters: N/A

   Encoding considerations: binary

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   Security considerations: See Section 9 of [RFC-XXXX].

   Interoperability considerations: N/A

   Published specification: [RFC-XXXX]

   Applications that use this media type: Any MIME-compliant transport

   Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

   Additional information:

   *  Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

   *  Magic number(s): TBD11

   *  File extension(s): .c509

   *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

   Person & email address to contact for further information:
   iesg@ietf.org

   Intended usage: COMMON

   Restrictions on usage: N/A

   Author: COSE WG

   Change controller: IETF

10.7.2.  Media Type application/c509-crlinfo+cbor

   When the application/c509-crlinfo+cbor media type is used, the data
   is a C509CRLInfo structure.  A stored file format is defined with
   "magic number" TBD12 using the reserved CBOR tag 55799 and the
   Content-Format TBD8, enveloped as described in [RFC9277],
   Section 2.2.

   Subtype name: c509-crlinfo+cbor

   Required parameters: N/A

   Optional parameters: N/A

   Encoding considerations: binary

   Security considerations: See Section 9 of [RFC-XXXX].

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   Interoperability considerations: N/A

   Published specification: [RFC-XXXX]

   Applications that use this media type: Any MIME-compliant transport

   Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

   Additional information:

   *  Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

   *  Magic number(s): TBD12

   *  File extension(s): .c509

   *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

   Person & email address to contact for further information:
   iesg@ietf.org

   Intended usage: COMMON

   Restrictions on usage: N/A

   Author: COSE WG

   Change controller: IETF

10.7.3.  Media Type application/c509-ocspreq+cbor

   When the application/c509-ocspreq+cbor media type is used, the data
   is a C509OCSPRequest structure.  A stored file format is defined with
   "magic number" TBD13 using the reserved CBOR tag 55799 and the
   Content-Format TBD9, enveloped as described in [RFC9277],
   Section 2.2.

   Subtype name: c509-ocspreq+cbor

   Required parameters: N/A

   Optional parameters: N/A

   Encoding considerations: binary

   Security considerations: See Section 9 of [RFC-XXXX].

   Interoperability considerations: N/A

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   Published specification: [RFC-XXXX]

   Applications that use this media type: OCSP clients

   Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

   Additional information:

   *  Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

   *  Magic number(s): TBD13

   *  File extension(s): .c509

   *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

   Person & email address to contact for further information:
   iesg@ietf.org

   Intended usage: COMMON

   Restrictions on usage: N/A

   Author: COSE WG

   Change controller: IETF

10.7.4.  Media Type application/c509-ocspresp+cbor

   When the application/c509-ocspresp+cbor media type is used, the data
   is a C509OCSPResponse structure.  A stored file format is defined
   with "magic number" TBD14 using the reserved CBOR tag 55799 and the
   Content-Format TBD10, enveloped as described in [RFC9277],
   Section 2.2.

   Subtype name: c509-ocspresp+cbor

   Required parameters: N/A

   Optional parameters: N/A

   Encoding considerations: binary

   Security considerations: See Section 9 of [RFC-XXXX].

   Interoperability considerations: N/A

   Published specification: [RFC-XXXX]

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   Applications that use this media type: OCSP servers

   Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

   Additional information:

   *  Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

   *  Magic number(s): TBD14

   *  File extension(s): .c509

   *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

   Person & email address to contact for further information:
   iesg@ietf.org

   Intended usage: COMMON

   Restrictions on usage: N/A

   Author: COSE WG

   Change controller: IETF

10.8.  CoAP Content-Formats Registry

   IANA is requested to add entries for "application/c509-crl+cbor",
   "application/c509-crlinfo+cbor", "application/c509-ocspreq+cbor" and
   "application/c509-ocspresp+cbor" to the "CoAP Content-Formats"
   registry in the registry group "Constrained RESTful Environments
   (CoRE) Parameters".

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   +-------------------------+---------+-------+------------+
   | Content                 | Content | ID    | Reference  |
   | Type                    | Coding  |       |            |
   +=========================+=========+=======+============+
   | application/            | -       | TBD7  | [[this     |
   | c509-crl+cbor           |         |       | document]] |
   +-------------------------+---------+-------+------------+
   | application/            |         | TBD8  | [[this     |
   | c509-crlinfo+cbor       | -       |       | document]] |
   +-------------------------+---------+-------+------------+
   | application/            | -       | TBD9  | [[this     |
   | c509-ocspreq+cbor       |         |       | document]] |
   +-------------------------+---------+-------+------------+
   | application/            | -       | TBD10 | [[this     |
   | c509-ocspresp+cbor      |         |       | document]] |
   +-------------------------+---------+-------+------------+

10.9.  Expert Review Guidelines

   TODO

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]
              Mattsson, J. P., Selander, G., Raza, S., Höglund, J.,
              Furuhed, M., and L. Liao, "CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates
              (C509 Certificates)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-21, 24 September 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
              cbor-encoded-cert-21>.

   [I-D.ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp]
              Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "OCSP Usage for Secure
              Telephone Identity Certificates", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp-14, 10
              June 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp-14>.

   [IANA.cose]
              IANA, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

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   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6066]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6066>.

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960>.

   [RFC7120]  Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code
              Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, DOI 10.17487/RFC7120, January
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7120>.

   [RFC7468]  Josefsson, S. and S. Leonard, "Textual Encodings of PKIX,
              PKCS, and CMS Structures", RFC 7468, DOI 10.17487/RFC7468,
              April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7468>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8226]  Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
              Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8226>.

   [RFC8610]  Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
              Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
              Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
              JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
              June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>.

   [RFC8742]  Bormann, C., "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)
              Sequences", RFC 8742, DOI 10.17487/RFC8742, February 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8742>.

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   [RFC8949]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8949>.

   [RFC9054]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Hash Algorithms", RFC 9054, DOI 10.17487/RFC9054, August
              2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9054>.

   [RFC9147]  Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9147>.

   [RFC9277]  Richardson, M. and C. Bormann, "On Stable Storage for
              Items in Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)",
              RFC 9277, DOI 10.17487/RFC9277, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9277>.

   [RFC9360]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Header Parameters for Carrying and Referencing X.509
              Certificates", RFC 9360, DOI 10.17487/RFC9360, February
              2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9360>.

   [RFC9682]  Bormann, C., "Updates to the Concise Data Definition
              Language (CDDL) Grammar", RFC 9682, DOI 10.17487/RFC9682,
              November 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9682>.

   [RFC9846]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, July 2026,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9846>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [CborMe]   Bormann, C., "CBOR Playground", May 2018,
              <https://cbor.me/>.

   [CRLite]   "mozilla/crlite", n.d.,
              <https://github.com/mozilla/crlite>.

   [CRLSets]  "CRLSets - The Chromium Projects", n.d.,
              <https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/
              crlsets/>.

   [POSIX]    "IEEE Standard for Information Technology--Portable
              Operating System Interface (POSIX(TM)) Base
              Specifications, Issue 7", January 2018,
              <https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/>.

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   [RFC3280]  Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
              Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3280, May 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3280>.

   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7228>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7252>.

   [RFC7925]  Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
              Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7925>.

   [RFC7942]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
              RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.

   [RFC8954]  Sahni, M., Ed., "Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
              Nonce Extension", RFC 8954, DOI 10.17487/RFC8954, November
              2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8954>.

   [RFC9861]  Viguier, B., Wong, D., Ed., Van Assche, G., Ed., Dang, Q.,
              Ed., and J. Daemen, Ed., "KangarooTwelve and TurboSHAKE",
              RFC 9861, DOI 10.17487/RFC9861, October 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9861>.

   [TinyOCSP] Höglund, J., Furuhed, M., and S. Raza, "Lightweight
              certificate revocation for low-power IoT with end-to-end
              security", Journal of Information Security and
              Applications 73:103424, DOI 10.1016/j.jisa.2023.103424,
              2023, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2023.103424>.

   [X.690]    "ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding
              Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
              Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", n.d.,
              <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690>.

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Appendix A.  Examples

A.1.  Overview

   +==========+==================+============+============+===========+
   | Section  | Description      | size(X509) | size(C509) | Size      |
   |          |                  |            |            | Reduction |
   +==========+==================+============+============+===========+
   | Appendix | CRL Example      | 147        | 120        | 18%       |
   | A.3.1    | Without Revoked  |            |            |           |
   |          | Certificates     |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
   | Appendix | CRL Example      | 335        | 177        | 47%       |
   | A.3.2    | With Revoked     |            |            |           |
   |          | Certificates     |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
   | Appendix | Delta CRL        | 335        | 160        | 52%       |
   | A.3.3    | Example With     |            |            |           |
   |          | Revoked          |            |            |           |
   |          | Certificates     |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
   | Appendix | Indirect CRL     | 409        | 202        | 51%       |
   | A.3.4    | Example With     |            |            |           |
   |          | Revoked          |            |            |           |
   |          | Certificates     |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
   | Appendix | Simple OCSP      | 150        | 51         | 66%       |
   | A.4.1    | Request Example  |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
   | Appendix | Unsigned OCSP    | 475        | 132        | 72%       |
   | A.4.2    | Request Example  |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
   | Appendix | Signed OCSP      | 584        | 209        | 64%       |
   | A.4.3    | Request Example  |            |            |           |
   |          | Without          |            |            |           |
   |          | Requestor's      |            |            |           |
   |          | Certificate      |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
   | Appendix | Signed OCSP      | 1035       | 420        | 59%       |
   | A.4.4    | Request Example  |            |            |           |
   |          | With             |            |            |           |
   |          | Requestor's      |            |            |           |
   |          | Certificate      |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
   | Appendix | Signed OCSP      | 1371       | 625        | 54%       |
   | A.4.5    | Request Example  |            |            |           |
   |          | With             |            |            |           |
   |          | Requestor's      |            |            |           |

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   |          | Certificate      |            |            |           |
   |          | Chain            |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
   | Appendix | Error OCSP       | 5          | 3          | 40%       |
   | A.5.1    | Response         |            |            |           |
   |          | Example          |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
   | Appendix | Simple OCSP      | 336        | 140        | 58%       |
   | A.5.2    | Response         |            |            |           |
   |          | Example          |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
   | Appendix | Basic OCSP       | 837        | 248        | 70%       |
   | A.5.3    | Response         |            |            |           |
   |          | Example Without  |            |            |           |
   |          | Responder's      |            |            |           |
   |          | Certificate      |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
   | Appendix | Basic OCSP       | 1181       | 446        | 62%       |
   | A.5.4    | Response         |            |            |           |
   |          | Example With     |            |            |           |
   |          | Responder's      |            |            |           |
   |          | Certificate      |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+
   | Appendix | Basic OCSP       | 1517       | 651        | 57%       |
   | A.5.5    | Response         |            |            |           |
   |          | Example With     |            |            |           |
   |          | Responder's      |            |            |           |
   |          | Certificate      |            |            |           |
   |          | Chain            |            |            |           |
   +----------+------------------+------------+------------+-----------+

                   Table 14: Size comparison in examples

A.2.  Helper Keys and Certificates

A.2.1.  CA Private Key and Certificate

A.2.1.1.  CA Private Key

   -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
   MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEIDP+AdMbqXudBAN3YNAwoR0i3nl4IuoSSA6Hazy2oAKc
   -----END PRIVATE KEY-----

A.2.1.2.  CA Certificate

A.2.1.2.1.  Plain Hex

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   8B0241010C73746573742063726C6F6373702D726F6F7463611A677485801A6B36EC
   7F6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63610C58205EF8A355A001A7C50D2349470120
   8131A4BB2AB920D40BFB0EE1F6AB28FF74008801542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C390
   05D492450E1056211860230107542DA3A403F7D2F4E0B3D8031A73BA8A839F557F0F
   5840E50465D60C02A2111EF3FC6E44F2A36008765B552351F9A3F5B2AA7C76F1F05D
   259847A4F4250B2E4B0AE2099762A2596D3CC1DB2CCD180AA0A2D0E191310B0F

A.2.1.2.2.  Textual Representation

   Certificate
     TBSCertificate
       Certificate Type: 2
       Serial Number
         01
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Issuer : CN=test crlocsp-rootca
       Subject: CN=test crlocsp-ca
       Validity
         Not Before: 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z
         Not After : 2026-12-31T23:59:59Z
       Subject Public Key Info:
         algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
         Raw public key
           5e:f8:a3:55:a0:01:a7:c5:0d:23:49:47:01:20:81:31:
           a4:bb:2a:b9:20:d4:0b:fb:0e:e1:f6:ab:28:ff:74:00
       Extensions
         SubjectKeyIdentifier (1)
           2f:45:e7:8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:
           45:0e:10:56
         KeyUsage (2), critical
           0x60: [keyCertSign, cRLSign]
         BasicConstraints (4), critical
           CA: true, pathLenConstraint: 1
         AuthorityKeyIdentifier (7)
           Key Identifier
             2d:a3:a4:03:f7:d2:f4:e0:b3:d8:03:1a:73:ba:8a:83:
             9f:55:7f:0f
     Signature Value
       e5:04:65:d6:0c:02:a2:11:1e:f3:fc:6e:44:f2:a3:60:
       08:76:5b:55:23:51:f9:a3:f5:b2:aa:7c:76:f1:f0:5d:
       25:98:47:a4:f4:25:0b:2e:4b:0a:e2:09:97:62:a2:59:
       6d:3c:c1:db:2c:cd:18:0a:a0:a2:d0:e1:91:31:0b:0f

A.2.2.  CRL Signer Private Key and Certificate

A.2.2.1.  CRL Signer Private Key

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   -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
   MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEIOJ3HnsrBJ5g5Pb5oy7qlvijr3Wfx3ywAUvnmRV4354s
   -----END PRIVATE KEY-----

A.2.2.2.  CRL Signer Certificate

A.2.2.2.1.  Plain Hex

   8B024212340C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A69570A806A63
   726C2D7369676E65720C5820C9BA1EC496DACB97AED087ADE390F398FBD477871EE9
   203817EC0E31902789FF86015409E433582556550A27DB4A19BCE2D660884722B621
   184007542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E10565840D46E6A8F9FD53417
   F36DFE56CBB8CACE0FC3E59ACBE72CD9916B3E4C5022D06D16CC9BF9AC54394037C9
   5433644194FAE18FF783381959584A21BDC0E1C6CB0B

A.2.2.2.2.  Textual Representation

   Certificate
     TBSCertificate
       Certificate Type: 2
       Serial Number
         12:34
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Issuer : CN=test crlocsp-ca
       Subject: CN=crl-signer
       Validity
         Not Before: 2025-01-02T00:00:00Z
         Not After : 2026-01-02T00:00:00Z
       Subject Public Key Info:
         algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
         Raw public key
           c9:ba:1e:c4:96:da:cb:97:ae:d0:87:ad:e3:90:f3:98:
           fb:d4:77:87:1e:e9:20:38:17:ec:0e:31:90:27:89:ff
       Extensions
         SubjectKeyIdentifier (1)
           09:e4:33:58:25:56:55:0a:27:db:4a:19:bc:e2:d6:60:
           88:47:22:b6
         KeyUsage (2), critical
           0x40: [cRLSign]
         AuthorityKeyIdentifier (7)
           Key Identifier
             2f:45:e7:8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:
             45:0e:10:56
     Signature Value
       d4:6e:6a:8f:9f:d5:34:17:f3:6d:fe:56:cb:b8:ca:ce:
       0f:c3:e5:9a:cb:e7:2c:d9:91:6b:3e:4c:50:22:d0:6d:
       16:cc:9b:f9:ac:54:39:40:37:c9:54:33:64:41:94:fa:
       e1:8f:f7:83:38:19:59:58:4a:21:bd:c0:e1:c6:cb:0b

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A.2.3.  OCSP Requestor Private Key and Certificate

A.2.3.1.  OCSP Requestor Private Key

   -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
   MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEIDoXZF67Rh+ENmXzefN4vLk/o2fK5q/otI2G1xQYtThH
   -----END PRIVATE KEY-----

A.2.3.2.  OCSP Requestor Certificate

A.2.3.2.1.  Plain Hex

   8B024212360C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A69570A806E6F
   6373702D726571756573746F720C582004530B1764EDD4B4E33AB44AF0F838961C00
   7176D74B6A3546ECB7FD57320DD3860154DD51BDB2A2C791C062D4027856DBACF526
   07F0BE210107542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E10565840F8C6183ECF
   8C3EFD50DD4942D172814C46EC0FC01DD586A597178DF864A0D9DA86B7CA17FC9F77
   2FF04C80E98B60D5B4B62408A277A5B70D0D2A3F5ED5442D07

A.2.3.2.2.  Textual Representation

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   Certificate
     TBSCertificate
       Certificate Type: 2
       Serial Number
         12:36
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Issuer : CN=test crlocsp-ca
       Subject: CN=ocsp-requestor
       Validity
         Not Before: 2025-01-02T00:00:00Z
         Not After : 2026-01-02T00:00:00Z
       Subject Public Key Info:
         algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
         Raw public key
           04:53:0b:17:64:ed:d4:b4:e3:3a:b4:4a:f0:f8:38:96:
           1c:00:71:76:d7:4b:6a:35:46:ec:b7:fd:57:32:0d:d3
       Extensions
         SubjectKeyIdentifier (1)
           dd:51:bd:b2:a2:c7:91:c0:62:d4:02:78:56:db:ac:f5:
           26:07:f0:be
         KeyUsage (2), critical
           0x1: [digitalSignature]
         AuthorityKeyIdentifier (7)
           Key Identifier
             2f:45:e7:8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:
             45:0e:10:56
     Signature Value
       f8:c6:18:3e:cf:8c:3e:fd:50:dd:49:42:d1:72:81:4c:
       46:ec:0f:c0:1d:d5:86:a5:97:17:8d:f8:64:a0:d9:da:
       86:b7:ca:17:fc:9f:77:2f:f0:4c:80:e9:8b:60:d5:b4:
       b6:24:08:a2:77:a5:b7:0d:0d:2a:3f:5e:d5:44:2d:07

A.2.4.  OCSP Responder Private Key and Certificate

A.2.4.1.  OCSP Responder Private Key

   -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
   MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VwBCIEII5swSxWTjlZinUj+5kie//qjgBbzupdc0lmaHF9NkXl
   -----END PRIVATE KEY-----

A.2.4.2.  OCSP Responder Certificate

A.2.4.2.1.  Plain Hex

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   8B024212350C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A69570A806E6F
   6373702D726573706F6E6465720C582081947BBC248AAC79738211A8D75BF92CB777
   D994073DF23AE06380EF2C573976880154B5B4CAF35401D06151DF9629DB579DC8CC
   A453A8210107542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E105627095840A01B0C
   BF3E34A4762D05404FD08A7AEC103035358314686D72B6159078C76E1D88597F3753
   1886A3F52F256FD722192B289D6844014467F1F17F05ACBB7B660A

A.2.4.2.2.  Textual Representation

   Certificate
     TBSCertificate
       Certificate Type: 2
       Serial Number
         12:35
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Issuer : CN=test crlocsp-ca
       Subject: CN=ocsp-responder
       Validity
         Not Before: 2025-01-02T00:00:00Z
         Not After : 2026-01-02T00:00:00Z
       Subject Public Key Info:
         algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
         Raw public key
           81:94:7b:bc:24:8a:ac:79:73:82:11:a8:d7:5b:f9:2c:
           b7:77:d9:94:07:3d:f2:3a:e0:63:80:ef:2c:57:39:76
       Extensions
         SubjectKeyIdentifier (1)
           b5:b4:ca:f3:54:01:d0:61:51:df:96:29:db:57:9d:c8:
           cc:a4:53:a8
         KeyUsage (2), critical
           0x1: [digitalSignature]
         AuthorityKeyIdentifier (7)
           Key Identifier
             2f:45:e7:8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:
             45:0e:10:56
         ExtendedKeyUsage (8), critical
           OCSPSigning (9)
     Signature Value
       a0:1b:0c:bf:3e:34:a4:76:2d:05:40:4f:d0:8a:7a:ec:
       10:30:35:35:83:14:68:6d:72:b6:15:90:78:c7:6e:1d:
       88:59:7f:37:53:18:86:a3:f5:2f:25:6f:d7:22:19:2b:
       28:9d:68:44:01:44:67:f1:f1:7f:05:ac:bb:7b:66:0a

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A.3.  CRL Examples

A.3.1.  CRL Example Without Revoked Certificates

   *  Size reduction: 18%

   *  Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.1.2

   *  Direct CRL

   *  Full CRL

   *  No revoked certificates

   *  Note that the X.509 CRL and the C509 CRL are not convertible.

A.3.1.1.  X.509 CRL

   PEM content (147 bytes):

   -----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
   MIGQMEQCAQEwBQYDK2VwMBoxGDAWBgNVBAMMD3Rlc3QgY3Jsb2NzcC1jYRcNMjUw
   MTAyMDAwMDAwWhcNMjUwMTA5MDAwMDAwWjAFBgMrZXADQQBeSb215S+/7HT9HjQN
   zeuuETZAjRIwCLxCIZatpkiov3ndsI7fjXcabny/kx9d5Ce39o3RcDG3QiDDdWOi
   R5UK
   -----END X509 CRL-----

A.3.1.2.  C509 CRL

   Plain Hex (120 bytes):

   8B000C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D6361542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005
   D492450E1056011A6775D7001A00093A80F680F6584013834F4E38AA9F0DC5B8D21C
   8650C776A6D961C31C894C36A71A6433F5ED7D30E67F787F13C7E4C349B2848A181F
   DBBCE361A14C220021C4A267367AD5F1D90D

   Textual Representation

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   C509CRL
     TBSCertList
       CRL Type: C509CRL (0)
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Authority Subject: CN=test crlocsp-ca
       Authority Key Identifier:
         2F:45:E7:8D:2C:AE:DF:36:8C:DF:53:C3:90:05:D4:92:
         45:0E:10:56
       CRL Number: 1
       This Update: 2025-01-02T00:00:00Z
       Next Update: 2025-01-09T00:00:00Z
       Base CRL Number: <null>
       Extensions: <empty>
     revokedCertsList: <null>
     Signature Value
       13:83:4f:4e:38:aa:9f:0d:c5:b8:d2:1c:86:50:c7:76:
       a6:d9:61:c3:1c:89:4c:36:a7:1a:64:33:f5:ed:7d:30:
       e6:7f:78:7f:13:c7:e4:c3:49:b2:84:8a:18:1f:db:bc:
       e3:61:a1:4c:22:00:21:c4:a2:67:36:7a:d5:f1:d9:0d

   Annotated hex

     0: 8B             # C509CRL=array[11]
     1:   00             # [0]. crlType=0
     2:   0C             # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
     3:   6F             # [2]. authoritySubject=char[15]
     4:     746573742063726C6F6373702D6361 # "test crlocsp-ca"
    19:   54             # [3]. authorityKeyIdentifier=byte[20]
    20:     2F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E1056
    40:   01             # [4]. crlNumber=1
    41:   1A 6775D700    # [5]. thisUpdate=1735776000:
                         #      2025-01-02T00:00:00Z
    46:   1A 00093A80    # [6]. nextUpdate=604800: 2025-01-09T00:00:00Z
    51:   F6             # [7]. baseCrlNumber=<null>
    52:   80             # [8]. crlExtensions=array[0]
    53:   F6             # [9]. revokedCertsList: <null>
    54:   58 40          # [10]. signature value=byte[64]
    56:     13834F4E38AA9F0DC5B8D21C8650C776A6D961C31C894C36A71A6433F5
    85:     ED7D30E67F787F13C7E4C349B2848A181FDBBCE361A14C220021C4A267
   114:     367AD5F1D90D

A.3.2.  CRL Example With Revoked Certificates

   *  Size reduction: 47%

   *  Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.1.2

   *  Direct CRL

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   *  Full CRL

   *  With revoked certificates

   *  With Per-Issuer Extension ExpiredCertsOnCRL

   *  Note that the X.509 CRL and the C509 CRL are not convertible.

A.3.2.1.  X.509 CRL

   PEM content (335 bytes):

   -----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
   MIIBSzCB/gIBATAFBgMrZXAwGjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPdGVzdCBjcmxvY3NwLWNhFw0y
   NTAxMDcwMDEyMzRaFw0yNTAxMTQwMDEyMzRaMIG3MCECAhEiFw0yNTAxMDYwMDEy
   MzRaMAwwCgYDVR0VBAMKAQYwIQICEjQXDTI1MDEwMTAwMTIzNFowDDAKBgNVHRUE
   AwoBATAhAgIzRBcNMjUwMTA0MDAxMjM0WjAMMAoGA1UdFQQDCgEGMCECAlVmFw0y
   NTAxMDIwMDEyMzRaMAwwCgYDVR0VBAMKAQYwEwICVngXDTI1MDEwNTAwMTIzNFow
   FAIDAJq8Fw0yNTAxMDMwMDEyMzRaMAUGAytlcANBAAK0jdEbZtlvJDmhKAJQTklZ
   WqS7xaN9gHvLC/8lvmqsSdY8T/1YbdkVGCyKsWuDSBGVFtrM2DrBzSDarRKctwY=
   -----END X509 CRL-----

A.3.2.2.  C509 CRL

   Plain Hex (177 bytes):

   8B000C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D6361542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005
   D492450E1056021A677C71721A00093A80F68085F6840302031A677488728218571A
   677485805824112206978006123400000001334403F4800655660151800656780546
   00009ABC02A30000F6584070BB7A38065FBCABFE615170F05A9A9FE83DC892D5F735
   812B2A053AF4B300EB466BABB4F1A387CDCE90D8302C680B77AA61566423D7C235F7
   BD31344CF7F405

   Textual Representation

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   C509CRL
     TBSCertList
       CRL Type: C509CRL (0)
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Authority Subject: CN=test crlocsp-ca
       Authority Key Identifier:
         2F:45:E7:8D:2C:AE:DF:36:8C:DF:53:C3:90:05:D4:92:
         45:0E:10:56
       CRL Number: 2
       This Update: 2025-01-07T00:12:34Z
       Next Update: 2025-01-14T00:12:34Z
       Base CRL Number: <null>
       Extensions: <empty>
     revokedCertsList:
       PerIssuerRevokedCerts[0]
         Issuer: <null>
         RevokedCertsControl
           Flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
           Serial number length: 2
           Date length: 3
           Base date: 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z
         Extensions
           ExpiredCertsOnCRL (87)
             2025-01-01T00:00:00Z
         RevokedCerts:
           0x1122, 2025-01-06T00:12:34Z, certificateHold
           0x1234, 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z, keyCompromise
           0x3344, 2025-01-04T00:12:34Z, certificateHold
           0x5566, 2025-01-02T00:12:34Z, certificateHold
           0x5678, 2025-01-05T00:12:34Z, unspecified
           0x9ABC, 2025-01-03T00:12:34Z, unspecified
         RemovedFromCRLCerts: <null>
     Signature Value
       70:bb:7a:38:06:5f:bc:ab:fe:61:51:70:f0:5a:9a:9f:
       e8:3d:c8:92:d5:f7:35:81:2b:2a:05:3a:f4:b3:00:eb:
       46:6b:ab:b4:f1:a3:87:cd:ce:90:d8:30:2c:68:0b:77:
       aa:61:56:64:23:d7:c2:35:f7:bd:31:34:4c:f7:f4:05

   Annotated hex

     0: 8B             # C509CRL=array[11]
     1:   00             # [0]. crlType=0
     2:   0C             # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
     3:   6F             # [2]. authoritySubject=char[15]
     4:     746573742063726C6F6373702D6361 # "test crlocsp-ca"
    19:   54             # [3]. authorityKeyIdentifier=byte[20]
    20:     2F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E1056
    40:   02             # [4]. crlNumber=2

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    41:   1A 677C7172    # [5]. thisUpdate=1736208754:
                         #      2025-01-07T00:12:34Z
    46:   1A 00093A80    # [6]. nextUpdate=604800: 2025-01-14T00:12:34Z
    51:   F6             # [7]. baseCrlNumber=<null>
    52:   80             # [8]. crlExtensions=array[0]
    53:   85             # [9]. revokedCertsList=array[5]
                           #---PerIssuerRevokedCerts[0]---
    54:     F6             # [0]. issuer=<null>
    55:     84             # [1]. revokedCertsControl=array[4]
    56:       03             # [0]. flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
    57:       02             # [1]. serialNumberLength=2
    58:       03             # [2]. dateLength=3
    59:       1A 67748872    # [3]. baseDate=1735690354:
                             #      2025-01-01T00:12:34Z
    64:     82             # [2]. extensions=array[2]
                             #---extension[0]---
    65:       18 57          # [0]. type=ExpiredCertsOnCRL (87)
    67:       1A 67748580    # [1]. value=1735689600:
                             #      2025-01-01T00:00:00Z
    72:     58 24          # [3]. revokedCerts=byte[36], 6 entries
                             #---entries[0]---
    74:       1122           # CSN=1122
    76:       069780         # date=069780: 2025-01-06T00:12:34Z
    79:       06             # reason=6: certificateHold
                             #---entries[1]---
    80:       1234           # CSN=1234
    82:       000000         # date=000000: 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z
    85:       01             # reason=1: keyCompromise
                             #---entries[2]---
    86:       3344           # CSN=3344
    88:       03F480         # date=03F480: 2025-01-04T00:12:34Z
    91:       06             # reason=6: certificateHold
                             #---entries[3]---
    92:       5566           # CSN=5566
    94:       015180         # date=015180: 2025-01-02T00:12:34Z
    97:       06             # reason=6: certificateHold
                             #---entries[4]---
    98:       5678           # CSN=5678
   100:       054600         # date=054600: 2025-01-05T00:12:34Z
   103:       00             # reason=0: unspecified
                             #---entries[5]---
   104:       9ABC           # CSN=9ABC
   106:       02A300         # date=02A300: 2025-01-03T00:12:34Z
   109:       00             # reason=0: unspecified
   110:     F6             # [4]. removedFromCRLCerts=<null>
   111:   58 40          # [10]. signature value=byte[64]
   113:     70BB7A38065FBCABFE615170F05A9A9FE83DC892D5F735812B2A053AF4
   142:     B300EB466BABB4F1A387CDCE90D8302C680B77AA61566423D7C235F7BD

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   171:     31344CF7F405

A.3.3.  Delta CRL Example With Revoked Certificates

   *  Size reduction: 52%

   *  Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.1.2

   *  Direct CRL

   *  Delta CRL

   *  With revoked certificates

   *  With entries removed from the CRL since the last full CRL

   *  Note that the X.509 CRL and the C509 CRL are not convertible.

A.3.3.1.  X.509 CRL

   PEM content (335 bytes):

   -----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
   MIIBSzCB/gIBATAFBgMrZXAwGjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPdGVzdCBjcmxvY3NwLWNhFw0y
   NTAxMDgwMDEyMzRaFw0yNTAxMTAwMDEyMzRaMIG3MCECAjQSFw0yNTAxMDcxMjEy
   MzRaMAwwCgYDVR0VBAMKAQEwEwICeFYXDTI1MDEwODAwMTAzNFowFAIDALyaFw0y
   NTAxMDgwMDA4MzRaMCECAhEiFw0yNTAxMDcxMzEyMzRaMAwwCgYDVR0VBAMKAQgw
   IQICM0QXDTI1MDEwNzE0MTIzNFowDDAKBgNVHRUEAwoBCDAhAgJVZhcNMjUwMTA3
   MTUxMjM0WjAMMAoGA1UdFQQDCgEIMAUGAytlcANBAKxSjqeefzjGdniA3bQCg3rL
   d7rrJnfh8GfsWdawC9BHjK1G336hRYaxwLOtyQS4Mn80jjSwrN+bXg10spSA4gA=
   -----END X509 CRL-----

A.3.3.2.  C509 CRL

   Plain Hex (160 bytes):

   8B000C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D6361542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005
   D492450E1056031A677DC2F21A0002A300028085F6840302021A677D1A32804F3412
   0000017856A84800BC9AA7D0004C11220E1033441C2055662A305840369C3E6412E9
   D0537CD39EA1DA40C68C32B4EC0E5678650D6AF73677A5A0CF37F1CDE75D663DE374
   9101F4354CCD6D8D05773887650046932B583C5365D7EB0B

   Textual Representation

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   C509CRL
     TBSCertList
       CRL Type: C509CRL (0)
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Authority Subject: CN=test crlocsp-ca
       Authority Key Identifier:
         2F:45:E7:8D:2C:AE:DF:36:8C:DF:53:C3:90:05:D4:92:
         45:0E:10:56
       CRL Number: 3
       This Update: 2025-01-08T00:12:34Z
       Next Update: 2025-01-10T00:12:34Z
       Base CRL Number: 2
       Extensions: <empty>
     revokedCertsList:
       PerIssuerRevokedCerts[0]
         Issuer: <null>
         RevokedCertsControl
           Flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
           Serial number length: 2
           Date length: 2
           Base date: 2025-01-07T12:12:34Z
         Extensions: <empty>
         RevokedCerts:
           0x3412, 2025-01-07T12:12:34Z, keyCompromise
           0x7856, 2025-01-08T00:10:34Z, unspecified
           0xBC9A, 2025-01-08T00:08:34Z, unspecified
         RemovedFromCRLCerts:
           0x1122, 2025-01-07T13:12:34Z
           0x3344, 2025-01-07T14:12:34Z
           0x5566, 2025-01-07T15:12:34Z
     Signature Value
       36:9c:3e:64:12:e9:d0:53:7c:d3:9e:a1:da:40:c6:8c:
       32:b4:ec:0e:56:78:65:0d:6a:f7:36:77:a5:a0:cf:37:
       f1:cd:e7:5d:66:3d:e3:74:91:01:f4:35:4c:cd:6d:8d:
       05:77:38:87:65:00:46:93:2b:58:3c:53:65:d7:eb:0b

   Annotated hex

     0: 8B             # C509CRL=array[11]
     1:   00             # [0]. crlType=0
     2:   0C             # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
     3:   6F             # [2]. authoritySubject=char[15]
     4:     746573742063726C6F6373702D6361 # "test crlocsp-ca"
    19:   54             # [3]. authorityKeyIdentifier=byte[20]
    20:     2F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E1056
    40:   03             # [4]. crlNumber=3
    41:   1A 677DC2F2    # [5]. thisUpdate=1736295154:
                         #      2025-01-08T00:12:34Z

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    46:   1A 0002A300    # [6]. nextUpdate=172800: 2025-01-10T00:12:34Z
    51:   02             # [7]. baseCrlNumber=2
    52:   80             # [8]. crlExtensions=array[0]
    53:   85             # [9]. revokedCertsList=array[5]
                           #---PerIssuerRevokedCerts[0]---
    54:     F6             # [0]. issuer=<null>
    55:     84             # [1]. revokedCertsControl=array[4]
    56:       03             # [0]. flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
    57:       02             # [1]. serialNumberLength=2
    58:       02             # [2]. dateLength=2
    59:       1A 677D1A32    # [3]. baseDate=1736251954:
                             #      2025-01-07T12:12:34Z
    64:     80             # [2]. extensions=array[0]
    65:     4F             # [3]. revokedCerts=byte[15], 3 entries
                             #---entries[0]---
    66:       3412           # CSN=3412
    68:       0000           # date=0000: 2025-01-07T12:12:34Z
    70:       01             # reason=1: keyCompromise
                             #---entries[1]---
    71:       7856           # CSN=7856
    73:       A848           # date=A848: 2025-01-08T00:10:34Z
    75:       00             # reason=0: unspecified
                             #---entries[2]---
    76:       BC9A           # CSN=BC9A
    78:       A7D0           # date=A7D0: 2025-01-08T00:08:34Z
    80:       00             # reason=0: unspecified
    81:     4C             # [4]. removedFromCRLCerts=byte[12], 3
                           #      entries
                             #---entries[0]---
    82:       1122           # CSN=1122
    84:       0E10           # date=0E10: 2025-01-07T13:12:34Z
                             #---entries[1]---
    86:       3344           # CSN=3344
    88:       1C20           # date=1C20: 2025-01-07T14:12:34Z
                             #---entries[2]---
    90:       5566           # CSN=5566
    92:       2A30           # date=2A30: 2025-01-07T15:12:34Z
    94:   58 40          # [10]. signature value=byte[64]
    96:     369C3E6412E9D0537CD39EA1DA40C68C32B4EC0E5678650D6AF73677A5
   125:     A0CF37F1CDE75D663DE3749101F4354CCD6D8D05773887650046932B58
   154:     3C5365D7EB0B

A.3.4.  Indirect CRL Example With Revoked Certificates

   *  Size reduction: 51%

   *  Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.2.2

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   *  Indirect CRL

   *  Full CRL

   *  With revoked certificates

   *  With two issuers

   *  Note that the X.509 CRL and the C509 CRL are not convertible.

A.3.4.1.  X.509 CRL

   PEM content (409 bytes):

   -----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
   MIIBlTCCAUcCAQEwBQYDK2VwMBUxEzARBgNVBAMMCmNybC1zaWduZXIXDTI1MDEw
   NzAwMTIzNFoXDTI1MDExNDAwMTIzNFowggEEMEoCAhI0Fw0yNTAxMDEwMDEyMzRa
   MDUwCgYDVR0VBAMKAQEwJwYDVR0dBCAwHqQcMBoxGDAWBgNVBAMMD3Rlc3QgY3Js
   b2NzcC1jYTATAgJWeBcNMjUwMTA1MDAxMjM0WjAUAgMAmrwXDTI1MDEwMzAwMTIz
   NFowRQICESIXDTI1MDEwNjAwMTIzNFowMDAKBgNVHRUEAwoBBjAiBgNVHR0EGzAZ
   pBcwFTETMBEGA1UEAwwKZXhhbXBsZSBDQTAhAgIzRBcNMjUwMTA0MDAxMjM0WjAM
   MAoGA1UdFQQDCgEGMCECAlVmFw0yNTAxMDIwMDEyMzRaMAwwCgYDVR0VBAMKAQYw
   BQYDK2VwA0EAUMWMYunvDSqQzFV+lo5O5TZmopxPvnMBpuR0Do8kCA4P4PHGg/E8
   1U6GfBu/9MvUuTOX13loPDedsjvs/uK8AQ==
   -----END X509 CRL-----

A.3.4.2.  C509 CRL

   Plain Hex (202 bytes):

   8B000C6A63726C2D7369676E65725409E433582556550A27DB4A19BCE2D660884722
   B6041A677C71721A00093A80F6808A6F746573742063726C6F6373702D6361840302
   031A6774887280521234000000015678054600009ABC02A30000F66A6578616D706C
   65204341840302031A6775D9F28052112205460006334402A30006556600000006F6
   5840F00D6270F91486A7F378D06F01A807E64E086BB366BE3A1592CE4A64BFFD621F
   30E2AB93766B4F8818116AB7DA7BEDF7C3EBCBDEAC6D0455F5F5669712006205

   Textual Representation

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   C509CRL
     TBSCertList
       CRL Type: C509CRL (0)
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Authority Subject: CN=crl-signer
       Authority Key Identifier:
         09:E4:33:58:25:56:55:0A:27:DB:4A:19:BC:E2:D6:60:
         88:47:22:B6
       CRL Number: 4
       This Update: 2025-01-07T00:12:34Z
       Next Update: 2025-01-14T00:12:34Z
       Base CRL Number: <null>
       Extensions: <empty>
     revokedCertsList:
       PerIssuerRevokedCerts[0]
         Issuer: CN=test crlocsp-ca
         RevokedCertsControl
           Flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
           Serial number length: 2
           Date length: 3
           Base date: 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z
         Extensions: <empty>
         RevokedCerts:
           0x1234, 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z, keyCompromise
           0x5678, 2025-01-05T00:12:34Z, unspecified
           0x9ABC, 2025-01-03T00:12:34Z, unspecified
         RemovedFromCRLCerts: <null>
       PerIssuerRevokedCerts[1]
         Issuer: CN=example CA
         RevokedCertsControl
           Flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
           Serial number length: 2
           Date length: 3
           Base date: 2025-01-02T00:12:34Z
         Extensions: <empty>
         RevokedCerts:
           0x1122, 2025-01-06T00:12:34Z, certificateHold
           0x3344, 2025-01-04T00:12:34Z, certificateHold
           0x5566, 2025-01-02T00:12:34Z, certificateHold
         RemovedFromCRLCerts: <null>
     Signature Value
       f0:0d:62:70:f9:14:86:a7:f3:78:d0:6f:01:a8:07:e6:
       4e:08:6b:b3:66:be:3a:15:92:ce:4a:64:bf:fd:62:1f:
       30:e2:ab:93:76:6b:4f:88:18:11:6a:b7:da:7b:ed:f7:
       c3:eb:cb:de:ac:6d:04:55:f5:f5:66:97:12:00:62:05

   Annotated hex

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     0: 8B             # C509CRL=array[11]
     1:   00             # [0]. crlType=0
     2:   0C             # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
     3:   6A             # [2]. authoritySubject=char[10]
     4:     63726C2D7369676E6572 # "crl-signer"
    14:   54             # [3]. authorityKeyIdentifier=byte[20]
    15:     09E433582556550A27DB4A19BCE2D660884722B6
    35:   04             # [4]. crlNumber=4
    36:   1A 677C7172    # [5]. thisUpdate=1736208754:
                         #      2025-01-07T00:12:34Z
    41:   1A 00093A80    # [6]. nextUpdate=604800: 2025-01-14T00:12:34Z
    46:   F6             # [7]. baseCrlNumber=<null>
    47:   80             # [8]. crlExtensions=array[0]
    48:   8A             # [9]. revokedCertsList=array[10]
                           #---PerIssuerRevokedCerts[0]---
    49:     6F             # [0]. issuer=char[15]
    50:       746573742063726C6F6373702D6361 # "test crlocsp-ca"
    65:     84             # [1]. revokedCertsControl=array[4]
    66:       03             # [0]. flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
    67:       02             # [1]. serialNumberLength=2
    68:       03             # [2]. dateLength=3
    69:       1A 67748872    # [3]. baseDate=1735690354:
                             #      2025-01-01T00:12:34Z
    74:     80             # [2]. extensions=array[0]
    75:     52             # [3]. revokedCerts=byte[18], 3 entries
                             #---entries[0]---
    76:       1234           # CSN=1234
    78:       000000         # date=000000: 2025-01-01T00:12:34Z
    81:       01             # reason=1: keyCompromise
                             #---entries[1]---
    82:       5678           # CSN=5678
    84:       054600         # date=054600: 2025-01-05T00:12:34Z
    87:       00             # reason=0: unspecified
                             #---entries[2]---
    88:       9ABC           # CSN=9ABC
    90:       02A300         # date=02A300: 2025-01-03T00:12:34Z
    93:       00             # reason=0: unspecified
    94:     F6             # [4]. removedFromCRLCerts=<null>
                           #---PerIssuerRevokedCerts[1]---
    95:     6A             # [5]. issuer=char[10]
    96:       6578616D706C65204341 # "example CA"
   106:     84             # [6]. revokedCertsControl=array[4]
   107:       03             # [0]. flags: sorted, with reason (0x3)
   108:       02             # [1]. serialNumberLength=2
   109:       03             # [2]. dateLength=3
   110:       1A 6775D9F2    # [3]. baseDate=1735776754:
                             #      2025-01-02T00:12:34Z
   115:     80             # [7]. extensions=array[0]

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   116:     52             # [8]. revokedCerts=byte[18], 3 entries
                             #---entries[0]---
   117:       1122           # CSN=1122
   119:       054600         # date=054600: 2025-01-06T00:12:34Z
   122:       06             # reason=6: certificateHold
                             #---entries[1]---
   123:       3344           # CSN=3344
   125:       02A300         # date=02A300: 2025-01-04T00:12:34Z
   128:       06             # reason=6: certificateHold
                             #---entries[2]---
   129:       5566           # CSN=5566
   131:       000000         # date=000000: 2025-01-02T00:12:34Z
   134:       06             # reason=6: certificateHold
   135:     F6             # [9]. removedFromCRLCerts=<null>
   136:   58 40          # [10]. signature value=byte[64]
   138:     F00D6270F91486A7F378D06F01A807E64E086BB366BE3A1592CE4A64BF
   167:     FD621F30E2AB93766B4F8818116AB7DA7BEDF7C3EBCBDEAC6D0455F5F5
   196:     669712006205

A.4.  OCSP Request Examples

A.4.1.  Simple OCSP Request Example

   *  Size reduction: 66%

   *  Simple OCSP Request (C509SimpleOCSPRequest)

   *  Note that the X.509 OCSP Request and the C509 OCSP Request are not
      convertible.

A.4.1.1.  X.509 OCSP Request

   PEM content (150 bytes):

   -----BEGIN OCSP REQUEST-----
   MIGTMIGQMGswaTBnMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQQgMlOOdIW9N65FTx8NK5dV11i5H26O
   Onrzl6D0AGBcb/gEIMwRyHQKBQnsTaFM5YhucjZMD2O2DtY0fxPBbuclt2aiAhQS
   NBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNKIhMB8wHQYJKwYBBQUHMAECBBARERERERERERER
   ERERERER
   -----END OCSP REQUEST-----

A.4.1.2.  C509 OCSP Request

   Plain Hex (51 bytes):

   86022F501111111111111111111111111111111148A01C73A5F3B063345410652787
   FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D80

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   Textual Representation

   C509SimpleOCSPRequest
     Type: C509SimpleOCSPRequest (2)
     Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
     IssuerCertHash:
       a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
     SerialNumberHash:
       10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
       5a:6f:0d:8d
     Nonce
       11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
     Extensions: <empty>

   Annotated hex

    0: 86             # C509OCSPRequest=array[6]
    1:   02             # [0]. ocspRequestType=C509SimpleOCSPRequest
                        #      (2)
    2:   2F             # [1]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
    3:   50             # [2]. nonce=byte[16]
    4:     11111111111111111111111111111111
   20:   48             # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
   21:     A01C73A5F3B06334
   29:   54             # [4]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
   30:     10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
   50:   80             # [5]. extensions=array[0]

A.4.2.  Unsigned OCSP Request Example

   *  Size reduction: 72%

   *  Unsigned OCSP Request (C509UnsignedOCSPRequest)

   *  Note that the X.509 OCSP Request and the C509 OCSP Request are not
      convertible.

A.4.2.1.  X.509 OCSP Request

   PEM content (475 bytes):

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   -----BEGIN OCSP REQUEST-----
   MIIB1zCCAdMwggGsMGkwZzALBglghkgBZQMEAgEEIDJTjnSFvTeuRU8fDSuXVddY
   uR9ujjp685eg9ABgXG/4BCDMEch0CgUJ7E2hTOWIbnI2TA9jtg7WNH8TwW7nJbdm
   ogIUEjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0EjQwaTBnMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQQgMlOOdIW9
   N65FTx8NK5dV11i5H26OOnrzl6D0AGBcb/gEIMwRyHQKBQnsTaFM5YhucjZMD2O2
   DtY0fxPBbuclt2aiAhQ0VjRWNFY0VjRWNFY0VjRWNFY0VjBpMGcwCwYJYIZIAWUD
   BAIBBCAyU450hb03rkVPHw0rl1XXWLkfbo46evOXoPQAYFxv+AQgzBHIdAoFCexN
   oUzliG5yNkwPY7YO1jR/E8Fu5yW3ZqICFFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4MGkw
   ZzALBglghkgBZQMEAgEEIDMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMz
   BCBERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERERAIUIjMiMyIzIjMiMyIz
   IjMiMyIzIjOiITAfMB0GCSsGAQUFBzABAgQQEREREREREREREREREREREQ==
   -----END OCSP REQUEST-----

A.4.2.2.  C509 OCSP Request

   Plain Hex (132 bytes):

   85002F5011111111111111111111111111111111808648A01C73A5F3B06334808654
   10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D805475D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E7
   48DFD53A8B9D176D8054D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B67840080482222
   222222222222808254D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B80

   Textual Representation

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   C509UnsignedOCSPRequest
     Type: C509UnsignedOCSPRequest (0)
     Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
     Nonce
       11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
     Requests
       OcspPerIssuerRequest
         issuerCertHash
           a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
         extensions: <empty>
         singleRequests
           SingleCertRequest
             SerialNumberHash:
               10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
               5a:6f:0d:8d
             Extensions: <empty>
           SingleCertRequest
             SerialNumberHash:
               75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
               8b:9d:17:6d
             Extensions: <empty>
           SingleCertRequest
             SerialNumberHash:
               d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
               5b:67:84:00
             Extensions: <empty>
       OcspPerIssuerRequest
         issuerCertHash
           22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
         extensions: <empty>
         singleRequests
           SingleCertRequest
             SerialNumberHash:
               d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
               ce:41:7e:3b
             Extensions: <empty>
     Extensions: <empty>

   Annotated hex

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     0: 85             # C509OCSPRequest=array[5]
     1:   00             # [0]. ocspRequestType=C509UnsignedOCSPRequest
                         #      (0)
     2:   2F             # [1]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
     3:   50             # [2]. nonce=byte[16]
     4:     11111111111111111111111111111111
    20:   80             # [3]. extensions=array[0]
    21:   86             # [4]. requests=array[6]
                           #---PerIssuerRequests[0]---
    22:     48             # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
    23:       A01C73A5F3B06334
    31:     80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
    32:     86             # [2]. singleRequests=array[6]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[0]---
    33:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    34:         10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
    54:       80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[1]---
    55:       54             # [2]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    56:         75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
    76:       80             # [3]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[2]---
    77:       54             # [4]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    78:         D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
    98:       80             # [5]. extensions=array[0]
                           #---PerIssuerRequests[1]---
    99:     48             # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
   100:       2222222222222222
   108:     80             # [4]. extensions=array[0]
   109:     82             # [5]. singleRequests=array[2]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[0]---
   110:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
   111:         D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
   131:       80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]

A.4.3.  Signed OCSP Request Example Without Requestor's Certificate

   *  Size reduction: 64%

   *  Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.3.2

   *  Signed OCSP Request (C509SignedOCSPRequest) without requestor's
      certificate

   *  Note that the X.509 OCSP Request and the C509 OCSP Request are not
      convertible.

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A.4.3.1.  X.509 OCSP Request

   PEM content (584 bytes):

   -----BEGIN OCSP REQUEST-----
   MIICRDCCAfKhHaQbMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMMDm9jc3AtcmVxdWVzdG9yMIIBrDBpMGcw
   CwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAyU450hb03rkVPHw0rl1XXWLkfbo46evOXoPQAYFxv+AQg
   zBHIdAoFCexNoUzliG5yNkwPY7YO1jR/E8Fu5yW3ZqICFBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0
   EjQSNBI0MGkwZzALBglghkgBZQMEAgEEIDJTjnSFvTeuRU8fDSuXVddYuR9ujjp6
   85eg9ABgXG/4BCDMEch0CgUJ7E2hTOWIbnI2TA9jtg7WNH8TwW7nJbdmogIUNFY0
   VjRWNFY0VjRWNFY0VjRWNFYwaTBnMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQQgMlOOdIW9N65FTx8N
   K5dV11i5H26OOnrzl6D0AGBcb/gEIMwRyHQKBQnsTaFM5YhucjZMD2O2DtY0fxPB
   buclt2aiAhRWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeDBpMGcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAz
   MzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMwQgRERERERERERERERERERE
   REREREREREREREREREREREQCFCIzIjMiMyIzIjMiMyIzIjMiMyIzoiEwHzAdBgkr
   BgEFBQcwAQIEEBERERERERERERERERERERGgTDBKMAUGAytlcANBAJxdKYl8BFnb
   nngr44EK7xqnJFQWfa8iM4Lje1eezFCTX1GiRVJEqS2Oe2HEdFggCngY5q5RkRaY
   qvjTEhXlRwg=
   -----END OCSP REQUEST-----

A.4.3.2.  C509 OCSP Request

   Plain Hex (209 bytes):

   89010C2F50111111111111111111111111111111114844F0528B56F35AD9808648A0
   1C73A5F3B0633480865410652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D805475D8
   BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D8054D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A
   51605B67840080482222222222222222808254D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAEC
   F6CE417E3B80F658407B840FABA2179AC564A97BA369436F05316FE45FFA28B773FB
   33397123BA7AB17605572D7B638B26127E1B86FB452C5B4F1FEAE1638D5D328AF893
   B77A7D1106

   Textual Representation

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   C509SignedOCSPRequest
     TBSOCSPRequest
       Type: C509SignedOCSPRequest (1)
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
       RequestorCertHash
         44:f0:52:8b:56:f3:5a:d9
       Nonce
         11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
       Extensions: <empty>
       Requests
         OcspPerIssuerRequest
           issuerCertHash
             a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
           extensions: <empty>
           singleRequests
             SingleCertRequest
               SerialNumberHash:
                 10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
                 5a:6f:0d:8d
               Extensions: <empty>
             SingleCertRequest
               SerialNumberHash:
                 75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
                 8b:9d:17:6d
               Extensions: <empty>
             SingleCertRequest
               SerialNumberHash:
                 d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
                 5b:67:84:00
               Extensions: <empty>
         OcspPerIssuerRequest
           issuerCertHash
             22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
           extensions: <empty>
           singleRequests
             SingleCertRequest
               SerialNumberHash:
                 d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
                 ce:41:7e:3b
               Extensions: <empty>
       Requestor Certs: null
     Signature Value
       7b:84:0f:ab:a2:17:9a:c5:64:a9:7b:a3:69:43:6f:05:
       31:6f:e4:5f:fa:28:b7:73:fb:33:39:71:23:ba:7a:b1:
       76:05:57:2d:7b:63:8b:26:12:7e:1b:86:fb:45:2c:5b:
       4f:1f:ea:e1:63:8d:5d:32:8a:f8:93:b7:7a:7d:11:06

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   Annotated hex

     0: 89             # C509OCSPRequest=array[9]
     1:   01             # [0]. ocspRequestType=C509SignedOCSPRequest
                         #      (1)
     2:   0C             # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
     3:   2F             # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
     4:   50             # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
     5:     11111111111111111111111111111111
    21:   48             # [4]. requestorCertHash=byte[8]
    22:     44F0528B56F35AD9
    30:   80             # [5]. extensions=array[0]
    31:   86             # [6]. requests=array[6]
                           #---PerIssuerRequests[0]---
    32:     48             # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
    33:       A01C73A5F3B06334
    41:     80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
    42:     86             # [2]. singleRequests=array[6]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[0]---
    43:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    44:         10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
    64:       80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[1]---
    65:       54             # [2]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    66:         75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
    86:       80             # [3]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[2]---
    87:       54             # [4]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    88:         D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
   108:       80             # [5]. extensions=array[0]
                           #---PerIssuerRequests[1]---
   109:     48             # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
   110:       2222222222222222
   118:     80             # [4]. extensions=array[0]
   119:     82             # [5]. singleRequests=array[2]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[0]---
   120:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
   121:         D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
   141:       80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
   142:   F6             # [7]. requestorCerts=<null>
   143:   58 40          # [8]. signatureValue=byte[64]
   145:     7B840FABA2179AC564A97BA369436F05316FE45FFA28B773FB33397123
   174:     BA7AB17605572D7B638B26127E1B86FB452C5B4F1FEAE1638D5D328AF8
   203:     93B77A7D1106

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A.4.4.  Signed OCSP Request Example With Requestor's Certificate

   *  Size reduction: 59%

   *  Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.3.2

   *  Signed OCSP Request (C509SignedOCSPRequest) with embedded
      requestor's certificate

   *  Note that the X.509 OCSP Request and the C509 OCSP Request are not
      convertible.

A.4.4.1.  X.509 OCSP Request

   PEM content (1035 bytes):

   -----BEGIN OCSP REQUEST-----
   MIIEBzCCAnGhHaQbMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMMDm9jc3AtcmVxdWVzdG9yMIIBrDBpMGcw
   CwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAyU450hb03rkVPHw0rl1XXWLkfbo46evOXoPQAYFxv+AQg
   zBHIdAoFCexNoUzliG5yNkwPY7YO1jR/E8Fu5yW3ZqICFBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0
   EjQSNBI0MGkwZzALBglghkgBZQMEAgEEIDJTjnSFvTeuRU8fDSuXVddYuR9ujjp6
   85eg9ABgXG/4BCDMEch0CgUJ7E2hTOWIbnI2TA9jtg7WNH8TwW7nJbdmogIUNFY0
   VjRWNFY0VjRWNFY0VjRWNFYwaTBnMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQQgMlOOdIW9N65FTx8N
   K5dV11i5H26OOnrzl6D0AGBcb/gEIMwRyHQKBQnsTaFM5YhucjZMD2O2DtY0fxPB
   buclt2aiAhRWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeDBpMGcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAz
   MzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMwQgRERERERERERERERERERE
   REREREREREREREREREREREQCFCIzIjMiMyIzIjMiMyIzIjMiMyIzooGfMIGcMBoG
   CSsGAQUFBzABBAQNMAsGCSsGAQUFBzABATBfBgkrBgEFBQcwAQgEUjBQMAcwBQYD
   K2VwMCEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcwIjAKBggqhkjO
   PQQDAjAUBgcqhkjOPQIBBgkrJAMDAggBAQcwHQYJKwYBBQUHMAECBBARERERERER
   ERERERERERERoIIBjjCCAYowBQYDK2VwA0EAnqnZjVvfg50lAZOGBiSExUCuMKja
   IHCZKykPyiVpW8ECz2Ejd8NiIQ/pnXvzTRvbQz1i7y+figq4L4YZYGfjAaCCATww
   ggE4MIIBNDCB56ADAgECAgISNjAFBgMrZXAwGjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPdGVzdCBjcmxv
   Y3NwLWNhMB4XDTI1MDEwMjAwMDAwMFoXDTI2MDEwMjAwMDAwMFowGTEXMBUGA1UE
   AwwOb2NzcC1yZXF1ZXN0b3IwKjAFBgMrZXADIQAEUwsXZO3UtOM6tErw+DiWHABx
   dtdLajVG7Lf9VzIN06NSMFAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLE21FmKGxtqhtplEK6lZNgSl+T5
   MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIHgDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTZfXfmNML3ADAMpY/IdzZbFVAH
   ojAFBgMrZXADQQCY+ZIhXpHFm+r/HrfqPv0rqn4dvQHRKwN3gZhZyWeQP/nP6vYx
   W73WoQgSSbXiyYVCHNASdBpZljgSyNJ6NX0C
   -----END OCSP REQUEST-----

A.4.4.2.  C509 OCSP Request

   Plain Hex (420 bytes):

Liao, et al.               Expires 6 May 2027                  [Page 85]
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   89010C2F50111111111111111111111111111111114844F0528B56F35AD984185D82
   0001185E840CF600820118188648A01C73A5F3B0633480865410652787FA0527BC24
   49A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D805475D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D80
   54D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B67840080482222222222222222808254
   D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B8058C38B024212360C6F74657374
   2063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A69570A806E6F6373702D72657175657374
   6F720C582004530B1764EDD4B4E33AB44AF0F838961C007176D74B6A3546ECB7FD57
   320DD3860154DD51BDB2A2C791C062D4027856DBACF52607F0BE210107542F45E78D
   2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E10565840F8C6183ECF8C3EFD50DD4942D172814C
   46EC0FC01DD586A597178DF864A0D9DA86B7CA17FC9F772FF04C80E98B60D5B4B624
   08A277A5B70D0D2A3F5ED5442D07584075C65F028199FFC884B6A0E3E4F9EDC380A0
   37B1E9B5868C74F5A0CEBCCDF6C7D0C0D69B1BB6976414444E156D72E12E2FF93678
   2513516B02B4A1E40EB13D01

   Textual Representation

   C509SignedOCSPRequest
     TBSOCSPRequest
       Type: C509SignedOCSPRequest (1)
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
       RequestorCertHash
         44:f0:52:8b:56:f3:5a:d9
       Nonce
         11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
       Extensions
         AcceptOCSPResponseTypes (93)
           C509ErrorOCSPResponse (0)
           C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
         preferredSignatureAlgorithms (94)
             Preferred Signature Algorithm:
               Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
             Preferred Signature Algorithm:
               Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-sha256 (0)
               Public Key Algorithms:
                 EC public key on curve secp256r1 (1)
                 EC public key on curve brainpoolp256r1 (24)
       Requests
         OcspPerIssuerRequest
           issuerCertHash
             a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
           extensions: <empty>
           singleRequests
             SingleCertRequest
               SerialNumberHash:
                 10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
                 5a:6f:0d:8d
               Extensions: <empty>

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             SingleCertRequest
               SerialNumberHash:
                 75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
                 8b:9d:17:6d
               Extensions: <empty>
             SingleCertRequest
               SerialNumberHash:
                 d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
                 5b:67:84:00
               Extensions: <empty>
         OcspPerIssuerRequest
           issuerCertHash
             22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
           extensions: <empty>
           singleRequests
             SingleCertRequest
               SerialNumberHash:
                 d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
                 ce:41:7e:3b
               Extensions: <empty>
       Requestor Certs
         C509Certificate
           8b:02:42:12:36:0c:6f:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:
           63:73:70:2d:63:61:1a:67:75:d7:00:1a:69:57:0a:80:
           6e:6f:63:73:70:2d:72:65:71:75:65:73:74:6f:72:0c:
           58:20:04:53:0b:17:64:ed:d4:b4:e3:3a:b4:4a:f0:f8:
           38:96:1c:00:71:76:d7:4b:6a:35:46:ec:b7:fd:57:32:
           0d:d3:86:01:54:dd:51:bd:b2:a2:c7:91:c0:62:d4:02:
           78:56:db:ac:f5:26:07:f0:be:21:01:07:54:2f:45:e7:
           8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:45:0e:10:
           56:58:40:f8:c6:18:3e:cf:8c:3e:fd:50:dd:49:42:d1:
           72:81:4c:46:ec:0f:c0:1d:d5:86:a5:97:17:8d:f8:64:
           a0:d9:da:86:b7:ca:17:fc:9f:77:2f:f0:4c:80:e9:8b:
           60:d5:b4:b6:24:08:a2:77:a5:b7:0d:0d:2a:3f:5e:d5:
           44:2d:07
     Signature Value
       75:c6:5f:02:81:99:ff:c8:84:b6:a0:e3:e4:f9:ed:c3:
       80:a0:37:b1:e9:b5:86:8c:74:f5:a0:ce:bc:cd:f6:c7:
       d0:c0:d6:9b:1b:b6:97:64:14:44:4e:15:6d:72:e1:2e:
       2f:f9:36:78:25:13:51:6b:02:b4:a1:e4:0e:b1:3d:01

   Annotated hex

Liao, et al.               Expires 6 May 2027                  [Page 87]
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     0: 89             # C509OCSPRequest=array[9]
     1:   01             # [0]. ocspRequestType=C509SignedOCSPRequest
                         #      (1)
     2:   0C             # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
     3:   2F             # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
     4:   50             # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
     5:     11111111111111111111111111111111
    21:   48             # [4]. requestorCertHash=byte[8]
    22:     44F0528B56F35AD9
    30:   84             # [5]. extensions=array[4]
                           #---extension[0]---
    31:     18 5D          # [0]. type=AcceptOCSPResponseTypes (93)
    33:     82             # [1]. value=array[2]
    34:       00             # [0]. C509ErrorOCSPResponse (0)
    35:       01             # [1]. C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
                           #---extension[1]---
    36:     18 5E          # [2]. type=preferredSignatureAlgorithms
                           #      (94)
    38:     84             # [3]. value=array[4]
                             #---preferredSignatureAlgorithms[0]---
    39:       0C             # [0]. sigIdentifier=Ed25519 (12)
    40:       F6             # [1]. pubKeyAlgIdentifiers=<null>
                             #---preferredSignatureAlgorithms[1]---
    41:       00             # [2]. sigIdentifier=ecdsa-with-sha256 (0)
    42:       82             # [3]. pubKeyAlgIdentifiers=array[2]
    43:         01             # [0]. pubKeyAlgIdentifier=EC public key
                               #      on curve secp256r1 (1)
    44:         18 18          # [1]. pubKeyAlgIdentifier=EC public key
                               #      on curve brainpoolp256r1 (24)
    46:   86             # [6]. requests=array[6]
                           #---PerIssuerRequests[0]---
    47:     48             # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
    48:       A01C73A5F3B06334
    56:     80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
    57:     86             # [2]. singleRequests=array[6]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[0]---
    58:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    59:         10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
    79:       80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[1]---
    80:       54             # [2]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    81:         75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
   101:       80             # [3]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[2]---
   102:       54             # [4]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
   103:         D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
   123:       80             # [5]. extensions=array[0]
                           #---PerIssuerRequests[1]---

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   124:     48             # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
   125:       2222222222222222
   133:     80             # [4]. extensions=array[0]
   134:     82             # [5]. singleRequests=array[2]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[0]---
   135:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
   136:         D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
   156:       80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
   157:   58 C3          # [7]. requestorCerts(COSE_C509)=byte[195]
   159:     8B024212360C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A69
   188:     570A806E6F6373702D726571756573746F720C582004530B1764EDD4B4
   217:     E33AB44AF0F838961C007176D74B6A3546ECB7FD57320DD3860154DD51
   246:     BDB2A2C791C062D4027856DBACF52607F0BE210107542F45E78D2CAEDF
   275:     368CDF53C39005D492450E10565840F8C6183ECF8C3EFD50DD4942D172
   304:     814C46EC0FC01DD586A597178DF864A0D9DA86B7CA17FC9F772FF04C80
   333:     E98B60D5B4B62408A277A5B70D0D2A3F5ED5442D07
   354:   58 40          # [8]. signatureValue=byte[64]
   356:     75C65F028199FFC884B6A0E3E4F9EDC380A037B1E9B5868C74F5A0CEBC
   385:     CDF6C7D0C0D69B1BB6976414444E156D72E12E2FF936782513516B02B4
   414:     A1E40EB13D01

A.4.5.  Signed OCSP Request Example With Requestor's Certificate Chain

   *  Size reduction: 54%

   *  Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.3.2

   *  Signed OCSP Request (C509SignedOCSPRequest) with embedded
      requestor's certificate chain (2 certificates)

   *  Note that the X.509 OCSP Request and the C509 OCSP Request are not
      convertible.

A.4.5.1.  X.509 OCSP Request

   PEM content (1371 bytes):

Liao, et al.               Expires 6 May 2027                  [Page 89]
Internet-Draft               C509 Revocation               November 2026

   -----BEGIN OCSP REQUEST-----
   MIIFVzCCAnGhHaQbMBkxFzAVBgNVBAMMDm9jc3AtcmVxdWVzdG9yMIIBrDBpMGcw
   CwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAyU450hb03rkVPHw0rl1XXWLkfbo46evOXoPQAYFxv+AQg
   zBHIdAoFCexNoUzliG5yNkwPY7YO1jR/E8Fu5yW3ZqICFBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0
   EjQSNBI0MGkwZzALBglghkgBZQMEAgEEIDJTjnSFvTeuRU8fDSuXVddYuR9ujjp6
   85eg9ABgXG/4BCDMEch0CgUJ7E2hTOWIbnI2TA9jtg7WNH8TwW7nJbdmogIUNFY0
   VjRWNFY0VjRWNFY0VjRWNFYwaTBnMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQQgMlOOdIW9N65FTx8N
   K5dV11i5H26OOnrzl6D0AGBcb/gEIMwRyHQKBQnsTaFM5YhucjZMD2O2DtY0fxPB
   buclt2aiAhRWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeDBpMGcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAz
   MzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMwQgRERERERERERERERERERE
   REREREREREREREREREREREQCFCIzIjMiMyIzIjMiMyIzIjMiMyIzooGfMIGcMBoG
   CSsGAQUFBzABBAQNMAsGCSsGAQUFBzABATBfBgkrBgEFBQcwAQgEUjBQMAcwBQYD
   K2VwMCEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcwIjAKBggqhkjO
   PQQDAjAUBgcqhkjOPQIBBgkrJAMDAggBAQcwHQYJKwYBBQUHMAECBBARERERERER
   ERERERERERERoIIC3jCCAtowBQYDK2VwA0EAnqnZjVvfg50lAZOGBiSExUCuMKja
   IHCZKykPyiVpW8ECz2Ejd8NiIQ/pnXvzTRvbQz1i7y+figq4L4YZYGfjAaCCAoww
   ggKIMIIBNDCB56ADAgECAgISNjAFBgMrZXAwGjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPdGVzdCBjcmxv
   Y3NwLWNhMB4XDTI1MDEwMjAwMDAwMFoXDTI2MDEwMjAwMDAwMFowGTEXMBUGA1UE
   AwwOb2NzcC1yZXF1ZXN0b3IwKjAFBgMrZXADIQAEUwsXZO3UtOM6tErw+DiWHABx
   dtdLajVG7Lf9VzIN06NSMFAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFLE21FmKGxtqhtplEK6lZNgSl+T5
   MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIHgDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTZfXfmNML3ADAMpY/IdzZbFVAH
   ojAFBgMrZXADQQCY+ZIhXpHFm+r/HrfqPv0rqn4dvQHRKwN3gZhZyWeQP/nP6vYx
   W73WoQgSSbXiyYVCHNASdBpZljgSyNJ6NX0CMIIBTDCB/6ADAgECAgEBMAUGAytl
   cDAeMRwwGgYDVQQDDBN0ZXN0IGNybG9jc3Atcm9vdGNhMB4XDTI1MDEwMTAwMDAw
   MFoXDTI2MTIzMTIzNTk1OVowGjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPdGVzdCBjcmxvY3NwLWNhMCow
   BQYDK2VwAyEAXvijVaABp8UNI0lHASCBMaS7Krkg1Av7DuH2qyj/dACjZjBkMB0G
   A1UdDgQWBBTZfXfmNML3ADAMpY/IdzZbFVAHojAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwEgYD
   VR0TAQH/BAgwBgEB/wIBATAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSRI5z6+eeDbLKfUeExkdsQ064W
   kzAFBgMrZXADQQDWXgHXy/pBf7F7mfeX7Wknr1Yv9j6NNbPjp9OBYMxkZ0AQTY85
   GJfdqxGY89BaJhkgQ2Km+DwziCEbNrxWPUEC
   -----END OCSP REQUEST-----

A.4.5.2.  C509 OCSP Request

   Plain Hex (625 bytes):

Liao, et al.               Expires 6 May 2027                  [Page 90]
Internet-Draft               C509 Revocation               November 2026

   89010C2F50111111111111111111111111111111114844F0528B56F35AD984185D82
   0001185E840CF600820118188648A01C73A5F3B0633480865410652787FA0527BC24
   49A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D805475D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D80
   54D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B67840080482222222222222222808254
   D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B808258C38B024212360C6F746573
   742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A69570A806E6F6373702D726571756573
   746F720C582004530B1764EDD4B4E33AB44AF0F838961C007176D74B6A3546ECB7FD
   57320DD3860154DD51BDB2A2C791C062D4027856DBACF52607F0BE210107542F45E7
   8D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E10565840F8C6183ECF8C3EFD50DD4942D17281
   4C46EC0FC01DD586A597178DF864A0D9DA86B7CA17FC9F772FF04C80E98B60D5B4B6
   2408A277A5B70D0D2A3F5ED5442D0758CA8B0241010C73746573742063726C6F6373
   702D726F6F7463611A677485801A6B36EC7F6F746573742063726C6F6373702D6361
   0C58205EF8A355A001A7C50D23494701208131A4BB2AB920D40BFB0EE1F6AB28FF74
   008801542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E1056211860230107542DA3A4
   03F7D2F4E0B3D8031A73BA8A839F557F0F5840E50465D60C02A2111EF3FC6E44F2A3
   6008765B552351F9A3F5B2AA7C76F1F05D259847A4F4250B2E4B0AE2099762A2596D
   3CC1DB2CCD180AA0A2D0E191310B0F58408EC4D20A1C156B2FDB61D82D39EF9D54CC
   BFFE42EAC1ACADDECD20787D979A38823BBB1A6458C22F07E6487073769FB9B52544
   7A43B0C9C3BCDE790455DEC508

   Textual Representation

   C509SignedOCSPRequest
     TBSOCSPRequest
       Type: C509SignedOCSPRequest (1)
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
       RequestorCertHash
         44:f0:52:8b:56:f3:5a:d9
       Nonce
         11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
       Extensions
         AcceptOCSPResponseTypes (93)
           C509ErrorOCSPResponse (0)
           C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
         preferredSignatureAlgorithms (94)
             Preferred Signature Algorithm:
               Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
             Preferred Signature Algorithm:
               Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-sha256 (0)
               Public Key Algorithms:
                 EC public key on curve secp256r1 (1)
                 EC public key on curve brainpoolp256r1 (24)
       Requests
         OcspPerIssuerRequest
           issuerCertHash
             a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
           extensions: <empty>

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           singleRequests
             SingleCertRequest
               SerialNumberHash:
                 10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
                 5a:6f:0d:8d
               Extensions: <empty>
             SingleCertRequest
               SerialNumberHash:
                 75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
                 8b:9d:17:6d
               Extensions: <empty>
             SingleCertRequest
               SerialNumberHash:
                 d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
                 5b:67:84:00
               Extensions: <empty>
         OcspPerIssuerRequest
           issuerCertHash
             22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
           extensions: <empty>
           singleRequests
             SingleCertRequest
               SerialNumberHash:
                 d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
                 ce:41:7e:3b
               Extensions: <empty>
       Requestor Certs
         C509Certificate
           8b:02:42:12:36:0c:6f:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:
           63:73:70:2d:63:61:1a:67:75:d7:00:1a:69:57:0a:80:
           6e:6f:63:73:70:2d:72:65:71:75:65:73:74:6f:72:0c:
           58:20:04:53:0b:17:64:ed:d4:b4:e3:3a:b4:4a:f0:f8:
           38:96:1c:00:71:76:d7:4b:6a:35:46:ec:b7:fd:57:32:
           0d:d3:86:01:54:dd:51:bd:b2:a2:c7:91:c0:62:d4:02:
           78:56:db:ac:f5:26:07:f0:be:21:01:07:54:2f:45:e7:
           8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:45:0e:10:
           56:58:40:f8:c6:18:3e:cf:8c:3e:fd:50:dd:49:42:d1:
           72:81:4c:46:ec:0f:c0:1d:d5:86:a5:97:17:8d:f8:64:
           a0:d9:da:86:b7:ca:17:fc:9f:77:2f:f0:4c:80:e9:8b:
           60:d5:b4:b6:24:08:a2:77:a5:b7:0d:0d:2a:3f:5e:d5:
           44:2d:07
         C509Certificate
           8b:02:41:01:0c:73:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:63:
           73:70:2d:72:6f:6f:74:63:61:1a:67:74:85:80:1a:6b:
           36:ec:7f:6f:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:63:73:70:
           2d:63:61:0c:58:20:5e:f8:a3:55:a0:01:a7:c5:0d:23:
           49:47:01:20:81:31:a4:bb:2a:b9:20:d4:0b:fb:0e:e1:
           f6:ab:28:ff:74:00:88:01:54:2f:45:e7:8d:2c:ae:df:

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           36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:45:0e:10:56:21:18:60:
           23:01:07:54:2d:a3:a4:03:f7:d2:f4:e0:b3:d8:03:1a:
           73:ba:8a:83:9f:55:7f:0f:58:40:e5:04:65:d6:0c:02:
           a2:11:1e:f3:fc:6e:44:f2:a3:60:08:76:5b:55:23:51:
           f9:a3:f5:b2:aa:7c:76:f1:f0:5d:25:98:47:a4:f4:25:
           0b:2e:4b:0a:e2:09:97:62:a2:59:6d:3c:c1:db:2c:cd:
           18:0a:a0:a2:d0:e1:91:31:0b:0f
     Signature Value
       8e:c4:d2:0a:1c:15:6b:2f:db:61:d8:2d:39:ef:9d:54:
       cc:bf:fe:42:ea:c1:ac:ad:de:cd:20:78:7d:97:9a:38:
       82:3b:bb:1a:64:58:c2:2f:07:e6:48:70:73:76:9f:b9:
       b5:25:44:7a:43:b0:c9:c3:bc:de:79:04:55:de:c5:08

   Annotated hex

     0: 89             # C509OCSPRequest=array[9]
     1:   01             # [0]. ocspRequestType=C509SignedOCSPRequest
                         #      (1)
     2:   0C             # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
     3:   2F             # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
     4:   50             # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
     5:     11111111111111111111111111111111
    21:   48             # [4]. requestorCertHash=byte[8]
    22:     44F0528B56F35AD9
    30:   84             # [5]. extensions=array[4]
                           #---extension[0]---
    31:     18 5D          # [0]. type=AcceptOCSPResponseTypes (93)
    33:     82             # [1]. value=array[2]
    34:       00             # [0]. C509ErrorOCSPResponse (0)
    35:       01             # [1]. C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
                           #---extension[1]---
    36:     18 5E          # [2]. type=preferredSignatureAlgorithms
                           #      (94)
    38:     84             # [3]. value=array[4]
                             #---preferredSignatureAlgorithms[0]---
    39:       0C             # [0]. sigIdentifier=Ed25519 (12)
    40:       F6             # [1]. pubKeyAlgIdentifiers=<null>
                             #---preferredSignatureAlgorithms[1]---
    41:       00             # [2]. sigIdentifier=ecdsa-with-sha256 (0)
    42:       82             # [3]. pubKeyAlgIdentifiers=array[2]
    43:         01             # [0]. pubKeyAlgIdentifier=EC public key
                               #      on curve secp256r1 (1)
    44:         18 18          # [1]. pubKeyAlgIdentifier=EC public key
                               #      on curve brainpoolp256r1 (24)
    46:   86             # [6]. requests=array[6]
                           #---PerIssuerRequests[0]---
    47:     48             # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
    48:       A01C73A5F3B06334

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    56:     80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
    57:     86             # [2]. singleRequests=array[6]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[0]---
    58:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    59:         10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
    79:       80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[1]---
    80:       54             # [2]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    81:         75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
   101:       80             # [3]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[2]---
   102:       54             # [4]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
   103:         D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
   123:       80             # [5]. extensions=array[0]
                           #---PerIssuerRequests[1]---
   124:     48             # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
   125:       2222222222222222
   133:     80             # [4]. extensions=array[0]
   134:     82             # [5]. singleRequests=array[2]
                             #---SingleCertRequests[0]---
   135:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
   136:         D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
   156:       80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
   157:   82             # [7]. requestorCerts(COSE_C509)=array[2]
   158:     58 C3          # [0]. C509CertData=byte[195]
   160:       8B024212360C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A
   188:       69570A806E6F6373702D726571756573746F720C582004530B1764ED
   216:       D4B4E33AB44AF0F838961C007176D74B6A3546ECB7FD57320DD38601
   244:       54DD51BDB2A2C791C062D4027856DBACF52607F0BE210107542F45E7
   272:       8D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E10565840F8C6183ECF8C3EFD50
   300:       DD4942D172814C46EC0FC01DD586A597178DF864A0D9DA86B7CA17FC
   328:       9F772FF04C80E98B60D5B4B62408A277A5B70D0D2A3F5ED5442D07
   355:     58 CA          # [1]. C509CertData=byte[202]
   357:       8B0241010C73746573742063726C6F6373702D726F6F7463611A6774
   385:       85801A6B36EC7F6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63610C58205EF8
   413:       A355A001A7C50D23494701208131A4BB2AB920D40BFB0EE1F6AB28FF
   441:       74008801542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E1056211860
   469:       230107542DA3A403F7D2F4E0B3D8031A73BA8A839F557F0F5840E504
   497:       65D60C02A2111EF3FC6E44F2A36008765B552351F9A3F5B2AA7C76F1
   525:       F05D259847A4F4250B2E4B0AE2099762A2596D3CC1DB2CCD180AA0A2
   553:       D0E191310B0F
   559:   58 40          # [8]. signatureValue=byte[64]
   561:     8EC4D20A1C156B2FDB61D82D39EF9D54CCBFFE42EAC1ACADDECD20787D
   590:     979A38823BBB1A6458C22F07E6487073769FB9B525447A43B0C9C3BCDE
   619:     790455DEC508

A.5.  OCSP Response Examples

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A.5.1.  Error OCSP Response Example

   *  Size reduction: 40%

   *  Error Response (C509ErrorOCSPResponse)

A.5.1.1.  X.509 OCSP Response

   PEM content (5 bytes):

   -----BEGIN OCSP RESPONSE-----
   MAMKAQY=
   -----END OCSP RESPONSE-----

A.5.1.2.  C509 OCSP Response

   Plain Hex (3 bytes):

   820006

   Textual Representation

   C509ErrorResponse
     Type:   C509ErrorOCSPResponse (0)
     Status: unauthorized (6)

   Annotated hex

   0: 82             # C509OCSPResponse=array[2]
   1:   00             # [0]. ocspResponseType=C509ErrorOCSPResponse
                       #      (0)
   2:   06             # [1]. responseStatus=unauthorized (6)

A.5.2.  Simple OCSP Response Example

   *  Size reduction: 58%

   *  Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.4.2

   *  Simple OCSP Response (C509SimpleOCSPResponse) without responder's
      certificate

   *  Note that the X.509 OCSP Response and the C509 OCSP Response are
      not convertible.

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A.5.2.1.  X.509 OCSP Response

   PEM content (336 bytes):

   -----BEGIN OCSP RESPONSE-----
   MIIBTAoBAKCCAUUwggFBBgkrBgEFBQcwAQEEggEyMIIBLjCB4aIWBBTq5ZqK6ar0
   EEsV5Q6O4BcVF3QYrxgPMjAyNTAzMDMwMDAwMDBaMIGSMIGPMGcwCwYJYIZIAWUD
   BAIBBCAyU450hb03rkVPHw0rl1XXWLkfbo46evOXoPQAYFxv+AQgzBHIdAoFCexN
   oUzliG5yNkwPY7YO1jR/E8Fu5yW3ZqICFBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0gAAY
   DzIwMjUwMzAyMTYwMDAwWqARGA8yMDI1MDMwMzA3MDAwMFqhITAfMB0GCSsGAQUF
   BzABAgQQERERERERERERERERERERETAFBgMrZXADQQAoVz6mB1JqePHWA2adyeK4
   ElU3cwbFiAepAQkUhmtUT9vU4J4mc/QxA39Ja36kVABy8+f62xw0f+5v3G9LTS0M
   -----END OCSP RESPONSE-----

A.5.2.2.  C509 OCSP Response

   Plain Hex (140 bytes):

   8E020C2F5011111111111111111111111111111111480600867838E3311A48A01C73
   A5F3B063345410652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D001A67C4F1003970
   7F19627080F6584052D9F137BC08E4D17C3C1A0412EF70F6C4BA7124EB998F3B0A53
   AAF62F84FD18BF9AB24AEC7CE9C73717A816BFA1E3E9B0BEE6FA1DD588F0A2C838DF
   DED37404

   Textual Representation

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   C509SimpleOCSPResponse
     TBSSimpleOCSPResponse
       Type: C509SimpleOCSPResponse (2)
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
       Nonce
         11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
       ResponderCertHash
         06:00:86:78:38:e3:31:1a
       IssuerCertHash
         a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
       SerialNumberHash
         10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
         5a:6f:0d:8d
       Cert Status: good
       ProducedAt: 2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
       This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
       Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
       Extensions: <empty>
       Responder Certs: null
     Signature Value
       52:d9:f1:37:bc:08:e4:d1:7c:3c:1a:04:12:ef:70:f6:
       c4:ba:71:24:eb:99:8f:3b:0a:53:aa:f6:2f:84:fd:18:
       bf:9a:b2:4a:ec:7c:e9:c7:37:17:a8:16:bf:a1:e3:e9:
       b0:be:e6:fa:1d:d5:88:f0:a2:c8:38:df:de:d3:74:04

   Annotated hex

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     0: 8E             # C509OCSPResponse=array[14]
     1:   02             # [0]. ocspResponseType=C509SimpleOCSPResponse
                         #      (2)
     2:   0C             # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
     3:   2F             # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
     4:   50             # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
     5:     11111111111111111111111111111111
    21:   48             # [4]. responderCertHash=byte[8]
    22:     0600867838E3311A
    30:   48             # [5]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
    31:     A01C73A5F3B06334
    39:   54             # [6]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    40:     10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
    60:   00             # [7]. certStatus=good (0)
    61:   1A 67C4F100    # [8]. producedAt=1740960000:
                         #      2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
    66:   39 707F        # [9]. thisUpdate=-28800: 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
    69:   19 6270        # [10]. nextUpdate=25200: 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
    72:   80             # [11]. extensions=array[0]
    73:   F6             # [12]. responderCerts=<null>
    74:   58 40          # [13]. signatureValue=byte[64]
    76:     52D9F137BC08E4D17C3C1A0412EF70F6C4BA7124EB998F3B0A53AAF62F
   105:     84FD18BF9AB24AEC7CE9C73717A816BFA1E3E9B0BEE6FA1DD588F0A2C8
   134:     38DFDED37404

A.5.3.  Basic OCSP Response Example Without Responder's Certificate

   *  Size reduction: 70%

   *  Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.4.2

   *  Basic OCSP Response (C509BasicOCSPResponse) without responder's
      certificate

   *  Note that the X.509 OCSP Response and the C509 OCSP Response are
      not convertible.

A.5.3.1.  X.509 OCSP Response

   PEM content (837 bytes):

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   -----BEGIN OCSP RESPONSE-----
   MIIDQQoBAKCCAzowggM2BgkrBgEFBQcwAQEEggMnMIIDIzCCAtWiFgQU6uWaiumq
   9BBLFeUOjuAXFRd0GK8YDzIwMjUwMzAzMDAwMDAwWjCCAnQwgY8wZzALBglghkgB
   ZQMEAgEEIDJTjnSFvTeuRU8fDSuXVddYuR9ujjp685eg9ABgXG/4BCDMEch0CgUJ
   7E2hTOWIbnI2TA9jtg7WNH8TwW7nJbdmogIUEjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0EjSA
   ABgPMjAyNTAzMDIxNjAwMDBaoBEYDzIwMjUwMzAzMDcwMDAwWjCBpTBnMAsGCWCG
   SAFlAwQCAQQgMlOOdIW9N65FTx8NK5dV11i5H26OOnrzl6D0AGBcb/gEIMwRyHQK
   BQnsTaFM5YhucjZMD2O2DtY0fxPBbuclt2aiAhQ0VjRWNFY0VjRWNFY0VjRWNFY0
   VqEWGA8xOTcwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFqgAwoBBhgPMjAyNTAzMDIxNjAwMDBaoBEYDzIw
   MjUwMzAzMDcwMDAwWjCBpTBnMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQQgMlOOdIW9N65FTx8NK5dV
   11i5H26OOnrzl6D0AGBcb/gEIMwRyHQKBQnsTaFM5YhucjZMD2O2DtY0fxPBbucl
   t2aiAhRWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeKEWGA8yMDI1MDMwMTE2MDAwMFqgAwoB
   BBgPMjAyNTAzMDIxNjAwMDBaoBEYDzIwMjUwMzAzMDcwMDAwWjCBjzBnMAsGCWCG
   SAFlAwQCAQQgMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMEIERERERE
   REREREREREREREREREREREREREREREREREREAhQiMyIzIjMiMyIzIjMiMyIzIjMi
   M4IAGA8yMDI1MDMwMjE2MDAwMFqgERgPMjAyNTAzMDMwNzAwMDBaoTIwMDAdBgkr
   BgEFBQcwAQIEEBEREREREREREREREREREREwDwYJKwYBBQUHMAEJBAIFADAFBgMr
   ZXADQQCaRi+pYIEMvQ/4MpYqP8MDa4wRdqow+HmCecWetC36CdSC0KF+oukKTk/b
   65VJ3TmJa1blNiaKl58HVz5zVR8D
   -----END OCSP RESPONSE-----

A.5.3.2.  C509 OCSP Response

   Plain Hex (248 bytes):

   8A010C2F5011111111111111111111111111111111480600867838E3311A1A67C4F1
   00808648A01C73A5F3B06334808F5410652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D
   8D0039707F196270805475D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D0139707F
   1962708054D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400821A67C32F00043970
   7F19627080482222222222222222808554D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE
   417E3B0239707F19627080F658401BB7E5C65F7D65260A4FB127BE66B1DB3E7C9F16
   DC2969D5F67DFCF25DCCF1EE09ED28441F92B5242AF60F760AE4029EC5C74DB7C042
   3A941F869358C71FF800

   Textual Representation

   C509BasicOCSPResponse
     TBSBasicOCSPResponse
       Type: C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
       Nonce
         11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
       ResponderCertHash
         06:00:86:78:38:e3:31:1a
       ProducedAt: 2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
       Extensions: <empty>
       Responses

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         OcspPerIssuerResponse
           IssuerCertHash
             a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
           Extensions: <empty>
           SingleResponses
             SingleCertResponse
               SerialNumberHash:
                 10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
                 5a:6f:0d:8d
               Cert Status: good
               This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
               Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
               Extensions: <empty>
             SingleCertResponse
               SerialNumberHash:
                 75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
                 8b:9d:17:6d
               Cert Status: not-issued
               This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
               Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
               Extensions: <empty>
             SingleCertResponse
               SerialNumberHash:
                 d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
                 5b:67:84:00
               Cert Status: revoked (superseded)
                 Revoked at 2025-03-01T16:00:00Z
               This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
               Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
               Extensions: <empty>
         OcspPerIssuerResponse
           IssuerCertHash
             22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
           Extensions: <empty>
           SingleResponses
             SingleCertResponse
               SerialNumberHash:
                 d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
                 ce:41:7e:3b
               Cert Status: unknown
               This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
               Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
               Extensions: <empty>
       Responder Certs: null
     Signature Value
       1b:b7:e5:c6:5f:7d:65:26:0a:4f:b1:27:be:66:b1:db:
       3e:7c:9f:16:dc:29:69:d5:f6:7d:fc:f2:5d:cc:f1:ee:
       09:ed:28:44:1f:92:b5:24:2a:f6:0f:76:0a:e4:02:9e:

Liao, et al.               Expires 6 May 2027                 [Page 100]
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       c5:c7:4d:b7:c0:42:3a:94:1f:86:93:58:c7:1f:f8:00

   Annotated hex

     0: 8A             # C509OCSPResponse=array[10]
     1:   01             # [0]. ocspResponseType=C509BasicOCSPResponse
                         #      (1)
     2:   0C             # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
     3:   2F             # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
     4:   50             # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
     5:     11111111111111111111111111111111
    21:   48             # [4]. responderCertHash=byte[8]
    22:     0600867838E3311A
    30:   1A 67C4F100    # [5]. producedAt=1740960000:
                         #      2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
    35:   80             # [6]. extensions=array[0]
    36:   86             # [7]. responses=array[6]
                           #---PerIssuerResponses[0]---
    37:     48             # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
    38:       A01C73A5F3B06334
    46:     80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
    47:     8F             # [2]. singleResponses=array[15]
                             #---SingleCertResponses[0]---
    48:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    49:         10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
    69:       00             # [1]. certStatus=good (0)
    70:       39 707F        # [2]. thisUpdate=-28800:
                             #      2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
    73:       19 6270        # [3]. nextUpdate=25200:
                             #      2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
    76:       80             # [4]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertResponses[1]---
    77:       54             # [5]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    78:         75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
    98:       01             # [6]. certStatus=not-issued (1)
    99:       39 707F        # [7]. thisUpdate=-28800:
                             #      2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
   102:       19 6270        # [8]. nextUpdate=25200:
                             #      2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
   105:       80             # [9]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertResponses[2]---
   106:       54             # [10]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
   107:         D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
   127:       82             # [11]. certStatus=array[2]
   128:         1A 67C32F00    # [0]. revocationTime=1740844800:
                               #      2025-03-01T16:00:00Z
   133:         04             # [1]. revocationReason=superseded (4)
   134:       39 707F        # [12]. thisUpdate=-28800:

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                             #       2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
   137:       19 6270        # [13]. nextUpdate=25200:
                             #       2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
   140:       80             # [14]. extensions=array[0]
                           #---PerIssuerResponses[1]---
   141:     48             # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
   142:       2222222222222222
   150:     80             # [4]. extensions=array[0]
   151:     85             # [5]. singleResponses=array[5]
                             #---SingleCertResponses[0]---
   152:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
   153:         D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
   173:       02             # [1]. certStatus=unknown (2)
   174:       39 707F        # [2]. thisUpdate=-28800:
                             #      2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
   177:       19 6270        # [3]. nextUpdate=25200:
                             #      2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
   180:       80             # [4]. extensions=array[0]
   181:   F6             # [8]. responderCerts=<null>
   182:   58 40          # [9]. signature value=byte[64]
   184:     1BB7E5C65F7D65260A4FB127BE66B1DB3E7C9F16DC2969D5F67DFCF25D
   213:     CCF1EE09ED28441F92B5242AF60F760AE4029EC5C74DB7C0423A941F86
   242:     9358C71FF800

A.5.4.  Basic OCSP Response Example With Responder's Certificate

   *  Size reduction: 62%

   *  Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.4.2

   *  Basic OCSP Response (C509BasicOCSPResponse) with embedded
      responder's certificate

   *  Note that the X.509 OCSP Response and the C509 OCSP Response are
      not convertible.

A.5.4.1.  X.509 OCSP Response

   PEM content (1181 bytes):

Liao, et al.               Expires 6 May 2027                 [Page 102]
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   -----BEGIN OCSP RESPONSE-----
   MIIEmQoBAKCCBJIwggSOBgkrBgEFBQcwAQEEggR/MIIEezCCAtWiFgQU6uWaiumq
   9BBLFeUOjuAXFRd0GK8YDzIwMjUwMzAzMDAwMDAwWjCCAnQwgY8wZzALBglghkgB
   ZQMEAgEEIDJTjnSFvTeuRU8fDSuXVddYuR9ujjp685eg9ABgXG/4BCDMEch0CgUJ
   7E2hTOWIbnI2TA9jtg7WNH8TwW7nJbdmogIUEjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0EjSA
   ABgPMjAyNTAzMDIxNjAwMDBaoBEYDzIwMjUwMzAzMDcwMDAwWjCBpTBnMAsGCWCG
   SAFlAwQCAQQgMlOOdIW9N65FTx8NK5dV11i5H26OOnrzl6D0AGBcb/gEIMwRyHQK
   BQnsTaFM5YhucjZMD2O2DtY0fxPBbuclt2aiAhQ0VjRWNFY0VjRWNFY0VjRWNFY0
   VqEWGA8xOTcwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFqgAwoBBhgPMjAyNTAzMDIxNjAwMDBaoBEYDzIw
   MjUwMzAzMDcwMDAwWjCBpTBnMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQQgMlOOdIW9N65FTx8NK5dV
   11i5H26OOnrzl6D0AGBcb/gEIMwRyHQKBQnsTaFM5YhucjZMD2O2DtY0fxPBbucl
   t2aiAhRWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeKEWGA8yMDI1MDMwMTE2MDAwMFqgAwoB
   BBgPMjAyNTAzMDIxNjAwMDBaoBEYDzIwMjUwMzAzMDcwMDAwWjCBjzBnMAsGCWCG
   SAFlAwQCAQQgMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMEIERERERE
   REREREREREREREREREREREREREREREREREREAhQiMyIzIjMiMyIzIjMiMyIzIjMi
   M4IAGA8yMDI1MDMwMjE2MDAwMFqgERgPMjAyNTAzMDMwNzAwMDBaoTIwMDAdBgkr
   BgEFBQcwAQIEEBEREREREREREREREREREREwDwYJKwYBBQUHMAEJBAIFADAFBgMr
   ZXADQQCaRi+pYIEMvQ/4MpYqP8MDa4wRdqow+HmCecWetC36CdSC0KF+oukKTk/b
   65VJ3TmJa1blNiaKl58HVz5zVR8DoIIBVDCCAVAwggFMMIH/oAMCAQICAhI1MAUG
   AytlcDAaMRgwFgYDVQQDDA90ZXN0IGNybG9jc3AtY2EwHhcNMjUwMTAyMDAwMDAw
   WhcNMjYwMTAyMDAwMDAwWjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5vY3NwLXJlc3BvbmRlcjAqMAUG
   AytlcAMhAIGUe7wkiqx5c4IRqNdb+Sy3d9mUBz3yOuBjgO8sVzl2o2owaDAdBgNV
   HQ4EFgQU6uWaiumq9BBLFeUOjuAXFRd0GK8wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMB8GA1Ud
   IwQYMBaAFNl9d+Y0wvcAMAylj8h3NlsVUAeiMBYGA1UdJQEB/wQMMAoGCCsGAQUF
   BwMJMAUGAytlcANBABOjKOFFurdnjAVsbGF91L4VCZ2qF1Dh+3wLKakj1yv394ef
   hUq5LdEQsV83LeBZZoIvh06AhhH9Rd09LFwohwg=
   -----END OCSP RESPONSE-----

A.5.4.2.  C509 OCSP Response

   Plain Hex (446 bytes):

   8A010C2F5011111111111111111111111111111111480600867838E3311A1A67C4F1
   00808648A01C73A5F3B06334808F5410652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D
   8D0039707F196270805475D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D0139707F
   1962708054D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400821A67C32F00043970
   7F19627080482222222222222222808554D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE
   417E3B0239707F1962708058C58B024212350C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63
   611A6775D7001A69570A806E6F6373702D726573706F6E6465720C582081947BBC24
   8AAC79738211A8D75BF92CB777D994073DF23AE06380EF2C573976880154B5B4CAF3
   5401D06151DF9629DB579DC8CCA453A8210107542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005
   D492450E105627095840A01B0CBF3E34A4762D05404FD08A7AEC103035358314686D
   72B6159078C76E1D88597F37531886A3F52F256FD722192B289D6844014467F1F17F
   05ACBB7B660A5840C8B1C14815BD49604E7A99439C84B550FED5F94CFF35E8238CD5
   3CEA91D58A0D4627D2EA0800EBEA3E1453C0E71B175B441466E3431FB235A1BD6E43
   03109B03

   Textual Representation

Liao, et al.               Expires 6 May 2027                 [Page 103]
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   C509BasicOCSPResponse
     TBSBasicOCSPResponse
       Type: C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
       Nonce
         11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
       ResponderCertHash
         06:00:86:78:38:e3:31:1a
       ProducedAt: 2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
       Extensions: <empty>
       Responses
         OcspPerIssuerResponse
           IssuerCertHash
             a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
           Extensions: <empty>
           SingleResponses
             SingleCertResponse
               SerialNumberHash:
                 10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
                 5a:6f:0d:8d
               Cert Status: good
               This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
               Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
               Extensions: <empty>
             SingleCertResponse
               SerialNumberHash:
                 75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
                 8b:9d:17:6d
               Cert Status: not-issued
               This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
               Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
               Extensions: <empty>
             SingleCertResponse
               SerialNumberHash:
                 d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
                 5b:67:84:00
               Cert Status: revoked (superseded)
                 Revoked at 2025-03-01T16:00:00Z
               This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
               Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
               Extensions: <empty>
         OcspPerIssuerResponse
           IssuerCertHash
             22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
           Extensions: <empty>
           SingleResponses
             SingleCertResponse

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               SerialNumberHash:
                 d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
                 ce:41:7e:3b
               Cert Status: unknown
               This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
               Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
               Extensions: <empty>
       Responder Certs
         C509Certificate
           8b:02:42:12:35:0c:6f:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:
           63:73:70:2d:63:61:1a:67:75:d7:00:1a:69:57:0a:80:
           6e:6f:63:73:70:2d:72:65:73:70:6f:6e:64:65:72:0c:
           58:20:81:94:7b:bc:24:8a:ac:79:73:82:11:a8:d7:5b:
           f9:2c:b7:77:d9:94:07:3d:f2:3a:e0:63:80:ef:2c:57:
           39:76:88:01:54:b5:b4:ca:f3:54:01:d0:61:51:df:96:
           29:db:57:9d:c8:cc:a4:53:a8:21:01:07:54:2f:45:e7:
           8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:45:0e:10:
           56:27:09:58:40:a0:1b:0c:bf:3e:34:a4:76:2d:05:40:
           4f:d0:8a:7a:ec:10:30:35:35:83:14:68:6d:72:b6:15:
           90:78:c7:6e:1d:88:59:7f:37:53:18:86:a3:f5:2f:25:
           6f:d7:22:19:2b:28:9d:68:44:01:44:67:f1:f1:7f:05:
           ac:bb:7b:66:0a
     Signature Value
       c8:b1:c1:48:15:bd:49:60:4e:7a:99:43:9c:84:b5:50:
       fe:d5:f9:4c:ff:35:e8:23:8c:d5:3c:ea:91:d5:8a:0d:
       46:27:d2:ea:08:00:eb:ea:3e:14:53:c0:e7:1b:17:5b:
       44:14:66:e3:43:1f:b2:35:a1:bd:6e:43:03:10:9b:03

   Annotated hex

     0: 8A             # C509OCSPResponse=array[10]
     1:   01             # [0]. ocspResponseType=C509BasicOCSPResponse
                         #      (1)
     2:   0C             # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
     3:   2F             # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
     4:   50             # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
     5:     11111111111111111111111111111111
    21:   48             # [4]. responderCertHash=byte[8]
    22:     0600867838E3311A
    30:   1A 67C4F100    # [5]. producedAt=1740960000:
                         #      2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
    35:   80             # [6]. extensions=array[0]
    36:   86             # [7]. responses=array[6]
                           #---PerIssuerResponses[0]---
    37:     48             # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
    38:       A01C73A5F3B06334
    46:     80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
    47:     8F             # [2]. singleResponses=array[15]

Liao, et al.               Expires 6 May 2027                 [Page 105]
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                             #---SingleCertResponses[0]---
    48:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    49:         10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
    69:       00             # [1]. certStatus=good (0)
    70:       39 707F        # [2]. thisUpdate=-28800:
                             #      2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
    73:       19 6270        # [3]. nextUpdate=25200:
                             #      2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
    76:       80             # [4]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertResponses[1]---
    77:       54             # [5]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    78:         75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
    98:       01             # [6]. certStatus=not-issued (1)
    99:       39 707F        # [7]. thisUpdate=-28800:
                             #      2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
   102:       19 6270        # [8]. nextUpdate=25200:
                             #      2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
   105:       80             # [9]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertResponses[2]---
   106:       54             # [10]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
   107:         D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
   127:       82             # [11]. certStatus=array[2]
   128:         1A 67C32F00    # [0]. revocationTime=1740844800:
                               #      2025-03-01T16:00:00Z
   133:         04             # [1]. revocationReason=superseded (4)
   134:       39 707F        # [12]. thisUpdate=-28800:
                             #       2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
   137:       19 6270        # [13]. nextUpdate=25200:
                             #       2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
   140:       80             # [14]. extensions=array[0]
                           #---PerIssuerResponses[1]---
   141:     48             # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
   142:       2222222222222222
   150:     80             # [4]. extensions=array[0]
   151:     85             # [5]. singleResponses=array[5]
                             #---SingleCertResponses[0]---
   152:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
   153:         D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
   173:       02             # [1]. certStatus=unknown (2)
   174:       39 707F        # [2]. thisUpdate=-28800:
                             #      2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
   177:       19 6270        # [3]. nextUpdate=25200:
                             #      2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
   180:       80             # [4]. extensions=array[0]
   181:   58 C5          # [8]. responderCerts(COSE_C509)=byte[197]
   183:     8B024212350C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A69
   212:     570A806E6F6373702D726573706F6E6465720C582081947BBC248AAC79
   241:     738211A8D75BF92CB777D994073DF23AE06380EF2C573976880154B5B4

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   270:     CAF35401D06151DF9629DB579DC8CCA453A8210107542F45E78D2CAEDF
   299:     368CDF53C39005D492450E105627095840A01B0CBF3E34A4762D05404F
   328:     D08A7AEC103035358314686D72B6159078C76E1D88597F37531886A3F5
   357:     2F256FD722192B289D6844014467F1F17F05ACBB7B660A
   380:   58 40          # [9]. signature value=byte[64]
   382:     C8B1C14815BD49604E7A99439C84B550FED5F94CFF35E8238CD53CEA91
   411:     D58A0D4627D2EA0800EBEA3E1453C0E71B175B441466E3431FB235A1BD
   440:     6E4303109B03

A.5.5.  Basic OCSP Response Example With Responder's Certificate Chain

   *  Size reduction: 57%

   *  Verifiable with certificate in Appendix A.2.4.2

   *  Basic OCSP Response (C509BasicOCSPResponse) with embedded
      responder's certificate chain (2 certificates)

   *  Note that the X.509 OCSP Response and the C509 OCSP Response are
      not convertible.

A.5.5.1.  X.509 OCSP Response

   PEM content (1517 bytes):

Liao, et al.               Expires 6 May 2027                 [Page 107]
Internet-Draft               C509 Revocation               November 2026

   -----BEGIN OCSP RESPONSE-----
   MIIF6QoBAKCCBeIwggXeBgkrBgEFBQcwAQEEggXPMIIFyzCCAtWiFgQU6uWaiumq
   9BBLFeUOjuAXFRd0GK8YDzIwMjUwMzAzMDAwMDAwWjCCAnQwgY8wZzALBglghkgB
   ZQMEAgEEIDJTjnSFvTeuRU8fDSuXVddYuR9ujjp685eg9ABgXG/4BCDMEch0CgUJ
   7E2hTOWIbnI2TA9jtg7WNH8TwW7nJbdmogIUEjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0EjQSNBI0EjSA
   ABgPMjAyNTAzMDIxNjAwMDBaoBEYDzIwMjUwMzAzMDcwMDAwWjCBpTBnMAsGCWCG
   SAFlAwQCAQQgMlOOdIW9N65FTx8NK5dV11i5H26OOnrzl6D0AGBcb/gEIMwRyHQK
   BQnsTaFM5YhucjZMD2O2DtY0fxPBbuclt2aiAhQ0VjRWNFY0VjRWNFY0VjRWNFY0
   VqEWGA8xOTcwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFqgAwoBBhgPMjAyNTAzMDIxNjAwMDBaoBEYDzIw
   MjUwMzAzMDcwMDAwWjCBpTBnMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAQQgMlOOdIW9N65FTx8NK5dV
   11i5H26OOnrzl6D0AGBcb/gEIMwRyHQKBQnsTaFM5YhucjZMD2O2DtY0fxPBbucl
   t2aiAhRWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeFZ4VnhWeKEWGA8yMDI1MDMwMTE2MDAwMFqgAwoB
   BBgPMjAyNTAzMDIxNjAwMDBaoBEYDzIwMjUwMzAzMDcwMDAwWjCBjzBnMAsGCWCG
   SAFlAwQCAQQgMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMzMEIERERERE
   REREREREREREREREREREREREREREREREREREAhQiMyIzIjMiMyIzIjMiMyIzIjMi
   M4IAGA8yMDI1MDMwMjE2MDAwMFqgERgPMjAyNTAzMDMwNzAwMDBaoTIwMDAdBgkr
   BgEFBQcwAQIEEBEREREREREREREREREREREwDwYJKwYBBQUHMAEJBAIFADAFBgMr
   ZXADQQCaRi+pYIEMvQ/4MpYqP8MDa4wRdqow+HmCecWetC36CdSC0KF+oukKTk/b
   65VJ3TmJa1blNiaKl58HVz5zVR8DoIICpDCCAqAwggFMMIH/oAMCAQICAhI1MAUG
   AytlcDAaMRgwFgYDVQQDDA90ZXN0IGNybG9jc3AtY2EwHhcNMjUwMTAyMDAwMDAw
   WhcNMjYwMTAyMDAwMDAwWjAZMRcwFQYDVQQDDA5vY3NwLXJlc3BvbmRlcjAqMAUG
   AytlcAMhAIGUe7wkiqx5c4IRqNdb+Sy3d9mUBz3yOuBjgO8sVzl2o2owaDAdBgNV
   HQ4EFgQU6uWaiumq9BBLFeUOjuAXFRd0GK8wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMB8GA1Ud
   IwQYMBaAFNl9d+Y0wvcAMAylj8h3NlsVUAeiMBYGA1UdJQEB/wQMMAoGCCsGAQUF
   BwMJMAUGAytlcANBABOjKOFFurdnjAVsbGF91L4VCZ2qF1Dh+3wLKakj1yv394ef
   hUq5LdEQsV83LeBZZoIvh06AhhH9Rd09LFwohwgwggFMMIH/oAMCAQICAQEwBQYD
   K2VwMB4xHDAaBgNVBAMME3Rlc3QgY3Jsb2NzcC1yb290Y2EwHhcNMjUwMTAxMDAw
   MDAwWhcNMjYxMjMxMjM1OTU5WjAaMRgwFgYDVQQDDA90ZXN0IGNybG9jc3AtY2Ew
   KjAFBgMrZXADIQBe+KNVoAGnxQ0jSUcBIIExpLsquSDUC/sO4farKP90AKNmMGQw
   HQYDVR0OBBYEFNl9d+Y0wvcAMAylj8h3NlsVUAeiMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBBjAS
   BgNVHRMBAf8ECDAGAQH/AgEBMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFJEjnPr554Nssp9R4TGR2xDT
   rhaTMAUGAytlcANBANZeAdfL+kF/sXuZ95ftaSevVi/2Po01s+On04FgzGRnQBBN
   jzkYl92rEZjz0FomGSBDYqb4PDOIIRs2vFY9QQI=
   -----END OCSP RESPONSE-----

A.5.5.2.  C509 OCSP Response

   Plain Hex (651 bytes):

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   8A010C2F5011111111111111111111111111111111480600867838E3311A1A67C4F1
   00808648A01C73A5F3B06334808F5410652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D
   8D0039707F196270805475D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D0139707F
   1962708054D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400821A67C32F00043970
   7F19627080482222222222222222808554D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE
   417E3B0239707F196270808258C58B024212350C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D
   63611A6775D7001A69570A806E6F6373702D726573706F6E6465720C582081947BBC
   248AAC79738211A8D75BF92CB777D994073DF23AE06380EF2C573976880154B5B4CA
   F35401D06151DF9629DB579DC8CCA453A8210107542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C390
   05D492450E105627095840A01B0CBF3E34A4762D05404FD08A7AEC10303535831468
   6D72B6159078C76E1D88597F37531886A3F52F256FD722192B289D6844014467F1F1
   7F05ACBB7B660A58CA8B0241010C73746573742063726C6F6373702D726F6F746361
   1A677485801A6B36EC7F6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63610C58205EF8A355A0
   01A7C50D23494701208131A4BB2AB920D40BFB0EE1F6AB28FF74008801542F45E78D
   2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E1056211860230107542DA3A403F7D2F4E0B3D803
   1A73BA8A839F557F0F5840E50465D60C02A2111EF3FC6E44F2A36008765B552351F9
   A3F5B2AA7C76F1F05D259847A4F4250B2E4B0AE2099762A2596D3CC1DB2CCD180AA0
   A2D0E191310B0F58408AE4AAB91FE232B36AE874CE310BE76449626B177C2E596A21
   E3DECDA9E7B9DC702291C6DAF19AF5ADE236EE34B38996CF4803BC6569037492EB41
   F7ADE8D505

   Textual Representation

   C509BasicOCSPResponse
     TBSBasicOCSPResponse
       Type: C509BasicOCSPResponse (1)
       Signature Algorithm: Ed25519 (12)
       Hash Algorithm: SHA256 (-16)
       Nonce
         11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11
       ResponderCertHash
         06:00:86:78:38:e3:31:1a
       ProducedAt: 2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
       Extensions: <empty>
       Responses
         OcspPerIssuerResponse
           IssuerCertHash
             a0:1c:73:a5:f3:b0:63:34
           Extensions: <empty>
           SingleResponses
             SingleCertResponse
               SerialNumberHash:
                 10:65:27:87:fa:05:27:bc:24:49:a1:bf:c5:ab:31:aa:
                 5a:6f:0d:8d
               Cert Status: good
               This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
               Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
               Extensions: <empty>

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             SingleCertResponse
               SerialNumberHash:
                 75:d8:bc:4f:ba:fc:66:94:46:76:41:e7:48:df:d5:3a:
                 8b:9d:17:6d
               Cert Status: not-issued
               This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
               Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
               Extensions: <empty>
             SingleCertResponse
               SerialNumberHash:
                 d1:ac:13:5d:7d:a2:9b:dc:f4:dc:a0:d5:28:1a:51:60:
                 5b:67:84:00
               Cert Status: revoked (superseded)
                 Revoked at 2025-03-01T16:00:00Z
               This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
               Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
               Extensions: <empty>
         OcspPerIssuerResponse
           IssuerCertHash
             22:22:22:22:22:22:22:22
           Extensions: <empty>
           SingleResponses
             SingleCertResponse
               SerialNumberHash:
                 d3:a0:c1:e3:db:92:e8:f6:81:05:37:d4:5c:fa:ec:f6:
                 ce:41:7e:3b
               Cert Status: unknown
               This Update: -28800, 2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
               Next Update: 25200, 2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
               Extensions: <empty>
       Responder Certs
         C509Certificate
           8b:02:42:12:35:0c:6f:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:
           63:73:70:2d:63:61:1a:67:75:d7:00:1a:69:57:0a:80:
           6e:6f:63:73:70:2d:72:65:73:70:6f:6e:64:65:72:0c:
           58:20:81:94:7b:bc:24:8a:ac:79:73:82:11:a8:d7:5b:
           f9:2c:b7:77:d9:94:07:3d:f2:3a:e0:63:80:ef:2c:57:
           39:76:88:01:54:b5:b4:ca:f3:54:01:d0:61:51:df:96:
           29:db:57:9d:c8:cc:a4:53:a8:21:01:07:54:2f:45:e7:
           8d:2c:ae:df:36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:45:0e:10:
           56:27:09:58:40:a0:1b:0c:bf:3e:34:a4:76:2d:05:40:
           4f:d0:8a:7a:ec:10:30:35:35:83:14:68:6d:72:b6:15:
           90:78:c7:6e:1d:88:59:7f:37:53:18:86:a3:f5:2f:25:
           6f:d7:22:19:2b:28:9d:68:44:01:44:67:f1:f1:7f:05:
           ac:bb:7b:66:0a
         C509Certificate
           8b:02:41:01:0c:73:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:63:
           73:70:2d:72:6f:6f:74:63:61:1a:67:74:85:80:1a:6b:

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           36:ec:7f:6f:74:65:73:74:20:63:72:6c:6f:63:73:70:
           2d:63:61:0c:58:20:5e:f8:a3:55:a0:01:a7:c5:0d:23:
           49:47:01:20:81:31:a4:bb:2a:b9:20:d4:0b:fb:0e:e1:
           f6:ab:28:ff:74:00:88:01:54:2f:45:e7:8d:2c:ae:df:
           36:8c:df:53:c3:90:05:d4:92:45:0e:10:56:21:18:60:
           23:01:07:54:2d:a3:a4:03:f7:d2:f4:e0:b3:d8:03:1a:
           73:ba:8a:83:9f:55:7f:0f:58:40:e5:04:65:d6:0c:02:
           a2:11:1e:f3:fc:6e:44:f2:a3:60:08:76:5b:55:23:51:
           f9:a3:f5:b2:aa:7c:76:f1:f0:5d:25:98:47:a4:f4:25:
           0b:2e:4b:0a:e2:09:97:62:a2:59:6d:3c:c1:db:2c:cd:
           18:0a:a0:a2:d0:e1:91:31:0b:0f
     Signature Value
       8a:e4:aa:b9:1f:e2:32:b3:6a:e8:74:ce:31:0b:e7:64:
       49:62:6b:17:7c:2e:59:6a:21:e3:de:cd:a9:e7:b9:dc:
       70:22:91:c6:da:f1:9a:f5:ad:e2:36:ee:34:b3:89:96:
       cf:48:03:bc:65:69:03:74:92:eb:41:f7:ad:e8:d5:05

   Annotated hex

     0: 8A             # C509OCSPResponse=array[10]
     1:   01             # [0]. ocspResponseType=C509BasicOCSPResponse
                         #      (1)
     2:   0C             # [1]. signatureAlgorithm=Ed25519 (12)
     3:   2F             # [2]. hashAlgorithm=SHA256 (-16)
     4:   50             # [3]. nonce=byte[16]
     5:     11111111111111111111111111111111
    21:   48             # [4]. responderCertHash=byte[8]
    22:     0600867838E3311A
    30:   1A 67C4F100    # [5]. producedAt=1740960000:
                         #      2025-03-03T00:00:00Z
    35:   80             # [6]. extensions=array[0]
    36:   86             # [7]. responses=array[6]
                           #---PerIssuerResponses[0]---
    37:     48             # [0]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
    38:       A01C73A5F3B06334
    46:     80             # [1]. extensions=array[0]
    47:     8F             # [2]. singleResponses=array[15]
                             #---SingleCertResponses[0]---
    48:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
    49:         10652787FA0527BC2449A1BFC5AB31AA5A6F0D8D
    69:       00             # [1]. certStatus=good (0)
    70:       39 707F        # [2]. thisUpdate=-28800:
                             #      2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
    73:       19 6270        # [3]. nextUpdate=25200:
                             #      2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
    76:       80             # [4]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertResponses[1]---
    77:       54             # [5]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]

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    78:         75D8BC4FBAFC6694467641E748DFD53A8B9D176D
    98:       01             # [6]. certStatus=not-issued (1)
    99:       39 707F        # [7]. thisUpdate=-28800:
                             #      2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
   102:       19 6270        # [8]. nextUpdate=25200:
                             #      2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
   105:       80             # [9]. extensions=array[0]
                             #---SingleCertResponses[2]---
   106:       54             # [10]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
   107:         D1AC135D7DA29BDCF4DCA0D5281A51605B678400
   127:       82             # [11]. certStatus=array[2]
   128:         1A 67C32F00    # [0]. revocationTime=1740844800:
                               #      2025-03-01T16:00:00Z
   133:         04             # [1]. revocationReason=superseded (4)
   134:       39 707F        # [12]. thisUpdate=-28800:
                             #       2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
   137:       19 6270        # [13]. nextUpdate=25200:
                             #       2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
   140:       80             # [14]. extensions=array[0]
                           #---PerIssuerResponses[1]---
   141:     48             # [3]. issuerCertHash=byte[8]
   142:       2222222222222222
   150:     80             # [4]. extensions=array[0]
   151:     85             # [5]. singleResponses=array[5]
                             #---SingleCertResponses[0]---
   152:       54             # [0]. serialNumberHash=byte[20]
   153:         D3A0C1E3DB92E8F6810537D45CFAECF6CE417E3B
   173:       02             # [1]. certStatus=unknown (2)
   174:       39 707F        # [2]. thisUpdate=-28800:
                             #      2025-03-02T16:00:00Z
   177:       19 6270        # [3]. nextUpdate=25200:
                             #      2025-03-03T07:00:00Z
   180:       80             # [4]. extensions=array[0]
   181:   82             # [8]. responderCerts(COSE_C509)=array[2]
   182:     58 C5          # [0]. C509CertData=byte[197]
   184:       8B024212350C6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63611A6775D7001A
   212:       69570A806E6F6373702D726573706F6E6465720C582081947BBC248A
   240:       AC79738211A8D75BF92CB777D994073DF23AE06380EF2C5739768801
   268:       54B5B4CAF35401D06151DF9629DB579DC8CCA453A8210107542F45E7
   296:       8D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E105627095840A01B0CBF3E34A4
   324:       762D05404FD08A7AEC103035358314686D72B6159078C76E1D88597F
   352:       37531886A3F52F256FD722192B289D6844014467F1F17F05ACBB7B66
   380:       0A
   381:     58 CA          # [1]. C509CertData=byte[202]
   383:       8B0241010C73746573742063726C6F6373702D726F6F7463611A6774
   411:       85801A6B36EC7F6F746573742063726C6F6373702D63610C58205EF8
   439:       A355A001A7C50D23494701208131A4BB2AB920D40BFB0EE1F6AB28FF
   467:       74008801542F45E78D2CAEDF368CDF53C39005D492450E1056211860

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   495:       230107542DA3A403F7D2F4E0B3D8031A73BA8A839F557F0F5840E504
   523:       65D60C02A2111EF3FC6E44F2A36008765B552351F9A3F5B2AA7C76F1
   551:       F05D259847A4F4250B2E4B0AE2099762A2596D3CC1DB2CCD180AA0A2
   579:       D0E191310B0F
   585:   58 40          # [9]. signature value=byte[64]
   587:     8AE4AAB91FE232B36AE874CE310BE76449626B177C2E596A21E3DECDA9
   616:     E7B9DC702291C6DAF19AF5ADE236EE34B38996CF4803BC6569037492EB
   645:     41F7ADE8D505

Appendix B.  Document Updates

   This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

B.1.  Version -00 to -01

   *  Added the section "Alternative Certificate Status Checking
      Mechanisms".

   *  Constrained the value ranges of integer fields in the CDDL.

   *  Replaced the "C509 Hash Algorithms" registry with the "COSE
      Algorithms" registry.

   *  Specified the PEM representation of C509 CRL and C509 OCSP
      messages.

   *  Added the registries for C509 CRL types and C509 OCSP request and
      response types.

   *  Added the section "Implementation Status".

   *  Added the section "Security Considerations".

   *  Clarifications and editorial improvements.

Acknowledgments

   The authors thank xxx for reviewing and commenting on intermediate
   versions of the draft.

Authors' Addresses

   Lijun Liao
   NIO Inc.
   China
   Email: lijun.liao@nio.io

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   Marco Tiloca
   RISE AB
   Sweden
   Email: marco.tiloca@ri.se

   Joel Höglund
   RISE AB
   Sweden
   Email: joel.hoglund@ri.se

   Rikard Höglund
   RISE AB
   Sweden
   Email: rikard.hoglund@ri.se

   Shahid Raza
   University of Glasgow
   United Kingdom
   Email: shahid.raza@glasgow.ac.uk

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