Export of BGP Prefix Origin Validation in IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)
draft-liu-sidrops-ipfix-bgp-pov-01
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Yisong Liu , Xueyan Song , 周陶然 | ||
| Last updated | 2026-10-21 | ||
| Replaces | draft-liu-opsawg-ipfix-bgp-pov | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| On agenda | sidrops at IETF-127 | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-liu-sidrops-ipfix-bgp-pov-01
SIDROPS Y. Liu
Internet-Draft China Mobile
Intended status: Standards Track X. Song
Expires: 24 April 2027 T. Zhou
ZTE Corporation
21 October 2026
Export of BGP Prefix Origin Validation in IP Flow Information Export
(IPFIX)
draft-liu-sidrops-ipfix-bgp-pov-01
Abstract
This document defines an IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)
Information Element for monitoring the state of Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) based BGP Prefix Origin Validation. The
Information Element enables network operators to collect and analyze
BGP route validation states (valid, invalid, not-found) to facilitate
the detection of route origin hijacks and improve network
observability and security.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 April 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terms Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. IPFIX IEs for BGP Prefix Origin Validation . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. bgpPrefixOriginValidationState . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
The RPKI [RFC6480] provides a cryptographic framework for validating
the association between IP address blocks and Autonomous System (AS)
numbers. BGP Prefix Origin Validation, as defined in [RFC6811],
enables routers to verify whether the origin AS of a BGP route
announcement is authorized to advertise the corresponding IP prefix,
based on Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC9582] in the RPKI.
When BGP Prefix Origin Validation is enabled on a router, the router
maintains a local cache of Validated ROA Payloads (VRPs) obtained
through the RPKI-to-Router protocol (RTR) [RFC8210]. For each
received BGP UPDATE message, the router extracts the announced IP
prefix and its origin AS, compares this tuple against the local VRP
cache, and assigns a validation state (valid, invalid, not found)
according to the algorithm specified in [RFC6811]. This validation
state can be attached as a local path attribute to the BGP route
entry and influence subsequent routing decisions, such as route
filtering and route preference adjustment.
While this validation mechanism enhances BGP security, network
operators currently lack standardized methods to monitor the
validation states across their network infrastructure. This document
addresses this question by defining a standard IPFIX [RFC7011]
information element for exporting flow information from network
devices.
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This document defines a new IPFIX Information Element specifically
designed for monitoring the state of RPKI-based BGP Prefix Origin
Validation. The element enables network operators to collect,
analyze, and monitor the validation states of BGP routes across their
network infrastructure.
IPFIX sampling occurs during packet forwarding, and flow records are
inherently tied to active route decisions that guide forwarding or
discarding. Therefore, the validation state exported by this
Information Element reflects only the active forwarding route
selected for the observed traffic. Inactive routes, backup routes,
and routes not selected by the forwarding engine are outside the
scope of this document.
2. Terminology
2.1. Terms Used in This Document
This document uses the following terms defined in [RFC6811].
Validated ROA Payload (VRP): A locally stored object which contains
the content (IP address, prefix length, maximum length, origin AS
number).
Prefix: (IP address, prefix length), interpreted as is customary (see
[RFC4632]).
Route: Data derived from a received BGP UPDATE, as defined in
[RFC4271].
Additionally, this document uses the terms defined in [RFC7011].
Observation Point: An Observation Point is a location in the network
where packets can be observed. Examples include a line to which a
probe is attached; a shared medium, such as an Ethernet-based LAN; a
single port of a router; or a set of interfaces (physical or logical)
of a router.
Exporter: A device that hosts one or more Exporting Processes is
termed an Exporter.
IPFIX Device: An IPFIX Device hosts at least one Exporting Process.
It may host further Exporting Processes as well as arbitrary numbers
of Observation Points and Metering Processes.
Information Element: An Information Element is a protocol and
encoding independent description of an attribute that may appear in
an IPFIX Record. Information Elements are defined in the IANA "IPFIX
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Information Elements" registry (see IANA-IPFIX). The type associated
with an Information Element indicates constraints on what it may
contain and also determines the valid encoding mechanisms for use in
IPFIX.
Exporting Process: The Exporting Process sends IPFIX Messages to one
or more Collecting Processes. The Flow Records in the Messages are
generated by one or more Metering Processes.
Collecting Process: A Collecting Process receives IPFIX Messages from
one or more Exporting Processes. The Collecting Process might
process or store Flow Records received within these Messages, but
such actions are out of scope for this document.
2.2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. IPFIX IEs for BGP Prefix Origin Validation
This section defines a new IPFIX Information Element for monitoring
RPKI-based BGP Prefix Origin Validation.
3.1. bgpPrefixOriginValidationState
Name: bgpPrefixOriginValidationState
ElementID: TBD1
Description: This element describes the result of comparing a BGP
route prefix derived from a BGP UPDATE message against VRP
obtained from RPKI server. The validation algorithm follows
[RFC6811].
The result of BGP Prefix Origin Validation is used for the active
route of a specific BGP prefix. The validation state value is
carried in an unsigned integer, using code points aligned with
[RFC8097] for the validation outcomes.
0: valid - At least one Validated ROA Payload (VRP) matches the
route prefix and origin AS.
1: not found - No VRP covers the route prefix.
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2: invalid - At least one VRP covers the route prefix, but no VRP
matches it.
Values 3 - 255 are reserved for future use. Exporting Processes
MUST NOT send reserved values. Collecting Processes SHOULD ignore
any received reserved values.
Regarding the potential differences in RPKI validation states from
various perspectives as discussed in RFC 8893, the state reported
by this IE is derived from the local device's RPKI validation
result and corresponds to the active route present in the LocRIB
(Local Routing Information Base). The IE does not address state
differences due to varying perspectives nor represents states
conveyed via extended communities.
Abstract Data Type: unsigned8
Data Type Semantics: identifier
Additional Information: See [RFC6811] the definition of validation
state of BGP route prefix.
Reference: [RFC6811], [RFC8097], [RFC8893], this document.
4. Operational Considerations
Typical operational uses of this IE include: (1) hijack detection: a
prefix that transitions from valid/not-found to invalid at an
Observation Point may indicate a route origin hijack or a wrong ROA,
raising alarm generation; (2) RPKI deployment assessment: tracking
the ratio of invalid and not-found routes over time reveals the
effectiveness of ROA publication, with persistently not-found
prefixes indicating candidates for ROA creation; (3) coordination
with RPKI data: correlating exported validation states with Relying
Party data helps distinguish local validation failures from RPKI
repository issues.
The Observation Point [RFC7011] for monitoring BGP Prefix Origin
Validation states is typically the router performing the validation.
The router acting as an IPFIX Exporter is expected to have BGP Prefix
Origin Validation enabled and properly configured. This includes
establishing RTR sessions with RPKI cache servers and ensuring the
local VRP cache is synchronized. When the observed route is non-
active, or when BGP Prefix Origin Validation is not enabled or
partially enabled, the IPFIX Collector may design different templates
based on monitoring requirements to establish a complete routing
context and enable accurate analysis.
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When network operators design a template for IPFIX export of BGP
Prefix Origin Validation information export, which should combine
with other context informations, such as sourceIPv4Prefix/
sourceIPv6Prefix, sourceIPv4PrefixLength/sourceIPv6PrefixLength,
bgpSourceAsNumber, as defined in [RFC7012].
In scenarios of network changes or maintenance, frequent export of
IPFIX records for BGP validation states may lead to considerable
overhead on router resources and bandwidth. Operators should balance
monitoring needs with performance impact by using thresholds,
adjusted export intervals, or focused sampling, such as prioritizing
invalid states, refer to [RFC5475] for sampling and filtering
strategies.
5. Security Considerations
The security considerations for IPFIX in general discussed in
[RFC7011], and those for RPKI and BGP Prefix Origin Validation
discussed in [RFC6811] apply to this document.
The IPFIX data records containing BGP Prefix Origin Validation state
SHOULD be transported using security protocols (such as TLS, DTLS)
and satisfy the mutual authentication between IPFIX Exporting
Processes and IPFIX Collecting Processes as specified in [RFC7011].
An implementation may use BGP Prefix Origin Validation state as the
information input for network routing policies. Network operators
should ensure that the data collection and storage of BGP Prefix
Origin Validation state comply with applicable privacy regulations.
6. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to assign a new Information Element ID in the IPFIX
Information Elements registry.
Information Element bgpPrefixOriginValidationState with Element ID
TBD1.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7011] Claise, B., Ed., Trammell, B., Ed., and P. Aitken,
"Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)
Protocol for the Exchange of Flow Information", STD 77,
RFC 7011, DOI 10.17487/RFC7011, September 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7011>.
[RFC8097] Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
Community", RFC 8097, DOI 10.17487/RFC8097, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8097>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.
[RFC5475] Zseby, T., Molina, M., Duffield, N., Niccolini, S., and F.
Raspall, "Sampling and Filtering Techniques for IP Packet
Selection", RFC 5475, DOI 10.17487/RFC5475, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5475>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC7012] Claise, B., Ed. and B. Trammell, Ed., "Information Model
for IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)", RFC 7012,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7012, September 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7012>.
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[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.
[RFC8893] Bush, R., Volk, R., and J. Heitz, "Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) Origin Validation for BGP Export",
RFC 8893, DOI 10.17487/RFC8893, September 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8893>.
[RFC9582] Snijders, J., Maddison, B., Lepinski, M., Kong, D., and S.
Kent, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",
RFC 9582, DOI 10.17487/RFC9582, May 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9582>.
Authors' Addresses
Yisong Liu
China Mobile
China
Email: liuyisong@chinamobile.com
Xueyan Song
ZTE Corporation
China
Email: song.xueyan2@zte.com.cn
Taoran Zhou
ZTE Corporation
China
Email: zhou.taoran@zte.com.cn
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