Privacy Preserving Verifiable Geofencing with Residency Proofs for Sovereign Workloads
draft-lkspa-rats-verifiable-geo-fence-01
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| Authors | Ramki Krishnan , Ned Smith , Diego Lopez , A Prasad , Srinivasa Addepalli | ||
| Last updated | 2026-04-30 (Latest revision 2026-03-15) | ||
| Replaces | draft-lkspa-wimse-verifiable-geo-fence | ||
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draft-lkspa-rats-verifiable-geo-fence-01
RATS R. Krishnan
Internet-Draft JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Intended status: Standards Track N. Smith
Expires: 1 November 2026 Intel
D. Lopez
Telefonica
A. Prasad
Oracle
S. Addepalli
Aryaka
30 April 2026
Privacy Preserving Verifiable Geofencing with Residency Proofs for
Sovereign Workloads
draft-lkspa-rats-verifiable-geo-fence-01
Abstract
Modern cloud and distributed computing rely heavily on software-only
identities and bearer tokens that are easily stolen, replayed, or
used from unauthorized locations. Furthermore, traditional methods
of location verification — such as IP-address-based geolocation — are
easily spoofed via VPNs or proxies and significantly compromise
infrastructure security and privacy for sovereign workloads and high-
assurance environments.
This document defines the *Verifiable Geofencing Attestation Profile
(V-GAP)*, a profile of the RATS Architecture {{!RFC9334}}, that
solves these challenges through hardware-rooted cryptographic
verifiability. A host machine runs a Workload Identity Agent for
managing the workload identities on that platform. This profile
replaces implicit trust and spoofable indicators with
cryptographically verifiable hardware-rooted Evidence of integrity
and location for this agent. Critically, this framework prioritizes
location privacy by utilizing Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), allowing
a workload to prove it is within a compliant zone without disclosing
precise coordinates.
By binding software identities to persistent silicon identities and
verified physical residency, V-GAP establishes a silicon-to-workload
chain of trust. It ensures that sensitive operations are only
performed by authorized workloads running on untampered hardware in
cryptographically verified, privacy-preserving geographic boundaries,
fulfilling the high-assurance requirements of the WIMSE Architecture
{{!I-D.ietf-wimse-architecture}}.
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Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 November 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Scope and Layering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Relationship to Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Server-centric Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. User-centric Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Compliance and Risk Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Verifiable Geofencing Attestation Profile (V-GAP) . . . . . . 9
5.1. RATS Role Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Evidence Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. V-GAP Evidence Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3.1. Top-Level Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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5.3.2. lah-bundle Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3.3. geolocation-payload Variants . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3.4. MNO Endorsement (RATS Endorsement) . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3.5. Workload Identity Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.4. TPM Quote Verification Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.5. Freshness and Replay Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1. Location Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.1.1. GNSS Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.1.2. Mobile Network Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.1.3. Location Trust Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.2. Zero-Knowledge Proof Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix B. Operational Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B.1. Gating Credentials on Verified Evidence . . . . . . . . . 21
B.2. Distributed Identity Issuance and Scaling . . . . . . . . 21
B.3. Mobility and Sovereign Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.4. Location Anchor Hosts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix C. Scalable Fleet Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
C.1. Nonce Chain and Merkle Audit Log . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
C.2. Key Registry and Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
C.3. Key Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
C.3.1. Example Rotation Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
C.4. Credential Activation and Re-Verification . . . . . . . . 23
C.5. Revocation and Health Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
C.6. Disconnected Operation (Leased Identity) . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix D. Deployment Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix E. Policy Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix F. V-GAP Examples and Sensor Recipes . . . . . . . . . 25
F.1. Example Instance (privacy-technique = "zkp") . . . . . . 25
F.2. Sensor Type Input Recipes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix G. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix H. Data Residency References . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Introduction
Operators of sovereign and high-assurance workloads need
cryptographic assurance that sensitive computation occurs only on
approved hardware within approved geographic boundaries. Traditional
methods — IP-based geolocation, region labels, bearer tokens — are
easily spoofed, stolen, or replayed and provide no hardware-rooted
verifiability. Key gaps include:
* *Unverifiable location metadata:* Location tags for data objects
are typically unsigned, making provenance and integrity difficult
to validate.
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* *Token theft and replay:* Bearer tokens can be copied and replayed
from unauthorized hosts or locations.
* *Implicit trust in "region" and transit:* A relying party often
cannot cryptographically verify a server's physical residency, and
requests may traverse intermediaries that expand the effective
trust boundary.
This document defines the Verifiable Geofencing Attestation Profile
(V-GAP), a profile of the RATS Architecture {{!RFC9334}} that makes
*platform integrity* and *geofence residency* verifiable inputs to
workload credential issuance. V-GAP enables a Relying Party (or
credential issuer) to require Evidence that:
1. the Workload Identity Agent is running on an approved, measured
platform (platform integrity); and
2. that platform is resident within an approved geographic boundary,
optionally without revealing coordinates (residency).
To maintain location privacy while providing cryptographic
verifiability, V-GAP supports Transparent Zero-Knowledge Proofs
(ZKPs) — non-interactive, hash-based proofs that allow a platform to
demonstrate "in-zone" residency without disclosing exact coordinates
and without requiring a trusted setup.
1.1. Scope and Layering
V-GAP covers platform integrity verification (Layer 2) and residency
verification (Layer 3). It assumes that the binding of individual
workloads to the local Workload Identity Agent (Layer 1) is
established by a co-location mechanism such as {{!I-D.mw-wimse-
transitive-attestation}}. Together, these three layers form a
complete chain of trust from silicon to workload, as required by the
WIMSE Architecture {{!I-D.ietf-wimse-architecture}}.
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+======+==========================================+=================+
|Layer | Scope | Responsibility |
+======+==========================================+=================+
|*Layer| {{!I-D.mw-wimse-transitive-attestation}} | Bind workload |
|1* | | to a local |
| | | Workload |
| | | Identity Agent |
| | | (co-location). |
+------+------------------------------------------+-----------------+
|*Layer| This document | Verify |
|2* | | platform |
| | | integrity for |
| | | the Workload |
| | | Identity Agent |
| | | (platform |
| | | Evidence). |
+------+------------------------------------------+-----------------+
|*Layer| This document | Verify |
|3* | | platform |
| | | residency |
| | | within an |
| | | approved |
| | | boundary |
| | | (location |
| | | Evidence). |
+------+------------------------------------------+-----------------+
Table 1
1.2. Relationship to Related Work
defines how a Verifier encodes geographic location conclusions —
jurisdiction-level results such as country, subdivision, and city —
as EAT Attestation Result claims for consumption by a Relying Party.
That draft addresses the *output encoding* side of the attestation
pipeline.
V-GAP addresses the complementary *input side*: the Evidence profile
the Attester produces, the hardware-binding mechanism (TPM quote)
that makes location evidence verifiable, and the verification
procedure the Verifier applies to produce an Attestation Result.
V-GAP Evidence is what a Verifier appraises to yield the kind of
geographic result claims that {{I-D.richardson-rats-geographic-
results}} encodes.
The two documents are intended to compose: a Verifier that appraises
a V-GAP lah-bundle could express its conclusion as an Attestation
Result using the geographic claims defined in {{I-D.richardson-rats-
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geographic-results}}. V-GAP is self-contained; use of that encoding
is OPTIONAL and is one possible way a Verifier may express its
conclusions — consumers MAY enforce geofence policy directly from the
Attestation Result, use the V-GAP X.509 extension (OID
1.3.6.1.4.1.65284.1.1) as the trust signal, or adopt any other result
encoding their deployment requires.
One gap in the combined stack is not addressed by either document:
the mapping from a raw location fix or geofence proof to a named
legal jurisdiction (for example, from "inside polygon P" to "in
jurisdiction X"). This mapping raises its own trust questions — who
maintains the polygon-to-jurisdiction database, under what authority,
and how that mapping is kept current — and is deferred to future
work.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 {{!RFC2119}} {{!RFC8174}} when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2.1. Abbreviations
* *AK*: Attestation Key
* *BMC*: Baseboard Management Controller
* *DAA*: Direct Anonymous Attestation
* *EAT*: Entity Attestation Token
* *EK*: Endorsement Key
* *GNSS*: Global Navigation Satellite System
* *IMA*: Integrity Measurement Architecture
* *IMEI*: International Mobile Equipment Identity
* *IMSI*: International Mobile Subscriber Identity
* *LAH*: Location Anchor Host
* *OOB*: Out-of-Band
* *PCR*: Platform Configuration Register
* *PoR*: Proof of Residency
* *SPDM*: Security Protocol and Data Model
* *STARK*: Scalable Transparent ARgument of Knowledge
* *SVID*: SPIFFE Verifiable Identity Document
* *TEE*: Trusted Execution Environment
* *TPM*: Trusted Platform Module
* *V-GAP*: Verifiable Geofencing Attestation Profile
* *ZKP*: Zero-Knowledge Proof
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3. Key Terms
Data Residency: Requirement that data processing and storage remain
within an approved geographic boundary.
Geofencing: Enforcement that workloads execute only on approved
hosts within an approved geographic boundary.
Workload Identity Agent: On-host component that issues workload
identities (for example, SVIDs) to local workloads, subject to
verifier-approved evidence.
Location Anchor Host (LAH): Trusted host or device that produces
location evidence used to establish residency within a geofence.
In RATS terms, the LAH is the Attester.
Workload Host: Physical or virtual machine running the Workload
Identity Agent and workloads; produces platform evidence. Unless
otherwise stated, this document assumes the unified deployment
model in which the Workload Host and the Location Anchor Host
(LAH) are the same machine.
Composite Geolocation: Location estimate fused from multiple sources
and accompanied by a quality indicator.
Proof of Residency (PoR) / Co-location: Evidence that binds a
workload (or Workload Host) to an approved local environment and
geofence for a specific attestation interval.
Silicon Root of Trust: Hardware trust anchor that supports measured
boot and protects attestation keys.
Transparent Zero-Knowledge Proof: ZKP that does not require a
trusted setup; used to prove "inside an approved zone" without
revealing precise coordinates.
Workload Identity Management Plane: Issues and validates workload
identities and trust bundles based on verifier results and policy.
In RATS terms, this plane acts as the Relying Party and Credential
Issuer.
Host Identity Management Plane: Verifies platform integrity and
residency evidence, and manages attestation key registration and
platform health state (often via OOB paths). In RATS terms, this
plane acts as the Verifier.
V-GAP (Verifiable Geofencing Attestation Profile): Nested evidence
format defined in this document for binding identity to verified
platform integrity and verified residency.
N_fusion (Workload Fusion Nonce): Fresh nonce used to bind identity
issuance to a specific attestation interval, delivered by the
Workload Identity Management Plane. Corresponds to the nonce
field in the lah-bundle.
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4. Use Cases
This profile supports attested data residency and geofencing for
workloads and (optionally) users. Common use cases fall into:
server-centric enforcement, user-centric enforcement, and compliance
and risk reduction.
4.1. Server-centric Enforcement
Enterprises need cryptographic proof that workloads run only on
approved hosts within an approved geographic boundary, and that data
flows only between approved boundaries.
* *Workload-to-workload (general):* Relying parties accept workload
identities only when the issuing host attests platform integrity
and "in-zone" residency, preventing credentials from being used
outside the approved boundary.
* *Agentic AI workloads:* An AI agent may access sensitive data or
perform sensitive actions only when its Workload Identity Agent
presents hardware-rooted integrity evidence and a verifiable "in-
zone" proof (optionally privacy-preserving), binding identity to
both platform state and residency.
* *Federated / edge AI (key or model release):* High-value artifacts
(e.g., decryption keys or model weights in federated learning) are
released only when the partner/edge host attests it is integral
and resident within the required boundary. This is useful for
intermittently connected sites.
* *User-to-server:* Clients validate that the server endpoint is
operating within an approved boundary (e.g., by policy tied to the
server's attested identity and residency evidence).
4.2. User-centric Enforcement
Enterprises may also need trustworthy location signals for user-
facing access decisions.
* *Geofenced access control:* User access is permitted only when the
user (or user device) proves it is within an allowed boundary,
ideally without requiring precise location disclosure.
* *On-premises boundaries:* Customer-premises equipment can define
an enterprise boundary, with a network or enterprise
infrastructure providing supporting evidence for policy
enforcement.
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* *Restricted support geographies:* Administrative or support
actions can be allowed only when the operator proves presence
within allowed geographies, reducing policy and insider-risk
exposure.
4.3. Compliance and Risk Reduction
Geofence attestation provides audit-ready evidence to support data
residency and sovereignty controls, and it can also reduce non-
compliance risk from misconfiguration or spoofable signals. Even
when not mandated, "in-zone" proofs help address: configuration
drift, edge relocation/proxying, contractual residency requirements,
and location-privacy minimization (proving "inside the zone" without
storing coordinates).
5. Verifiable Geofencing Attestation Profile (V-GAP)
V-GAP is a profile of the RATS Architecture {{!RFC9334}} that binds a
Workload Identity Agent to (1) hardware-rooted platform integrity and
(2) verified residency within a configured geofence. The Attester
(Location Anchor Host) produces a V-GAP Evidence structure (lah-
bundle) that the Verifier (Host Identity Management Plane) appraises
to produce an Attestation Result.
5.1. RATS Role Mapping
V-GAP instantiates the RATS Architecture {{!RFC9334}} with the
following role assignments.
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+================+============+====================================+
| RATS Role | V-GAP | Function |
| ({{!RFC9334}}) | Entity | |
+================+============+====================================+
| Attester | Location | Produces V-GAP Evidence (the lah- |
| | Anchor | bundle), including TPM quotes and |
| | Host (LAH) | geolocation claims. |
+----------------+------------+------------------------------------+
| Verifier | Host | Appraises V-GAP Evidence — |
| | Identity | validates TPM quotes, checks PCRs, |
| | Management | verifies geolocation proofs — and |
| | Plane | produces an Attestation Result. |
+----------------+------------+------------------------------------+
| Endorser | Mobile | Provides a location Endorsement |
| | Network | (mno-endorsement) attesting device |
| | Operator | location within carrier |
| | (MNO) | visibility. |
+----------------+------------+------------------------------------+
| Relying Party | Workload | Consumes the Attestation Result |
| + Credential | Identity | and decides whether to issue or |
| Issuer | Management | renew workload credentials (e.g., |
| | Plane | X.509-SVIDs). Also acts as the CA |
| | | that signs the credential. |
+----------------+------------+------------------------------------+
| Downstream | mTLS peer | Consumes the workload credential |
| Relying Party | / service | containing the V-GAP extension; |
| (note 1) | consumer | trusts the CA signature as proxy |
| | | for verified integrity and |
| | | residency. |
+----------------+------------+------------------------------------+
Table 2
Note 1: "Downstream Relying Party" is not a role defined by
{{!RFC9334}}. It is used here to distinguish the entity that consumes
the issued credential from the Relying Party that consumes the
Attestation Result.
5.2. Evidence Flow
The V-GAP evidence flow follows the RATS background-check model
({{!RFC9334}}, Section 3.2): the Attester conveys Evidence to the
Verifier, the Verifier appraises it and conveys the Attestation
Result to the Relying Party.
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Attester (LAH)
|
| V-GAP Evidence (lah-bundle)
v
Verifier (Host Identity Mgmt Plane) <--- Endorsement (MNO)
|
| Attestation Result
v
Relying Party + Credential Issuer (Workload Identity Mgmt Plane)
|
| X.509-SVID with V-GAP extension
v
Downstream Relying Party (mTLS peer)
The Relying Party in V-GAP also acts as a Credential Issuer (CA): it
materializes the Attestation Result into an X.509 workload identity
credential (for example, a SPIFFE SVID) containing the V-GAP Evidence
as a CRITICAL extension. This "trust translator" pattern allows
downstream consumers to rely on standard X.509/mTLS verification
without needing to understand RATS or V-GAP directly.
Implementations of this profile MUST mark the X.509 extension
containing the V-GAP Evidence Bundle as CRITICAL. When marked
CRITICAL, any downstream Relying Party that does not understand the
extension MUST reject the credential, enforcing fail-closed behavior
for residency-constrained workloads.
5.3. V-GAP Evidence Structure
The lah-bundle is the RATS Evidence structure defined by this
profile. It is a hardware-sealed object embedded as an X.509
extension (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.65284.1.1) in the workload identity
credential (for example, a SPIFFE SVID). It binds a workload
identity to physically verifiable claims — TPM hardware identity,
privacy-preserving geolocation, and agent binary integrity — without
exposing PII.
5.3.1. Top-Level Structure
{
"lah-bundle": { },
"mno-endorsement": { },
"workload": { }
}
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5.3.2. lah-bundle Fields
+==============+=============+==========+===========================+
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
+==============+=============+==========+===========================+
| tpm-ak | string | Yes | TPM Attestation Key |
| | (Base64URL) | | public key (PEM- |
| | | | encoded). Hardware |
| | | | identity anchor. The |
| | | | TPM enforces that only |
| | | | this key can produce |
| | | | tpm-quote-seal — |
| | | | proving co-residency. |
+--------------+-------------+----------+---------------------------+
| geolocation- | string | Yes | SHA-256 over tpm-ak- |
| id-hash | (Base64URL) | | bytes concatenated with |
| | | | any sensor-specific |
| | | | identifiers (see Sensor |
| | | | Type Input Recipes |
| | | | appendix for per-sensor |
| | | | constructions). Binds |
| | | | the TPM identity anchor |
| | | | to the geolocation |
| | | | sensor identity. |
| | | | Sensor integrity is |
| | | | assumed to be |
| | | | established by the host |
| | | | management plane via an |
| | | | out-of-band channel. |
+--------------+-------------+----------+---------------------------+
| geolocation- | string | Yes | SHA-256 commitment over |
| proof-hash | (Base64URL) | | geolocation-payload. |
| | | | Required in both |
| | | | privacy modes. When |
| | | | privacy-technique=zkp: |
| | | | SHA-256(zkp-proof- |
| | | | bytes). When privacy- |
| | | | technique=none: SHA- |
| | | | 256(JCS({lat, lon, |
| | | | accuracy})). |
+--------------+-------------+----------+---------------------------+
| privacy- | string enum | Yes | "none" = raw lat/lon/ |
| technique | | | accuracy in payload. |
| | | | "zkp" = zero-knowledge |
| | | | proof URI in payload. |
| | | | Controls location |
| | | | privacy only; device |
| | | | identity privacy is |
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| | | | always protected via |
| | | | geolocation-id-hash. |
+--------------+-------------+----------+---------------------------+
| geolocation- | object | Yes | Inner location data. |
| payload | | | Structure depends on |
| | | | privacy-technique (see |
| | | | Payload Variants |
| | | | below). Committed to |
| | | | by geolocation-proof- |
| | | | hash and optionally |
| | | | signed by mno- |
| | | | endorsement.mno-sig. |
+--------------+-------------+----------+---------------------------+
| nonce | string | Yes | Freshness nonce |
| | (Base64URL) | | (N_fusion) issued by |
| | | | the Relying Party |
| | | | (Workload Identity |
| | | | Management Plane) for |
| | | | each attestation |
| | | | interval. |
| | | | Implementations may use |
| | | | chained nonce |
| | | | constructions for |
| | | | additional audit |
| | | | guarantees (see Nonce |
| | | | Chain and Merkle Audit |
| | | | Log appendix). |
+--------------+-------------+----------+---------------------------+
| timestamp | integer | Yes | Unix epoch seconds. |
| | (int64) | | Set by the Attester |
| | | | (LAH) at bundle |
| | | | construction time. |
+--------------+-------------+----------+---------------------------+
| tpm-quote- | string | Yes | TPM2_Quote produced by |
| seal | (Base64URL) | | the AK in tpm-ak. |
| | | | Qualifying data = SHA- |
| | | | 256(JCS({tpm-ak, |
| | | | geolocation-id-hash, |
| | | | geolocation-proof-hash, |
| | | | privacy-technique, |
| | | | nonce, timestamp, |
| | | | workload-identity- |
| | | | agent-image-digest})). |
| | | | Binds all fields into a |
| | | | single hardware-sealed |
| | | | statement. |
+--------------+-------------+----------+---------------------------+
| workload- | string (hex | Yes | SHA-256 digest of the |
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| identity- | SHA-256) | | Workload Identity Agent |
| agent-image- | | | binary, measured at |
| digest | | | attestation time by the |
| | | | Verifier (Host Identity |
| | | | Management Plane). |
| | | | Detects agent binary |
| | | | compromise on every |
| | | | renewal cycle. |
+--------------+-------------+----------+---------------------------+
Table 3
5.3.3. geolocation-payload Variants
*When privacy-technique = "none" (raw coordinates):*
+==========+==================+==========+===================+
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
+==========+==================+==========+===================+
| lat | number (float64) | Yes | Latitude, WGS-84 |
| | | | decimal degrees |
+----------+------------------+----------+-------------------+
| lon | number (float64) | Yes | Longitude, WGS-84 |
| | | | decimal degrees |
+----------+------------------+----------+-------------------+
| accuracy | number (float64) | Yes | Accuracy radius |
| | | | in meters |
+----------+------------------+----------+-------------------+
Table 4
geolocation-proof-hash = Base64URL(SHA-256(JCS({lat, lon,
accuracy})))
*When privacy-technique = "zkp" (zero-knowledge proof):*
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+===============+========+==========+==============================+
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
+===============+========+==========+==============================+
| zkp-proof-uri | string | Yes | URI to fetch full ZKP proof |
| | (URI) | | bytes from the proof |
| | | | depository. Verifier |
| | | | fetches bytes, computes SHA- |
| | | | 256(bytes), checks against |
| | | | geolocation-proof-hash. |
+---------------+--------+----------+------------------------------+
| zkp-format | string | Yes | ZKP proof system. |
| | enum | | Currently: "plonky2". |
+---------------+--------+----------+------------------------------+
Table 5
geolocation-proof-hash = Base64URL(SHA-256(zkp-proof-bytes))
5.3.4. MNO Endorsement (RATS Endorsement)
The mno-endorsement is a RATS Endorsement {{!RFC9334}}: a signed
statement from a third party (the Mobile Network Operator) about the
Attester's location. The MNO attests device location within carrier
visibility but does not sign host-level fields. This element is
OPTIONAL at the top level; when present, its fields are REQUIRED.
+==============+=============+==========+==========================+
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
+==============+=============+==========+==========================+
| mno-key-cert | string | Yes | MNO signing certificate. |
| | (Base64URL | | Verifiers SHOULD |
| | DER) | | validate this |
| | | | certificate chains to a |
| | | | known MNO root before |
| | | | accepting the |
| | | | endorsement. |
+--------------+-------------+----------+--------------------------+
| mno-sig | string | Yes | ECDSA/EdDSA signature |
| | (Base64URL) | | over JCS(geolocation- |
| | | | payload) only. The MNO |
| | | | attests location within |
| | | | carrier visibility — |
| | | | does not sign host |
| | | | fields (tpm-ak, nonce, |
| | | | tpm-quote-seal). |
+--------------+-------------+----------+--------------------------+
Table 6
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5.3.5. Workload Identity Binding
The workload object binds the V-GAP Evidence to a specific workload
identity, enabling the Verifier to associate platform and residency
claims with the credential being issued.
+=============+=========+==========+=============================+
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
+=============+=========+==========+=============================+
| workload-id | string | Yes | The workload's SPIFFE |
| | (SPIFFE | | identity URI (e.g., |
| | ID) | | spiffe://example.org/ |
| | | | python-app). |
+-------------+---------+----------+-----------------------------+
| key-source | string | Yes | Identifier for the origin |
| | | | of the workload's key |
| | | | material (for example, |
| | | | "tpm-app-key"). Values are |
| | | | deployment-specific; this |
| | | | field is recorded for audit |
| | | | and policy evaluation. |
+-------------+---------+----------+-----------------------------+
Table 7
5.4. TPM Quote Verification Procedure
The Verifier MUST perform the following steps to validate the tpm-
quote-seal:
1. Decode tpm-quote-seal (Base64URL → bytes)
2. Parse TPMS_ATTEST structure
3. Assert TPMS_ATTEST.type == TPM_ST_ATTEST_QUOTE
4. Compute expected_qd = SHA-256(JCS({tpm-ak, geolocation-id-hash,
geolocation-proof-hash, privacy-technique, nonce, timestamp,
workload-identity-agent-image-digest}))
5. Assert TPMS_ATTEST.qualifyingData == expected_qd
6. Verify signature over TPMS_ATTEST bytes using tpm-ak public key
(RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or ECDSA)
If any step fails, the Verifier MUST reject the Evidence and MUST NOT
produce a positive Attestation Result.
5.5. Freshness and Replay Prevention
To prevent mix-and-match and replay attacks, Verifiers MUST enforce
the following:
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* Attestation Results MUST be fresh and MUST be bound to the
credential issuance event (for example, by cryptographically
binding freshness values used for platform quotes and workload
credential issuance within the Verifier result).
* The nonce field in the lah-bundle MUST be a freshness value issued
by the Relying Party (Workload Identity Management Plane) for each
attestation interval.
* Verifiers MUST reject Evidence where the timestamp falls outside
the configured freshness window.
Where policy requires it, the Verifier can additionally require that
an agent software measurement (for example, image digest) is covered
by validated platform Evidence, reducing the risk that a modified or
unauthorized agent obtains credentials.
6. Security Considerations
V-GAP reduces reliance on spoofable location signals and stolen
tokens by making integrity and residency cryptographically
verifiable. Implementers still need to address the following
threats:
* *Replay and mix-and-match*: Use nonces and evidence stapling so
that old location evidence cannot be combined with a fresh
platform quote (or vice versa).
* *Location spoofing*: GNSS and mobile network signals must be
treated as adversarial inputs; per-source threats and mitigations
are detailed in the subsections below.
* *Relay and displacement*: When proximity mechanisms are introduced
in future profiles, implementers should be aware that they are
vulnerable to relay attacks and anchor displacement. Mitigations
(such as tight RTT-based acceptance windows and anchor health
attestation) are deferred to those future profiles.
* *Management plane compromise*: OOB paths reduce dependence on the
host OS but introduce dependence on the management controller and
its network. Protect this plane with secure boot, authenticated
updates, strong access controls, network segmentation, and audit
logging.
* *Time and freshness*: Verifiers MUST enforce bounded freshness
windows and MUST define recovery behavior (re-attestation,
quarantine, or revocation) when clocks drift or evidence becomes
stale.
* *Registry and allowlist integrity*: Protect key registries and
policy stores against tampering; treat them as high-value
privileged assets.
* *Privacy*: Avoid unnecessary collection or retention of precise
location data. Prefer "in-zone" proofs (ZKP) where policy
permits.
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6.1. Location Spoofing
6.1.1. GNSS Spoofing
GNSS signals are unauthenticated by default and can be spoofed via
synthetic signal generators (e.g., software-defined radio replay of
valid signals) or multipath injection. Implementers SHOULD apply
mitigations proportional to the required assurance level:
* *Signal authentication*: Galileo OSNMA (Open Service Navigation
Message Authentication) provides cryptographic authentication of
navigation messages and is the strongest available civilian
countermeasure. GPS GAIA offers equivalent protection for GPS III
signals. Implementations SHOULD prefer authenticated GNSS signals
where available.
* *Multi-constellation cross-validation*: Cross-checking fixes
across independent constellations (GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, BeiDou)
substantially raises the cost of spoofing; consistent simultaneous
spoofing of all constellations requires significantly more
attacker capability.
* *Anomaly detection*: Sudden position jumps, implausible velocity
changes, and anomalous signal-to-noise ratios are indicators of
spoofing or jamming. Evidence that fails these checks SHOULD be
rejected.
6.1.2. Mobile Network Spoofing
Mobile network location evidence is subject to distinct threats:
* *IMSI catchers and rogue base stations*: Attacker-controlled base
stations can force a device onto a fake cell, yielding attacker-
controlled location if evidence derives from device-reported cell
identity.
* *SS7/Diameter abuse*: Attackers with access to legacy carrier
signaling can issue location queries that yield false or
manipulated carrier-side location data.
* *MNO root key compromise*: The mno-endorsement is only as
trustworthy as the MNO signing root. Verifiers MUST validate the
mno-key-cert certificate chain to a known MNO root and SHOULD
treat a root compromise as requiring immediate policy revocation.
The CAMARA API model — where location is derived from carrier network
infrastructure rather than device-reported cell identifiers — is more
resistant to IMSI catcher attacks and is the RECOMMENDED approach
when MNO corroboration is used.
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6.1.3. Location Trust Levels
The quality indicator defined in Composite Geolocation SHOULD be
mapped to a location trust level enforced by the Verifier as a
precondition for a positive Attestation Result. The following non-
normative tiers illustrate a conformant policy:
+=============+===================================================+
| Trust Level | Evidence Basis |
+=============+===================================================+
| Low | Single unauthenticated GNSS fix, no corroboration |
+-------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| Medium | Multi-constellation GNSS with anomaly detection, |
| | or network-side MNO corroboration (CAMARA) alone |
+-------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| High | Authenticated GNSS (OSNMA or GAIA), or Medium |
| | GNSS + MNO corroboration |
+-------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| Highest | Authenticated GNSS + independent network-side MNO |
| | corroboration (CAMARA) + anomaly detection |
+-------------+---------------------------------------------------+
Table 8
The security value of multi-source corroboration derives from
*channel independence*: GNSS and MNO evidence travel over different
physical and logical channels. Requiring consistent evidence from
both simultaneously raises the bar for spoofing. Verifiers SHOULD
require a minimum trust level commensurate with the sensitivity of
the enforced geofence policy, and SHOULD apply conservative policy
(downgrade or reject the Attestation Result) when evidence quality
degrades.
6.2. Zero-Knowledge Proof Security
V-GAP's privacy-technique = "zkp" mode uses Plonky2 STARK proofs.
The following properties and threats apply:
* *Circuit correctness is the primary attack surface.* A ZKP proves
only what its arithmetic circuit encodes. Errors in the geofence
boundary circuit — including precision errors, off-by-one boundary
conditions, or incorrect coordinate system handling — yield proofs
that are cryptographically valid but semantically incorrect. The
geofence circuit MUST be independently audited before deployment.
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* *No trusted setup.* Plonky2 is STARK-based and requires no trusted
setup phase, eliminating the class of attacks arising from
compromised SNARK setup parameters. Implementations substituting
a different zkp-format MUST ensure it also provides transparent
setup, or MUST document the resulting trust assumptions.
* *Computational soundness.* STARK security is computational, not
unconditional, and relies on the collision resistance of the
underlying hash function. Implementations SHOULD target at least
128-bit security and MUST document the proof system parameters
(field size, hash function, FRI parameters) to enable independent
security analysis.
* *Proof freshness.* A valid ZKP proves location at proof-generation
time. The nonce and timestamp freshness requirements that apply
to tpm-quote-seal apply equally to ZKP proofs: Verifiers MUST
reject proofs whose timestamp falls outside the configured
freshness window.
* *Prover integrity.* A compromised prover can produce false proofs
even for a correctly specified circuit. This threat is mitigated
by V-GAP's TPM binding: the tpm-quote-seal covers geolocation-
proof-hash, so a false proof can only be embedded in a bundle that
also passes TPM quote verification for an approved platform. The
ZKP privacy guarantee is only meaningful in conjunction with
verified platform integrity.
7. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to register the following Object Identifier (OID)
in the "SMI Numbers" registry under the "SMI Private Enterprise
Numbers" (1.3.6.1.4.1) branch, or as appropriate for the V-GAP
profile.
* *OID*: 1.3.6.1.4.1.65284.1.1
* *Description*: Verifiable Geofencing Attestation Profile (V-GAP)
Evidence Bundle
* *Reference*: This document.
* *PEN*: 65284 (IANA Private Enterprise Number assigned to Ram
Krishnan)
Appendix A. Contributors
The following individuals have contributed to this document:
Bala Siva Sai Akhil Malepati
Independent
Email: saiakhil2012@yahoo.com
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Ghada Arfaoui
Orange
Email: ghada.arfaoui@orange.com
Michael Epley
Red Hat
Email: mepley@redhat.com
Vijay Masilamani
Independent
Email: saanvijay20@gmail.com
Appendix B. Operational Guidance
B.1. Gating Credentials on Verified Evidence
This profile assumes two cooperating control planes, mapped to RATS
roles:
* *Verifier (Host Identity Management Plane):* Appraises platform
integrity and residency Evidence and produces an Attestation
Result.
* *Relying Party + Credential Issuer (Workload Identity Management
Plane):* Issues or renews workload identities (for example, SVIDs)
only when the Attestation Result satisfies policy. Also acts as
the CA that signs the resulting credential.
In intermittently connected edge deployments, local operation can
continue during outages, while centralized policy can be enforced on
renewal and on release of high-value secrets once connectivity is
available.
B.2. Distributed Identity Issuance and Scaling
To support edge deployments and intermittent connectivity, identity
issuance may be distributed within a sovereign boundary.
* *Edge issuance*: Workload identities (for example, SVIDs) may be
issued by an issuer deployed within the same boundary as the
workloads.
* *Scoping*: Issued identities should be scoped so they are not
accepted outside the intended deployment boundary (for example,
via trust bundle partitioning and policy).
* *Renewal gating*: Issuers should renew short-lived identities only
when the Verifier result for integrity and residency is valid for
the requested freshness window.
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B.3. Mobility and Sovereign Handover
When a workload moves between anchors or boundaries, the Workload
Identity Agent should obtain a new V-GAP bundle that reflects the new
LAH and current residency.
Verifiers should treat this as a normal re-attestation event: -
platform integrity continuity can remain stable, but - residency
checks should be re-evaluated for the new anchor/boundary.
B.4. Location Anchor Hosts
To scale location sensing, a deployment may use dedicated anchors:
* *End-user anchors*: A user device (for example, a phone) can serve
as an LAH for a nearby client device. The mechanism by which the
anchor establishes its own location (and any proximity evidence it
may provide) is out of scope for this document.
* *Data center anchors*: A small set of hosts can act as LAHs for a
cluster. Timing-based mechanisms (for example, PTP-derived) may
assist in establishing relative location; protocol details are
deferred to future profiling work (see {{I-D.ramki-ptp-hardware-
rooted-attestation}}).
Appendix C. Scalable Fleet Management
Large deployments need lifecycle management for the attestation keys
referenced by V-GAP (for example, tpm-ak) and for the policies that
authorize them.
C.1. Nonce Chain and Merkle Audit Log
One way to satisfy the freshness requirements in this profile is
through a chained nonce and Merkle audit log. Where bundle[n]
denotes the JCS-canonicalized lah-bundle object at attestation
interval n:
chain[n] = SHA-256(chain[n-1] || SHA-256(JCS(bundle[n])))
nonce[n] = HMAC(secret, n || chain[n-1])
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+===========+=====================================================+
| Mechanism | Role |
+===========+=====================================================+
| Chained | Input control — agent cannot submit without |
| nonce | responding to the management plane's current state. |
+-----------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| Merkle | Audit output — proves inclusion of past bundles, |
| chain | detects gaps, and enables regulatory audit. |
+-----------+-----------------------------------------------------+
Table 9
C.2. Key Registry and Synchronization
* A Cloud (central) Verifier (Host Identity Management Plane)
maintains a registry of accepted AK public keys and associated
metadata (for example, EK certificate chain, hardware identity,
and status).
* An Edge Verifier may maintain a local registry to support
disconnected operation and periodically synchronizes updates to
the central registry.
C.3. Key Rotation
To prevent rogue key injection during rotation:
* The central registry should accept a new AK only if the edge plane
provides a rotation proof that chains the new AK to previously
accepted state.
* A rotation proof should be a JCS-canonicalized object signed by
the previously accepted AK (or, if available, validated by a fresh
hardware-rooted OOB quote).
C.3.1. Example Rotation Proof
{
"new-ak-pub": "Base64URL_Encoded_Public_Key",
"serial-number": "AK_Serial_XYZ",
"timestamp": 1708845600,
"hardware-uuid": "Host_Hardware_UUID",
"signature": "Base64URL_Signature_from_Previous_AK"
}
C.4. Credential Activation and Re-Verification
Credential activation (for example, TPM2_MakeCredential) is expensive
to run on every request. Verifiers should perform it on events such
as:
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* Initial onboarding
* Reboot / reset detection (for example, TPM clock/reset counters)
* Policy violations or drift signals (for example, firmware or
inventory changes)
* Failure of location evidence checks
* Explicit elevation to higher assurance policy
Between full activations, Verifiers may accept fresh quotes from
registered AKs as proof of continued compliance, subject to policy.
C.5. Revocation and Health Signals
* The edge plane should maintain a per-node health signal (for
example, tamper, firmware policy violations).
* On severe health signals, the Verifier should revoke the relevant
AK(s) and reject identities derived from them according to policy.
C.6. Disconnected Operation (Leased Identity)
For intermittent connectivity, the Verifier may issue identities with
extended validity (a lease) under policy. If a lease is used:
* The edge plane should revoke or refuse renewal locally on tamper/
drift signals.
* The workload should re-attest and satisfy current policy on
reconnection before renewal or release of high-value secrets.
Appendix D. Deployment Patterns
Implementations commonly fall into the following patterns, differing
in how platform integrity Evidence and the tpm-quote-seal are
collected:
* *In-band host attestation*: Evidence collected by host software
(for example, Keylime-style deployments). In this pattern, the
Relying Party (for example, SPIRE Server) generates N_fusion and
shares it with the Verifier (for example, the Keylime Verifier)
over a server-to-server channel. The Keylime Verifier then
delivers N_fusion to the Keylime Agent running on the host, which
collects TPM and geolocation evidence, assembles the lah-bundle,
and returns it via the host-side channel. This pattern is well-
suited to commodity servers and cloud VMs where a BMC path is not
available or not required.
* *Out-of-band management*: Evidence collected via a management
controller / BMC path (for example, iLO-class OOB management such
as HPE OneView). In this pattern, the Relying Party (for example,
SPIRE Server) generates N_fusion and shares it with the Verifier
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(for example, HPE OneView) over a server-to-server channel. The
Verifier delivers N_fusion to the host via the BMC / OOB path —
bypassing the host OS entirely. The host TPM seals the lah-bundle
with that nonce, and the sealed bundle is returned via the same
OOB path. This pattern is recommended for high-assurance
environments where the host OS is part of the threat model.
* *Cloud-hosted attestation environments*: Provider mechanisms
exposing measured boot and TPM-backed claims (for example, Nitro-
class enclaves or shielded VM instances). The cloud provider
supplies a hardware-rooted quote that can serve as the tpm-quote-
seal; the geolocation claim is typically derived from the
provider's zone or region attestation. Implementations should
verify that the provider's attestation scope satisfies the
geofence policy.
Appendix E. Policy Use
Relying parties and credential issuers can use V-GAP Attestation
Results as inputs to authorization.
* *ABAC*: Residency and integrity can be mandatory claims for
sensitive operations.
* *KMS gatekeeping*: Release of high-value assets (for example,
decryption keys) should depend on a recent successful verification
result.
* *Fail closed*: If V-GAP Evidence is carried in an X.509 extension
and marked CRITICAL, any implementation that does not understand
the extension will reject the credential.
Appendix F. V-GAP Examples and Sensor Recipes
F.1. Example Instance (privacy-technique = "zkp")
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{
"lah-bundle": {
"tpm-ak": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG...\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----",
"geolocation-id-hash": "7f4a2c1b9e3d8f0a6b5c4d2e1f0a9b8c...",
"geolocation-proof-hash": "c8bc2ed62a7a650d99e0884197cdf345...",
"privacy-technique": "zkp",
"geolocation-payload": {
"zkp-proof-uri": "https://verifier.example/v1/proof/c8bc2ed6...",
"zkp-format": "plonky2"
},
"nonce": "ZmUyZjdmMzlmZGVlZWQxOTM1YjY0Mjk0...",
"timestamp": 1740693456,
"tpm-quote-seal": "ARoAAQALAAUACwEA...",
"workload-identity-agent-image-digest": "a1b2c3d4e5f6...64-char-hex-sha256"
},
"mno-endorsement": {
"mno-key-cert": "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8A...",
"mno-sig": "MEYCIQDx9z2k..."
},
"workload": {
"workload-id": "spiffe://example.org/python-app",
"key-source": "tpm-app-key"
}
}
F.2. Sensor Type Input Recipes
The following recipes define how geolocation-id-hash is constructed
from different sensor types. The Verifier sees only the opaque hash
— never the raw identifiers.
+=================+==========================================+
| Sensor Type | geolocation-id-hash Input |
+=================+==========================================+
| Mobile (CAMARA) | SHA-256(tpm-ak-bytes \|\| IMEI-bytes |
| | \|\| IMSI-bytes) |
+-----------------+------------------------------------------+
| GNSS receiver | SHA-256(tpm-ak-bytes \|\| sensor-serial- |
| | bytes \|\| sensor-class-id-bytes) |
+-----------------+------------------------------------------+
Table 10
Appendix G. Implementation Status
[Note to RFC Editor: This section may be removed before publication
as per {{!RFC7942}}.]
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A reference implementation of the V-GAP profile is publicly
available:
* *Repository*: https://github.com/lfedgeai/AegisSovereignAI
(https://github.com/lfedgeai/AegisSovereignAI)
* *Path*: hybrid-cloud-poc/
* *License*: Apache 2.0
The implementation demonstrates the *in-band host attestation*
deployment pattern ({{deployment-patterns-informative}}) using:
* *TPM 2.0* hardware root of trust (AK-based quotes, PCR 15 TOCTOU
protection)
* *SPIRE* (Relying Party + Credential Issuer) with a custom
unifiedidentity plugin that embeds the lah-bundle as an X.509
extension (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.65284.1.1)
* *Keylime* (Verifier) with IMA measurement of the SPIRE agent
binary (workload-identity-agent-image-digest)
* *Plonky2* STARK prover for privacy-technique = "zkp" geofence
proofs
* *Geolocation sensor cascade*: Mobile/CAMARA, GNSS/GPS, and config-
file fallback with IMEI/IMSI binding for geolocation-id-hash
The implementation includes automated end-to-end tests (./run-
demo.sh) that exercise the full attestation flow from TPM quote
construction through ZKP proof generation and SVID issuance with
embedded V-GAP Evidence.
Appendix H. Data Residency References
India -- Reserve Bank of India (RBI): Payment System Data
Localization (2018): From RBI Circular RBI/2017-18/153 (April 6,
2018): "All system providers shall ensure that the entire data
relating to payment systems operated by them are stored in a system
only in India. This data should include the full end-to-end
transaction details / information collected / carried / processed as
part of the message / payment instruction."
South Korea's Data Localization Regulations -- Geospatial Information
Management Act (Spatial Data Act): Article 16, Paragraph 1: Prohibits
the export of state-led survey data.
Authors' Addresses
Ram Krishnan
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Email: ramkri123@gmail.com
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Ned Smith
Intel
Email: ned.smith@intel.com
Diego R. Lopez
Telefonica
Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com
A Prasad
Oracle
Email: a.prasad@oracle.com
Srinivasa Addepalli
Aryaka
Email: srinivasa.addepalli@aryaka.com
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