Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional Randomness
draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02

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Network Working Group                                 J. Preuss Mattsson
Internet-Draft                                             E. Thormarker
Updates: 6979, 8032 (if approved)                            S. Ruohomaa
Intended status: Informational                                  Ericsson
Expires: September 12, 2020                               March 11, 2020

  Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional Randomness
               draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-02

Abstract

   Deterministic elliptic-curve signatures such as deterministic ECDSA
   and EdDSA have gained popularity over randomized ECDSA as their
   security do not depend on a source of high-quality randomness.
   Recent research has however found that implementations of these
   signature algorithms may be vulnerable to certain side-channel and
   fault injection attacks due to their determinism.  One countermeasure
   to such attacks is to re-add randomness to the otherwise
   deterministic calculation of the per-message secret number.  This
   document updates RFC 6979 and RFC 8032 to recommend constructions
   with additional randomness for deployments where side-channel attacks
   and fault injection attacks are a concern.

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Preuss Mattsson, et al.Expires September 12, 2020               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            Hedged ECC Signatures               March 2020

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Updates to RFC 8032 (EdDSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Updates to RFC 6979 (Deterministic ECDSA) . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  For discussion (to be removed in the future)  . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   In Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) signature algorithms, the per-
   message secret number has traditionally been generated from a random
   number generator (RNG).  The security of such algorithms depends on
   the cryptographic quality of the random number generation and biases
   in the randomness may have catastrophic effects such as compromising
   private keys.  Repeated per-message secret numbers have caused
   several severe security accidents in practice.  As stated in
   [RFC6979], the need for a cryptographically secure source of
   randomness is also a hindrance to deployment of randomized ECDSA
   [FIPS-186-4] in architectures where secure random number generation
   is challenging, in particular, embedded IoT systems and smartcards.
   [ABFJLM17] does however state that smartcards typically has a high-
   quality RNG on board, which makes it significantly easier and faster
   to use the RNG instead of doing a hash computation.

   In deterministic ECC signatures schemes such as Deterministic
   Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [RFC6979] and
   Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC8032], the per-
   message secret number is instead generated in a fully-deterministic
   way as a function of the message and the private key.  Except for key
   generation, the security of such deterministic signatures does not
   depend on a source of high-quality randomness.  As they are presumed
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