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Autonomous Decentralized Key Management (ADKM) Problem Statement
draft-mcewan-adkm-problem-statement-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author George McEwan
Last updated 2026-09-20
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draft-mcewan-adkm-problem-statement-00
Network Working Group                                          G. McEwan
Internet-Draft                                         20 September 2026
Intended status: Informational                                          
Expires: 24 March 2027

    Autonomous Decentralized Key Management (ADKM) Problem Statement
                 draft-mcewan-adkm-problem-statement-00

Abstract

   Many Internet applications require stable, long-lived identifiers
   whose controlling cryptographic keys evolve over time.  Existing
   standards provide mature mechanisms for certification, transparency,
   self-certifying identifiers, decentralized identifiers, and shared
   consensus over state.  However, these mechanisms address different
   trust and deployment models.

   This document identifies an interoperability gap in deployments that
   require stable identifier continuity, controller-authorized key-state
   evolution, independently verifiable event histories, and consistency
   evidence without requiring either a designated administrative issuer
   to authorize each state transition or participation in a global
   consensus system.

   The document defines the problem space for Autonomous Decentralized
   Key Management (ADKM), describes related approaches, and identifies
   requirements and scope boundaries for a possible application-
   independent key-state evolution architecture.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 March 2027.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Related Approaches and Scope Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  PKI and Administrative Trust Models . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Shared Consensus and Distributed Ledgers  . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Key Transparency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Self-Certifying and Decentralized Identifiers . . . . . .   6
     3.5.  Summary of the Gap  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  The Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Gap 1: Stable Identifier Continuity Across Key-State
           Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Gap 2: Limiting the Consequences of Active-Key
           Compromise  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Gap 3: Separating Cryptographic Validity from
           Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.4.  Gap 4: Duplicity and Equivocation Without Global Total
           Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.5.  Gap 5: Interoperable Deterministic Representation . . . .   9
   5.  Scope and Boundaries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   The operational integrity of many Internet security protocols depends
   on associating an identifier representing a device, service, software
   component, organization, or other subject with cryptographic key
   material.

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   Establishing an initial binding between an identifier and a public
   key is well understood, and several mature standards address
   certification, transparency, self-certifying identifiers,
   decentralized identifiers, and related functions.  A distinct problem
   arises when an application requires the identifier to remain stable
   while its controlling key state changes over time.

   Such changes can include routine key rotation, emergency replacement,
   modification of signing thresholds, delegation, recovery, and
   revocation.  A relying party may also need to determine whether a
   presented key state follows from an authenticated sequence of
   authorized transitions and whether conflicting histories have been
   observed.

   Existing mechanisms solve important portions of this problem under
   different trust and deployment assumptions.  PKI relies on
   established certification and administrative trust relationships.
   Transparency systems provide auditable views of bindings maintained
   by services or certification authorities.  Some distributed systems
   provide shared ordering or consensus over state.  Self-certifying
   identifier systems cryptographically bind identifiers to key
   material, and decentralized identifier frameworks allow method-
   specific approaches to key rotation and recovery.

   ADKM focuses on a narrower architectural question: how to provide a
   common, application-independent mechanism for verifiable evolution of
   controller-managed key state associated with a stable identifier,
   where successive states are authorized primarily through
   cryptographically linked evidence rather than repeated authorization
   by a designated external issuer or participation in a global
   consensus system.

   This document is a problem statement.  It does not select a
   particular event format, consistency mechanism, serialization,
   storage model, or deployment topology.

2.  Terminology

   Controller:

   An entity authorized by the current key state of an identifier to
   approve one or more permitted key-state transitions.

   Self-Certifying Identifier (SCID):

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   An identifier whose relationship to initial cryptographic key
   material can be verified from the identifier and associated
   cryptographic evidence without relying solely on a central naming
   registry.

   Key State:

   The set of public keys, signing thresholds, roles, and other
   authorization parameters that are valid for an identifier at a
   particular state in its evolution.

   Key Event:

   An authenticated statement that establishes or changes key state.

   Key Event History:

   An authenticated sequence of key events from an identifier's
   inception state to a later presented state.

   Autonomous Key-State Evolution:

   A model in which permitted key-state transitions can be authorized by
   the controller according to the protocol's rules without requiring a
   new authorization assertion from a designated external administrative
   authority for each transition.

   Local Evidence Verification:

   The ability of a relying party to validate a presented key state and
   the authenticated event history leading to that state using locally
   available cryptographic evidence and protocol rules, without
   requiring a synchronous query to a designated authority.

   Local evidence verification does not, by itself, prove that the
   presented state is the latest state that exists.

   Consistency Evidence:

   Cryptographic or protocol evidence used to determine whether
   conflicting key-event histories have been issued or observed.

   Freshness:

   The degree of confidence that a presented key state reflects a
   sufficiently recent state for the relying party's application.
   Freshness is distinct from cryptographic validity.

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3.  Related Approaches and Scope Boundaries

3.1.  PKI and Administrative Trust Models

   X.509 and PKIX [RFC5280] provide a mature framework for binding names
   and attributes to public keys through certification authorities and
   established trust anchors.  Certificate status and revocation
   mechanisms, including CRLs and OCSP [RFC6960], provide mechanisms for
   changing the validity of certificate-based bindings.

   Certificate Transparency [RFC9162] adds publicly auditable logging of
   certificate issuance and allows relying parties and monitors to
   detect suspect or unexpected certificates.

   These mechanisms are appropriate for many deployment profiles and are
   not replaced by the problem considered here.  Their trust model
   intentionally depends on certification authorities, trust anchors,
   certificate status mechanisms, or associated administrative
   infrastructure.

   ADKM focuses on deployments in which identifier continuity and
   authorization of successive key states are established primarily by
   cryptographically linked controller events rather than by obtaining a
   newly issued certificate or equivalent authorization from a
   designated certification authority for each transition.

   The distinction is architectural rather than a claim that one model
   supersedes the other.

3.2.  Shared Consensus and Distributed Ledgers

   Some distributed ledger and consensus systems provide a shared
   ordering or agreed state for key-related updates.  These systems can
   provide valuable consistency properties and can reduce dependence on
   a single administrative authority.

   In doing so, they introduce a dependency on the availability,
   governance, finality, and operational characteristics of the selected
   consensus system.  Different ledger architectures make different
   trade-offs, and this document does not assume that all distributed
   ledgers use the same consensus or ordering model.

   ADKM focuses on deployment profiles in which verification of an
   identifier's key-state history does not require participation in, or
   continued operation of, a particular global consensus system.  An
   ADKM deployment may still use a ledger or other shared infrastructure
   as an optional source of additional consistency or timestamp
   evidence.

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3.3.  Key Transparency

   Key Transparency systems, including the architecture developed by the
   IETF KEYTRANS working group [KEYTRANS], provide verifiability for
   identity-to-public-key bindings maintained within service-scoped
   authentication infrastructure.  The architecture is particularly
   concerned with providing users and relying parties with consistent
   and auditable views of those bindings.

   ADKM addresses a different, though potentially complementary,
   question: how the controller of an identifier can cryptographically
   authorize successive key states and expose an independently
   verifiable history of those transitions.

   These approaches are not mutually exclusive.  Transparency
   infrastructure could be used to provide additional consistency
   evidence for key state managed using an ADKM architecture.

3.4.  Self-Certifying and Decentralized Identifiers

   Self-certifying identifiers are established in existing work.  For
   example, the Host Identity Protocol [RFC7401] defines Host Identity
   Tags derived from public-key-based Host Identities and describes them
   as self-certifying.

   W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) [DID-CORE] define a common data
   model and method framework for decentralized identifiers and their
   verification methods.  DID methods can define update, rotation,
   revocation, recovery, and versioning behavior.  These behaviors are
   method-specific, and not all DID methods provide the same key-
   management or historical-state properties.

   The ADKM problem is not the invention of self-certifying or
   decentralized identifiers.  The interoperability gap is the absence
   of a common protocol model for stable identifier continuity and
   verifiable controller-authorized key-state evolution across
   implementations and application domains.

3.5.  Summary of the Gap

   Certification, transparency, self-certifying identifiers,
   decentralized identifier architectures, and consensus systems are
   individually established design patterns.

   ADKM asks whether the IETF should define a common protocol model that
   brings the following properties together:

   *  stable identifier continuity across key changes;

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   *  controller-authorized key-state evolution;

   *  cryptographically verifiable event history;

   *  mechanisms for limiting the consequences of active-key compromise;

   *  explicit consistency and equivocation handling;

   *  verification that can be performed from locally available
      evidence, subject to explicit freshness assumptions; and

   *  operation without requiring either a designated administrative
      issuer to authorize each transition or a mandatory global
      consensus ledger.

4.  The Problem Statement

   ADKM addresses the absence of a common, application-independent IETF
   protocol model that combines the properties described in Section 3.5.

   Any useful architecture needs to address at least the following
   problem areas.

4.1.  Gap 1: Stable Identifier Continuity Across Key-State Evolution

   Existing standards demonstrate several forms of cryptographically
   derived, self-certifying, and decentralized identifiers.  The
   remaining interoperability question is how a stable identifier can
   retain verifiable continuity while its controlling keys, signing
   thresholds, and authorization parameters evolve over time.

   The architecture needs to define how an inception state is bound to
   the identifier and how subsequent state transitions remain
   cryptographically linked to that initial binding without requiring
   the identifier to be re-established through an external registry
   after each transition.

4.2.  Gap 2: Limiting the Consequences of Active-Key Compromise

   Compromise of a currently authorized private key can allow an
   attacker to create signatures that are cryptographically
   indistinguishable from those created by the legitimate controller for
   as long as that key remains authorized.

   A key-state management architecture therefore needs to define how
   authority to establish a successor key state is authenticated when
   one or more currently active signing keys may have been compromised.

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   In particular, some deployments may require a mechanism in which
   possession of the currently active signing keys alone is insufficient
   to authorize arbitrary future key states.  This problem statement
   does not prescribe a particular mechanism for providing that
   property.

4.3.  Gap 3: Separating Cryptographic Validity from Freshness

   A relying party may need to validate a presented key state in an
   intermittently connected, disconnected, air-gapped, or edge
   environment.

   Portable cryptographic evidence can allow the relying party to
   determine whether a presented state follows from an authenticated
   history of permitted transitions.  However, such evidence alone
   cannot generally prove that no later valid transition or conflicting
   history exists.

   The architecture needs to distinguish:

   *  validation of the presented event history;

   *  evidence that the presented state is sufficiently fresh for the
      application; and

   *  evidence that no conflicting history has been observed.

   The protocol should make these assumptions explicit rather than
   treating cryptographic validity, freshness, and global consistency as
   equivalent properties.

4.4.  Gap 4: Duplicity and Equivocation Without Global Total Order

   Without a designated authority or mandatory global consensus
   mechanism enforcing a single authoritative sequence, a compromised or
   malicious controller may be able to produce two or more conflicting
   event histories.

   The architecture therefore needs a consistency model that allows
   conflicting, otherwise validly authenticated histories to be
   detected, evidenced, and compared without requiring all key events to
   participate in a single global total order.

   Possible approaches include independently operated observers, gossip,
   cross-checking, transparency mechanisms, or other forms of
   consistency evidence.  This problem statement does not select among
   them.

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4.5.  Gap 5: Interoperable Deterministic Representation

   Cryptographic verification of key-state events requires
   implementations to agree on the bytes, or on an unambiguous canonical
   representation, covered by signatures and digests.

   Existing mechanisms provide relevant building blocks.  JSON
   Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785] defines a canonical representation
   for JSON.  CBOR [RFC8949] defines deterministic encoding rules, and
   ongoing work on dCBOR [DCBOR] further narrows CBOR choices to support
   interoperable deterministic encoding.

   ADKM does not assume that a new serialization format is required.  It
   does require a clear definition of the representation, framing,
   canonicalization, and extensibility properties needed for
   interoperable event verification, with reuse of existing IETF
   mechanisms where they satisfy those requirements.

5.  Scope and Boundaries

   To remain focused and actionable, ADKM separates cryptographic key-
   state management from higher-layer application semantics.

   In Scope:

   *  an architectural and data model for stable identifiers and
      authenticated succession of key states;

   *  rules for validating inception, rotation, threshold changes,
      delegation, recovery, and revocation events;

   *  mechanisms for representing and exchanging authenticated key-event
      histories;

   *  mechanisms for representing, discovering, or exchanging
      consistency evidence associated with conflicting histories;

   *  explicit treatment of freshness and rollback concerns;

   *  deterministic representation and framing requirements for key-
      state events, reusing existing IETF serialization mechanisms where
      practical; and

   *  protocol elements necessary for interoperability across
      independent implementations.

   Out of Scope:

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   *  human identity proofing, real-world identity verification, or
      legal identity assurance levels;

   *  credential payload formats, claims semantics, or credential
      presentation protocols;

   *  application authorization or access-control policy;

   *  global human-readable naming or discovery systems;

   *  requiring use of a particular distributed ledger or global
      consensus network; and

   *  defining new cryptographic primitives where existing,
      appropriately reviewed algorithms can satisfy the protocol
      requirements.

6.  Security Considerations

   Any protocol developed for this problem space would operate directly
   on long-lived cryptographic authority and therefore requires an
   explicit threat model.

   Active-Key Compromise:

   The architecture should limit, to the extent possible, the ability of
   a compromised current key state to authorize unbounded future key
   states.  The specific mechanism is a solution question rather than a
   requirement of this problem statement.

   Complete Endpoint Compromise:

   No key-state protocol can guarantee recovery if an attacker obtains
   every secret and recovery capability that the protocol treats as
   sufficient to authorize future state.  The security model must
   identify which compromise combinations remain recoverable and which
   are terminal.

   Equivocation:

   A malicious or compromised controller may attempt to present
   conflicting histories to different relying parties.  In the absence
   of mandatory global ordering, the protocol must define how
   conflicting histories can be detected and how resulting evidence is
   interpreted.

   Freshness, Replay, and Rollback:

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   A cryptographically valid historical state may no longer be the state
   that an application should accept.  The protocol must distinguish
   valid historical evidence from sufficiently fresh evidence and must
   describe how relying parties can detect or bound replay and rollback
   risks.

   Observer and Network Attacks:

   If consistency or freshness evidence depends on independently
   operated observers, gossip, cross-checking, or similar mechanisms,
   the threat model must account for eclipse attacks, partitioning,
   delayed propagation, selective disclosure, and collusion.

   Algorithm Agility:

   Long-lived identifiers may outlive the recommended lifetime of a
   cryptographic algorithm.  The architecture should support migration
   of key types and cryptographic suites without requiring abandonment
   of identifier continuity.

   Privacy:

   Distribution of key-event histories or consistency evidence can
   create correlation and metadata risks.  A future protocol should
   minimize unnecessary disclosure and should not assume that all event
   histories need to be globally published.

   Resource Exhaustion:

   Long event histories, conflicting-history proofs, and unsolicited
   state data may create storage, bandwidth, and verification costs.
   Implementations will need bounded validation and denial-of-service
   protections.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

8.  Informative References

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
              Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

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   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure
              Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 6960,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.

   [RFC7401]  Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
              RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.

   [RFC8785]  Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
              Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.

   [RFC8949]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.

   [RFC9162]  Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
              Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
              December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>.

   [KEYTRANS] McMillion, B., "Key Transparency Architecture", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-keytrans-
              architecture-09, June 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-keytrans-
              architecture/>.

   [DCBOR]    McNally, W., Allen, C., Bormann, C., and L. Lundblade,
              "dCBOR: Deterministic CBOR", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-mcnally-deterministic-cbor-18, August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcnally-
              deterministic-cbor/>.

   [DID-CORE] Sporny, M., Longley, D., and D. Chadwick, "Decentralized
              Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0", July 2022,
              <https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/>.

Author's Address

   George McEwan
   Email: mcewan@utah.gov

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