Autonomous Decentralized Key Management (ADKM) Problem Statement
draft-mcewan-adkm-problem-statement-00
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | George McEwan | ||
| Last updated | 2026-09-20 | ||
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draft-mcewan-adkm-problem-statement-00
Network Working Group G. McEwan
Internet-Draft 20 September 2026
Intended status: Informational
Expires: 24 March 2027
Autonomous Decentralized Key Management (ADKM) Problem Statement
draft-mcewan-adkm-problem-statement-00
Abstract
Many Internet applications require stable, long-lived identifiers
whose controlling cryptographic keys evolve over time. Existing
standards provide mature mechanisms for certification, transparency,
self-certifying identifiers, decentralized identifiers, and shared
consensus over state. However, these mechanisms address different
trust and deployment models.
This document identifies an interoperability gap in deployments that
require stable identifier continuity, controller-authorized key-state
evolution, independently verifiable event histories, and consistency
evidence without requiring either a designated administrative issuer
to authorize each state transition or participation in a global
consensus system.
The document defines the problem space for Autonomous Decentralized
Key Management (ADKM), describes related approaches, and identifies
requirements and scope boundaries for a possible application-
independent key-state evolution architecture.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 March 2027.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Related Approaches and Scope Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. PKI and Administrative Trust Models . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Shared Consensus and Distributed Ledgers . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Key Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Self-Certifying and Decentralized Identifiers . . . . . . 6
3.5. Summary of the Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. The Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Gap 1: Stable Identifier Continuity Across Key-State
Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Gap 2: Limiting the Consequences of Active-Key
Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Gap 3: Separating Cryptographic Validity from
Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Gap 4: Duplicity and Equivocation Without Global Total
Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.5. Gap 5: Interoperable Deterministic Representation . . . . 9
5. Scope and Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
The operational integrity of many Internet security protocols depends
on associating an identifier representing a device, service, software
component, organization, or other subject with cryptographic key
material.
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Establishing an initial binding between an identifier and a public
key is well understood, and several mature standards address
certification, transparency, self-certifying identifiers,
decentralized identifiers, and related functions. A distinct problem
arises when an application requires the identifier to remain stable
while its controlling key state changes over time.
Such changes can include routine key rotation, emergency replacement,
modification of signing thresholds, delegation, recovery, and
revocation. A relying party may also need to determine whether a
presented key state follows from an authenticated sequence of
authorized transitions and whether conflicting histories have been
observed.
Existing mechanisms solve important portions of this problem under
different trust and deployment assumptions. PKI relies on
established certification and administrative trust relationships.
Transparency systems provide auditable views of bindings maintained
by services or certification authorities. Some distributed systems
provide shared ordering or consensus over state. Self-certifying
identifier systems cryptographically bind identifiers to key
material, and decentralized identifier frameworks allow method-
specific approaches to key rotation and recovery.
ADKM focuses on a narrower architectural question: how to provide a
common, application-independent mechanism for verifiable evolution of
controller-managed key state associated with a stable identifier,
where successive states are authorized primarily through
cryptographically linked evidence rather than repeated authorization
by a designated external issuer or participation in a global
consensus system.
This document is a problem statement. It does not select a
particular event format, consistency mechanism, serialization,
storage model, or deployment topology.
2. Terminology
Controller:
An entity authorized by the current key state of an identifier to
approve one or more permitted key-state transitions.
Self-Certifying Identifier (SCID):
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An identifier whose relationship to initial cryptographic key
material can be verified from the identifier and associated
cryptographic evidence without relying solely on a central naming
registry.
Key State:
The set of public keys, signing thresholds, roles, and other
authorization parameters that are valid for an identifier at a
particular state in its evolution.
Key Event:
An authenticated statement that establishes or changes key state.
Key Event History:
An authenticated sequence of key events from an identifier's
inception state to a later presented state.
Autonomous Key-State Evolution:
A model in which permitted key-state transitions can be authorized by
the controller according to the protocol's rules without requiring a
new authorization assertion from a designated external administrative
authority for each transition.
Local Evidence Verification:
The ability of a relying party to validate a presented key state and
the authenticated event history leading to that state using locally
available cryptographic evidence and protocol rules, without
requiring a synchronous query to a designated authority.
Local evidence verification does not, by itself, prove that the
presented state is the latest state that exists.
Consistency Evidence:
Cryptographic or protocol evidence used to determine whether
conflicting key-event histories have been issued or observed.
Freshness:
The degree of confidence that a presented key state reflects a
sufficiently recent state for the relying party's application.
Freshness is distinct from cryptographic validity.
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3. Related Approaches and Scope Boundaries
3.1. PKI and Administrative Trust Models
X.509 and PKIX [RFC5280] provide a mature framework for binding names
and attributes to public keys through certification authorities and
established trust anchors. Certificate status and revocation
mechanisms, including CRLs and OCSP [RFC6960], provide mechanisms for
changing the validity of certificate-based bindings.
Certificate Transparency [RFC9162] adds publicly auditable logging of
certificate issuance and allows relying parties and monitors to
detect suspect or unexpected certificates.
These mechanisms are appropriate for many deployment profiles and are
not replaced by the problem considered here. Their trust model
intentionally depends on certification authorities, trust anchors,
certificate status mechanisms, or associated administrative
infrastructure.
ADKM focuses on deployments in which identifier continuity and
authorization of successive key states are established primarily by
cryptographically linked controller events rather than by obtaining a
newly issued certificate or equivalent authorization from a
designated certification authority for each transition.
The distinction is architectural rather than a claim that one model
supersedes the other.
3.2. Shared Consensus and Distributed Ledgers
Some distributed ledger and consensus systems provide a shared
ordering or agreed state for key-related updates. These systems can
provide valuable consistency properties and can reduce dependence on
a single administrative authority.
In doing so, they introduce a dependency on the availability,
governance, finality, and operational characteristics of the selected
consensus system. Different ledger architectures make different
trade-offs, and this document does not assume that all distributed
ledgers use the same consensus or ordering model.
ADKM focuses on deployment profiles in which verification of an
identifier's key-state history does not require participation in, or
continued operation of, a particular global consensus system. An
ADKM deployment may still use a ledger or other shared infrastructure
as an optional source of additional consistency or timestamp
evidence.
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3.3. Key Transparency
Key Transparency systems, including the architecture developed by the
IETF KEYTRANS working group [KEYTRANS], provide verifiability for
identity-to-public-key bindings maintained within service-scoped
authentication infrastructure. The architecture is particularly
concerned with providing users and relying parties with consistent
and auditable views of those bindings.
ADKM addresses a different, though potentially complementary,
question: how the controller of an identifier can cryptographically
authorize successive key states and expose an independently
verifiable history of those transitions.
These approaches are not mutually exclusive. Transparency
infrastructure could be used to provide additional consistency
evidence for key state managed using an ADKM architecture.
3.4. Self-Certifying and Decentralized Identifiers
Self-certifying identifiers are established in existing work. For
example, the Host Identity Protocol [RFC7401] defines Host Identity
Tags derived from public-key-based Host Identities and describes them
as self-certifying.
W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) [DID-CORE] define a common data
model and method framework for decentralized identifiers and their
verification methods. DID methods can define update, rotation,
revocation, recovery, and versioning behavior. These behaviors are
method-specific, and not all DID methods provide the same key-
management or historical-state properties.
The ADKM problem is not the invention of self-certifying or
decentralized identifiers. The interoperability gap is the absence
of a common protocol model for stable identifier continuity and
verifiable controller-authorized key-state evolution across
implementations and application domains.
3.5. Summary of the Gap
Certification, transparency, self-certifying identifiers,
decentralized identifier architectures, and consensus systems are
individually established design patterns.
ADKM asks whether the IETF should define a common protocol model that
brings the following properties together:
* stable identifier continuity across key changes;
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* controller-authorized key-state evolution;
* cryptographically verifiable event history;
* mechanisms for limiting the consequences of active-key compromise;
* explicit consistency and equivocation handling;
* verification that can be performed from locally available
evidence, subject to explicit freshness assumptions; and
* operation without requiring either a designated administrative
issuer to authorize each transition or a mandatory global
consensus ledger.
4. The Problem Statement
ADKM addresses the absence of a common, application-independent IETF
protocol model that combines the properties described in Section 3.5.
Any useful architecture needs to address at least the following
problem areas.
4.1. Gap 1: Stable Identifier Continuity Across Key-State Evolution
Existing standards demonstrate several forms of cryptographically
derived, self-certifying, and decentralized identifiers. The
remaining interoperability question is how a stable identifier can
retain verifiable continuity while its controlling keys, signing
thresholds, and authorization parameters evolve over time.
The architecture needs to define how an inception state is bound to
the identifier and how subsequent state transitions remain
cryptographically linked to that initial binding without requiring
the identifier to be re-established through an external registry
after each transition.
4.2. Gap 2: Limiting the Consequences of Active-Key Compromise
Compromise of a currently authorized private key can allow an
attacker to create signatures that are cryptographically
indistinguishable from those created by the legitimate controller for
as long as that key remains authorized.
A key-state management architecture therefore needs to define how
authority to establish a successor key state is authenticated when
one or more currently active signing keys may have been compromised.
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In particular, some deployments may require a mechanism in which
possession of the currently active signing keys alone is insufficient
to authorize arbitrary future key states. This problem statement
does not prescribe a particular mechanism for providing that
property.
4.3. Gap 3: Separating Cryptographic Validity from Freshness
A relying party may need to validate a presented key state in an
intermittently connected, disconnected, air-gapped, or edge
environment.
Portable cryptographic evidence can allow the relying party to
determine whether a presented state follows from an authenticated
history of permitted transitions. However, such evidence alone
cannot generally prove that no later valid transition or conflicting
history exists.
The architecture needs to distinguish:
* validation of the presented event history;
* evidence that the presented state is sufficiently fresh for the
application; and
* evidence that no conflicting history has been observed.
The protocol should make these assumptions explicit rather than
treating cryptographic validity, freshness, and global consistency as
equivalent properties.
4.4. Gap 4: Duplicity and Equivocation Without Global Total Order
Without a designated authority or mandatory global consensus
mechanism enforcing a single authoritative sequence, a compromised or
malicious controller may be able to produce two or more conflicting
event histories.
The architecture therefore needs a consistency model that allows
conflicting, otherwise validly authenticated histories to be
detected, evidenced, and compared without requiring all key events to
participate in a single global total order.
Possible approaches include independently operated observers, gossip,
cross-checking, transparency mechanisms, or other forms of
consistency evidence. This problem statement does not select among
them.
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4.5. Gap 5: Interoperable Deterministic Representation
Cryptographic verification of key-state events requires
implementations to agree on the bytes, or on an unambiguous canonical
representation, covered by signatures and digests.
Existing mechanisms provide relevant building blocks. JSON
Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785] defines a canonical representation
for JSON. CBOR [RFC8949] defines deterministic encoding rules, and
ongoing work on dCBOR [DCBOR] further narrows CBOR choices to support
interoperable deterministic encoding.
ADKM does not assume that a new serialization format is required. It
does require a clear definition of the representation, framing,
canonicalization, and extensibility properties needed for
interoperable event verification, with reuse of existing IETF
mechanisms where they satisfy those requirements.
5. Scope and Boundaries
To remain focused and actionable, ADKM separates cryptographic key-
state management from higher-layer application semantics.
In Scope:
* an architectural and data model for stable identifiers and
authenticated succession of key states;
* rules for validating inception, rotation, threshold changes,
delegation, recovery, and revocation events;
* mechanisms for representing and exchanging authenticated key-event
histories;
* mechanisms for representing, discovering, or exchanging
consistency evidence associated with conflicting histories;
* explicit treatment of freshness and rollback concerns;
* deterministic representation and framing requirements for key-
state events, reusing existing IETF serialization mechanisms where
practical; and
* protocol elements necessary for interoperability across
independent implementations.
Out of Scope:
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* human identity proofing, real-world identity verification, or
legal identity assurance levels;
* credential payload formats, claims semantics, or credential
presentation protocols;
* application authorization or access-control policy;
* global human-readable naming or discovery systems;
* requiring use of a particular distributed ledger or global
consensus network; and
* defining new cryptographic primitives where existing,
appropriately reviewed algorithms can satisfy the protocol
requirements.
6. Security Considerations
Any protocol developed for this problem space would operate directly
on long-lived cryptographic authority and therefore requires an
explicit threat model.
Active-Key Compromise:
The architecture should limit, to the extent possible, the ability of
a compromised current key state to authorize unbounded future key
states. The specific mechanism is a solution question rather than a
requirement of this problem statement.
Complete Endpoint Compromise:
No key-state protocol can guarantee recovery if an attacker obtains
every secret and recovery capability that the protocol treats as
sufficient to authorize future state. The security model must
identify which compromise combinations remain recoverable and which
are terminal.
Equivocation:
A malicious or compromised controller may attempt to present
conflicting histories to different relying parties. In the absence
of mandatory global ordering, the protocol must define how
conflicting histories can be detected and how resulting evidence is
interpreted.
Freshness, Replay, and Rollback:
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A cryptographically valid historical state may no longer be the state
that an application should accept. The protocol must distinguish
valid historical evidence from sufficiently fresh evidence and must
describe how relying parties can detect or bound replay and rollback
risks.
Observer and Network Attacks:
If consistency or freshness evidence depends on independently
operated observers, gossip, cross-checking, or similar mechanisms,
the threat model must account for eclipse attacks, partitioning,
delayed propagation, selective disclosure, and collusion.
Algorithm Agility:
Long-lived identifiers may outlive the recommended lifetime of a
cryptographic algorithm. The architecture should support migration
of key types and cryptographic suites without requiring abandonment
of identifier continuity.
Privacy:
Distribution of key-event histories or consistency evidence can
create correlation and metadata risks. A future protocol should
minimize unnecessary disclosure and should not assume that all event
histories need to be globally published.
Resource Exhaustion:
Long event histories, conflicting-history proofs, and unsolicited
state data may create storage, bandwidth, and verification costs.
Implementations will need bounded validation and denial-of-service
protections.
7. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
8. Informative References
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
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[RFC6960] Santesson, S., "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure
Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 6960,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
[RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>.
[KEYTRANS] McMillion, B., "Key Transparency Architecture", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-keytrans-
architecture-09, June 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-keytrans-
architecture/>.
[DCBOR] McNally, W., Allen, C., Bormann, C., and L. Lundblade,
"dCBOR: Deterministic CBOR", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-mcnally-deterministic-cbor-18, August 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcnally-
deterministic-cbor/>.
[DID-CORE] Sporny, M., Longley, D., and D. Chadwick, "Decentralized
Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0", July 2022,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/>.
Author's Address
George McEwan
Email: mcewan@utah.gov
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