Evolution of Endpoint Security - An Operational Perspective
draft-mcfadden-opsec-endp-evolve-00
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Mark McFadden
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2021-02-14
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Individual Submission M. McFadden
Internet Draft internet policy advisors, ltd uk
Intended status: Informational February 14, 2021
Expires: August 14, 2021
Evolution of Endpoint Security - An Operational Perspective
draft-mcfadden-opsec-endp-evolve-00.txt
Status of this Memo
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McFadden Expires August 14, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Evolution of Endpoint Security February 2021
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Abstract
This draft discusses the traditional model of security where
endpoints in the network are protected by a variety of tools. It
proposes a model for endpoints and then argues that the older,
traditional approach is no longer sufficient for operational
security at the endpoint. A series of operational examples are
discussed in an Appendix.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................3
2. Endpoints, Definition, Model and Scope.........................3
2.1. Scope.....................................................3
2.2. Models....................................................4
2.3. Internal representation of an endpoint....................4
2.4. External representation of an endpoint....................5
3. Limitations of the Threat Landscape............................6
3.1. Typical Categories of Threats.............................7
3.2. Evolution of threat types and their descriptions..........7
4. Endpoint Security Capabilities.................................8
4.1. Intrinsic versus added security...........................9
4.2. Specific Endpoint Security Capabilities..................10
5. Optimal Properties of an Endpoint Security Solution...........11
6. Case Studies in the Limitations of Endpoint Security Only.....12
6.1. Unable to put an endpoint security add-on on the UE......13
6.2. Endpoints may not see the malware on the endpoint........16
6.3. Endpoints may miss information leakage attacks...........18
6.4. Suboptimality and gray areas.............................20
7. Defense-in-depth from the perspective of protocol design......23
8. Endpoint security from the perspective of protocol design.....24
8.1. Simplicity of design is important........................25
8.2. Diversity in protocol design.............................25
8.3. Protocol design and failure of intermediaries............26
8.4. Protocol evolution.......................................26
9. Security Considerations.......................................26
10. IANA Considerations..........................................27
11. Acknowledgements.............................................27
12. References...................................................27
12.1. Informative References..................................27
Appendix A. Operational Experience and Endpoint Security.........31
A.1. Endpoint only incidents..................................32
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