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The Delegation HTTP Authentication Scheme for Request-Bound Authority
draft-mcgraw-httpapi-agent-budget-04

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author John Paul McGraw, Jr.
Last updated 2026-09-10
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draft-mcgraw-httpapi-agent-budget-04
HTTPAPI                                                        J. McGraw
Internet-Draft                                                  TaskHawk
Intended status: Standards Track                       10 September 2026
Expires: 14 March 2027

 The Delegation HTTP Authentication Scheme for Request-Bound Authority
                  draft-mcgraw-httpapi-agent-budget-04

Abstract

   Delegated software requesters increasingly make HTTP requests that
   spend, consume, disclose, mutate, invoke, or actuate on behalf of
   human or organizational principals.  Existing HTTP authentication
   mechanisms indicate whether a requester holds a credential.
   RateLimit fields communicate server-advertised quota and current
   service-limit information.  HTTP Message Signatures can protect
   selected components of an HTTP message.  None of these mechanisms
   directly defines a common origin-server challenge for a requester to
   present verifiable, bounded authority from its principal before the
   server performs protected processing.

   This document defines the "Delegation" HTTP authentication scheme,
   response semantics for delegated-authority challenges using existing
   HTTP status codes and Problem Details, the Delegation-Proof HTTP
   field, and a COSE/CBOR proof carriage model for request-bound
   delegated authority.  The initial authority profile is the Budget
   profile, which uses a CBOR/COSE Budget-Attestation envelope to prove
   bounded authority to spend, consume metered service units, or commit
   bounded resources.  The mechanism is algorithm-agile; the initial
   cose-ml-dsa proof profile uses existing JOSE and COSE serializations
   for ML-DSA, with ML-DSA-65 as the baseline algorithm and ML-DSA-87
   available as a high-assurance deployment policy option.  A dedicated
   4NN Delegated Authority Required status code remains an open design
   question for HTTP Working Group review; this revision does not depend
   on that status code and does not define payment semantics.  This
   revision also defines a mandatory-to-implement preflight flow for
   large proof profiles so that GET and HEAD requests do not depend on
   request content, and so that requests with application
   representations do not need to multiplex the application body and the
   proof body in a single content stream.

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   For implementation experience, this individual draft also includes
   the initial Budget authority profile.  The HTTP authentication
   scheme, status-code semantics, Problem Details members, and field-
   carriage rules are intentionally separable from the COSE/CBOR Budget
   profile.  If a Working Group chooses to progress the HTTP mechanism
   independently, the Budget authority profile can be moved to a
   companion profile document without changing the Delegation challenge
   semantics defined here.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcgraw-httpapi-agent-budget/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the HTTPAPI Working Group
   mailing list (mailto:httpapi@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/httpapi/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/httpapi/.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 March 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components

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   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.2.  Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.3.  Relationship to OAuth, GNAP, and Token Exchange . . . . .   8
     1.4.  Relationship to Sender-Constrained Tokens and DPoP  . . .   8
     1.5.  Relationship to Attribute Certificates  . . . . . . . . .   9
     1.6.  Relationship to RateLimit Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     1.7.  Relationship to HTTP Message Signatures . . . . . . . . .  10
     1.8.  Relationship to HTTP 402  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   2.  Overview of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   3.  Delegation Challenge Responses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.1.  Dedicated Status Code Design Question . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.2.  Delegation Error Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.  The "Delegation" Authentication Scheme  . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.1.  Challenge Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.2.  Credentials Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.3.  HTTP Message Completeness and Incremental Processing  . .  19
     4.4.  Large-Proof Preflight Flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     4.5.  Preflight Target Binding Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     4.6.  Compact Credential Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     4.7.  Multi-Scheme Composition and the Delegation-Proof
           Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   5.  Budget Authority Profile: Budget-Attestation Envelope . . . .  27
     5.1.  Profile and Version Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     5.2.  COSE_Sign1 and Budget-Claims Encoding . . . . . . . . . .  28
     5.3.  Request-Binding Canonicalization  . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     5.4.  Primary Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     5.5.  Issuer Key Discovery and Trust  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     5.6.  Future Multi-Signer Profiles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     5.7.  Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   6.  Versioning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     7.1.  HTTP Status Code  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     7.2.  HTTP Authentication Scheme  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     7.3.  HTTP Field Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
     7.4.  Media Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   9.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
   Appendix A.  Implementation Status  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46

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     A.1.  Kevros  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
   Appendix B.  Changes Since -03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
   Appendix C.  Changes Since -02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
   Appendix D.  Changes Since -01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
   Appendix E.  Changes Since -00  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52

1.  Introduction

   Delegated software requesters acting on behalf of human or
   organizational principals increasingly make HTTP requests that may
   spend money, consume metered service units, disclose regulated data,
   mutate production state, invoke downstream services, or actuate
   external systems.  HTTP authentication [RFC9110] addresses whether a
   requester holds a usable credential.  RateLimit fields
   [I-D.ietf-httpapi-ratelimit-headers] communicate server-defined quota
   policies and current service-limit information.  HTTP Message
   Signatures [RFC9421] can provide integrity and authenticity for
   selected HTTP message components.  OAuth Token Exchange [RFC8693] and
   GNAP [RFC9635] define ways to obtain or negotiate authorization
   artifacts.

   Delegated authority at the protected origin is a distinct HTTP
   requirement: before processing a consequential request, an origin
   server or gateway needs a common way to challenge for, receive, and
   verify a proof that the requester has bounded authority from its
   principal for that request.  This document defines that challenge and
   proof-carriage layer.

   This document defines:

   *  The "Delegation" HTTP authentication scheme (Section 4), used in
      the WWW-Authenticate response field when delegated authority is
      required and in the Authorization request field of a subsequent
      request.

   *  Delegation challenge response semantics (Section 3), using 401
      (Unauthorized) when a Delegation credential is absent, invalid,
      incomplete, or otherwise needs to be obtained, and 403 (Forbidden)
      when a Delegation credential is understood but is insufficient
      under local policy.

   *  The Delegation-Proof HTTP field (Section 4.7), used when delegated
      authority is additive to another origin-server authentication
      mechanism already carried in Authorization.

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   *  A proof-profile model for request-bound authority.  The initial
      Budget authority profile defines the Budget-Attestation envelope
      (Section 5), a CBOR-encoded [RFC8949], COSE-signed [RFC9052]
      structure that carries semantic claims about issuer, requester,
      expiry, request binding, permitted rails, and amount.

   This document currently contains both the generic HTTP Delegation
   mechanism and the initial Budget authority profile so the protocol
   can be reviewed with a complete running profile.  The sections are
   scoped so the generic HTTP mechanism can be split from the Budget
   profile in a future revision if that is cleaner for Working Group
   processing.

   The Delegation authentication scheme is algorithm-agile.  The initial
   Budget cose-ml-dsa profile uses ML-DSA algorithm identifiers
   serialized for JOSE and COSE by [RFC9964], using the ML-DSA algorithm
   specified in [FIPS204].  Implementations of this profile MUST support
   ML-DSA-65 and MAY support ML-DSA-87.  A deployment MAY require ML-
   DSA-87 or another ML-DSA algorithm registered by [RFC9964] under
   local policy.  Algorithm families outside that registration require a
   separately specified proof profile.  This profile has exactly one
   Issuer signature in a COSE_Sign1 object.  Multi-signer,
   countersignature, and rail-specific co-signature constructions are
   outside this version and require a separately versioned profile.

   This document does not define a payment protocol.  Settlement rails
   such as L402 [L402], x402 [X402], card payments, or other systems can
   use Delegation proofs or the Budget profile as input to their own
   policy and settlement flows; however, their settlement semantics are
   outside the scope of this document.  In particular, this document
   does not depend on, redefine, or reserve any semantics for HTTP 402
   (Payment Required).

   Scope and modularization: Sections 3 and 4 define the HTTP response
   semantics, authentication challenge, credential syntax, and HTTP
   field semantics for Delegation.  Section 5 defines the initial Budget
   authority profile to demonstrate an interoperable cryptographic
   binding for one class of delegated authority.  During standards
   progression, the Working Group can move one or more proof profiles
   into companion documents for review by the COSE, OAuth, or GNAP
   communities without changing the core HTTP semantics defined by the
   authentication scheme, Problem Details members, and field carriage.

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1.1.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Principal:  The human, organization, service, or other authority
      holder on whose behalf a delegated requester acts.

   Issuer:  An entity that issues a Delegation proof on behalf of a
      principal.  In the Budget authority profile, the Issuer is the
      entity that issues Budget-Attestations.

   Delegated Requester:  A client, workload, device, job, agent, or
      other software component that presents a Delegation proof issued
      by an Issuer in order to make HTTP requests within delegated
      bounds.

   Agent:  A delegated requester.  The term "agent" remains the
      motivating deployment case and appears in existing implementation
      field names; it is not a protocol requirement for any specific
      architecture.

   Verifier:  An origin server, or a gateway or reverse proxy explicitly
      authorized by the origin for the same protection space, that
      receives a Delegation proof, validates its signatures and claims,
      and decides whether to perform protected processing for the
      Protected Target Request.  This document defines origin-server
      authentication and does not define proxy authentication.  Generic
      forward proxies and intermediaries that are not authoritative for
      the origin's protection space do not issue, validate, or consume
      Delegation credentials except as ordinary HTTP message forwarding
      behavior permits.

   Protected Processing:  Application processing that the Verifier will
      not perform until the requester has presented a Delegation proof
      satisfying local policy.  Examples include actions that spend,
      consume, disclose, mutate, invoke, or actuate.

   Delegation Proof:  A verifiable object presented by a delegated
      requester to show bounded authority from a principal for a request
      or class of requests.

   Proof Carrier Request:  The HTTP request that transports a Delegation

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      proof.  In direct field presentation it is also the Protected
      Target Request.  In preflight it is the POST request to the
      preflight endpoint and is distinct from the future Protected
      Target Request.

   Protected Target Request:  The HTTP request whose protected
      processing the Delegation proof is intended to authorize.
      Request-Binding always describes this request, never a distinct
      Proof Carrier Request.

   Authority Profile:  A profile that defines the claims, proof format,
      bounds, and verifier checks for a specific class of delegated
      authority.  Budget is the initial authority profile in this
      document.

   Budget Authority Profile:  The authority profile defined in Section 5
      for spending, consuming metered service units, or committing
      bounded resources.

   Budget-Attestation:  The CBOR-encoded, COSE-signed Delegation proof
      defined for the Budget authority profile in Section 5.

   Settlement Rail:  An out-of-band protocol or payment system used to
      transfer value or record resource consumption.  Rail names can
      appear in field 7 of a Budget-Attestation.  This document does not
      define how any settlement rail operates.

1.2.  Applicability

   Delegation is a general HTTP mechanism for request-bound delegated
   authority.  Autonomous software agents and paid-resource access are
   motivating deployment cases; however, the mechanism also applies to
   service workloads, CI/CD jobs, IoT or fleet devices, batch systems,
   scheduled data processors, delegated administration tools, and other
   requesters that need to prove bounded authority before protected
   processing occurs.

   The core mechanism is intentionally broader than budget.  Authority
   profiles can define bounds for spending, service-unit consumption,
   compute allocation, data disclosure, infrastructure mutation,
   downstream invocation, procurement commitment, safety-relevant
   actuation, or other consequential actions.  The Budget authority
   profile is the initial profile because it provides a concrete
   interoperable proof format and a clear deployment need.

   Budget-Claims field 3 carries the delegated requester identifier.
   Deployments MAY populate it with an agent identifier, service-account
   identifier, workload identity, device identifier, job identifier, or

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   privacy-preserving alias.  This field does not require the requester
   to be an AI system.  Deployment APIs MAY continue using names such as
   agent_id at their local boundary, but that name is not encoded in the
   signed CBOR claims map.

1.3.  Relationship to OAuth, GNAP, and Token Exchange

   OAuth Token Exchange [RFC8693] defines an HTTP- and JSON-based
   Security Token Service pattern for obtaining security tokens,
   including delegation and impersonation cases.  GNAP [RFC9635] defines
   a grant negotiation and authorization protocol for delegating
   authorization to software and conveying the resulting artifacts.
   This document does not replace either protocol.

   Delegation defines the protected-resource challenge and presentation
   layer: an origin server or gateway can tell a requester which
   delegated authority proof is required before protected processing,
   and the requester can present a request-bound proof for verification.
   OAuth, GNAP, an STS, an issuer-managed key service, or another
   deployment-specific system can be used to obtain the proof.  The
   issuance flow is outside the scope of this document.

   The delegation semantics in this document are closer to delegation
   than impersonation: the requester remains distinct from the
   principal, and the proof records that the requester is acting with
   bounded authority from the principal.  The document does not define
   general identity authentication, user consent, account linking, or
   grant negotiation.

1.4.  Relationship to Sender-Constrained Tokens and DPoP

   OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP) [RFC9449] sender-
   constrains OAuth access and refresh tokens by binding an issued token
   to a client key and requiring the client to prove possession of the
   corresponding private key on protected-resource requests.  This
   reduces replay risk when an OAuth token is leaked.  It does not, by
   itself, express bounded delegated authority for protected processing,
   and a valid DPoP proof is not a Delegation proof.

   A deployment MAY require the requester identity or session credential
   used with Delegation to be sender-constrained, for example by DPoP,
   mutual TLS, HTTP Message Signatures, or another deployment-specific
   mechanism.  Validation of that credential is a separate
   authentication layer.  Failure of the sender-constrained credential
   is handled according to that authentication layer; failure of the
   Delegation proof is handled with the 401/403 response semantics
   defined in Section 3.

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   When OAuth DPoP and Delegation are used on the same protected
   request, the implementation has to define field composition because
   DPoP uses the Authorization: DPoP authentication scheme, while
   Delegation can use Authorization: Delegation.  A request MUST NOT
   concatenate both credentials in one Authorization field.  A
   deployment can carry the identity credential in Authorization and
   delegated authority in Delegation-Proof or in the base profile's
   preflight Proof Carrier Request.  Direct body carriage on the
   Protected Target Request requires a separately selected and versioned
   noncircular packaging profile.  A deployment that wants to use a
   preflight compact Delegation credential on a request that must also
   retain Authorization: DPoP needs a companion profile defining non-
   Authorization carriage and binding for the compact Delegation
   credential.  This document does not define that profile.

1.5.  Relationship to Attribute Certificates

   X.509 attribute certificates define an older authorization mechanism
   separate from public-key identity certificates; [RFC5755] describes
   authorization as the conveyance of privilege from one entity to
   another.  Delegation follows the same broad separation between
   identity and authority, but does not define an X.509 attribute-
   certificate profile.  It defines HTTP challenge semantics and HTTP
   proof carriage for request-bound delegated authority.

1.6.  Relationship to RateLimit Fields

   RateLimit fields describe service limits from the server to the
   client.  They tell the client what quota policy applies and what
   capacity is currently available under that server-defined policy.
   They are useful for throttling, backoff, and avoiding 429 responses.

   Delegation proofs travel in the opposite direction.  They are client-
   presented credentials showing that an Issuer authorized a Delegated
   Requester to act within stated bounds on behalf of a principal.  They
   are evaluated before the Verifier performs protected processing.

   This document defines a separate mechanism rather than extending
   RateLimit because a signed, bearer-presented authority proof has
   different issuer, freshness, replay, and verification semantics from
   server-advertised quota metadata.  Extending RateLimit-Policy would
   change the issuer and trust model of RateLimit from server-authored
   quota advertisement into principal-authorized delegated authority,
   which is a different protocol semantic rather than a new quota
   parameter.

   The mechanisms are complementary:

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   *  A server MAY return RateLimit fields on 200, 401, 403, 429, or
      other responses when it wants to communicate server-side quota
      state.

   *  A server MUST NOT treat RateLimit fields as a substitute for a
      Delegation proof, because RateLimit fields are not signed
      authority from the requester's principal.

   *  A Budget-Attestation MUST NOT be interpreted as a server quota
      promise.  It only states the Delegated Requester's delegated
      authority under the Budget authority profile.

     +===========+============================+======================+
     | Property  | RateLimit fields           | Delegation proof     |
     +===========+============================+======================+
     | Direction | Server to client           | Client to verifier   |
     +-----------+----------------------------+----------------------+
     | Issuer    | Resource server or gateway | Issuer acting for    |
     |           |                            | the principal        |
     +-----------+----------------------------+----------------------+
     | Integrity | HTTP field semantics       | COSE/JOSE signature  |
     +-----------+----------------------------+----------------------+
     | Purpose   | Advertise quota and        | Prove bounded        |
     |           | current service limits     | delegated authority  |
     +-----------+----------------------------+----------------------+
     | Failure   | Client might be throttled  | Request fails before |
     | mode      |                            | protected processing |
     +-----------+----------------------------+----------------------+

                                  Table 1

1.7.  Relationship to HTTP Message Signatures

   [RFC9421] defines signatures over components of individual HTTP
   messages.  A Delegation proof signs a portable authority object whose
   claims can be evaluated independently of a single HTTP message and,
   when required, bound to a particular bearing request.  The two
   mechanisms can be composed: a Delegated Requester can send an HTTP-
   message signature that covers the request as transmitted and a
   Delegation proof that covers delegated authority for the action.

   The preflight target-binding fields defined by this document describe
   the protected request that will be sent after preflight.  They are
   not intended to replace HTTP Message Signatures.  Where this document
   needs the method and target URI of a protected request, the
   comparison semantics are aligned with the corresponding HTTP Message
   Signatures derived components, including @method and @target-uri.
   Where this document needs a representation digest, deployments SHOULD

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   use the digest algorithm and syntax defined for HTTP Digest Fields
   [RFC9530], and the digest accepted during preflight SHOULD match the
   protected request's Content-Digest field when that field is present.
   A deployment can additionally require an HTTP-message signature over
   the protected request, including @method, @target-uri, content-
   digest, and authorization, when it needs message-level integrity in
   addition to delegated authority.

   This document uses target-binding fields in the preflight request
   because the protected request has not yet been sent when the full
   proof is presented.  The fields identify the future protected request
   for verifier policy and compact credential binding; they do not sign
   or otherwise authenticate the preflight HTTP message itself.

1.8.  Relationship to HTTP 402

   HTTP 402 (Payment Required) is reserved by HTTP Semantics [RFC9110].
   Some deployed payment systems use 402 responses as part of their own
   settlement flows.  This document neither depends on those deployments
   nor defines their semantics.

   An implementation MAY use a Delegation proof or the Budget authority
   profile before invoking a settlement rail.  Whether that later
   settlement interaction uses HTTP 402, a 401 challenge, a signed
   request body, or another transport is out of scope for this document.

2.  Overview of Operation

   A protected origin determines that a request requires delegated
   authority and that no acceptable Delegation credential is present:

   POST /export HTTP/1.1
   Host: api.example

   It returns:

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   HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
   Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2026 18:00:00 GMT
   Cache-Control: no-store
   Content-Type: application/problem+json
   Delegation-Version: 1
   WWW-Authenticate: Delegation realm="api.example",
                     version=1,
                     profile="budget",
                     proof-format="cose-ml-dsa",
                     alg="ML-DSA-65",
                     nonce="QMjVqg5Xb6yV0bO_t9X8gQ",
                     preflight-uri="https://api.example/preflight",
                     max-age=300

   {
     "type": "https://example.com/problems/delegation-required",
     "title": "Delegated authority proof required",
     "status": 401,
     "detail": "A valid Delegation proof is required.",
     "authority_requirements": {
       "profile": "budget",
       "proof_formats": ["cose-ml-dsa"],
       "actions": ["dataset:export"],
       "min_amount": "2.50",
       "currency": "USD",
       "proof_required": true,
       "verifier_required": true,
       "preflight_uri": "https://api.example/preflight",
       "nonce": "QMjVqg5Xb6yV0bO_t9X8gQ",
       "max_age": 300
     }
   }

   The Delegated Requester obtains a Delegation proof from its Issuer by
   means outside this document and submits the large proof to the
   advertised preflight URI.  In this example the proof uses the Budget
   authority profile:

   POST /preflight HTTP/1.1
   Host: api.example
   Content-Type: application/delegation-proof+cose
   Delegation-Target-Method: "POST"
   Delegation-Target-URI: "https://api.example/export"
   Delegation-Target-Content-Digest: sha-256=:<base64-sha-256-digest>:
   Content-Length: 4217

   [COSE_Sign1 Budget-Attestation bytes]

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   Angle-bracketed values in examples are placeholders, not wire syntax.

   If the attestation is valid for the request and local policy, the
   Verifier returns a compact, verifier-issued Delegation credential
   bound to the original method, origin, target, nonce, expiry, and
   representation digest:

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Cache-Control: no-store
   Content-Type: application/json

   {
     "credential_type": "delegation-compact",
     "credential": "kdc1.Pz9leGFtcGxlLW9wYXF1ZS10b2tlbg",
     "authorization": "Delegation kdc1.Pz9leGFtcGxlLW9wYXF1ZS10b2tlbg",
     "expires_in": 120,
     "target": {
       "method": "POST",
       "uri": "https://api.example/export",
       "content_digest": "sha-256=:<base64-sha-256-digest>:"
     }
   }

   The requester then retries the original protected request using
   normal HTTP semantics.  The final request carries the compact
   Delegation credential in the Authorization field.  If the protected
   request has an application representation, that representation
   remains the request content:

   POST /export HTTP/1.1
   Host: api.example
   Authorization: Delegation kdc1.Pz9leGFtcGxlLW9wYXF1ZS10b2tlbg
   Content-Type: application/json

   {"format":"jsonl","limit":1000}

   If Delegation validation fails, the Verifier returns either a 401 or
   403 response as described in Section 3 and SHOULD include a reason
   extension member in the Problem Details body.

3.  Delegation Challenge Responses

   Delegation uses existing HTTP authentication semantics as its
   baseline response model.  A Verifier that requires delegated
   authority and receives no Delegation credential, an invalid
   Delegation credential, or a partial Delegation credential SHOULD send
   a 401 (Unauthorized) response containing a WWW-Authenticate response
   field with at least one Delegation challenge.  This follows the HTTP

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   authentication model in [RFC9110]: the response supplies a challenge
   that the client can answer by obtaining or presenting a Delegation
   credential.

   A Verifier that receives a syntactically valid and authenticated
   Delegation credential that is insufficient for the requested
   resource, exceeds local policy, names an unacceptable authority
   profile, or otherwise does not authorize the request SHOULD send a
   403 (Forbidden) response.  A 403 response MAY include a WWW-
   Authenticate response field with a Delegation challenge when a
   different Delegation credential might allow the request to succeed;
   it MUST NOT include that challenge when local policy forbids the
   request independent of Delegation credential contents.

   A Delegation challenge response SHOULD include Cache-Control: no-
   store as defined by HTTP caching [RFC9111].  A Delegation challenge
   response that contains a nonce, requester-specific policy, or other
   policy-sensitive material MUST include Cache-Control: no-store.

   A Delegation challenge response SHOULD include an application/
   problem+json body using [RFC9457].  The Problem Details object SHOULD
   contain an authority_requirements extension member when the Verifier
   can describe the delegated authority needed for the protected
   request.  A profile MAY define additional profile-specific members;
   for example, the Budget authority profile can describe amounts,
   units, or accepted settlement rails.  When a value is represented
   both in a WWW-Authenticate challenge parameter and in the Problem
   Details body, the challenge parameter is authoritative for
   authentication processing.  The Problem Details body is explanatory
   and actionable metadata for clients; it does not relax, override, or
   extend the WWW-Authenticate challenge.

   This document does not redefine HTTP 402 (Payment Required), and a
   Delegation challenge response MUST NOT be interpreted as a settlement
   request.  A 429 (Too Many Requests) response remains the appropriate
   signal for server-side quota exhaustion.

3.1.  Dedicated Status Code Design Question

   Earlier revisions proposed a dedicated 427 (Budget Required) status
   code for Budget challenges.  The broader design question is whether
   HTTP needs a dedicated status code for delegated authority
   challenges.  A future revision can request registration of a 4NN
   Delegated Authority Required status code if the HTTP Working Group
   concludes that existing 401 and 403 semantics plus WWW-Authenticate:
   Delegation and Problem Details are insufficient for interoperable
   clients, intermediaries, and API gateways.

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   This revision therefore uses 401 and 403 as the baseline and does not
   request an HTTP status-code registration.  Conformant implementations
   use the 401/403 behavior defined in Section 3 unless and until a
   future revision registers a dedicated status code.

3.2.  Delegation Error Tokens

   When a Verifier returns a Delegation challenge response because a
   presented Delegation credential failed validation or did not satisfy
   policy, the Problem Details object SHOULD contain a reason extension
   member.  The value of this member is a token identifying the
   validation failure.  This document defines the following initial
   tokens:

   *  token_expired: The presented Budget-Attestation expiry value is in
      the past relative to the Verifier's clock.

   *  nonce_stale: The nonce in the attestation does not match a valid,
      unexpired challenge window.

   *  nonce_replay: The nonce has already been accepted by the Verifier
      within its replay-tracking window.

   *  bad_signature: Cryptographic validation of the primary Issuer
      signature failed.

   *  untrusted_issuer: The issuer identifier in Budget-Claims field 2
      identifies an issuer for which the Verifier has no explicit trust
      relationship.

   *  authority_insufficient: The signed authority bounds do not satisfy
      the requirement advertised by the resource server.

   *  budget_insufficient: The signed budget bounds in Budget-Claims
      fields 4 and 5 do not satisfy the budget requirement advertised by
      the resource server.

   *  version_unsupported: The Budget-Claims field 1 value, Delegation-
      Version field, or version challenge parameter is not supported by
      the Verifier.

   *  binding_mismatch: The request target URI, method, origin, or body
      digest does not match the signed request-binding values.

4.  The "Delegation" Authentication Scheme

   The Delegation authentication scheme is used in WWW-Authenticate and
   Authorization fields.

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4.1.  Challenge Syntax

   The Delegation authentication scheme challenge uses the auth-param
   syntax defined by [RFC9110], Section 11.2:

   delegation-challenge = "Delegation" 1*SP 1#auth-param

   The realm and nonce parameters are REQUIRED.  The profile parameter
   identifies an acceptable authority profile, such as budget.  The
   proof-format parameter identifies an acceptable proof serialization,
   such as cose-ml-dsa.  The alg parameter identifies one acceptable
   primary signature algorithm for the indicated proof format.  A
   Verifier that accepts multiple algorithms SHOULD send separate
   Delegation challenges rather than overloading a single alg parameter
   with a list syntax.  A challenge MUST NOT contain more than one alg
   parameter.  Authority profiles MAY define additional challenge
   parameters; for example, a Budget profile can define accepted
   settlement rails while leaving rail semantics out of scope for this
   document.

   The preflight-uri parameter is OPTIONAL.  When present, it identifies
   the preflight endpoint for the challenged protection space.  A
   profile that requires preflight for a challenged request SHOULD
   include preflight-uri in the Delegation challenge or advertise the
   same endpoint through an authenticated discovery mechanism.  A
   Problem Details authority_requirements.preflight_uri member can
   mirror or further explain the preflight endpoint, but it does not
   override a preflight-uri challenge parameter.

   The interoperable profile identifier for the authority profile
   defined in this document is budget.  Deployments MAY use private-use
   or local profile identifiers when those identifiers are mapped by
   authenticated configuration or discovery metadata to the same Budget
   claim and verification semantics.  Such private-use identifiers are
   deployment-specific and MUST NOT be assumed interoperable by other
   implementations unless a future specification registers or otherwise
   defines them.

   After auth-param parsing, the nonce value MUST be the canonical
   base64url encoding without padding defined by [RFC4648], Section 5.
   A Verifier MUST reject an invalid or noncanonical encoding.  The
   decoded value MUST be 16 to 64 octets.  Budget-Claims field 10 is the
   CBOR bstr containing exactly those decoded octets; it is not the
   encoded challenge text.  The Issuer and Verifier MUST compare those
   octets exactly.

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   The nonce parameter MUST contain at least 128 bits of unpredictable
   entropy and MUST be generated by the Verifier for the protection
   space identified by realm.  A Verifier MUST accept a nonce at most
   once.  Replay of a nonce, absence of nonce state, or loss of the
   replay cache MUST cause the Verifier to reject the request.

   To reduce outstanding-challenge state, Verifiers SHOULD support self-
   authenticating nonce constructions.  A self-authenticating nonce
   contains unpredictable bytes and integrity-protected metadata such as
   protection space, issuance time, key identifier, and policy binding.
   The nonce is authenticated with a server-held secret, for example
   using an HMAC or AEAD construction, and MUST NOT reveal that secret
   to clients.  This construction allows a Verifier to validate the
   origin and age of a returned nonce without storing every issued
   challenge.  It does not remove the requirement to enforce at-most-
   once acceptance; Verifiers still need accepted-nonce replay tracking
   or an equivalent replay-detection mechanism until the challenge can
   no longer be accepted.

   The max-age parameter, when present, is the validity window in
   seconds for the challenge parameters and nonce.  It does not extend
   the Delegation proof lifetime.  A Verifier MUST reject a Delegation
   proof whose nonce is older than max-age for the corresponding
   challenge.  If max-age is omitted, Verifiers SHOULD apply a local
   default and that default SHOULD NOT exceed 900 seconds.

4.2.  Credentials Syntax

   delegation-credentials = "Delegation" 1*SP delegation-token
   delegation-token       = token68

   The credential token carries a base64url-encoded Delegation proof or
   a verifier-issued compact Delegation credential derived from a
   previously verified proof.  If the encoded proof would exceed
   practical HTTP field size limits, the requester MUST NOT assume that
   the proof can be carried in an HTTP field.  The Budget cose-ml-dsa
   profile MUST support the preflight flow defined in Section 4.4 as the
   mandatory-to-implement fallback for large proofs.

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   Before decoding an Authorization: Delegation token, the Verifier MUST
   know whether the selected credential kind is a full Delegation proof
   or a compact credential from challenge/preflight state or from a non-
   overlapping, authenticated local token syntax.  Failure to validate
   the selected kind MUST cause rejection and MUST NOT trigger decoding
   as the other kind.  Because this document leaves compact-token syntax
   implementation-specific, a deployment that enables both kinds in one
   protection space MUST configure a disjoint authenticated
   discriminator or equivalent state that selects exactly one kind
   before decoding.  Without such a discriminator, it MUST NOT enable
   both kinds for that protection space.

   A client MUST NOT reuse a Delegation credential solely because a
   later request is in the same realm or protection space.  Delegation
   credentials are bounded by their authority profile, nonce, expiry,
   request binding, and compact credential replay rules.  A client can
   reuse a compact Delegation credential only when the credential's
   profile explicitly permits that reuse and the requested operation
   remains within the credential's verified binding.

   Requesters using the Budget cose-ml-dsa profile SHOULD use preflight
   by default because ML-DSA-backed COSE envelopes are large before
   base64url expansion and can exceed field-size limits enforced by
   intermediaries.  [RFC9958] describes the larger key, ciphertext, and
   signature sizes of PQC mechanisms as a protocol-design consideration
   rather than a transparent algorithm rollover.  A deployment profile
   MAY permit field carriage with Authorization: Delegation only when it
   defines accepted field-size limits and failure behavior.  A Verifier
   MAY reject oversized field-carried credentials before CBOR or COSE
   decoding.

   The content of GET and HEAD requests has no generally defined
   semantics in HTTP.  The Budget cose-ml-dsa profile MUST NOT rely on
   GET or HEAD request content for Delegation proof carriage.  When a
   GET or HEAD request needs a large Delegation proof, the requester
   MUST use the preflight flow in Section 4.4 or another explicitly
   negotiated profile that does not depend on GET or HEAD request
   content.  This requirement does not mean that every authenticated GET
   or HEAD request needs a new preflight exchange: small credentials
   that fit within deployment field-size limits, previously issued
   compact credentials whose profile explicitly permits the requested
   use, or future profile-defined proof-reference mechanisms can avoid
   the extra round trip.  The Budget cose-ml-dsa profile only makes
   preflight mandatory to implement as the fallback when the proof
   itself is too large for ordinary field carriage.

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   When the protected operation also requires an application request
   body, body-carried proof creates a packaging question: the HTTP
   request has only one content stream.  The mandatory interoperability
   fallback for the Budget cose-ml-dsa profile is preflight.  In the
   base Budget profile, application/delegation-proof+cose request-
   content carriage is used only for the Proof Carrier POST to the
   preflight endpoint; direct presentation on the Protected Target
   Request uses field carriage subject to its configured size limit.  A
   deployment profile MAY additionally define a same-request packaging
   media type, for example a multipart/related or profile-specific
   envelope, but such a media type is an additional profile and not the
   baseline interoperability requirement.  A packaging profile MUST
   define an unambiguous, noncircular extraction of the proof object and
   protected application-content octets, how those application octets
   are hashed without including the signature that covers the hash, and
   how the two are cryptographically bound before claiming
   interoperability.

   In all cases, the Budget profile's request-binding rules in
   Section 5.3 apply to the protected operation.  A proof body by itself
   MUST NOT cause the Verifier to process an unrelated application body
   unless the packaging profile defines how the two are
   cryptographically bound.

4.3.  HTTP Message Completeness and Incremental Processing

   Regardless of carriage location, a Verifier MUST NOT accept a
   Delegation proof, issue a compact Delegation credential, expose
   verified claims, or perform the Protected Target Request until the
   Proof Carrier Request is complete.  For direct field presentation,
   where the carrier is the Protected Target Request, the Verifier also
   MUST wait for all protected application content and any trailer-
   carried Content-Digest to be complete and validated.  A field-carried
   proof can be parsed after receipt of the field section, but
   successful parsing does not satisfy this complete-message gate.  If
   the HTTP stack has not supplied its end-of-message indication, the
   message is incomplete even if the available proof bytes decode.
   Abort, timeout, missing completion, or failed bound-content
   validation MUST cause rejection without an authority-bearing effect.

   When a Delegation proof is carried in request content using
   application/delegation-proof+cose, TLS record boundaries, HTTP
   message and frame boundaries, transfer-coding syntax, transport read
   sizes, and implementation buffer boundaries are not part of a
   Delegation proof.  A Verifier MAY consume proof content
   incrementally, but it MUST derive the proof media-type data by
   processing exactly the ordered sequence of Proof Carrier Request
   content octets and then decoding any accepted content coding.  Given

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   the same complete content octets and Verifier state, every partition
   of those octets across TLS records, HTTP frames, reads, or internal
   buffers MUST produce the same derived proof data and verification
   result.  An incremental implementation MUST NOT omit, duplicate,
   insert, or reorder octets.  This specification defines no proof chunk
   format or chunk size.  An authority profile that defines another
   proof media type MUST specify its top-level object framing and
   completeness rules.

   For body carriage, the resulting media-type data MUST contain exactly
   one complete tagged or untagged COSE_Sign1 value permitted by
   Section 5, with no trailing octets.  Every accepted content coding
   MUST be successfully decoded before verification.  Incomplete
   content, content-decoding or proof-decoding failure, and trailing
   octets MUST cause verification failure.  Values obtained from partial
   decoding MUST NOT be treated as verified claims or used as a basis
   for protected processing.

   A Verifier MUST enforce cumulative coded-content limits while
   receiving a body-carried proof and cumulative decoded-proof limits
   after or during content decoding.  Counter overflow MUST cause
   rejection.  When either configured body-carriage limit is exceeded,
   the Verifier SHOULD use 413 (Content Too Large).  Field-carried
   proofs are instead subject to the field-size limits and failure
   behavior required by Section 4 and Section 4.7; coded-content and
   decoded-proof body limits do not synthetically apply to a field
   value.  A profile-defined field-value limit MUST be applied to the
   serialized field value as carried: this includes the authentication
   scheme and encoded token for Authorization, or the Structured Field
   Byte Sequence framing and base64 representation for Delegation-Proof.
   It MUST NOT be measured only over decoded COSE octets.  This document
   does not set a universal proof-size limit, and an implementation's
   internal processing unit does not change any configured total limit.

4.4.  Large-Proof Preflight Flow

   The preflight flow separates large-proof carriage from protected
   request processing.  It is the mandatory-to-implement fallback for
   the Budget cose-ml-dsa profile.

   A Delegation challenge response for a profile that supports preflight
   SHOULD advertise a preflight URI in the Problem Details
   authority_requirements object, the preflight-uri authentication
   challenge parameter, or by another profile-defined discovery
   mechanism.  A preflight-uri challenge parameter takes precedence over
   a Problem Details value, and a challenge-specific value takes
   precedence over a stable preflight URI learned through discovery.
   For the Budget cose-ml-dsa profile, a Verifier that requires

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   preflight for the challenged request MUST advertise a preflight URI
   through one of those mechanisms.  The advertised preflight URI
   identifies an endpoint that accepts a Delegation proof but does not
   perform the protected operation.

   Before transmitting a proof, the requester MUST obtain the preflight
   URI from a TLS-authenticated challenge response from the protected
   target origin or from authenticated configuration or discovery bound
   to that target's protection space.  The preflight URI MUST be an
   absolute HTTPS URI without userinfo or a fragment, and the requester
   MUST authenticate its HTTPS origin.  The requester MUST NOT send the
   proof to an endpoint that is not authorized to receive it for that
   protection space.  Cross-origin preflight is permitted only when
   authenticated configuration or discovery explicitly authorizes the
   endpoint for that protection space; a URI in a challenge or redirect
   alone does not establish that authorization.  The precedence rules
   above select among authorized endpoints and MUST NOT override these
   trust requirements.

   A requester MUST NOT follow a preflight redirect with a proof-bearing
   request unless it first applies the same endpoint authentication and
   recipient authorization requirements to the new destination.  It MUST
   NOT forward proof content or associated credentials to an
   unauthorized destination, and MUST NOT follow an HTTPS-to-HTTP
   downgrade.  These requirements do not authorize forwarding unrelated
   identity or session credentials.

   The requester submits the full Delegation proof to the preflight URI
   using POST.  The preflight request content type MUST be application/
   delegation-proof+cose for the base Budget profile.  A separately
   selected and versioned extension profile can define another exact
   media type and its parameters.  A preflight request MUST be bound to
   the protected request by method, origin, target URI, nonce, expiry,
   and, when the protected request has content, a representation digest.
   The Budget cose-ml-dsa profile uses the target-binding fields defined
   in Section 4.5 for this binding.

   The POST to the preflight URI is the Proof Carrier Request, not the
   Protected Target Request.  When Budget-Claims field 14 is present, it
   MUST bind the future Protected Target Request designated by the
   validated Delegation-Target-* fields.  It MUST NOT bind the method,
   URI, or proof-envelope content of the preflight POST.  In particular,
   Request-Binding body-h covers the future protected application
   content identified by Delegation-Target-Content-Digest, never the
   body-carried COSE proof bytes.

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   The Verifier MUST NOT perform the protected operation while
   processing the preflight request.  A successful Budget cose-ml-dsa
   preflight response returns a compact verifier-issued Delegation
   credential as described in Section 4.6.  A future authority profile
   can define another proof reference or verifier-issued artifact, but
   it MUST provide equivalent target binding, expiry, and replay
   protection before claiming interoperability.  The interoperability
   property is that any Verifier responsible for the same protection
   space can validate the compact credential and enforce replay policy;
   a credential that can only be resolved by the individual node that
   processed preflight is not interoperable.

   The requester then sends the protected request using ordinary HTTP
   semantics.  The protected request carries the compact Delegation
   credential in Authorization: Delegation.  For GET and HEAD requests,
   the protected request does not carry Delegation proof content.  For
   POST, PUT, PATCH, or other methods with request content, the
   protected request content remains the application representation.

   The Verifier MUST reject the compact Delegation credential if the
   method, origin, target URI, nonce, expiry, or representation digest
   observed on the protected request differs from the binding verified
   during preflight.  The Verifier MUST enforce at-most-once acceptance
   for credentials that authorize a non-idempotent protected operation.
   For a compact credential issued by preflight, the Verifier MUST
   atomically consume the proof nonce when issuing the compact
   credential or otherwise ensure that repeated preflight requests with
   the same proof nonce cannot mint multiple credentials for a non-
   idempotent operation.  The final protected request then consumes the
   compact credential replay key as described in Section 4.6.

4.5.  Preflight Target Binding Fields

   The Budget cose-ml-dsa preflight request uses the following HTTP
   fields to identify the protected request to which the full Delegation
   proof is being bound.  These fields are Structured Fields [RFC9651].

   Delegation-Target-Method:  The HTTP method token of the protected
      request.  HTTP method tokens are case-sensitive; the Verifier MUST
      compare this field using the exact method token that will be used
      for the protected request.  The field value is a Structured Field
      Item whose bare item is a String.  This comparison is aligned with
      the HTTP Message Signatures @method derived component.

   Delegation-Target-URI:  The absolute URI of the protected request
      target as reconstructed by the Verifier after applying only
      trusted origin or reverse-proxy configuration.  The field value is
      a Structured Field Item whose bare item is a String.  The Verifier

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      MUST derive scheme and authority from connection context, origin
      configuration, or explicitly trusted gateway metadata.  It MUST
      ignore untrusted Forwarded, X-Forwarded-*, or similar fields when
      reconstructing the target URI.  The Verifier MUST reject a
      preflight request whose target URI cannot be reconstructed
      deterministically, is outside the authority scope of the
      challenged resource, or uses a request-target form such as CONNECT
      authority-form or OPTIONS asterisk-form that is not defined by the
      authority profile.  This comparison is aligned with the HTTP
      Message Signatures @target-uri derived component.

   Delegation-Target-Content-Digest:  The digest of the protected
      request content, using the Digest Fields syntax defined by
      [RFC9530].  The field value is a Structured Field Dictionary.  The
      Budget cose-ml-dsa profile MUST support sha-256.  This field is
      REQUIRED when the protected request has content, including
      explicitly framed zero-length content.  If the protected request
      has no content, this field MUST be omitted.  The Verifier MUST
      compute the digest over the complete protected-request content
      according to [RFC9530] and require equality with the value
      accepted during preflight.  When Budget-Claims field 14 contains
      body-h, that value MUST be the same SHA-256 digest.  When the
      protected request carries Content-Digest, the Verifier MUST
      independently validate that field against the actual complete
      content and require its sha-256 value to equal the preflight
      digest and, when field 14 is present, body-h.  The Verifier MUST
      NOT trust a client-supplied Content-Digest value without verifying
      it.  If Content-Digest is received in a trailer section, the
      Verifier MUST NOT perform the protected operation before the
      trailer has been received and the digest has been validated.

   The Verifier MUST reject the preflight request if any required
   target-binding field is absent, malformed, ambiguous, inconsistent
   with the challenged resource, or inconsistent with the request-
   binding claims in the Delegation proof.  The Verifier MUST reject the
   later protected request if its observed method, effective request
   URI, or content digest differs from the target accepted during
   preflight.

4.6.  Compact Credential Response

   A successful Budget cose-ml-dsa preflight response SHOULD use 200
   (OK).  A deployment MAY use 201 (Created) when it exposes a distinct
   resource URI for the issued credential.  The response MUST include
   Cache-Control: no-store and MUST NOT be interpreted as a settlement
   signal, a payment receipt, or evidence of revenue.

   The response body MUST be a JSON object containing these members:

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   credential_type:  The string delegation-compact.

   credential:  An opaque token68 compact Delegation credential.  The
      credential syntax is implementation-specific; clients MUST treat
      it as opaque.

   authorization:  A convenience string equal to Delegation followed by
      the credential value.  The client MAY copy it directly into the
      protected request's Authorization field.

   expires_in:  The remaining credential lifetime in seconds, expressed
      as a non-negative integer.  The compact credential lifetime MUST
      NOT exceed the challenge window or the underlying Delegation proof
      lifetime.

   target:  A JSON object restating the accepted protected-request
      binding.  It MUST include method and uri.  It MUST include
      content_digest when the protected request content digest was part
      of the preflight binding.  The content_digest value uses the
      Digest Fields syntax defined by [RFC9530].

   A successful preflight response MUST NOT be interpreted as a
   settlement signal, a payment receipt, or evidence of revenue.
   Profiles or deployments can include additional metadata in the
   response body, but such metadata does not change the Delegation
   authorization semantics unless a future specification defines that
   behavior.

   A compact Delegation credential MUST be integrity protected by the
   Verifier and bound to the verified proof, issuer and requester
   identifiers when available, method, origin, target URI,
   representation digest when present, nonce, expiry, and local
   authority requirements.  The Budget cose-ml-dsa profile MUST NOT
   depend on node-local preflight state that is unavailable to another
   Verifier in the same protection space.  Implementations SHOULD use a
   self-authenticating compact credential, such as an opaque verifier-
   protected token whose contents are integrity protected and
   confidential from clients when necessary.  A deployment MAY instead
   use a server-side credential handle only when lookup, validation, and
   consumption state is consistently available to all Verifiers that can
   receive the protected request.  A Verifier MUST fail closed if it
   cannot validate, look up, or consume the compact credential and its
   replay state.  A compact Delegation credential that authorizes a non-
   idempotent protected operation MUST be accepted at most once.

   At protected-request acceptance, the Verifier MUST check the compact
   credential against the currently applicable local authority
   requirements and the authorization status of the original Issuer

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   signing key.  A successful preflight check alone is not sufficient.
   The credential or its integrity-bound validation state MUST identify
   the original Issuer and signing key and the policy context needed for
   those checks.  The Verifier MUST reject the request if the key is
   revoked, expired, or no longer authorized, or if current policy does
   not permit the request.  Required policy or key-status information
   MUST be authenticated and within its applicable freshness lifetime;
   unavailable or stale required information is a validation failure.
   Implementations can use integrity-protected version references or
   shared validation state to enforce invalidation, without prescribing
   a compact token format or requiring the original proof to be
   transmitted again.  Key rotation alone does not invalidate a
   credential when the original key remains authorized under current
   policy.

   Replay tracking for compact Delegation credentials is based on a
   Verifier-selected replay key, not on a client-interpretable token
   format.  A self-authenticating compact credential SHOULD contain or
   yield an integrity-protected credential identifier suitable for
   replay tracking.  The accepted challenge nonce MUST remain bound to
   the compact credential, either directly or through the integrity-
   bound proof or validation state.  A compact credential MAY contain an
   explicit representation of that nonce; omitting that representation
   MUST NOT omit the nonce binding or its verification.  This does not
   change the mandatory nonce in Budget-Claims field 10.  If no separate
   credential identifier is available to verifier logic, the Verifier
   MAY derive the replay key from a cryptographic hash of the received
   compact credential, the protection space, and the accepted protected-
   request binding.  Verifiers MUST NOT rely on a client-supplied,
   unauthenticated identifier for replay tracking.  For non-idempotent
   protected operations, replay-state unavailability or an inability to
   atomically consume the replay key is a validation failure.

4.7.  Multi-Scheme Composition and the Delegation-Proof Field

   The Delegation-Proof field carries a Delegation proof when the
   request already uses Authorization for another origin-server
   credential or when a deployment wants delegated authority to be
   visibly additive to another authentication scheme.

   The field value is a Structured Field Item [RFC9651] whose bare item
   is a Byte Sequence containing a COSE/CBOR Delegation proof.

   Delegation-Proof: :2BhA...base64-cose...kQ:

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   If both Authorization: Delegation and Delegation-Proof are present,
   the Verifier MUST reject the request unless a deployment profile
   explicitly defines how the two credentials compose.  This avoids
   ambiguity about which signed authority object is authoritative.

   The Authorization field MUST NOT be used to concatenate a non-
   Delegation credential and a Delegation credential into a single field
   value unless a future HTTP authentication scheme explicitly defines
   such composition.  When identity authentication must retain
   Authorization on the Protected Target Request, bounded low-footprint
   delegated authority SHOULD be presented in the Delegation-Proof
   field.  Using a preflight compact Delegation credential in that case
   requires a companion profile defining its non-Authorization carriage
   and binding; this document does not define that profile.  A proof
   body carried on the Protected Target Request requires the separate
   packaging profile described in Section 4.

   When a request carries both an identity credential and a Delegation
   proof, the Verifier MUST evaluate the identity authentication layer
   and the delegated authority layer independently.  Failure of the
   identity authentication layer is handled according to that
   authentication scheme, typically with 401 or 403.  Failure of the
   delegated authority layer is handled with the 401/403 response
   semantics defined in Section 3.

   Responses whose selected representation, protected processing, or
   authorization decision depends on a Delegation-Proof field are
   sensitive to a credential field that is not the Authorization field.
   Unless the response is otherwise safe for shared caching, an origin
   server or origin-authorized gateway SHOULD send Cache-Control: no-
   store or Cache-Control: private.  If a response to a request carrying
   Delegation-Proof is intentionally cacheable, the response MUST make
   the cache key explicit, for example by including Vary: Delegation-
   Proof and any other Delegation request fields that affect response
   selection.  Challenge responses and preflight responses remain
   subject to the Cache-Control: no-store requirements in Section 3 and
   Section 4.6.

   The Delegation-Proof field is not the general-purpose carriage path
   for multi-kilobyte post-quantum attestations.  Implementations of the
   base cose-ml-dsa profile MUST support preflight body carriage with
   media type application/delegation-proof+cose.  A separately selected
   and versioned extension profile can define another proof media type
   or same-request packaging.  A deployment profile MAY permit
   Delegation-Proof field carriage only when it defines accepted field-
   size limits and failure behavior.  A field-carried proof and the
   protected application content are bound using Section 5.3 and the
   complete-message checks in Section 4.3.  Field carriage alone does

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   not require a same-request body-packaging profile; that additional
   profile is needed when the proof and application content share one
   request-content stream.

   The interoperable media type for body-carried Delegation proofs
   defined by this document is application/delegation-proof+cose.
   Earlier or local media types, including Budget-specific deployment
   aliases, are implementation experience and MUST NOT be assumed
   interoperable unless separately specified or registered.

5.  Budget Authority Profile: Budget-Attestation Envelope

5.1.  Profile and Version Selection

   Before interpreting an integer label in a Budget-Claims map, a
   Verifier MUST select the expected Delegation authentication-scheme
   version, authority profile, proof format, algorithm policy, and
   carriage location from challenge state and authenticated local
   configuration for the protection space.  The carriage location
   identifies request-content carriage, Authorization field carriage, or
   Delegation-Proof field carriage.  Media metadata is conditional: for
   request-content carriage, the selected tuple also includes the
   expected proof media type and any permitted media-type parameters;
   for either field carriage location, no HTTP proof media type exists
   and a Verifier MUST NOT infer or synthesize one from the COSE object
   or proof-format name.

   For Authorization field carriage, the expected credential kind is
   also selected before token decoding as required by Section 4.  A
   full-proof selection enters the Budget-Claims processing defined
   here; a compact-token selection enters only the configured compact-
   token verifier.  Failure of either selected path MUST NOT fall back
   to the other.

   For body carriage in this profile, the media type is application/
   delegation-proof+cose and the optional outer parameter is constrained
   by Section 7.4; this base-profile carriage location is the preflight
   Proof Carrier Request, not the Protected Target Request.  Field
   carriage is permitted only under the size-limit and failure rules in
   Section 4 or Section 4.7, as applicable, and carries no proof media
   type.

   The Verifier MUST record the selected tuple, including carriage
   location, credential kind when applicable, and conditional media
   metadata, with the issued challenge nonce and, after decoding field
   10 under the already-selected schema, MUST confirm that the same
   tuple is associated with that live nonce.  A requester-provided value
   MUST NOT alter any member of the selected tuple.  A Verifier MUST NOT

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   select a claim schema by trying multiple decoders, by inspecting the
   CBOR type associated with a claim label, or by falling back to
   another profile after a decode or verification failure.  For this
   profile, the selected values include Delegation version 1, authority
   profile budget, proof format cose-ml-dsa, Budget-Claims version 1,
   and the algorithm policy advertised in the challenge and required
   locally.

   The outer COSE structure and Budget-Claims field 1 are decoded only
   to confirm the selected profile and version.  A mismatch, an unknown
   claim label, a claim whose type or meaning belongs to another
   profile, or a mixture of fields from different profile versions MUST
   cause rejection.  Duplicate map keys are ambiguous and MUST cause
   rejection before any claim is used.  Label 14 has only the Request-
   Binding type and semantics defined by this profile; any other type or
   interpretation is a mixed-profile encoding and MUST cause rejection.

5.2.  COSE_Sign1 and Budget-Claims Encoding

   The Budget authority profile defines a Budget-Attestation envelope as
   exactly one COSE_Sign1 object [RFC9052] carrying one CBOR claims set.
   The claims set is encoded using deterministic CBOR [RFC8949].  The
   notation below uses CDDL [RFC8610].  Encoders MUST follow the core
   deterministic encoding requirements of [RFC8949], Section 4.2.1.
   Verifiers MUST reject non-deterministic encodings.  When constructing
   the COSE Sig_structure, Verifiers MUST use the exact protected-header
   bstr and payload bstr received in the COSE_Sign1 object and MUST NOT
   substitute a locally reserialized CBOR value for either bstr.
   Verifiers MUST reject duplicate map keys in any map in the COSE_Sign1
   object, the decoded Budget-Claims payload, or a nested Request-
   Binding map.  Duplicate detection MUST occur during CBOR decoding or
   in a representation that preserves every encoded pair; a decoder MUST
   NOT first collapse pairs into an ordinary map and then attempt
   duplicate detection.  A header label occurring in both protected and
   unprotected header maps also causes rejection.  This document defines
   the cose-ml-dsa Budget profile using integer-labeled CBOR claims to
   avoid a drift-prone translation between text claim names and signed
   bytes.  The text names in comments below are descriptive only and are
   not encoded.

   For this profile, the Delegation proof is a COSE_Sign1 object
   carrying the deterministically encoded Budget-Claims map as its
   payload.  A COSE_Sign1 object can be encoded with COSE tag 18 or as
   the untagged four-element COSE_Sign1 array; Verifiers SHOULD accept
   both forms and Issuers SHOULD send the tagged form unless a
   deployment profile says otherwise.  The payload element MUST contain
   the Budget-Claims bstr; detached payloads represented by null are not
   permitted and MUST be rejected.  The protected header map MUST

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   contain the algorithm header parameter.  When multiple issuer keys
   are available, the protected header map MUST contain a kid value
   identifying the Issuer key.  The algorithm and kid header parameters
   MUST NOT appear in the unprotected header map.  The unprotected
   header map MUST be empty in this profile.  A crit protected header
   parameter, when present, MUST be understood by the Verifier before
   the proof is accepted.

   The COSE content type (ctyp) header parameter describes the COSE
   payload, not the outer HTTP representation.  The base Budget profile
   assigns no media type to the inner Budget-Claims map.  A base-profile
   Issuer therefore MUST omit ctyp, and a base-profile Verifier MUST
   reject a protected or unprotected ctyp parameter.  Only a separately
   selected and versioned extension profile can define an exact
   protected ctyp value and its verification rules.  Such an extension
   MUST treat ctyp only as a signed consistency condition and MUST NOT
   use it to select or change the authority profile.  No profile can
   place the outer application/delegation-proof+cose media type in ctyp
   merely because that media type carried the COSE_Sign1 object.

   This profile permits exactly one primary Issuer signature: the
   signature element of that COSE_Sign1 object.  Issuers MUST NOT use
   COSE_Sign, a COSE countersignature, a signature-bearing Budget-Claims
   field, a second signature slot, or a trailing signature object in
   this profile.  Verifiers MUST reject each of those constructions
   rather than ignore an additional signature or reinterpret the proof
   under another profile.

   The signature input is the COSE_Sign1 Sig_structure defined by
   [RFC9052], using context string Signature1, the encoded protected
   header bstr, an empty external_aad bstr unless a future profile
   defines another value, and the exact Budget-Claims payload bstr
   received by the Verifier.  Verifiers MUST reject proofs whose payload
   bstr does not decode to a deterministic Budget-Claims map or whose
   protected header bstr is not deterministically encoded.

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   Budget-Claims = {
     1  => uint,                ; version
     2  => tstr,                ; issuer identifier
     3  => tstr,                ; delegated requester identifier
     4  => tstr,                ; authorized budget total or limit
     5  => tstr,                ; remaining budget
     6  => tstr,                ; currency or metered-unit identifier
     7  => [+ tstr],            ; permitted rails/actions/classes
     8  => uint,                ; issued-at ms since Unix epoch
     9  => uint,                ; expires-at ms since Unix epoch
     10 => bstr .size (16..64), ; nonce from the Delegation challenge
     ? 11 => bstr,              ; reserved profile extension slot
     ? 12 => bstr .size 32,     ; reserved digest extension slot
     13 => tstr,                ; verifier or merchant binding
     ? 14 => Request-Binding    ; signed request binding
   }

   Request-Binding = {
     "method"  => tstr,
     "uri-h"   => bstr .size 32,
     "origin"  => tstr,
     ? "body-h" => bstr .size 32
   }

   Channel-Binding = {
     "type"  => tstr,
     "value" => bstr
   }

   Fields 4 and 5 carry decimal string values rather than binary
   floating-point numbers.  A Verifier MUST interpret them according to
   the authority profile's currency or metered-unit policy and MUST
   reject values it cannot parse unambiguously.  A Delegation challenge
   response using the Budget profile can advertise a minimum budget,
   unit requirement, or action requirement in its Problem Details body;
   that response member is an input to client policy and does not become
   authoritative unless it is reflected in the signed claims.

   Fields 11 and 12 are reserved extension slots and are optional in
   Budget-Claims version 1.  An Issuer using the base Budget cose-ml-dsa
   profile MUST omit both fields, and a Verifier of that base profile
   MUST accept their absence.  Their presence is valid only when the
   already-selected, separately specified profile defines their types,
   exact byte semantics, verification procedure, failure behavior, and
   version negotiation.  For field 12, such a profile MUST also define
   the digest algorithm and the exact bytes covered.

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   A Verifier MUST reject a proof containing field 11 or 12 when the
   selected profile does not define that field, when the Verifier does
   not explicitly support that profile, or when the field fails the
   profile-defined validation.  It MUST NOT infer extension semantics
   from a field's length or contents and MUST NOT retry the proof under
   another profile.

   Field 12 is not a replacement for field 14, a preflight target-
   content digest, an independently verified Content-Digest field, or
   computation of the actual protected-request content digest.  No
   extension profile can obtain those bindings merely by placing an
   unspecified digest in field 12.

   Field 14, when present, carries a signed Request-Binding structure.
   A Budget-Attestation that is intended to authorize only one specific
   protected request under this profile MUST include field 14 using
   exactly the construction defined in Section 5.3.  Any other type or
   semantics at label 14 is a mixed-profile encoding and MUST be
   rejected.  When field 14 is absent, the Budget-Attestation is
   authority for the class of actions and bounds expressed by its other
   claims; a Verifier can still issue a compact credential bound to one
   protected request after preflight, but it MUST NOT describe that
   original Budget-Attestation as issuer-bound to that specific HTTP
   target.

   The Channel-Binding structure above is a logical structure for
   profile extensions.  It is not part of the integer-labeled Budget-
   Claims map unless a future revision assigns a claim label for it.  It
   is included here to define semantics that a companion profile can
   bind to without changing the core Delegation challenge model.

5.3.  Request-Binding Canonicalization

   When a Budget-Attestation is bound to a Protected Target Request, the
   Issuer and Verifier MUST use the same canonical target-request
   components:

   *  method is the HTTP method token as received by the origin server.
      HTTP method tokens are case-sensitive; Verifiers MUST NOT case-
      normalize this value before comparison.

   *  origin is scheme "://" authority for the effective request URI as
      reconstructed by the Verifier after applying only trusted origin,
      gateway, or reverse-proxy configuration.  The scheme and host are
      serialized in lowercase.  A default port for the scheme is
      omitted; a non-default port is included.  Verifiers MUST NOT use
      untrusted Forwarded, X-Forwarded-*, or similar fields when
      reconstructing the origin.

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   *  uri-h is SHA-256 over the UTF-8 serialization of the origin-form
      target.  An empty path is serialized as /.  An absent query
      contributes no ?, while a present but empty query contributes a
      final ?; otherwise the path is followed by "?" and the query
      component.  Verifiers MUST NOT reorder query parameters, percent-
      decode and re-encode octets, remove dot segments, or otherwise
      transform the target before hashing.  Verifiers MUST reject target
      forms they cannot bind deterministically, including CONNECT
      authority-form and OPTIONS asterisk-form unless a profile
      explicitly defines those cases.

   *  body-h is SHA-256 over the HTTP request content bytes after
      transfer-coding removal and before application parsing or content-
      coding transformation.  It is REQUIRED when the protected request
      has content, including explicitly framed zero-length content, and
      MUST be omitted when the request has no content.

   The Issuer constructs the Request-Binding map from those components,
   encodes that map as Budget-Claims field 14 before constructing the
   Budget-Claims payload bstr, and signs that payload through the
   COSE_Sign1 Sig_structure.  No member other than those defined by
   Request-Binding is permitted in this version.  The Verifier
   independently reconstructs the method, origin, target, and body
   digest when present and compares them with the signed values.  A
   missing required member, an unknown member, a type mismatch, or any
   unequal component MUST cause rejection.

   For direct presentation in Authorization or Delegation-Proof, the
   Proof Carrier Request and Protected Target Request are the same
   request, and the Verifier reconstructs Request-Binding from that
   current request.  For preflight, they are distinct: the Verifier
   reconstructs Request-Binding from the validated Delegation-Target-*
   fields describing the future Protected Target Request.  It MUST NOT
   compare field 14 to the preflight POST method, preflight URI, or
   body-carried proof-envelope bytes.  A same-request packaging profile
   MUST define a noncircular extraction and hashing rule as required by
   Section 4 before its application content can be used for body-h.

   If the Verifier cannot reconstruct these components
   deterministically, it MUST reject the Delegation proof rather than
   process the request under an ambiguous binding.

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   A future profile extension can bind an attestation to an external
   channel-binding value such as a TLS exporter using a structure with
   the semantics of Channel-Binding above.  This document defines the
   channel-binding semantics but does not assign a Budget-Claims label
   or define mandatory channel-binding types.  A Verifier that
   implements such an extension MUST reject a channel-binding value
   whose type it does not understand or whose value does not match the
   locally computed channel-binding value for that type.

5.4.  Primary Signature

   Every Budget-Attestation MUST contain exactly one primary Issuer
   signature.  The protected COSE algorithm header MUST use the COSE
   algorithm identifier registered for the selected ML-DSA algorithm by
   [RFC9964].  The textual alg challenge name identifies that same
   algorithm; it is not the integer encoded in the protected COSE
   header.

   The Delegation authentication scheme is algorithm-agile.  The Budget
   cose-ml-dsa profile defined by this document has the following
   interoperability requirements:

   *  Implementations of this profile MUST support ML-DSA-65.

   *  Implementations MAY support ML-DSA-87.

   *  Deployments MAY require ML-DSA-87 or another ML-DSA algorithm
      registered by [RFC9964] under local policy.  Supporting ML-DSA-65
      does not require a Verifier to accept it when the selected
      deployment policy requires ML-DSA-87.

   *  Verifiers MUST validate that the signed protected-header algorithm
      matches local policy and MUST reject algorithm downgrades.

   Future documents can define additional authority profiles or proof
   formats using other COSE or JOSE algorithm identifiers without
   changing the semantics of the Delegation authentication scheme.

   ML-DSA processing follows [RFC9964], including its empty ctx
   parameter.  The message being signed is the complete COSE
   Sig_structure.  The ML-DSA ctx parameter is distinct from the COSE
   context string Signature1 and from COSE external_aad.  HashML-DSA and
   nonempty ML-DSA contexts are not defined by the algorithm identifiers
   used by this profile.

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5.5.  Issuer Key Discovery and Trust

   A Verifier MUST establish trust in an Issuer public key before
   accepting a Budget-Attestation signed by that key.  Trust can be
   established through local configuration, an authenticated out-of-band
   agreement, or an issuer-controlled HTTPS key-set endpoint.  A
   Verifier MUST NOT treat an untrusted issuer identifier in Budget-
   Claims field 2 or arbitrary key URL in an attestation as sufficient
   authority to trust a key.

   One interoperable deployment profile is an issuer-controlled HTTPS
   key-set URI obtained through authenticated configuration or
   discovery, for example https://example.com/issuer-keys, returning a
   COSE_KeySet with media type application/cose-key-set.  A Verifier
   using this profile MUST authenticate the HTTPS origin, MUST require
   each accepted key to carry a key identifier usable as kid, MUST bind
   each key to the expected issuer and algorithm policy, and MUST reject
   the request if the key set is unavailable or omits the referenced
   key.  Cached key material MUST NOT be used beyond its authenticated
   freshness lifetime.  Key rotation SHOULD provide overlap between old
   and new keys for already-issued attestations.

   This document does not define a fixed discovery path or register a
   well-known URI suffix.  The trusted configuration or discovery
   mechanism identifies the issuer origin and key-set URI.  The example
   path has no special protocol meaning.  Deployment-specific aliases do
   not create an interoperable discovery name or authorize trusting a
   key at an otherwise untrusted origin.

   Implementation-specific JSON key-set formats MAY be used by
   deployments during migration, but such formats are not the
   interoperable key-discovery profile defined by this document unless a
   future revision specifies their media type, schema, and security
   processing rules.  Deployments that publish JSON transition metadata
   SHOULD include enough information to map each public key to the
   corresponding RFC 9964 JOSE or COSE algorithm identifier and MUST NOT
   publish private AKP priv seed material.  COSE key parameters or
   labels that are not registered for interoperable use are private-use
   deployment metadata; a key-set that depends on such labels is not an
   interoperable key-discovery profile unless a companion specification
   defines those labels and their validation rules.

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5.6.  Future Multi-Signer Profiles

   This version defines no second signer, rail co-signature,
   countersignature, or multi-signature encoding.  A future
   specification can define a separately versioned profile using
   COSE_Sign or a COSE countersignature construction, but that profile
   has to specify the complete COSE structure, signature inputs, signer
   roles and trust, algorithms and key identification, cardinality,
   downgrade and stripping behavior, verification order, media-type
   signaling, and version negotiation.

   Private-use or experimental algorithm identifiers and signature
   containers are outside the Budget cose-ml-dsa profile.  They MUST NOT
   be advertised or accepted as interoperable values for this profile
   and MUST be isolated behind an explicitly selected private profile
   and media-type policy.

5.7.  Verification

   A Verifier processing a Budget-Attestation MUST:

   1.   Select the expected Delegation version, authority profile, proof
        format, algorithm policy, carriage location, credential kind
        when applicable, and body-carriage media metadata when
        applicable, as required by Section 5.1.  Reject an unsupported
        or mixed selection without attempting a fallback decode.

   2.   Apply Section 4.3 for every carriage location.  Decode exactly
        one COSE_Sign1 value encoded in CBOR from the selected body or
        field representation and reject non-deterministic, malformed,
        incomplete, or trailing octets.  Reject COSE_Sign,
        countersignatures, nonempty unprotected headers, signature-
        bearing claims, additional signature slots, and trailing
        signature objects.

   3.   Verify that Budget-Claims field 1 is supported and matches the
        selected profile version.  Reject unknown or duplicate labels,
        labels with the wrong type, and any label 14 value other than
        Request-Binding.  Accept absence of fields 11 and 12; when
        either is present, apply the extension-profile rules above and
        reject unless the selected profile explicitly defines and the
        Verifier supports and validates that field.

   4.   Verify the one primary signature against an Issuer key
        authorized for the issuer and kid.

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   5.   Verify that Budget-Claims field 13 matches an expected verifier
        or merchant identifier established by authenticated local
        configuration for the protected resource.  Reject a mismatch
        whether or not field 14 is present; successful request-binding
        verification does not replace this check.

   6.   Parse Budget-Claims fields 4 and 5 under the selected unit
        policy, verify field 6 identifies the required currency or
        metered unit, and verify the signed bounds satisfy the protected
        resource's policy.  Reject ambiguous, unparseable, unsupported,
        or insufficient values.

   7.   Verify Budget-Claims fields 8 and 9, clock skew, and maximum
        lifetime.  Both fields are milliseconds since the Unix epoch.
        Verifiers MUST first reject field 9 values earlier than field 8,
        without performing an underflowing subtraction, and then MUST
        reject lifetimes greater than 900000 milliseconds.  Verifiers
        SHOULD apply no more than 60000 milliseconds of clock-skew
        tolerance unless local policy is stricter.  Issuers and
        Verifiers SHOULD synchronize clocks using an authenticated time
        source suitable for the deployment.

   8.   Verify that Budget-Claims field 10 matches a live challenge and
        has not been used before.

   9.   Verify request binding against the Protected Target Request when
        the attestation includes Budget-Claims field 14, including
        method, origin, target URI hash, and body hash when present.
        For preflight, derive that request only from validated
        Delegation-Target-* fields, never from the Proof Carrier
        Request.  If field 14 is absent, the Verifier MUST enforce the
        action, resource-class, and preflight compact-credential binding
        needed by local policy before processing the protected request.

   10.  Verify the permitted rail, action, or resource-class policy
        expressed by mandatory Budget-Claims field 7.

   Failure at any step MUST cause the Verifier to reject the request.  A
   rejected proof MUST NOT expose any decoded claim as verified, MUST
   NOT result in compact credential issuance, and MUST NOT cause the
   protected operation or any other authority-bearing effect.

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6.  Versioning

   This document defines version 1 of the Delegation authentication
   scheme and the initial Budget authority profile.  A Delegation
   challenge response MUST include a Delegation-Version response field
   containing a Structured Field Integer [RFC9651].  A Delegation
   challenge SHOULD also include a version auth-param when the Verifier
   supports more than one version or expects clients to use a specific
   version.  When both Delegation-Version and a version auth-param are
   present in the same challenge response, they MUST identify the same
   Delegation authentication-scheme version.  A client that receives
   conflicting values MUST treat the challenge as unsupported.

   A client that receives an unknown Delegation-Version value or version
   challenge parameter MUST NOT guess at wire compatibility.  It MAY
   retry using a version it supports only when the server advertises
   that version through local policy or a future version-negotiation
   mechanism.  The Delegation authentication-scheme version is distinct
   from Budget-Claims field 1, which is the Budget profile/envelope
   version.  A server that receives a Delegation credential or
   Delegation-Version request value for an unsupported version MUST
   reject the request using Section 3 and a version_unsupported reason
   code, unless a future revision defines a different upgrade response.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This section follows the guidance in [RFC8126] and [RFC9205].  The
   requested registrations use the existing HTTP and media-type
   registries.

7.1.  HTTP Status Code

   This revision does not request a new HTTP status-code registration.
   The dedicated 4NN Delegated Authority Required design question is
   tracked in Section 3.1.

7.2.  HTTP Authentication Scheme

   IANA is asked to register the following entry in the "Hypertext
   Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme Registry" defined by
   [RFC9110]:

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   +================+===========+======================================+
   | Authentication | Reference | Notes                                |
   | Scheme Name    |           |                                      |
   +================+===========+======================================+
   | Delegation     | This      | Origin-server authentication         |
   |                | document, | using WWW-Authenticate and           |
   |                | Section 4 | Authorization; not defined           |
   |                |           | for proxy authentication             |
   +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+

                                  Table 2

7.3.  HTTP Field Name

   IANA is asked to register the following entry in the "Hypertext
   Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry":

   +=============+=========+============+===========+=================+
   | Field Name  |Status   | Structured | Reference | Comments        |
   |             |         | Type       |           |                 |
   +=============+=========+============+===========+=================+
   | Delegation- |permanent| Item       | This      | Integer item    |
   | Version     |         |            | document, | identifying the |
   |             |         |            | Section 6 | Delegation      |
   |             |         |            |           | authentication- |
   |             |         |            |           | scheme version  |
   +-------------+---------+------------+-----------+-----------------+
   | Delegation- |permanent| Item       | This      | Byte Sequence   |
   | Proof       |         |            | document, | item carrying a |
   |             |         |            | Section   | Delegation      |
   |             |         |            | 4.7       | proof when      |
   |             |         |            |           | Authorization   |
   |             |         |            |           | is used by      |
   |             |         |            |           | another origin- |
   |             |         |            |           | server scheme   |
   +-------------+---------+------------+-----------+-----------------+
   | Delegation- |permanent| Item       | This      | String item     |
   | Target-     |         |            | document, | identifying the |
   | Method      |         |            | Section   | protected       |
   |             |         |            | 4.5       | request method  |
   |             |         |            |           | for Delegation  |
   |             |         |            |           | preflight       |
   |             |         |            |           | target binding  |
   +-------------+---------+------------+-----------+-----------------+
   | Delegation- |permanent| Item       | This      | String item     |
   | Target-URI  |         |            | document, | identifying the |
   |             |         |            | Section   | protected       |
   |             |         |            | 4.5       | request target  |

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   |             |         |            |           | URI for         |
   |             |         |            |           | Delegation      |
   |             |         |            |           | preflight       |
   |             |         |            |           | target binding  |
   +-------------+---------+------------+-----------+-----------------+
   | Delegation- |permanent| Dictionary | This      | Digest Fields   |
   | Target-     |         |            | document, | dictionary      |
   | Content-    |         |            | Section   | identifying the |
   | Digest      |         |            | 4.5       | protected       |
   |             |         |            |           | request content |
   |             |         |            |           | digest for      |
   |             |         |            |           | Delegation      |
   |             |         |            |           | preflight       |
   |             |         |            |           | target binding  |
   +-------------+---------+------------+-----------+-----------------+

                                 Table 3

   This revision does not request creation of a Delegation error-token
   registry.  The reason values in Section 3.2 are defined for this
   authentication scheme and its initial Budget authority profile.  A
   future revision can request a registry if multiple independent
   extensions need a shared token namespace.

7.4.  Media Type

   IANA is asked to register the following media type in the "Media
   Types" registry using the template from [RFC6838]:

   Type name:  application

   Subtype name:  delegation-proof+cose

   Required parameters:  N/A

   Optional parameters:  cose-type, with the same semantics as the cose-
      type parameter for application/cose in [RFC9052].  Profile
      selection already restricts this media type to exactly one
      COSE_Sign1 structure, so the parameter is OPTIONAL for both tagged
      and untagged forms.  When present, its only accepted form in this
      profile is cose-type="cose-sign1".  A value identifying COSE_Sign
      or another COSE structure is not valid for the Budget cose-ml-dsa
      profile.

   Encoding considerations:  binary

   Security considerations:  See Section 8.

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   Interoperability considerations:  Implementations need to support
      COSE processing, deterministic CBOR, and the algorithm identifiers
      profiled by this document, and meet the complete-content
      requirements in Section 4.3.

   Published specification:  This document.

   Applications that use this media type:  HTTP clients, gateways, and
      origin servers that exchange Delegation proofs, including Budget-
      Attestation envelopes under the Budget authority profile.

   Fragment identifier considerations:  This media type does not support
      fragment identifiers.

   Additional information:  Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A;
      Magic number(s): N/A; File extension(s): N/A; Macintosh file type
      code(s): N/A.

   Person & email address to contact for further information:  John
      McGraw, j.mcgraw@taskhawktech.com

   Intended usage:  COMMON

   Restrictions on usage:  N/A

   Author:  John McGraw

   Change controller:  IESG

   Provisional registration?  No

8.  Security Considerations

   Delegation proofs are bearer credentials until verified.  HTTP
   exchanges carrying them MUST use TLS.  Servers SHOULD scrub
   Authorization field values, Delegation-Proof field values, and body-
   carried Delegation credential values from logs.

   Deployments that use bearer, DPoP-bound, mutual-TLS-bound, or
   otherwise sender-constrained credentials for identity or session
   authentication MUST validate those credentials before treating the
   requester as authenticated.  Sender-constraining an identity or
   session token does not replace Delegation nonce validation, request
   binding, Issuer trust, Budget bounds, or Verifier policy.
   Conversely, a valid Delegation proof does not authorize use of an
   unrelated OAuth access token, API key, or other execution credential.

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   Verifiers MUST validate every check in Section 5 before processing
   the protected request.  Missing keys, unavailable verification
   dependencies, malformed CBOR, non-deterministic CBOR, expired proofs,
   signature failures, nonce replay, unsupported versions, and loss of
   nonce state all require request rejection.

   Profile and version selection is part of that fail-closed boundary.
   A Verifier MUST NOT infer a profile from a claim's CBOR type,
   interpret one claim label under multiple schemas, accept a field from
   an unselected extension, or retry a failed proof under a legacy or
   private profile.  Fields 11 and 12 have no semantics in the base
   profile and their unexpected presence requires rejection.  Label 14
   has exactly the signed Request-Binding type and semantics defined by
   this document; any other interpretation requires rejection.  A
   carriage-location mismatch, body-media mismatch, synthesized field
   media type, credential-kind fallback, or base-profile ctyp parameter
   also requires rejection.

   The COSE or JOSE algorithm identifier is part of the signed protected
   metadata.  Verifiers MUST compare it against configured policy and
   MUST NOT let a challenge parameter or client preference downgrade the
   algorithm.

   The Budget authority profile uses post-quantum digital signatures for
   delegated-authority proofs.  It does not define post-quantum key
   establishment, confidentiality migration, certificate migration,
   hybrid key exchange, or a general post-quantum migration protocol.
   Implementers need to evaluate those surrounding cryptographic
   migration questions separately; see [RFC9958] for engineer-facing
   discussion of PQC migration impacts.  Deployments with long-lived
   confidentiality or quantum-transition requirements need to make
   independent TLS and certificate migration decisions under the
   applicable TLS profiles and deployment policy.  This document does
   not choose or recommend a TLS key-establishment profile.  Support for
   a TLS quantum-transition profile MUST NOT be represented as support
   for the Budget cose-ml-dsa profile, and support for the Budget
   profile MUST NOT be represented as post-quantum transport
   confidentiality.

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   Cryptographic signature verification establishes integrity of the
   exact signed protected-header and payload bytes and provenance from a
   key trusted for the selected Issuer and profile.  Successful overall
   Delegation proof verification additionally establishes satisfaction
   of the checks that the Verifier actually performs.  Neither
   establishes that a signed assertion is factually true or that an
   external system performed a claimed action.  A deployment that relies
   on external evidence needs a separate, explicitly specified
   provenance and validation procedure and MUST fail closed when that
   procedure is unavailable or fails.

   This profile has exactly one signature.  Additional signers,
   countersignatures, and private-use signature slots are not additive
   inputs to this profile; their presence makes the proof invalid under
   this version.

   At-most-once credential acceptance does not guarantee exactly-once
   completion of protected processing.  A failure can occur after replay
   state is consumed but before an operation completes, or after an
   operation completes but before its response is delivered.
   Application transaction, idempotency, and recovery semantics remain
   separate from this authentication scheme.  An uncertain outcome does
   not permit reuse of a credential that the replay rules require to be
   single-use.

   Key lifecycle is security-critical.  Issuers SHOULD rotate signing
   keys on a predictable schedule, publish revocation information
   through the same trust channel used for key distribution, and avoid
   issuing attestations whose lifetime extends beyond the authenticated
   lifetime of the signing key.  Verifiers MUST reject attestations
   signed by revoked, expired, or unexpected keys.

   Large post-quantum signatures can create denial-of-service pressure
   on HTTP parsers, HTTP field-section processing, and COSE libraries.
   ML-DSA-backed COSE envelopes are commonly too large to assume safe
   carriage through general-purpose HTTP fields after base64url
   expansion.  This is consistent with the protocol-redesign and
   constrained-network concerns discussed in [RFC9958].  Implementations
   MUST apply size limits before decoding, MUST bound CBOR nesting depth
   and map sizes, and MUST reject duplicate keys and unsupported
   critical protected parameters before expensive signature
   verification.  Verifiers that fetch issuer key sets or discovery
   metadata MUST bound response sizes, redirect behavior, parsing depth,
   and cache lifetimes.  They MUST NOT fetch arbitrary key URLs supplied
   inside an untrusted proof.

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   Verifier nonce state can itself become a resource-exhaustion target.
   Verifiers MUST bound the number of outstanding nonces per issuer,
   protection space, and client identity signal available to the
   deployment, and MUST expire unused nonces no later than their
   challenge max-age.  When nonce state reaches a configured limit, the
   Verifier MUST reject requests that depend on an untracked nonce or
   shed unauthenticated challenge issuance rather than accept a request
   with an untracked nonce.  At high scale, deployments SHOULD use self-
   authenticating nonces as described in Section 4 so challenge issuance
   does not require allocating distributed state for every
   unauthenticated request.  Such constructions reduce outstanding-
   challenge state but do not remove the need for bounded accepted-nonce
   replay tracking when at-most-once acceptance is required.

   The Budget authority profile describes channel-binding extension
   semantics for deployments that need binding to a particular TLS
   session or exporter value.  Specific channel-binding types are not
   mandatory-to-implement in this revision and need profiling before
   they can be assumed interoperable.  In the absence of channel
   binding, short lifetimes, single-use nonces, request binding, and
   replay-cache enforcement are mandatory replay controls.

9.  Privacy Considerations

   These considerations are informed by the privacy guidance in
   [RFC6973].

   Delegation proofs can reveal delegated requester identifiers,
   principal or issuer identifiers, requested actions, authority bounds,
   rail preferences, and amount limits.  Implementations SHOULD use
   short lifetimes, random nonces, data minimization in requester
   identifiers, and body carriage when field logging by intermediaries
   would create avoidable privacy risk.  Issuer and requester
   identifiers SHOULD be pairwise or otherwise scoped when a stable
   global identifier is not required by deployment policy.  Challenge
   responses SHOULD reveal only the authority requirements needed for
   the client to obtain an acceptable proof.  Public reason tokens and
   detailed Problem Details bodies can become policy or issuer-
   enumeration oracles; deployments SHOULD rate-limit unauthenticated
   challenge traffic and avoid returning unnecessary detail to untrusted
   clients.  Logs SHOULD redact Authorization, Delegation-Proof, body-
   carried proof bytes, compact credentials, and preflight target URIs
   or content digests when those values could reveal sensitive resources
   or actions.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

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   [FIPS204]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
              "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", FIPS
              PUB 204, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204, August 2024,
              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
              NIST.FIPS.204.pdf>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.

   [RFC6838]  Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
              Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
              RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8610]  Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
              Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
              Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
              JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
              June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>.

   [RFC8949]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8949>.

   [RFC9052]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.

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   [RFC9110]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.

   [RFC9111]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9111>.

   [RFC9205]  Nottingham, M., "Building Protocols with HTTP", BCP 56,
              RFC 9205, DOI 10.17487/RFC9205, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9205>.

   [RFC9457]  Nottingham, M., Wilde, E., and S. Dalal, "Problem Details
              for HTTP APIs", RFC 9457, DOI 10.17487/RFC9457, July 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9457>.

   [RFC9530]  Polli, R. and L. Pardue, "Digest Fields", RFC 9530,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9530, February 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9530>.

   [RFC9651]  Nottingham, M. and P. Kamp, "Structured Field Values for
              HTTP", RFC 9651, DOI 10.17487/RFC9651, September 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9651>.

   [RFC9964]  Prorock, M. and O. Steele, "ML-DSA for JSON Object Signing
              and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and
              Encryption (COSE)", RFC 9964, DOI 10.17487/RFC9964, May
              2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9964>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-httpapi-ratelimit-headers]
              Polli, R., Ruiz, A. M., and D. Miller, "RateLimit header
              fields for HTTP", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-httpapi-ratelimit-headers-11, 23 May 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpapi-
              ratelimit-headers-11>.

   [L402]     Lightning Labs, "L402 Protocol Specification", 2024,
              <https://github.com/lightninglabs/L402>.

   [RFC5755]  Farrell, S., Housley, R., and S. Turner, "An Internet
              Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization",
              RFC 5755, DOI 10.17487/RFC5755, January 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5755>.

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   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6973>.

   [RFC7942]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
              RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.

   [RFC8693]  Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
              and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.

   [RFC9421]  Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP
              Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421,
              February 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421>.

   [RFC9449]  Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T.,
              Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
              Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449,
              September 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9449>.

   [RFC9635]  Richer, J., Ed. and F. Imbault, "Grant Negotiation and
              Authorization Protocol (GNAP)", RFC 9635,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9635, October 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9635>.

   [RFC9958]  Banerjee, A., Reddy.K, T., Schoinianakis, D., Hollebeek,
              T., and M. Ounsworth, "Post-Quantum Cryptography for
              Engineers", RFC 9958, DOI 10.17487/RFC9958, June 2026,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9958>.

   [X402]     Coinbase, Inc., "x402: An Open Standard for Internet-
              Native Payments", 2025,
              <https://www.x402.org/x402-whitepaper.pdf>.

Appendix A.  Implementation Status

   This appendix follows [RFC7942] and is to be removed before
   publication as an RFC.

A.1.  Kevros

   Organization: TaskHawk Systems LLC.

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   Contact: j.mcgraw@taskhawktech.com.

   Maturity and coverage: Experimental implementation experience with
   earlier revisions informed this document.  It includes delegated-
   authority challenge, proof-carriage, and verification work.
   Deployment-specific formats are not asserted to be wire-compatible
   with the Budget profile defined here.

   Conformance and interoperability: This report does not claim a
   complete implementation of this revision or interoperability with an
   independent implementation.  In particular, it makes no
   implementation claim for the complete-message, segmentation-
   independence, optional-extension, profile-first dispatch, and
   Request-Binding requirements added or clarified here.  Local
   authoring checks and fixed test cases do not establish those runtime
   properties.

   This implementation report is included for review under [RFC7942].
   It does not assert deployment readiness, verified live use,
   settlement, revenue, or IETF Working Group adoption.

Appendix B.  Changes Since -03

   *  Limited the recommended Problem Details response to the
      application/problem+json format defined by RFC 9457.

   *  Made verifier or merchant identifier validation unconditional,
      independently of the optional signed request binding.

   *  Required authenticated and authorized preflight destinations,
      including explicit cross-origin authorization and validation
      before redirecting a proof-bearing request.

   *  Clarified compact-credential acceptance against current policy and
      Issuer-key status, and distinguished mandatory nonce binding from
      optional explicit nonce representation in the compact credential.

   *  Clarified the single-signature ML-DSA algorithm boundary, the
      distinction between textual challenge names and COSE identifiers,
      and RFC 9964's empty ML-DSA context requirement.

   *  Clarified direct field-carried proof binding without requiring a
      body packaging profile when the proof is outside application
      content.

   *  Left the issuer key-set URI to authenticated configuration or
      discovery, without defining an unregistered well-known URI suffix.

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   *  Distinguished at-most-once credential acceptance from exactly-once
      application completion and reduced the implementation report to
      relevant interoperability and maturity information.

   *  Required body-carried Delegation proof processing to be
      independent of HTTP framing and implementation read boundaries,
      without defining a proof chunk format or chunk size, and extended
      the complete-message gate to field carriage.

   *  Required a complete Proof Carrier Request and, for the Budget
      profile, exactly one permitted COSE_Sign1 value before proof
      acceptance, compact-credential issuance, or protected processing,
      with fail-closed handling of decoding failure and trailing octets.

   *  Required cumulative bounds for coded request content and decoded
      proof octets, fail-closed counter-overflow handling, and
      recommended 413 (Content Too Large) when a configured bound is
      exceeded; scoped field limits to the serialized HTTP field value
      rather than decoded COSE size.

   *  Scoped COSE signature verification to the exact protected-header
      and payload bstr values used by Sig_structure, prohibited detached
      payloads, and required duplicate-key detection before native-map
      collapse.

   *  Required Verifiers to compute Content-Digest over complete
      protected-request content, require exact agreement with preflight
      and Request-Binding digests, and wait for validation of a trailer-
      carried digest before protected processing.

   *  Limited the Budget cose-ml-dsa profile to exactly one COSE_Sign1
      Issuer signature and deferred multi-signer, countersignature, and
      rail co-signature constructions to a separately versioned future
      profile.

   *  Made claim labels 11 and 12 optional reserved extension slots.
      Their absence is valid in the base profile; their presence fails
      closed unless an explicitly selected and supported profile defines
      and verifies them.

   *  Required scheme/profile/proof-format/algorithm/carriage selection,
      conditional body-media selection, credential-kind selection, and
      nonce binding before claim-label interpretation; prohibited trial
      decoding and mixed-profile or full-proof/compact-token fallback;
      and fixed label 14 to the single Request-Binding construction
      defined by this document.

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   *  Defined the exact canonical base64url-without-padding conversion
      between the Delegation challenge nonce and the 16-to-64-octet
      Budget-Claims field 10 bstr.

   *  Required base-profile omission and rejection of COSE ctyp; only a
      separately selected and versioned extension can define an exact
      protected value.

   *  Clarified that signature verification establishes exact-byte
      integrity and trusted-key provenance, while overall proof success
      additionally establishes only the checks actually performed;
      neither establishes factual truth, external-hardware validity,
      model correctness, or theorem discharge.

   *  Corrected the Budget-Claims lifetime check to use the millisecond
      units of fields 8 and 9, reject expiration before issuance without
      underflow, and cap the lifetime at 900000 milliseconds.

   *  Made verification of mandatory field 7 unconditional and specified
      the exact optional media-type parameter form cose-type="cose-
      sign1".

   *  Defined empty-path and absent-versus-empty-query Request-Binding
      behavior, required body-h exactly when request content is present,
      and prohibited any verified-claim, credential, or protected effect
      after rejection.

   *  Distinguished the Proof Carrier Request from the Protected Target
      Request so preflight Request-Binding covers the designated future
      application request, never the preflight POST or body-carried
      proof bytes.

   *  Corrected the RFC 7942 implementation appendix to distinguish
      private legacy envelopes from this interoperable profile and
      remove equivalence claims.

Appendix C.  Changes Since -02

   *  Made the large-proof preflight flow mandatory to implement for the
      Budget cose-ml-dsa profile.

   *  Specified that the Budget cose-ml-dsa profile MUST NOT rely on GET
      or HEAD request content for Delegation proof carriage.

   *  Defined preflight as the baseline interoperability fallback for
      large post-quantum proofs and for operations that also carry an
      application representation body.

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   *  Left same-request multipart/related or profile-specific envelopes
      as optional packaging profiles rather than the baseline
      interoperability path.

   *  Clarified that a successful preflight returns a compact Delegation
      credential bound to method, origin, target URI, nonce, expiry, and
      representation digest, while leaving other proof-reference
      artifacts to future profiles.

   *  Defined the Delegation-Target-Method, Delegation-Target-URI, and
      Delegation-Target-Content-Digest fields used by the Budget cose-
      ml-dsa preflight flow.

   *  Clarified that those target-binding fields align with HTTP Message
      Signatures derived-component semantics and HTTP Digest Fields
      rather than replacing message-level signatures.

   *  Defined the Budget cose-ml-dsa compact credential response shape,
      including credential_type, opaque credential, authorization
      convenience value, expires_in, and target, while keeping
      settlement and revenue semantics out of the preflight response.

   *  Clarified that compact credentials need verifier-portable
      validation within the protection space and cannot depend on node-
      local preflight state.

   *  Added an optional signed Request-Binding claim for request-
      specific Budget attestations and clarified the difference between
      issuer-bound request authority and verifier-bound compact
      credentials issued after preflight.

   *  Tightened origin-authorized verifier scope, target URI
      reconstruction, cache behavior for Delegation-Proof, preflight URI
      challenge carriage, IANA field registration metadata, and
      security/privacy considerations based on HTTP-focused review.

   *  Clarified that the combined HTTP mechanism plus Budget profile is
      current implementation-experience packaging and can be split into
      companion drafts for Working Group processing.

   *  Added [RFC9958] as an informative reference for post-quantum
      migration and large-signature protocol-design considerations.

   *  Clarified that the Budget authority profile uses PQC signatures
      for delegated-authority proofs but does not define PQC key
      establishment, confidentiality migration, certificate migration,
      hybrid key exchange, or a general PQC migration protocol.

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   *  Added DPoP/sender-constrained-token composability text, including
      the Authorization field composition boundary when Authorization:
      DPoP and Delegation are both required.

   *  Added a neutral transport-security migration note for TLS and
      certificate migration, while keeping TLS key establishment
      separate from the Budget cose-ml-dsa proof profile.

   *  Clarified private-use authority-profile identifiers and their
      relationship to the interoperable budget profile identifier.

   *  Updated issuer-key discovery guidance and retained authenticated
      origin, key identity, algorithm policy, and freshness
      requirements; this revision leaves the concrete key-set URI to
      authenticated configuration or discovery.

   *  Tightened Kevros implementation-status text to distinguish
      published draft-02 metadata, local draft-03 preview behavior,
      operational enforcement health fields, proof verification, rail
      observation, settlement, and revenue.

Appendix D.  Changes Since -01

   *  Refactored the core mechanism from Budget-specific language to the
      Delegation HTTP authentication scheme for request-bound delegated
      authority.

   *  Made Budget the initial authority profile rather than the protocol
      boundary.

   *  Replaced core Budget challenge examples with WWW-Authenticate:
      Delegation, Delegation-Version, Delegation-Proof, and
      authority_requirements.

   *  Made 401 and 403 with WWW-Authenticate: Delegation and Problem
      Details the baseline response model for delegated-authority
      challenges.

   *  Moved the dedicated status-code question to 4NN Delegated
      Authority Required instead of requesting status-code registration
      in this revision.

   *  Tightened the alg challenge parameter to one algorithm per
      challenge.

   *  Kept the COSE/CBOR Budget-Attestation profile separable from the
      core HTTP authentication and Problem Details semantics.

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   *  Replaced explanatory text-claim CDDL with the integer-labeled
      Budget claims map used by the initial cose-ml-dsa Budget profile.

   *  Added request-binding canonicalization rules and called out the
      packaging question for large proof bodies plus application request
      bodies.

   *  Clarified that JSON issuer-key discovery formats are transition
      metadata, not the interoperable COSE_KeySet profile.

Appendix E.  Changes Since -00

   *  Removed language implying HTTP 402 semantics are controlled by
      deployed payment protocols.

   *  Added Section 1.2 and Section 1.6.

   *  Updated ML-DSA serialization references to [RFC9964] and changed
      the initial cose-ml-dsa interoperability baseline to ML-DSA-65,
      with ML-DSA-87 available as a high-assurance deployment policy
      option.

   *  Made body carriage mandatory to implement for the cose-ml-dsa
      profile and recommended by default for post-quantum Budget-
      Attestation envelopes.

   *  Kept Authorization: Delegation and Delegation-Proof as explicitly
      bounded field-carriage options for deployment profiles that define
      accepted field sizes and failure behavior.

   *  Added nonce replay, key-distribution, IANA, deterministic-CBOR,
      and expanded security text based on review feedback.

   *  Aligned the attestation lifetime rule with implementation
      behavior: after rejecting exp < iat, an exp - iat interval greater
      than 900000 milliseconds is a verifier rejection condition.

   *  Tightened Implementation Status to separate challenge emission,
      Budget-Attestation verification, rail observation, settlement, and
      revenue.

Author's Address

   John Paul McGraw, Jr.
   TaskHawk Systems LLC
   Charlottesville, VA
   United States of America
   Email: j.mcgraw@taskhawktech.com

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