A privacy analysis on DoH deployment
draft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis-00

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dnsop                                                         D. Migault
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                         November 04, 2019
Expires: May 7, 2020

                  A privacy analysis on DoH deployment
                draft-mglt-abcd-doh-privacy-analysis-00

Abstract

   This document provides an analysis on DoH impact on privacy

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020.

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  DNS traffic and privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Privacy impact of DoH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  DNS systems polices:  lost of control versus independence   6
   5.  Privacy impact related to the choice of the  DNS resolver . .   7
   6.  Privacy impact of concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Acknowledgment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described BCP 14
   [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals,
   as shown here.

2.  Introduction

   DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484] differs from the traditional
   DNS [RFC1035] in that DNS exchanges between the DNS client and the
   resolver are now encrypted and that DNS traffic is not signaled as
   DNS traffic (with port 53) but instead uses (port 443).

   Such approach could enhance end user's privacy by preventing any on-
   path party to infer any DNS related information from the observed
   traffic.  However, such enhancement may also have counter effects
   such as the loose of control of the DNS traffic by the end user
   itself.

   This draft aims at providing an analysis on the impact of the
   deployment of DoH on the current internet.

   Section Section 3 details privacy sensitive information carried by
   the DNS traffic and evaluate how specific this information is
   specific to DNS or could be inferred from other traffic such as the
   web traffic depending on Internet concentration.

   Section Section 4 exposes the privacy implication of possible usage
   of DoH and more precisely the ability to circumvent or enforce the
   end user policies.

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   While encrypting the DNS traffic enables the section of a DNS
   resolver, section Section 5 exposes the privacy implications
   associated to the selection of a resolver and show that choosing a
   resolver outside the boundaries of an ISP provides in fact limited
   protection toward that ISP.

   Finally, section Section 6 shows that despite the advantages that
   concentration could provide by obfuscating the IP address, the
   overall picture of concentration shows that it represents a threat to
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