Effect of Pervasive Encryption on Operators
draft-mm-wg-effect-encrypt-13

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual in sec area)
Last updated 2017-11-11 (latest revision 2017-10-11)
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Network Working Group                                        K. Moriarty
Internet-Draft                                                  Dell EMC
Intended status: Informational                                 A. Morton
Expires: April 13, 2018                                        AT&T Labs
                                                        October 10, 2017

              Effect of Pervasive Encryption on Operators
                     draft-mm-wg-effect-encrypt-13

Abstract

   Pervasive Monitoring (PM) attacks on the privacy of Internet users is
   of serious concern to both the user and the operator communities.
   RFC7258 discussed the critical need to protect users' privacy when
   developing IETF specifications and also recognized making networks
   unmanageable to mitigate PM is not an acceptable outcome, an
   appropriate balance is needed.  This document discusses current
   security and network management practices that may be impacted by the
   shift to increased use of encryption to help guide protocol
   development in support of manageable, secure networks.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 13, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

Moriarty & Morton        Expires April 13, 2018                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            Effect of Encryption              October 2017

   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Additional Background on Encryption Changes . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Network Service Provider Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Passive Monitoring  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.1.1.  Traffic Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.1.2.  Troubleshooting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.1.3.  Traffic Analysis Fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.2.  Traffic Optimization and Management . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.2.1.  Load Balancers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.2.2.  Differential Treatment based on Deep Packet
               Inspection (DPI)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.2.3.  Network Congestion Management . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       2.2.4.  Performance-enhancing Proxies . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       2.2.5.  Caching and Content Replication Near the Network Edge  13
       2.2.6.  Content Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.3.  Network Access and Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.3.1.  Content Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       2.3.2.  Network Access and Data Usage . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       2.3.3.  Application Layer Gateways  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       2.3.4.  HTTP Header Insertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   3.  Encryption in Hosting SP Environments . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     3.1.  Management Access Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.1.1.  Customer Access Monitoring  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       3.1.2.  SP Content Monitoring of Applications . . . . . . . .  20
     3.2.  Hosted Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       3.2.1.  Monitoring Managed Applications . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       3.2.2.  Mail Service Providers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     3.3.  Data Storage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.3.1.  Host-level Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       3.3.2.  Disk Encryption, Data at Rest . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
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