Scalable Remote Attestation for Systems, Containers, and Applications
draft-moriarty-attestationsets-01

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IETF                                                         K. Moriarty
Internet-Draft                        Center for Internet Security (CIS)
Intended status: Standards Track                           April 2, 2021
Expires: October 4, 2021

 Scalable Remote Attestation for Systems, Containers, and Applications
                   draft-moriarty-attestationsets-01

Abstract

   This document establishes an architectural pattern whereby a remote
   attestation could be issued for a complete set of benchmarks or
   controls that are defined and grouped by an external entity,
   preventing the need to send over individual attestations for each
   item within a benchmark or control framework.  This document
   establishes a pattern to list sets of benchmarks and controls within
   CWT and JWT formats for use as an Entity Attestation Token (EAT).

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 4, 2021.

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   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Moriarty                 Expires October 4, 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft      draft-moriarty-attestationsets-01         April 2021

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Policy and Measurement Set Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Supportability and Re-Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Configuration Sets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Remediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix B.  Open Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   Attestation from a root of trust (hardware or software), may be
   accomplished via a number of formats.  Some use cases are well
   defined, including the Root of Trust (RoT) (e.g.  Trusted Platfrom
   Module, OpenTitan) and attestation format as well as the specific
   policy and measurement expectations at boot.  Device identity and
   measurements can be attestated at runtime.  The attestations on
   evidence (e.g. hash of boot element) and verification of attestations
   are typically contained within a system and are limited to the
   control plane for management.  The policy and measurement sets for
   comparison are protected to assure the result in the attestation
   verification process for boot element.  Event logs and PCR values may
   be exposed to provide transparency into the verified attestations.
   Remote attestation on systems is intended to provide an assessment of
   posture for all managed systems and across various layers in each of
   these systems in an environment.  This document describes a method to
   use existing attestation formats and protocols while allowing for
   profiles of policies and measurements at defined assurance levels
   that scale to provide transparency to posture assessment results with
   remote attestation.

   There is a balance of exposure and evidence needed to assess posture
   when providing assurance of controls and system state.  Currently,
   logs and TPM PCR values may be passed to provide assurance of
   verification of attestation evidence meeting set requirements.