Scalable Remote Attestation for Systems, Containers, and Applications
draft-moriarty-attestationsets-01
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Kathleen Moriarty
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2021-04-02
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IETF K. Moriarty
Internet-Draft Center for Internet Security (CIS)
Intended status: Standards Track April 2, 2021
Expires: October 4, 2021
Scalable Remote Attestation for Systems, Containers, and Applications
draft-moriarty-attestationsets-01
Abstract
This document establishes an architectural pattern whereby a remote
attestation could be issued for a complete set of benchmarks or
controls that are defined and grouped by an external entity,
preventing the need to send over individual attestations for each
item within a benchmark or control framework. This document
establishes a pattern to list sets of benchmarks and controls within
CWT and JWT formats for use as an Entity Attestation Token (EAT).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 4, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
Moriarty Expires October 4, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft draft-moriarty-attestationsets-01 April 2021
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Policy and Measurement Set Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Supportability and Re-Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Configuration Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Remediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix B. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction
Attestation from a root of trust (hardware or software), may be
accomplished via a number of formats. Some use cases are well
defined, including the Root of Trust (RoT) (e.g. Trusted Platfrom
Module, OpenTitan) and attestation format as well as the specific
policy and measurement expectations at boot. Device identity and
measurements can be attestated at runtime. The attestations on
evidence (e.g. hash of boot element) and verification of attestations
are typically contained within a system and are limited to the
control plane for management. The policy and measurement sets for
comparison are protected to assure the result in the attestation
verification process for boot element. Event logs and PCR values may
be exposed to provide transparency into the verified attestations.
Remote attestation on systems is intended to provide an assessment of
posture for all managed systems and across various layers in each of
these systems in an environment. This document describes a method to
use existing attestation formats and protocols while allowing for
profiles of policies and measurements at defined assurance levels
that scale to provide transparency to posture assessment results with
remote attestation.
There is a balance of exposure and evidence needed to assess posture
when providing assurance of controls and system state. Currently,
logs and TPM PCR values may be passed to provide assurance of
verification of attestation evidence meeting set requirements.
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