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Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages

The information below is for an old version of the document that is already published as an RFC.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 6046.
Authors Kathleen Moriarty , Brian Trammell
Last updated 2013-03-02 (Latest revision 2010-06-30)
Replaces draft-moriarty-post-inch-rid-soap
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Intended RFC status Historic
Stream WG state (None)
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state Became RFC 6046 (Informational)
Action Holders
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD Sean Turner
Send notices to (None)
INCH Working Group                                           K. Moriarty
Internet-Draft                                                       RSA
Intended status: Informational                               B. Trammell
Expires: January 1, 2011                                      ETH Zurich
                                                           June 30, 2010

      Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages


   The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) defines a
   common XML format for document exchange, and Realtime Internetwork
   Defense (RID) defines extensions to IODEF intended for the
   cooperative handling of security incidents within consortia of
   network operators and enterprises.  This document specifies a
   transport protocol for RID based upon the passing of RID messages
   over HTTP/TLS.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 1, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must

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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) [RFC5070]
   describes an XML document format for the purpose of exchanging data
   between Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) or those
   responsible for security incident handling for network providers
   (NPs).  The defined document format provides an easy way for CSIRTs
   to exchange data in a way which can be easily parsed.

   IODEF defines a message format, not a transport protocol, as the
   sharing of messages is assumed to be out of scope in order to allow
   CSIRTs to exchange and store messages in a way most suited to their
   established incident handling processes.  However, Real-time Inter-
   network Defense (RID) [I-D.moriarty-post-inch-rid] do require a
   specification of a transport protocol to ensure interoperability
   among members in a RID consortium.  This document specifies the
   transport of RID messages within HTTP [RFC2616] Request and Response
   messages transported over TLS [RFC5246] (herein, HTTP/TLS).  Note
   that any IODEF message may also be transported using this mechanism,
   by sending it as a RID Report message.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Transmission of RID Messages over HTTP/TLS

   This section specifies the details of the transport of RID messages
   over HTTP/TLS.  In this arrangement, each RID server is both an HTTP/
   TLS server and an HTTP/TLS Client.  When a RID message must be sent,
   the sending RID system connects to the receiving RID system and sends
   the message, optionally receiving a message in reply.  All RID
   systems MUST be prepared to accept HTTP/TLS connections from any RID
   peer with which it communicates, in order to support callback for
   delayed replies (see below).

   BCP 56 [RFC3205] contains a number of important considerations when
   using HTTP for application protocols.  These include the size of the
   payload for the application, whether the application will use a web

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   browser, whether the protocol should be defined on a port other than
   80, and if the security provided through HTTP/TLS suits the needs of
   the new application.

   It is acknowledged within the scope of these concerns that HTTP/TLS
   is not ideally suited for RID transport, as the former is a client-
   server protocol and the latter a message-exchange protocol; however,
   the ease of implementation of RID systems over HTTP/TLS outweighs
   these concerns.  Consistent with BCP 56, RID systems will listen for
   TCP connections on port [IANA NOTE: assigned port goes here].  Every
   RID system participating in a consortium MUST listen for HTTP/TLS
   connections on the assigned port.

   All RID messages sent in HTTP Requests MUST be sent using the POST
   with a Request-URI of /; additional Request-URI paths are reserved
   for future use by RID.

   Table 1 lists the allowable RID message types in an HTTP Response for
   a given RID message type in the Request.  A RID system MUST be
   prepared to handle an HTTP Response of the given type(s) when sending
   the corresponding HTTP Request.  A RID system MUST NOT send an HTTP
   Response containing any RID message other than the one corresponding
   to the one sent in the HTTP Request.

   As the queries and replies in a RID message exchange may be
   significantly separated in time, the receiving RID system MAY return
   202 Accepted, terminate the connection, and connect to the requesting
   RID system and sending the RID reply in an HTTP Request at a later
   time.  This mechanism is referred to in this document as "RID
   callback".  When performing RID callback, a responding system MUST
   connect to the network- and transport-layer addresses from which the
   original request was sent; there is no mechanism in RID for
   redirected callback.

   While a RID system SHOULD return the reply in an HTTP Response if it
   is available immediately or within a generally accepted HTTP client
   time out (about thirty seconds), this is not mandatory, and as such
   RID systems MUST be prepared for a query to be met with a 202
   Accepted, an empty Response body, a connection termination and a
   callback.  Note that all RID messages require a response from the
   receiving RID system, so a sending RID system can expect either an
   immediate response or a callback.

   RID systems accepting a callback message in an HTTP Request MUST
   return 202 Accepted.

   Table 1 lists the allowable request/response pairs for RID.

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    | Request RID type     | Callback | Result | Response RID type    |
    | TraceRequest         |          | 200    | RequestAuthorization |
    | TraceRequest         |          | 200    | Result               |
    | TraceRequest         |          | 202    | [empty]              |
    | RequestAuthorization |     X    | 202    | [empty]              |
    | Result               |     X    | 202    | [empty]              |
    | Investigation        |          | 200    | Result               |
    | Investigation        |          | 202    | [empty]              |
    | Report               |     X    | 202    | [empty]              |
    | IncidentQuery        |          | 200    | Report               |
    | IncidentQuery        |          | 202    | [empty]              |

                                  Table 1

   For security purposes, RID systems SHOULD NOT return 3xx Redirect
   response codes, and MUST NOT follow any 3xx Redirect.  When a RID
   System's address changes, contact point information within the
   consortium must be updated out of band.

   If a RID system receives an improper RID message in an HTTP Request,
   it MUST return an appropriate 4xx Client Error result code to the
   requesting RID system.  If a RID system cannot process a RID message
   received in an HTTP Request due to an error on its own side, it MUST
   return an appropriate 5xx Server Error result code to the requesting
   RID system.

   Note that HTTP provides no mechanism for signaling to a server that a
   response body is not a valid RID message.  If an RID system receives
   and improper RID message in an HTTP Response, or cannot process a RID
   message received in an HTTP Response due to an error on its own side,
   it MUST log the error and present it to the RID system administrator
   for handling; the error logging format is an implementation detail
   and is considered out of scope for this specification.

   RID systems MUST support and SHOULD use HTTP/1.1 persistent
   connections as described in [RFC2616].  RID systems MUST support
   chunked transfer encoding on the HTTP server side to allow the
   implementation of clients that do not need to precalculate message
   sizes before constructing HTTP headers.

   RID systems MUST use TLS for confidentiality, identification, and
   strong mutual authentication as in [RFC2818]; see Section 4 below for

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4.  Security Considerations

   All security considerations of related documents MUST be considered,
   especially the Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)
   [RFC5070] and Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)
   [I-D.moriarty-post-inch-rid].  The transport described herein is
   built on the foundation of these documents; the security
   considerations contained therein are incorporated by reference.

   For transport confidentiality, identification, and authentication,
   TLS with mutual authentication MUST be used to secure the HTTP
   connection as in [RFC2818].  The session MUST use non-NULL cypher
   suites for authentication, integrity, and confidentiality; sessions
   MAY be renegotiated within these constraints.  Although TLS
   implementations typically support the older SSL protocol, a RID peer
   MUST NOT request, offer, or use SSL 2.0 , due to known security
   vulnerabilities in this protocol; see Appendix E of [RFC5246] for

   Each RID consortium SHOULD use a trusted public key infrastructure
   (PKI) to manage identities for RID systems participating in TLS
   connections.  At minimum, each RID system MUST trust a set of X.509
   Issuer identities ("Certificate Authorities") to authenticate RID
   system peers with which it is willing to exchange information, and/or
   a specific white list of X.509 Subject identities of RID system peers

   RID systems MUST provide for the verification of the identity of a
   RID system peer presenting a valid and trusted certificate, by
   verifying the fully qualified domain name or other network-layer
   identifier against that stored in the certificate, if available.
   More information on best practices in peer identity verification is
   available in [I-D.saintandre-tls-server-id-check].

5.  IANA Considerations

   Consistent with BCP 56 [RFC3205], since RID over HTTP/TLS is a
   substantially new service, and should be controlled at the consortium
   member network's border differently than HTTP/TLS, it requires a new
   port number.  IANA has assigned port [IANA NOTE: assign port number
   here]/tcp to RID with service name [IANA NOTE: assign service name
   here; request 'rid'] over HTTP/TLS.

6.  References

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6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

   [RFC5070]  Danyliw, R., Meijer, J., and Y. Demchenko, "The Incident
              Object Description Exchange Format", RFC 5070,
              December 2007.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

              Moriarty, K., "Real-time Inter-network Defense",
              draft-moriarty-post-inch-rid-11 (work in progress),
              April 2010.

6.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3205]  Moore, K., "On the use of HTTP as a Substrate", BCP 56,
              RFC 3205, February 2002.

              Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Server Identity
              in Certificates Used with Transport Layer Security",
              draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-06 (work in
              progress), June 2010.

Authors' Addresses

   Kathleen M. Moriarty
   RSA, The Security Division of EMC
   174 Middlesex Turnpike
   Bedford MA  01730
   United States


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   Brian H. Trammell
   Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich
   Gloriastrasse 35
   8092 Zurich

   Phone: +41 44 632 70 13

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