Recommendations for Authoritative Servers Operators
draft-moura-dnsop-authoritative-recommendations-01

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Last updated 2018-12-20
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DNSOP Working Group                                             G. Moura
Internet-Draft                                        SIDN Labs/TU Delft
Intended status: Informational                               W. Hardaker
Expires: June 23, 2019                                      J. Heidemann
                                      USC/Information Sciences Institute
                                                               M. Davids
                                                               SIDN Labs
                                                       December 20, 2018

          Recommendations for Authoritative Servers Operators
           draft-moura-dnsop-authoritative-recommendations-01

Abstract

   This document summarizes recent research work exploring DNS
   configurations and offers specific, tangible recommendations to
   operators for configuring authoritative servers.

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

Ed note

   Text inside square brackets ([RF:ABC]) refers to individual comments
   we have received about the draft, and enumerated under
   <https://github.com/gmmoura/draft-moura-dnsop-authoritative-
   recommendations/blob/master/reviews/reviews-dnsop.md>.  They will be
   removed before publication.

   This draft is being hosted on GitHub - <https://github.com/gmmoura/
   draft-moura-dnsop-authoritative-recommendations>, where the most
   recent version of the document and open issues can be found.  The
   authors gratefully accept pull requests.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any

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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 23, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  R1:  Use equaly strong IP anycast in every authoritative
       server to achieve even load distribution  . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  R2: Routing Can Matter More Than Locations  . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  R3: Collecting Detailed Anycast Catchment Maps Ahead of
       Actual Deployment Can Improve Engineering Designs . . . . . .   6
   5.  R4: When under stress, employ two strategies  . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  R5: Consider longer time-to-live values whenever possible . .   9
   7.  R6: Shared Infrastructure Risks Collateral Damage During
       Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   The domain name system (DNS) has main two types of DNS servers:
   authoritative servers and recursive resolvers.  Figure 1 shows their
   relationship.  An authoritative server knows the content of a DNS
   zone from local knowledge, and thus can answer queries about that
   zone needing to query other servers [RFC2181].  A recursive resolver
   is a program that extracts information from name servers in response

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   to client requests [RFC1034].  A client, in Figure 1, is shown as
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