Broadening the Scope of Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Protocol
draft-mrossberg-ipsecme-multiple-sequence-counters-02
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Rossberg , Steffen Klassert , Michael Pfeiffer | ||
| Last updated | 2024-08-18 (Latest revision 2024-02-15) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
There are certain use cases where the Encapusalating Security Payload (ESP) protocol in its current form cannot reach its maximum potential regarding security, features and performance. Although these scenarios are quite different, the shortcomings could be remedied by three measures: Introducing more fine-grained sub-child-SAs, adapting the ESP header and trailer format, and allowing parts of the transport layer header to be unencrypted. These mechanisms are neither completely interdependent, nor are they entirely orthogonal, as the implementation of one measure does influence the integration of another. Although an independent specification and implementation of these mechanisms is possible, it may be worthwhile to consider a combined solution to avoid a combinatorial explosion of optional features. Therefore, this document does not yet propose a specific change to ESP. Instead, explains the relevant scenarios, details possible modifications of the protocol, collects arguments for (and against) these changes, and discusses their implications.
Authors
Michael Rossberg
Steffen Klassert
Michael Pfeiffer
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)