OAuth Actor Chain: Overview and Design
draft-mw-oauth-actor-chain-overview-01
This document is an Internet-Draft (I-D).
Anyone may submit an I-D to the IETF.
This I-D is not endorsed by the IETF and has no formal standing in the
IETF standards process.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | A Prasad , Ramki Krishnan , Diego Lopez , Srinivasa Addepalli , Suresh Krishnan | ||
| Last updated | 2026-11-01 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-mw-oauth-actor-chain-overview-01
OAuth A. Prasad
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Informational R. Krishnan
Expires: 5 May 2027
D. Lopez
S. Addepalli
S. Krishnan
1 November 2026
OAuth Actor Chain: Overview and Design
draft-mw-oauth-actor-chain-overview-01
Abstract
A request can pass through several services before reaching an API.
OAuth Token Exchange can represent an actor history in nested act
claims. It leaves the rules for constructing that history, limiting
its disclosure, and verifying an actor's own signature to additional
profiles. Actor Chain proposes those rules while keeping the
Authorization Server responsible for issuing tokens and applying
policy.
This document provides an overview of the authors' Actor Chain
proposal, whose Internet-Draft lineage began in SPICE in February
2026. The companion OAuth Actor Chain: Protocol and Interoperability
specification continues the existing OAuth draft series and defines
wire formats and processing requirements.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 May 2027.
Prasad, et al. Expires 5 May 2027 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft ACTOR-CHAIN-OVERVIEW November 2026
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Illustrative Workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Assurance and Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Token Claims and Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Evidence Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Deployment Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Cross-Domain Preservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Questions for IETF Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. Design Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
Applications delegate requests across services. Each receiving
service authorizes calls and may need actor identities, participation
evidence, and disclosure policy. Actors are services or agents
acting for the token's subject.
OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange [RFC8693] can represent history in nested
act claims. The Authorization Server (AS) decides whether to include
it. Under RFC 8693 Section 4.1, access control considers top-level
claims and the current actor; earlier actors are informational.
The Actor Chain proposal specifies history construction, disclosure,
and verification. A workflow is a sequence of related authorization
transitions. The AS authenticates each new actor, checks authority,
and issues the next token.
Prasad, et al. Expires 5 May 2027 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft ACTOR-CHAIN-OVERVIEW November 2026
The companion protocol specification, [ACTOR-CHAIN-PROTOCOL], defines
the implementation and interoperability requirements.
1.1. Motivation
A receiving service may trust its immediate caller but still need to
know which earlier services participated in the request. Different
recipients need different parts of that history. These examples
illustrate why:
+==============+================================================+
| Disclosure | Example authorization need |
+==============+================================================+
| "Full" | A production executor checks the initiating |
| | planner and immediate policy broker. The |
| | release gateway additionally checks the |
| | executor and accepted route through all three. |
+--------------+------------------------------------------------+
| "Subset" | A connector checks the request agent and |
| | planner. The repository checks the agent and |
| | connector without needing the planner's |
| | identity. |
+--------------+------------------------------------------------+
| "Actor-Only" | An external payroll API authorizes the |
| | registered payroll connector without learning |
| | the identities of the internal HR agents that |
| | prepared the request. |
+--------------+------------------------------------------------+
Table 1
Each recipient applies normal OAuth authorization and its configured
evidence policy. Earlier identities in nested act remain
informational; any required direct verification uses the applicable
actor evidence. Participation does not prove business approval or
successful execution.
Workflow accountability is a separate need. Retained records can
help an authorized auditor correlate accepted actor steps across a
workflow, even when an individual resource needs only its immediate
caller.
2. Illustrative Workflow
For a report request, orchestrator A asks planner B to select
documents; B invokes connector C, which retrieves records from API D.
Prasad, et al. Expires 5 May 2027 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft ACTOR-CHAIN-OVERVIEW November 2026
For illustration, A/B use Agent2Agent (A2A) [A2A-SPEC], B/C use
remote Model Context Protocol (MCP) [MCP-AUTH], and D runs on
Kubernetes. These are optional deployment choices.
A orchestrator --A2A--> B planner
B planner --MCP--> C connector --HTTPS--> D document API
With exchange permissions configured, A obtains a token for B; B
exchanges it for a token addressed to C, and C exchanges that for one
addressed to D. Each exchange records its requesting actor; each
receiver checks its token. Reusing a token for status checks adds no
step.
For "Verified" assurance, C signs an actor proof that requests access
to D and identifies B's accepted step as its predecessor. The AS
checks the proof and authority, then signs an acceptance. C signs
the request; the AS signs its acceptance.
3. Assurance and Disclosure
*Assurance models:*
* *Declared:* The Authorization Server asserts actor-chain history
and continuity.
* *Verified:* Each actor signs its transition request, and the AS
signs an acceptance. Evidence coverage determines which actor
signatures and links the recipient independently verifies.
*Disclosure* determines what actor history is visible to the
recipient, while assurance determines how that history is
substantiated. Verified assurance does not require the recipient to
see or independently verify the complete chain.
For the A -> B -> C -> D illustrative workflow:
+============+========================+======================+
| Disclosure | History visible to D | Assurance |
+============+========================+======================+
| Full | A, B, C | Declared or Verified |
+------------+------------------------+----------------------+
| Subset | A and C (illustrative, | Declared or Verified |
| | if authorized) | |
+------------+------------------------+----------------------+
| Actor-Only | C | Declared or Verified |
+------------+------------------------+----------------------+
Table 2
Prasad, et al. Expires 5 May 2027 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft ACTOR-CHAIN-OVERVIEW November 2026
One of the six assurance/disclosure profiles is selected at workflow
start and remains fixed. A disclosed subset such as A/C does not
establish adjacency or the absence of intervening actors.
4. Token Claims and Example
This example uses "Verified" assurance and "Actor-Only" disclosure:
+=======+======================================================+
| Claim | Meaning in C's token for D |
+=======+======================================================+
| sub | The party or context represented by the workflow |
+-------+------------------------------------------------------+
| aud | The intended recipient, D |
+-------+------------------------------------------------------+
| actp | The profile: verified-actor-only |
+-------+------------------------------------------------------+
| acti | A random identifier shared by this workflow's tokens |
+-------+------------------------------------------------------+
| act | C's identity: issuer and subject pair |
+-------+------------------------------------------------------+
| actc | The AS-signed acceptance of C's proof |
+-------+------------------------------------------------------+
Table 3
This partial JSON Web Token (JWT) omits issuer, lifetime, token
identifier, and sender binding. Angle brackets mark placeholders.
{
"sub": "workflow-subject-alias",
"aud": ["https://d.example"],
"actp": "verified-actor-only",
"acti": "<random workflow identifier>",
"act": { "iss": "https://actors.example/c", "sub": "C" },
"actc": "<acceptance_C>"
}
<acceptance_C> is the complete AS-signed acceptance JWT encoded as a
string. It contains hashes of C's proof and B's acceptance. These
fingerprints identify exact records without embedding them.
Supplying those records enables substitution checks.
Prasad, et al. Expires 5 May 2027 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft ACTOR-CHAIN-OVERVIEW November 2026
5. Evidence Delivery
D checks the AS's actc; verifying C's signature additionally requires
C's proof. Resources advertise requirements through authenticated
OAuth Protected Resource Metadata [RFC9728]. The optional acte
supplies evidence:
+==========+===================+==============================+
| Field | This example | Alternative |
+==========+===================+==============================+
| coverage | current: C's step | disclosed: actors in act; |
| | | path: complete "Full" path |
+----------+-------------------+------------------------------+
| delivery | inline: inside | introspection: authenticated |
| | the token | AS retrieval [RFC7662] |
+----------+-------------------+------------------------------+
Table 4
For "Subset", disclosed carries one original proof/acceptance pair
per actor occurrence in act. If D requires A/C, it receives and
verifies A/C without B's proof. Another authorized recipient may
receive B's evidence according to its policy. The issuer attests
that selected records belong to this token's accepted path.
Signatures authenticate the signed requests; they do not establish
adjacency across omitted actors. current provides direct verification
only of C's signed request; path independently checks the complete
accepted path.
Inline delivery avoids retrieval but enlarges tokens. Introspection
needs an available endpoint. Missing required evidence or
conflicting disclosure policy causes failure.
Here v=1 identifies the evidence format; <proof_C> is C's signed
access request for D. Each steps entry pairs a proof with its
acceptance:
{
"acte": {
"v": 1,
"coverage": "current",
"delivery": "inline",
"steps": [
{ "proof": "<proof_C>", "acceptance": "<acceptance_C>" }
]
}
}
Prasad, et al. Expires 5 May 2027 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft ACTOR-CHAIN-OVERVIEW November 2026
D requires this acceptance to equal the token's actc value, verifies
both signatures, and matches the acceptance's proof hash to the
supplied proof. Current evidence can hide A/B. current, disclosed,
and path use envelope version 1; each selected signature is checked,
and the final acceptance equals actc. Historical signed targets may
reveal omitted services; conflicting privacy requirements cause
failure.
SD-JWT could supply selective field disclosure in a future encoding
profile [RFC9901]; this version preserves ordinary JWT signatures and
defines no SD-JWT wire format.
6. Deployment Requirements
Clients, ASs, and verifiers need Actor Chain support. Each receiving
service that continues the workflow needs AS authorization to
exchange its inbound token; receiving a sender-bound token does not
transfer the previous actor's key.
When authorization relies on the immediate actor as the live
presenter, MCP's Bearer presentation [MCP-AUTH] needs a compatible
sender constraint, such as explicitly agreed certificate-bound mutual
TLS [RFC8705]. This does not satisfy a resource requirement for
Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP). Kubernetes credentials
[K8S-SA] authenticate workloads without creating actor proofs. The
protocol specification's "Agent and Workload Integration" section
[ACTOR-CHAIN-PROTOCOL] details these requirements. Live
interoperability remains untested.
7. Cross-Domain Preservation
Transfer between ASs preserves accepted state and original signatures
without adding an application actor. The protocol specification's
"Cross-Domain Preservation" section [ACTOR-CHAIN-PROTOCOL] defines
it.
Mapping read to documents.read requires authorization in the
destination domain. An earlier signature still covers read; it does
not attest to the translated meaning. Direct verification of a new
step requires its actor's fresh signature on local values. The same
applies to translated subject and resource names.
Prasad, et al. Expires 5 May 2027 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft ACTOR-CHAIN-OVERVIEW November 2026
8. Security Considerations
With uncompromised actor keys, independently authorized ActorID
bindings, and checked proof-to-acceptance linkage, an AS cannot
fabricate an actor's signed request. Under disclosed coverage, it
can misstate path membership, misapply policy, issue other tokens, or
collude. Evidence does not prove correct execution or faithful
interpretation of user intent.
C's exchange-time signature does not establish who presents the token
now. The protocol specification [ACTOR-CHAIN-PROTOCOL] uses
Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP) [RFC9449] to check control
of the token-bound key. Other sender-binding mechanisms need
explicit agreement.
Exact retries reuse one acceptance. Separate requests can branch;
one verified path does not prove uniqueness. Full evidence reveals
relationships and timing; workflow identifiers permit correlation.
Historical verification needs retained proofs and key history.
Introspection and replay state add live dependencies.
9. Questions for IETF Review
1. Do these use cases justify a common contract beyond RFC 8693?
2. Does issuer-attested membership meet Subset authorization needs?
3. Are disclosure requirements and recipient policy boundaries
sufficient?
4. Are the trust assumptions and assurance limits for cross-domain
mappings clearly specified?
10. Design Evolution
The authors' SPICE -00 (25 February 2026) carried actor signatures in
self-attested tokens [SPICE-ACTOR-CHAIN-00]. SPICE -01 (16 March
2026) moved them to exchange-time proofs with hash-linked AS
acceptances [SPICE-ACTOR-CHAIN-01]. OAuth -01 (15 June 2026)
continued this work [OAUTH-ACTOR-CHAIN-01]. The companion protocol
-03 continues that series and specifies evidence delivery.
11. IANA Considerations
This overview requests no IANA action. Registration requests are
defined in [ACTOR-CHAIN-PROTOCOL].
12. Informative References
Prasad, et al. Expires 5 May 2027 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft ACTOR-CHAIN-OVERVIEW November 2026
[A2A-SPEC] A2A Project, "Agent2Agent Protocol Specification, version
1.0.0", <https://a2a-protocol.org/v1.0.0/specification/>.
[ACTOR-CHAIN-PROTOCOL]
Prasad, A., Krishnan, R., Lopez, D., Addepalli, S., and S.
Krishnan, "OAuth Actor Chain: Protocol and
Interoperability", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-mw-oauth-actor-chain-03, 13 October 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mw-oauth-
actor-chain-03>.
[K8S-SA] Kubernetes, "Kubernetes Service Accounts",
<https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/service-
accounts/>.
[MCP-AUTH] Model Context Protocol, "Model Context Protocol
Authorization, revision 2026-07-28",
<https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-
28/basic/authorization>.
[OAUTH-ACTOR-CHAIN-01]
Prasad, A., Krishnan, R., Lopez, D., and S. Addepalli,
"Cryptographically Verifiable Actor Chains for OAuth 2.0
Token Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
mw-oauth-actor-chain-01, 15 June 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mw-oauth-actor-
chain/01/>.
[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.
[RFC8693] Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693>.
[RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T.
Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication
and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8705>.
[RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T.,
Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449,
September 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9449>.
Prasad, et al. Expires 5 May 2027 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft ACTOR-CHAIN-OVERVIEW November 2026
[RFC9728] Jones, M.B., Hunt, P., and A. Parecki, "OAuth 2.0
Protected Resource Metadata", RFC 9728,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9728, April 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9728>.
[RFC9901] Fett, D., Yasuda, K., and B. Campbell, "Selective
Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens", RFC 9901,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9901, November 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9901>.
[SPICE-ACTOR-CHAIN-00]
Prasad, A., Krishnan, R., Lopez, D., and S. Addepalli,
"Cryptographically Verifiable Actor Chain for OAuth 2.0
Token Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
mw-spice-actor-chain-00, 25 February 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mw-spice-actor-
chain/00/>.
[SPICE-ACTOR-CHAIN-01]
Prasad, A., Krishnan, R., Lopez, D., and S. Addepalli,
"Cryptographically Verifiable Actor Chains for OAuth 2.0
Token Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
mw-spice-actor-chain-01, 16 March 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mw-spice-actor-
chain/01/>.
Authors' Addresses
A Prasad
Email: ap1729@gmail.com
Ram Krishnan
Email: ramkri123@gmail.com
Diego R. Lopez
Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com
Srinivasa Addepalli
Email: srinivasa.addepalli@aryaka.com
Suresh Krishnan
Email: suresh.krishnan@gmail.com
Prasad, et al. Expires 5 May 2027 [Page 10]