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OAuth Actor Chain: Overview and Design
draft-mw-oauth-actor-chain-overview-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors A Prasad , Ramki Krishnan , Diego Lopez , Srinivasa Addepalli , Suresh Krishnan
Last updated 2026-11-01
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draft-mw-oauth-actor-chain-overview-01
OAuth                                                          A. Prasad
Internet-Draft                                                          
Intended status: Informational                               R. Krishnan
Expires: 5 May 2027                                                     
                                                                D. Lopez
                                                                        
                                                            S. Addepalli
                                                                        
                                                             S. Krishnan
                                                         1 November 2026

                 OAuth Actor Chain: Overview and Design
                 draft-mw-oauth-actor-chain-overview-01

Abstract

   A request can pass through several services before reaching an API.
   OAuth Token Exchange can represent an actor history in nested act
   claims.  It leaves the rules for constructing that history, limiting
   its disclosure, and verifying an actor's own signature to additional
   profiles.  Actor Chain proposes those rules while keeping the
   Authorization Server responsible for issuing tokens and applying
   policy.

   This document provides an overview of the authors' Actor Chain
   proposal, whose Internet-Draft lineage began in SPICE in February
   2026.  The companion OAuth Actor Chain: Protocol and Interoperability
   specification continues the existing OAuth draft series and defines
   wire formats and processing requirements.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 May 2027.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Illustrative Workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Assurance and Disclosure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Token Claims and Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Evidence Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Deployment Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Cross-Domain Preservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Questions for IETF Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. Design Evolution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   12. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   Applications delegate requests across services.  Each receiving
   service authorizes calls and may need actor identities, participation
   evidence, and disclosure policy.  Actors are services or agents
   acting for the token's subject.

   OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange [RFC8693] can represent history in nested
   act claims.  The Authorization Server (AS) decides whether to include
   it.  Under RFC 8693 Section 4.1, access control considers top-level
   claims and the current actor; earlier actors are informational.

   The Actor Chain proposal specifies history construction, disclosure,
   and verification.  A workflow is a sequence of related authorization
   transitions.  The AS authenticates each new actor, checks authority,
   and issues the next token.

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   The companion protocol specification, [ACTOR-CHAIN-PROTOCOL], defines
   the implementation and interoperability requirements.

1.1.  Motivation

   A receiving service may trust its immediate caller but still need to
   know which earlier services participated in the request.  Different
   recipients need different parts of that history.  These examples
   illustrate why:

     +==============+================================================+
     | Disclosure   | Example authorization need                     |
     +==============+================================================+
     | "Full"       | A production executor checks the initiating    |
     |              | planner and immediate policy broker.  The      |
     |              | release gateway additionally checks the        |
     |              | executor and accepted route through all three. |
     +--------------+------------------------------------------------+
     | "Subset"     | A connector checks the request agent and       |
     |              | planner.  The repository checks the agent and  |
     |              | connector without needing the planner's        |
     |              | identity.                                      |
     +--------------+------------------------------------------------+
     | "Actor-Only" | An external payroll API authorizes the         |
     |              | registered payroll connector without learning  |
     |              | the identities of the internal HR agents that  |
     |              | prepared the request.                          |
     +--------------+------------------------------------------------+

                                  Table 1

   Each recipient applies normal OAuth authorization and its configured
   evidence policy.  Earlier identities in nested act remain
   informational; any required direct verification uses the applicable
   actor evidence.  Participation does not prove business approval or
   successful execution.

   Workflow accountability is a separate need.  Retained records can
   help an authorized auditor correlate accepted actor steps across a
   workflow, even when an individual resource needs only its immediate
   caller.

2.  Illustrative Workflow

   For a report request, orchestrator A asks planner B to select
   documents; B invokes connector C, which retrieves records from API D.

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   For illustration, A/B use Agent2Agent (A2A) [A2A-SPEC], B/C use
   remote Model Context Protocol (MCP) [MCP-AUTH], and D runs on
   Kubernetes.  These are optional deployment choices.

   A orchestrator --A2A--> B planner
   B planner --MCP--> C connector --HTTPS--> D document API

   With exchange permissions configured, A obtains a token for B; B
   exchanges it for a token addressed to C, and C exchanges that for one
   addressed to D.  Each exchange records its requesting actor; each
   receiver checks its token.  Reusing a token for status checks adds no
   step.

   For "Verified" assurance, C signs an actor proof that requests access
   to D and identifies B's accepted step as its predecessor.  The AS
   checks the proof and authority, then signs an acceptance.  C signs
   the request; the AS signs its acceptance.

3.  Assurance and Disclosure

   *Assurance models:*

   *  *Declared:* The Authorization Server asserts actor-chain history
      and continuity.

   *  *Verified:* Each actor signs its transition request, and the AS
      signs an acceptance.  Evidence coverage determines which actor
      signatures and links the recipient independently verifies.

   *Disclosure* determines what actor history is visible to the
   recipient, while assurance determines how that history is
   substantiated.  Verified assurance does not require the recipient to
   see or independently verify the complete chain.

   For the A -> B -> C -> D illustrative workflow:

      +============+========================+======================+
      | Disclosure | History visible to D   | Assurance            |
      +============+========================+======================+
      | Full       | A, B, C                | Declared or Verified |
      +------------+------------------------+----------------------+
      | Subset     | A and C (illustrative, | Declared or Verified |
      |            | if authorized)         |                      |
      +------------+------------------------+----------------------+
      | Actor-Only | C                      | Declared or Verified |
      +------------+------------------------+----------------------+

                                 Table 2

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   One of the six assurance/disclosure profiles is selected at workflow
   start and remains fixed.  A disclosed subset such as A/C does not
   establish adjacency or the absence of intervening actors.

4.  Token Claims and Example

   This example uses "Verified" assurance and "Actor-Only" disclosure:

     +=======+======================================================+
     | Claim | Meaning in C's token for D                           |
     +=======+======================================================+
     | sub   | The party or context represented by the workflow     |
     +-------+------------------------------------------------------+
     | aud   | The intended recipient, D                            |
     +-------+------------------------------------------------------+
     | actp  | The profile: verified-actor-only                     |
     +-------+------------------------------------------------------+
     | acti  | A random identifier shared by this workflow's tokens |
     +-------+------------------------------------------------------+
     | act   | C's identity: issuer and subject pair                |
     +-------+------------------------------------------------------+
     | actc  | The AS-signed acceptance of C's proof                |
     +-------+------------------------------------------------------+

                                 Table 3

   This partial JSON Web Token (JWT) omits issuer, lifetime, token
   identifier, and sender binding.  Angle brackets mark placeholders.

   {
     "sub": "workflow-subject-alias",
     "aud": ["https://d.example"],
     "actp": "verified-actor-only",
     "acti": "<random workflow identifier>",
     "act": { "iss": "https://actors.example/c", "sub": "C" },
     "actc": "<acceptance_C>"
   }

   <acceptance_C> is the complete AS-signed acceptance JWT encoded as a
   string.  It contains hashes of C's proof and B's acceptance.  These
   fingerprints identify exact records without embedding them.
   Supplying those records enables substitution checks.

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5.  Evidence Delivery

   D checks the AS's actc; verifying C's signature additionally requires
   C's proof.  Resources advertise requirements through authenticated
   OAuth Protected Resource Metadata [RFC9728].  The optional acte
   supplies evidence:

      +==========+===================+==============================+
      | Field    | This example      | Alternative                  |
      +==========+===================+==============================+
      | coverage | current: C's step | disclosed: actors in act;    |
      |          |                   | path: complete "Full" path   |
      +----------+-------------------+------------------------------+
      | delivery | inline: inside    | introspection: authenticated |
      |          | the token         | AS retrieval [RFC7662]       |
      +----------+-------------------+------------------------------+

                                  Table 4

   For "Subset", disclosed carries one original proof/acceptance pair
   per actor occurrence in act.  If D requires A/C, it receives and
   verifies A/C without B's proof.  Another authorized recipient may
   receive B's evidence according to its policy.  The issuer attests
   that selected records belong to this token's accepted path.
   Signatures authenticate the signed requests; they do not establish
   adjacency across omitted actors. current provides direct verification
   only of C's signed request; path independently checks the complete
   accepted path.

   Inline delivery avoids retrieval but enlarges tokens.  Introspection
   needs an available endpoint.  Missing required evidence or
   conflicting disclosure policy causes failure.

   Here v=1 identifies the evidence format; <proof_C> is C's signed
   access request for D.  Each steps entry pairs a proof with its
   acceptance:

   {
     "acte": {
       "v": 1,
       "coverage": "current",
       "delivery": "inline",
       "steps": [
         { "proof": "<proof_C>", "acceptance": "<acceptance_C>" }
       ]
     }
   }

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   D requires this acceptance to equal the token's actc value, verifies
   both signatures, and matches the acceptance's proof hash to the
   supplied proof.  Current evidence can hide A/B. current, disclosed,
   and path use envelope version 1; each selected signature is checked,
   and the final acceptance equals actc.  Historical signed targets may
   reveal omitted services; conflicting privacy requirements cause
   failure.

   SD-JWT could supply selective field disclosure in a future encoding
   profile [RFC9901]; this version preserves ordinary JWT signatures and
   defines no SD-JWT wire format.

6.  Deployment Requirements

   Clients, ASs, and verifiers need Actor Chain support.  Each receiving
   service that continues the workflow needs AS authorization to
   exchange its inbound token; receiving a sender-bound token does not
   transfer the previous actor's key.

   When authorization relies on the immediate actor as the live
   presenter, MCP's Bearer presentation [MCP-AUTH] needs a compatible
   sender constraint, such as explicitly agreed certificate-bound mutual
   TLS [RFC8705].  This does not satisfy a resource requirement for
   Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP).  Kubernetes credentials
   [K8S-SA] authenticate workloads without creating actor proofs.  The
   protocol specification's "Agent and Workload Integration" section
   [ACTOR-CHAIN-PROTOCOL] details these requirements.  Live
   interoperability remains untested.

7.  Cross-Domain Preservation

   Transfer between ASs preserves accepted state and original signatures
   without adding an application actor.  The protocol specification's
   "Cross-Domain Preservation" section [ACTOR-CHAIN-PROTOCOL] defines
   it.

   Mapping read to documents.read requires authorization in the
   destination domain.  An earlier signature still covers read; it does
   not attest to the translated meaning.  Direct verification of a new
   step requires its actor's fresh signature on local values.  The same
   applies to translated subject and resource names.

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8.  Security Considerations

   With uncompromised actor keys, independently authorized ActorID
   bindings, and checked proof-to-acceptance linkage, an AS cannot
   fabricate an actor's signed request.  Under disclosed coverage, it
   can misstate path membership, misapply policy, issue other tokens, or
   collude.  Evidence does not prove correct execution or faithful
   interpretation of user intent.

   C's exchange-time signature does not establish who presents the token
   now.  The protocol specification [ACTOR-CHAIN-PROTOCOL] uses
   Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP) [RFC9449] to check control
   of the token-bound key.  Other sender-binding mechanisms need
   explicit agreement.

   Exact retries reuse one acceptance.  Separate requests can branch;
   one verified path does not prove uniqueness.  Full evidence reveals
   relationships and timing; workflow identifiers permit correlation.
   Historical verification needs retained proofs and key history.
   Introspection and replay state add live dependencies.

9.  Questions for IETF Review

   1.  Do these use cases justify a common contract beyond RFC 8693?

   2.  Does issuer-attested membership meet Subset authorization needs?

   3.  Are disclosure requirements and recipient policy boundaries
       sufficient?

   4.  Are the trust assumptions and assurance limits for cross-domain
       mappings clearly specified?

10.  Design Evolution

   The authors' SPICE -00 (25 February 2026) carried actor signatures in
   self-attested tokens [SPICE-ACTOR-CHAIN-00].  SPICE -01 (16 March
   2026) moved them to exchange-time proofs with hash-linked AS
   acceptances [SPICE-ACTOR-CHAIN-01].  OAuth -01 (15 June 2026)
   continued this work [OAUTH-ACTOR-CHAIN-01].  The companion protocol
   -03 continues that series and specifies evidence delivery.

11.  IANA Considerations

   This overview requests no IANA action.  Registration requests are
   defined in [ACTOR-CHAIN-PROTOCOL].

12.  Informative References

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   [A2A-SPEC] A2A Project, "Agent2Agent Protocol Specification, version
              1.0.0", <https://a2a-protocol.org/v1.0.0/specification/>.

   [ACTOR-CHAIN-PROTOCOL]
              Prasad, A., Krishnan, R., Lopez, D., Addepalli, S., and S.
              Krishnan, "OAuth Actor Chain: Protocol and
              Interoperability", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-mw-oauth-actor-chain-03, 13 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mw-oauth-
              actor-chain-03>.

   [K8S-SA]   Kubernetes, "Kubernetes Service Accounts",
              <https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/service-
              accounts/>.

   [MCP-AUTH] Model Context Protocol, "Model Context Protocol
              Authorization, revision 2026-07-28",
              <https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-
              28/basic/authorization>.

   [OAUTH-ACTOR-CHAIN-01]
              Prasad, A., Krishnan, R., Lopez, D., and S. Addepalli,
              "Cryptographically Verifiable Actor Chains for OAuth 2.0
              Token Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              mw-oauth-actor-chain-01, 15 June 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mw-oauth-actor-
              chain/01/>.

   [RFC7662]  Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
              RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.

   [RFC8693]  Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
              and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693>.

   [RFC8705]  Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T.
              Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication
              and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8705>.

   [RFC9449]  Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T.,
              Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
              Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449,
              September 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9449>.

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   [RFC9728]  Jones, M.B., Hunt, P., and A. Parecki, "OAuth 2.0
              Protected Resource Metadata", RFC 9728,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9728, April 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9728>.

   [RFC9901]  Fett, D., Yasuda, K., and B. Campbell, "Selective
              Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens", RFC 9901,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9901, November 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9901>.

   [SPICE-ACTOR-CHAIN-00]
              Prasad, A., Krishnan, R., Lopez, D., and S. Addepalli,
              "Cryptographically Verifiable Actor Chain for OAuth 2.0
              Token Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              mw-spice-actor-chain-00, 25 February 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mw-spice-actor-
              chain/00/>.

   [SPICE-ACTOR-CHAIN-01]
              Prasad, A., Krishnan, R., Lopez, D., and S. Addepalli,
              "Cryptographically Verifiable Actor Chains for OAuth 2.0
              Token Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              mw-spice-actor-chain-01, 16 March 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mw-spice-actor-
              chain/01/>.

Authors' Addresses

   A Prasad
   Email: ap1729@gmail.com

   Ram Krishnan
   Email: ramkri123@gmail.com

   Diego R. Lopez
   Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com

   Srinivasa Addepalli
   Email: srinivasa.addepalli@aryaka.com

   Suresh Krishnan
   Email: suresh.krishnan@gmail.com

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