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Message Binding for Workload Proof Tokens
draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Suhas Nandakumar , Cullen Fluffy Jennings
Last updated 2026-11-16
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draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding-00
Workload Identity in Multi System Environments             S. Nandakumar
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track                             C. Jennings
Expires: 20 May 2027                                       Cisco Systems
                                                        16 November 2026

               Message Binding for Workload Proof Tokens
             draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-binding-00

Abstract

   The WIMSE Workload Proof Token (WPT) proves possession of a
   workload's key for an HTTP request and binds the tokens that travel
   with it.  Agent protocols increasingly carry their messages over
   other transports, such as Media over QUIC, WebSocket, or QUIC
   streams, often through intermediaries that terminate TLS, such as
   relays, message brokers, or gateways.  There, a proof has no HTTP
   request to bind to, and the intermediaries that forward a message do
   not verify it, so freshness has to be established by the receiving
   verifier.  This document defines how a WPT is used with a message
   that carries it, adds a claim that binds the proof to the content of
   that message and a claim that echoes a nonce supplied by the
   verifier, and defines a registry of message canonicalization
   profiles, with a profile for JSON messages.  The same claims can be
   used in an SD-JWT Key Binding JWT.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nandakumar-wimse-wpt-message-
   binding/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Workload Identity in
   Multi System Environments Working Group mailing list
   (mailto:wimse@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/wimse/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/wimse/.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Carrying a WPT in a Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  On an HTTP Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  The mth Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  The nonce Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Canonicalization Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  json-jcs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.2.  HTTP Header Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Use in SD-JWT Key Binding JWTs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Relationship to Other Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     10.1.  JSON Web Token Claims  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     10.2.  WIMSE Message Canonicalization Profiles  . . . . . . . .   9
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

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   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   A Workload Proof Token [WIMSE-WPT] is a short-lived JWT, signed with
   the key confirmed by a Workload Identity Token (WIT) [WIMSE-CREDS],
   that a workload attaches to an HTTP request.  It binds the request's
   target through aud; the WIT through wth; a Transaction Token
   [TXN-TOKENS] through tth; and other tokens that carry end-user
   identity or authorization context through oth (Section 2 of
   [WIMSE-WPT]).  It does not bind the request content, and it relies on
   jti and a short lifetime against replay.  Bindings for non-HTTP
   protocols are left to future specifications (Section 1 of
   [WIMSE-WPT]).

   Agent protocols need such a binding for messages that are not HTTP
   requests.  An agent sends a control message, such as a request to
   open a delegated dialog or a signed approval, on a stream or track,
   and the message travels through intermediaries that terminate TLS,
   such as the relays of Media over QUIC Transport [MOQT].  The receiver
   needs to know that the workload holding the key sent this message,
   not a different one with the same credentials attached, and that the
   proof is fresh.  Agent dialog binding [DIALOG-BINDING] meets the same
   need for HTTP with the dth claim, which hashes the HTTP Dialog-
   Context field.

   This document generalizes that approach to any message:

   *  Section 2 says how a WPT travels inside a message and what its aud
      is when there is no HTTP target URI.

   *  mth (Section 3) is the hash of the message the WPT travels in,
      computed under a named canonicalization profile.

   *  nonce (Section 4) echoes a value the verifier supplied, so that a
      verifier establishes freshness itself, without relying on the
      intermediaries that forward the message.

   *  Section 5 defines the registry of canonicalization profiles and
      one generic profile for JSON messages.  Other documents can define
      profiles for other message formats.

   A binding for a particular message format defines only a profile.
   This document defines everything else a verifier needs: the claim,
   how a WPT is carried and addressed outside HTTP, freshness, and the
   registry that bindings use.

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   The binding is generic: an HTTP request body is also a message.  A
   WPT on an HTTP request can carry mth over its body, binding the
   request content as well as its target (Section 2.1).

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.2.  Terminology

   Message:  A unit of an application protocol that is sent and
      processed as a whole, such as a JSON object on a stream or an
      object on a media track.

   Credential member:  The part of a message that carries the WIT, the
      WPT, and any other tokens, such as a credentials member of a JSON
      message.  The application protocol names it.  In a message with a
      header and a payload, it can be a header field or a part of the
      payload.  A message carried with its tokens outside it, such as an
      HTTP request body, has none.

   Canonicalization profile:  A named rule that maps a message to the
      octets hashed into mth.

2.  Carrying a WPT in a Message

   When a WPT accompanies a message rather than an HTTP request:

   *  The WIT and the WPT travel in the message's credential member, as
      the application protocol defines.  This document does not define
      the member.

   *  aud is the workload identifier [WIMSE-ARCH] of the intended
      receiver of the message, or another value the application protocol
      defines, such as an agent identifier.  It is not a URI of a
      request.

   *  The WPT MUST contain mth (Section 3).

   *  The WPT SHOULD contain nonce (Section 4) when the verifier has
      supplied one.

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   *  wth, tth, and oth apply as in [WIMSE-WPT], with "request" read as
      "message"; oth keys are names that the application protocol
      defines for the tokens in its credential member.

   Validation follows Section 2 of [WIMSE-WPT], except for the checks
   specific to the HTTP Authorization field, with the additions in
   Section 3 and Section 4.

2.1.  On an HTTP Request

   A WPT on an HTTP request MAY also contain mth, computed over the
   request content under a profile that fits its media type, such as
   json-jcs for a JSON body. aud and the other claims stay as
   [WIMSE-WPT] defines them for HTTP.  The WPT then binds the request
   content, which [WIMSE-WPT] alone does not (Section 1 of [WIMSE-WPT]),
   and the binding survives intermediaries that re-serialize JSON.  A
   verifier that finds mth in a WPT on an HTTP request MUST verify it,
   and MUST reject the request if it does not match.

3.  The mth Claim

   mth:  The message hash.  A JSON object with two members:

      *  p: the name of a canonicalization profile from the registry in
         Section 10.2.

      *  h: the base64url encoding [RFC7515] of the SHA-256 hash
         [RFC6234] of the octets that the profile produces for the
         message.

   "mth": {"p": "json-jcs", "h": "pLk2tQ3m...Gv0"}

   A verifier MUST recognize the profile named in p, compute the hash of
   the received message under it, and reject the message if the hash
   differs from h.  A verifier that does not recognize the profile MUST
   reject the message.

   Because mth covers the message content, a WPT cannot be moved to a
   different message even within its lifetime, and an intermediary
   cannot change the message without detection.  The message's
   credential member (Section 1.2) is left out of the hash, because the
   WPT that carries mth is itself in that member and cannot hash itself.

4.  The nonce Claim

   nonce:  A string that the verifier supplied to the signer earlier,
      for example in a previous message of the same protocol exchange.

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   A verifier that supplied a nonce MUST check that the WPT echoes it
   and that it has not accepted that nonce before.  The application
   protocol defines how nonces are supplied and how long they are valid.
   A verifier that relies on nonce for freshness does not need to keep
   jti values beyond the nonce's validity, which suits protocols in
   which a message can arrive through any of several intermediaries.

5.  Canonicalization Profiles

   A profile fits the message's format. json-jcs (Section 5.1) suits
   JSON messages that intermediaries may re-serialize.  A message that
   is not JSON, such as a binary media payload, needs a profile defined
   for its format.  Such a profile hashes the message's octets as
   delivered and, where a message's position matters, the fields that
   identify it, so that a signed message cannot be replayed elsewhere.

5.1.  json-jcs

   The json-jcs profile applies to messages that are a single JSON
   object.  The application protocol names the credential member, if the
   message has one.  The profile produces the JSON Canonicalization
   Scheme [RFC8785] serialization of the message with the credential
   member removed.  A JSON HTTP request body has no credential member,
   because the WPT travels in a header field; the profile then covers
   the whole body (Section 2.1).

   An application protocol that uses json-jcs MUST state the name of the
   credential member, and MAY register a profile of its own whose name
   identifies the protocol and whose rule is json-jcs with that member.

5.2.  HTTP Header Fields

   mth on an HTTP request (Section 2.1) covers only the content.  This
   document defines no profile for HTTP header fields: the WIMSE HTTP
   Message Signatures profile [WIMSE-HTTPSIG] [RFC9421] covers chosen
   components, and [DIALOG-BINDING] covers the Dialog-Context field with
   dth.  A request signed that way that carries an Idempotency-Key field
   [IDEMPOTENCY] MUST include that field among the covered components,
   so that the key cannot be removed or replaced in transit.

6.  Use in SD-JWT Key Binding JWTs

   An SD-JWT Key Binding JWT [RFC9901] already carries nonce and aud.  A
   KB-JWT that accompanies a message MAY include mth, with the meaning
   defined here, when the SD-JWT is presented in the message's
   credential member.

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7.  Relationship to Other Work

   Dialog binding [DIALOG-BINDING] binds the HTTP Dialog-Context field
   with dth.  Where the dialog context is carried inside a message
   rather than an HTTP field, mth serves the same purpose and covers the
   rest of the message as well.  The two can coexist: an HTTP request
   uses dth; a message on another transport uses mth.

   Aggregate signatures for delegation chains [AGG-SIG] attribute
   changes to request and response bodies at each hop of an HTTP chain.
   mth binds one message to one sender; it does not by itself provide
   provenance across hops.

   DPoP [RFC9449] identifies the HTTP request by method and target URI.
   The CAT-4-MOQT profile of DPoP [MoQ-C4M] replaces these with the MOQT
   action, Track Namespace, and Track Name, so that a relay can check
   that a token's holder authorized that action.  Such a proof covers
   the action, not the objects published, and is verified by the relay.
   mth complements it: the receiving workload verifies that the sender
   holds the key and sent this message content, end to end through any
   intermediaries.

   An agent protocol can register its own profile and use mth to bind
   delegation credentials to the control message that opens a delegated
   dialog.

   On an HTTP request (Section 2.1), mth covers only the request
   content.  HTTP Message Signatures [RFC9421], as profiled for
   workloads in [WIMSE-HTTPSIG], also cover header fields, but cover the
   octets of the content, which an intermediary that re-serializes it
   changes.  A deployment that must protect header fields uses HTTP
   Message Signatures; one that needs only the content bound, across
   such intermediaries, can use mth.  JSON-RPC protocols over HTTP, such
   as A2A and MCP, are an example.

8.  Security Considerations

   Canonicalization:  Signer and verifier must produce identical octets.
      Profiles MUST define canonicalization precisely; json-jcs relies
      on [RFC8785].  A verifier MUST reject a message whose JSON
      contains duplicate member names.

   Nonce handling:  A nonce that is predictable or reused allows replay.
      Nonces MUST have at least 128 bits of entropy and be accepted at
      most once.

   Replay records:  "Accepted at most once" holds only if every instance

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      of a verifier consults the same record.  A verifier that runs as
      several instances MUST share its record of accepted nonces and jti
      values, keyed by issuer, audience, and value, and keep each entry
      until the WPT's exp or the nonce's validity ends.  An instance
      that cannot reach the record MUST reject the message.

   Repeated actions:  mth binds a WPT to one message, but a signer can
      send the same operation again as a new message with a new WPT.
      Detecting that is the application's task.  An application protocol
      whose messages cause side effects SHOULD carry an idempotency key
      in the message, where mth covers it, and a receiver SHOULD bind
      each key to the first message accepted under it and reject a later
      message with the same key and a different hash.  This rule applies
      to HTTP requests that carry Idempotency-Key [IDEMPOTENCY].

   Clocks:  exp and iat checks assume a correct clock.  A verifier that
      cannot trust its clock, for example after a restart without a time
      source, MUST NOT accept WPTs until it can; a secure time source
      such as Roughtime [ROUGHTIME] can provide this.

   Partial coverage:  mth covers what its profile covers. json-jcs
      covers the message, not the metadata that the transport carries
      around it, such as the stream, channel, or topic it was sent on.
      An application protocol that relies on such metadata MUST include
      it in the message or use a profile that covers it.

   Intermediaries:  mth makes modification of a message detectable but
      does not hide its content from intermediaries.  Confidentiality
      across them needs end-to-end encryption of the message.

9.  Privacy Considerations

   mth reveals nothing beyond a hash of a message the verifier already
   holds. nonce values SHOULD be random rather than derived from
   identifiers.

10.  IANA Considerations

10.1.  JSON Web Token Claims

   *  Claim Name: mth

   *  Claim Description: Hash of the message a proof of possession
      accompanies, under a canonicalization profile

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Reference: Section 3

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   The nonce claim is already registered.

10.2.  WIMSE Message Canonicalization Profiles

   IANA is requested to create the "WIMSE Message Canonicalization
   Profiles" registry, with the policy Specification Required.  Each
   entry has a Profile Name, a Description, and a Reference.

   Initial entries:

   *  Profile Name: json-jcs

   *  Description: JCS of a JSON message with its credential member
      removed

   *  Reference: Section 5.1

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6234]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6234>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8785]  Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
              Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785>.

   [RFC9901]  Fett, D., Yasuda, K., and B. Campbell, "Selective
              Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens", RFC 9901,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9901, November 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9901>.

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   [WIMSE-CREDS]
              Campbell, B., Salowey, J. A., Schwenkschuster, A.,
              Sheffer, Y., and Y. Rosomakho, "WIMSE Workload
              Credentials", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-wimse-workload-creds-03, 30 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              workload-creds-03>.

   [WIMSE-WPT]
              Campbell, B. and A. Schwenkschuster, "WIMSE Workload Proof
              Token", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              wimse-wpt-02, 27 August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              wpt-02>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [AGG-SIG]  Reddy.K, T., Tschofenig, H., and Y. Sheffer,
              "Authenticated Provenance for WIMSE Delegation Chains",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reddy-wimse-
              aggregate-signatures-01, 28 September 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-wimse-
              aggregate-signatures-01>.

   [DIALOG-BINDING]
              Reddy.K, T. and Z. Sarker, "Binding Agent Dialogs to WIMSE
              and OAuth Credentials", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-reddy-wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00, 30 October
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-
              wimse-oauth-dialog-binding-00>.

   [IDEMPOTENCY]
              Jena, J., Dalal, S., and D. Tishkin, "The Idempotency-Key
              HTTP Header Field", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-httpapi-idempotency-key-header-08, 22 October
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
              httpapi-idempotency-key-header-08>.

   [MoQ-C4M]  Lemmons, C., Simon, G., Nandakumar, S., and W. Law,
              "Authorization scheme for MOQT using Common Access
              Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-moq-
              c4m-02, 2 November 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-moq-c4m-
              02>.

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   [MOQT]     Nandakumar, S., Vasiliev, V., Swett, I., and A. Frindell,
              "Media over QUIC Transport", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-ietf-moq-transport-23, 2 November 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-moq-
              transport-23>.

   [RFC9421]  Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP
              Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421,
              February 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421>.

   [RFC9449]  Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T.,
              Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
              Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449,
              September 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9449>.

   [ROUGHTIME]
              Ladd, W. and M. Dansarie, "Roughtime: A Protocol for Rough
              Time Synchronization", RFC 10049, DOI 10.17487/RFC10049,
              October 2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10049>.

   [TXN-TOKENS]
              Tulshibagwale, A., Fletcher, G., and P. Kasselman,
              "Transaction Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens-11, 30 July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              transaction-tokens-11>.

   [WIMSE-ARCH]
              Salowey, J. A., Rosomakho, Y., and H. Tschofenig,
              "Workload Identity in a Multi System Environment (WIMSE)
              Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-wimse-arch-08, 6 July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
              arch-08>.

   [WIMSE-HTTPSIG]
              Salowey, J. A. and Y. Sheffer, "WIMSE Workload-to-Workload
              Authentication with HTTP Signatures", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08, 20
              October 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-wimse-http-signature-08>.

Acknowledgments

   This document builds on the WIMSE Workload Proof Token and on the dth
   claim of agent dialog binding.

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Authors' Addresses

   Suhas Nandakumar
   Cisco
   Email: snandaku@cisco.com

   Cullen Jennings
   Cisco Systems
   Email: fluffy@cisco.com

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