A Security Architecture Against Service Function Chaining Threats
draft-nguyen-sfc-security-architecture-00
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2020-05-27 (latest revision 2019-11-24) | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
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https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-nguyen-sfc-security-architecture-00.txt
Abstract
Service Function Chaining (SFC) provides a special capability that defines an ordered list of network services as a virtual chain and makes a network more flexible and manageable. However, SFC is vulnerable to various attacks caused by compromised switches, especially the middlebox-bypass attack. In this document, we propose a security architecture that can detect not only middlebox-bypass attacks but also other incorrect forwarding actions by compromised switches. The existing solutions to protect SFC against compromised switches and middlebox-bypass attacks can only solve individual problems. The proposed architecture uses both probe-based and statistics-based methods to check the probe packets with random pre- assigned keys and collect statistics from middleboxes for detecting any abnormal actions in SFC.
Authors
THANG Nguyen
(nct@soongsil.ac.kr)
Minho Park
(mhp@ssu.ac.kr)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)