Considerations For Using Short Term Certificates
draft-nir-saag-star-01

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Last updated 2018-09-06 (latest revision 2018-03-05)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-nir-saag-star-01.txt

Abstract

Recently there has been renewed interest in an old idea: Issue certificates with short validity periods and forego revocation processing, reasoning that expiration is a sufficient replacement for revocation as long as that expiration is not too far off. This document covers considerations, both security and operational, for using such Short Term Auto Renewed (STAR) certificates for various scenarios where Using a revocation protocol is considered inappropriate.

Authors

Yoav Nir (ynir.ietf@gmail.com)
Thomas Fossati (thomas.fossati@nokia.com)
Yaron Sheffer (yaronf.ietf@gmail.com)
Toerless Eckert (tte+ietf@cs.fau.de)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)