Considerations For Using Short Term Certificates
draft-nir-saag-star-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Yoav Nir , Thomas Fossati , Yaron Sheffer , Toerless Eckert | ||
| Last updated | 2018-09-06 (Latest revision 2018-03-05) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Recently there has been renewed interest in an old idea: Issue certificates with short validity periods and forego revocation processing, reasoning that expiration is a sufficient replacement for revocation as long as that expiration is not too far off. This document covers considerations, both security and operational, for using such Short Term Auto Renewed (STAR) certificates for various scenarios where Using a revocation protocol is considered inappropriate.
Authors
Yoav Nir
Thomas Fossati
Yaron Sheffer
Toerless Eckert
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)