SDLP Security Architecture (SDLP RFC 4)
draft-norton-sdlp-sec-arch-04

Internet-Draft                                                 M. Norton
Intended status: Informational                               Independent
Expires: January 24, 2027                                  July 24, 2026

                 SDLP Security Architecture (SDLP RFC 4)
                   draft-norton-sdlp-sec-arch-04

M. Norton
Independent
El Mirage, Arizona, USA
Email: mark433norton@gmail.com
July 2026

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Abstract

The Secured Digital Lifecycle Protocol (SDLP) defines a physics-layer
security model in which digital objects secure themselves throughout
their entire lifecycle. Existing security measures—such as cryptographic
signatures, watermarking, provenance metadata, and attestation—are
integrated and enforced within a unified physics layer positioned
between the Transport and Application layers. This document describes
the SDLP security architecture, including the environment safety check,
the composite PASS/FAIL trust verdict, and the mandatory BitDrop
behavior applied when any trust condition fails. The SDLP security
architecture ensures that digital objects operate only within verified,
tamper-resistant environments and provides a complete, end-to-end
defense against unauthorized access, copying, modification, and
redistribution.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
   2.  Terminology
   3.  SDLP Security Architecture Overview
     3.1.  The Physics Layer
     3.2.  Placement Between Transport and Application Layers
     3.3.  Integration of Existing Security Measures
   4.  Environment Safety Check
     4.1.  Full-Spectrum Validation
     4.2.  Composite PASS/FAIL Trust Verdict
     4.3.  BitDrop Behavior on FAIL
     4.4.  Prohibition of Partial Trust States
   5.  Lifecycle Security Model
     5.1.  Object Self-Security
     5.2.  Tamper Detection and Response
     5.3.  Provenance and Lineage Continuity
     5.4.  Decay and Lifecycle Enforcement
   6.  Threat Model
     6.1.  Piracy Vectors
     6.2.  Unauthorized Redistribution
     6.3.  Tampering and Instrumentation
     6.4.  Environment Spoofing
   7.  Security Considerations
   8.  IANA Considerations
   9.  References
     9.1.  Normative References
     9.2.  Informative References
   Acknowledgments
   Author's Address

1.  Introduction

The Secured Digital Lifecycle Protocol (SDLP) provides a unified
security architecture designed to protect digital objects throughout
their entire lifecycle. Modern content-distribution ecosystems rely on
multiple independent security mechanisms—such as cryptographic
signatures, watermarking, provenance metadata, attestation, and
environment verification—but these mechanisms operate in isolation and
leave gaps that can be exploited for unauthorized access, copying, or
redistribution.

SDLP addresses these gaps by introducing a physics-layer security model
positioned between the Transport and Application layers. In this model,
each SDLP object secures itself, performing a full-spectrum environment
safety check before any operation is permitted. The physics layer
integrates existing security measures and enforces them consistently,
ensuring that digital objects operate only within verified, trusted, and
tamper-resistant environments.

A composite PASS/FAIL trust verdict determines whether an SDLP object
may proceed. Any failure in the environment safety check results in
mandatory BitDrop, preventing partial trust states and eliminating
exploit surfaces associated with degraded or permissive behavior. This
architecture provides an end-to-end defense against piracy, tampering,
instrumentation, environment spoofing, and unauthorized redistribution.

This document describes the SDLP security architecture, the role of the
physics layer, the environment safety check, the PASS/FAIL trust model,
and the BitDrop enforcement mechanism.

2.  Terminology

   The following terms are used throughout this document:

   SDLP Object
      A digital object that conforms to the Secured Digital Lifecycle
      Protocol and contains all required lineage, provenance, and
      physics-layer enforcement metadata.

   Physics Layer
      A security enforcement layer positioned between the Transport and
      Application layers. The physics layer performs environment safety
      checks, applies lifecycle rules, and enforces PASS/FAIL trust
      decisions.

   Environment Safety Check
      A full-spectrum validation performed by an SDLP object to assess
      the trustworthiness of its execution environment. The check
      includes identity verification, tamper detection, transport-path
      integrity, lineage consistency, provenance validation, and policy
      compatibility.

   PASS/FAIL Trust Verdict
      A composite trust decision produced by the environment safety
      check. PASS indicates that all trust conditions are satisfied.
      FAIL indicates that one or more trust conditions have failed.

   BitDrop
      The mandatory behavior applied when the trust verdict is FAIL. An
      SDLP object MUST cease operation and become unusable. Partial
      trust states are not permitted.

   Lineage
      The set of identifiers that uniquely describe an SDLP object's
      origin and individuality: DistributorID, CustomerID, ProductID,
      ProductName, DownloadID, Date, and Time.

   Provenance
      Cryptographic and metadata-based information that establishes the
      authenticity and origin of an SDLP object and its relationship to
      the distributor’s trust graph.

   Decay
      A lifecycle mechanism that governs the remaining operational
      energy, permitted actions, and lifecycle stage of an SDLP object.

   Tamper Detection
      The physics-layer capability to identify unauthorized debugging,
      instrumentation, virtualization, memory inspection, or other
      forms of environment manipulation.

   BitDrop-Protected Environment
      An execution environment that supports physics-layer enforcement,
      including the ability to apply BitDrop, validate lineage, enforce
      decay, and maintain provenance continuity.

3.  SDLP Security Architecture Overview

   The SDLP security architecture defines how digital objects secure
   themselves through a physics-layer enforcement model. This model
   integrates existing security mechanisms and applies them consistently
   across the entire lifecycle of an SDLP object. The architecture
   ensures that objects operate only within trusted environments and
   that any violation of trust results in immediate termination through
   BitDrop. This section provides an overview of the physics layer, its
   placement within the protocol stack, and its role in unifying
   existing security measures.

3.1.  The Physics Layer

   The physics layer is the core enforcement mechanism of SDLP. It
   governs object behavior, validates the execution environment, applies
   lifecycle rules, and enforces trust decisions. Unlike traditional
   application-level security models, the physics layer resides within
   the object itself, allowing each SDLP object to perform autonomous
   security operations.

   The physics layer performs the environment safety check, evaluates
   lineage and provenance continuity, detects tampering, enforces decay,
   and determines whether an object may proceed. All enforcement occurs
   before the application is permitted to interact with the object.

3.2.  Placement Between Transport and Application Layers

   The physics layer is positioned between the Transport and Application
   layers. This placement ensures that SDLP objects validate their
   environment immediately upon arrival, before any application-level
   processing occurs.

   By operating at this layer, SDLP prevents exploit surfaces associated
   with application-level enforcement, such as unauthorized playback,
   instrumentation, or environment spoofing. The physics layer acts as a
   mandatory gatekeeper, allowing or denying access based solely on the
   PASS/FAIL trust verdict.

3.3.  Integration of Existing Security Measures

   SDLP does not replace existing security mechanisms; it unifies and
   enforces them. The physics layer incorporates cryptographic
   signatures, watermarking, provenance metadata, attestation tokens,
   transport-path integrity checks, and environment verification into a
   single, cohesive enforcement model.

   Each SDLP object uses these mechanisms during the environment safety
   check. The physics layer ensures that all measures are applied
   consistently and that any failure in any measure results in a FAIL
   verdict and mandatory BitDrop. This integration eliminates gaps
   created by isolated or partial security systems and provides complete
   lifecycle protection.

4.  Environment Safety Check

   The environment safety check is the primary security operation
   performed by the SDLP physics layer. Before any SDLP object may be
   accessed, interpreted, or executed by an application, the object
   MUST perform a full-spectrum validation of its execution environment.
   The environment safety check determines whether the environment is
   trustworthy, uncompromised, and capable of enforcing SDLP physics.
   The result of this validation is a composite PASS/FAIL trust verdict.
   A FAIL verdict triggers mandatory BitDrop, and no partial trust
   states are permitted.

4.1.  Full-Spectrum Validation

   The environment safety check evaluates all relevant dimensions of
   trust. An SDLP object MUST validate:

      * Execution environment identity
      * Transport-path integrity
      * Tamper and instrumentation detection
      * Lineage consistency
      * Provenance continuity
      * Decay and lifecycle state
      * Policy compatibility with SDLP physics

   These checks are performed autonomously by the SDLP object. The
   physics layer MUST complete all checks before any application-level
   interaction is allowed. Failure in any dimension results in a FAIL
   verdict.

4.2.  Composite PASS/FAIL Trust Verdict

   The environment safety check produces a single composite trust
   verdict. The verdict is binary:

      * PASS: All trust conditions are satisfied.
      * FAIL: One or more trust conditions have failed.

   SDLP objects MUST NOT expose individual trust-dimension results to
   the application. The composite verdict is the only output of the
   environment safety check. This design prevents applications from
   attempting to operate in degraded or partially trusted states.

4.3.  BitDrop Behavior on FAIL

   If the composite trust verdict is FAIL, the SDLP object MUST perform
   BitDrop. BitDrop is the mandatory termination behavior in which the
   object ceases operation and becomes unusable. An object that has
   performed BitDrop MUST NOT be recoverable, replayable, or usable in
   any subsequent environment.

   BitDrop prevents exploit surfaces associated with permissive or
   degraded behavior. It ensures that no SDLP object can be coerced into
   operating within an unsafe, tampered, or unverifiable environment.

4.4.  Prohibition of Partial Trust States

   SDLP objects MUST NOT operate in partial trust states. The physics
   layer does not support degraded modes, permissive fallback behavior,
   or conditional operation based on incomplete validation.

   Any failure in any trust dimension MUST result in a FAIL verdict and
   mandatory BitDrop. This prohibition eliminates attack vectors that
   rely on partial validation, weakened enforcement, or incomplete
   security checks.

   By enforcing a strict PASS/FAIL model, SDLP ensures that digital
   objects operate only within fully verified, tamper-resistant
   environments and that no exploitable intermediate states exist.

5.  Lifecycle Security Model

   The SDLP lifecycle security model defines how digital objects secure
   themselves from creation through termination. Unlike traditional
   security systems that rely on external enforcement, SDLP objects
   contain all necessary mechanisms to validate their environment,
   enforce lifecycle rules, and respond to tampering. The lifecycle
   model ensures that objects remain trustworthy, verifiable, and
   resistant to unauthorized manipulation throughout their existence.

5.1.  Object Self-Security

   SDLP objects are autonomous security entities. Each object contains
   the metadata, cryptographic material, lineage identifiers, provenance
   anchors, and physics-layer logic required to secure itself. No
   external application or runtime is responsible for enforcing SDLP
   security; enforcement is intrinsic to the object.

   Before any operation is permitted, the object MUST perform the
   environment safety check described in Section 4. If the composite
   trust verdict is PASS, the object may proceed. If the verdict is
   FAIL, the object MUST perform BitDrop and terminate.

5.2.  Tamper Detection and Response

   The physics layer includes mechanisms to detect unauthorized
   debugging, instrumentation, virtualization, memory inspection,
   hooking, or other forms of tampering. Tamper detection is performed
   as part of the environment safety check and may also occur during
   object operation if supported by the environment.

   If tampering is detected, the object MUST produce a FAIL verdict and
   perform BitDrop. SDLP objects MUST NOT attempt to continue operation
   after tamper detection, nor may they enter a degraded or partially
   trusted state.

5.3.  Provenance and Lineage Continuity

   SDLP objects maintain continuity of provenance and lineage throughout
   their lifecycle. Provenance anchors and lineage identifiers
   (DistributorID, CustomerID, ProductID, ProductName, DownloadID, Date,
   and Time) MUST remain intact and verifiable.

   The physics layer validates provenance and lineage during the
   environment safety check. Any inconsistency, corruption, or removal
   of lineage or provenance information MUST result in a FAIL verdict
   and mandatory BitDrop.

   Provenance continuity ensures that SDLP objects cannot be separated
   from their origin, redistributed without authorization, or injected
   into untrusted ecosystems.

5.4.  Decay and Lifecycle Enforcement

   SDLP objects include a decay mechanism that governs their lifecycle
   state, remaining operational energy, and permitted actions. Decay
   rules are defined by the distributor and enforced by the physics
   layer.

   The physics layer MUST validate the object's decay state during the
   environment safety check. If the object has exceeded its permitted
   lifecycle or if decay rules cannot be enforced by the environment,
   the object MUST produce a FAIL verdict and perform BitDrop.

   Decay ensures that SDLP objects cannot be used indefinitely, replayed
   without restriction, or operated outside their intended lifecycle
   parameters. Lifecycle enforcement provides an additional layer of
   protection against unauthorized redistribution and long-term misuse.

6.  Threat Model

   The SDLP threat model identifies the classes of attacks that digital
   objects may encounter throughout their lifecycle and describes how
   the physics layer mitigates these threats. Traditional content-
   protection systems rely on external enforcement, which leaves gaps
   exploitable by piracy, tampering, environment spoofing, and
   unauthorized redistribution. SDLP addresses these threats by
   embedding enforcement within the object itself and applying a strict
   PASS/FAIL trust model with mandatory BitDrop on failure.

6.1.  Piracy Vectors

   Piracy includes unauthorized copying, redistribution, extraction,
   replay, or reproduction of digital objects. Attackers may attempt to
   bypass application-level controls, intercept transport paths, or
   manipulate runtime environments to obtain unrestricted access.

   SDLP mitigates piracy by requiring each object to validate its
   environment before any operation is permitted. Lineage and provenance
   continuity ensure that objects cannot be separated from their origin
   or redistributed without detection. Any attempt to operate an object
   outside a trusted environment results in a FAIL verdict and BitDrop.

6.2.  Unauthorized Redistribution

   Unauthorized redistribution occurs when digital objects are copied,
   transferred, or shared outside their intended distribution channels.
   Attackers may attempt to replay objects in untrusted environments,
   strip identifying metadata, or inject objects into unauthorized
   ecosystems.

   SDLP objects contain immutable lineage identifiers and provenance
   anchors that MUST remain intact. The physics layer validates these
   identifiers during the environment safety check. If lineage or
   provenance information is missing, corrupted, or inconsistent, the
   object MUST produce a FAIL verdict and perform BitDrop.

6.3.  Tampering and Instrumentation

   Tampering includes debugging, hooking, memory inspection,
   virtualization, instrumentation, or any attempt to alter object
   behavior or bypass enforcement. Attackers may attempt to modify
   object code, intercept physics-layer operations, or manipulate
   runtime conditions.

   The physics layer includes tamper detection mechanisms that identify
   unauthorized manipulation. If tampering is detected at any point, the
   object MUST produce a FAIL verdict and perform BitDrop. SDLP objects
   MUST NOT continue operation after tamper detection, nor may they
   enter degraded or partially trusted states.

6.4.  Environment Spoofing

   Environment spoofing occurs when attackers attempt to deceive digital
   objects into believing they are operating within a trusted
   environment. Spoofing may involve falsifying attestation tokens,
   simulating trusted runtimes, or replaying environment metadata.

   The environment safety check performs full-spectrum validation,
   including identity verification, transport-path integrity, and
   attestation authenticity. The composite PASS/FAIL verdict ensures
   that spoofed environments cannot satisfy all trust conditions. Any
   inconsistency results in a FAIL verdict and mandatory BitDrop.

   By requiring complete trust across all dimensions, SDLP eliminates
   exploit surfaces associated with partial validation or permissive
   fallback behavior.

7.  Security Considerations

   The SDLP security architecture is designed to provide complete,
   physics-layer enforcement of trust, provenance, lineage, and
   environment validation. Because SDLP objects secure themselves, the
   security of the system depends on correct implementation of the
   physics layer and strict adherence to the PASS/FAIL trust model.

   SDLP objects MUST perform the environment safety check before any
   operation is permitted. Failure in any trust dimension MUST result in
   a FAIL verdict and mandatory BitDrop. Implementations that attempt to
   bypass, weaken, or modify this behavior introduce exploitable
   vulnerabilities and are non-compliant with this specification.

   Distributors MUST ensure that lineage identifiers, provenance
   anchors, and decay rules are correctly generated and cryptographically
   protected. Environments that host SDLP objects MUST support physics-
   layer enforcement, including tamper detection, attestation
   verification, and BitDrop capability.

   Because SDLP objects do not operate in partial trust states, any
   environment incapable of full-spectrum validation will result in a
   FAIL verdict. Implementers MUST ensure that trusted environments
   provide complete support for SDLP physics to avoid unintended
   termination.

   The SDLP security model assumes that attackers may attempt piracy,
   tampering, environment spoofing, or unauthorized redistribution.
   These threats are mitigated only when the physics layer is fully
   implemented and all enforcement rules are applied consistently.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

   No registries are created or modified by this specification, and no
   protocol parameters require assignment. SDLP operates entirely within
   the physics-layer enforcement model and does not introduce values
   that require coordination through IANA.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017.

9.2.  Informative References

   [C2PA]     Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity,
              "C2PA Specification", Version 2.0, 2024.

   [MovieLabs] MovieLabs, "Enhanced Content Protection Specification",
              2023.

   [W3C-VC]   Sporny, M., Longley, D., Chadwick, D., et al.,
              "Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0", W3C
              Recommendation, 2023.

   [W3C-PROV] Moreau, L., Groth, P., "PROV-DM: The PROV Data Model",
              W3C Recommendation, 2013.

   [TEE]      Sabt, M., Achemlal, M., Bouabdallah, A.,
              "Trusted Execution Environments: A Survey",
              IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 2015.

   [Attestation]  Intel Corporation, "Intel SGX Remote Attestation
              Technical Overview", 2022.

   [Watermarking] Cox, I., Miller, M., Bloom, J., Fridrich, J.,
              Kalker, T., "Digital Watermarking and Steganography",
              Morgan Kaufmann, 2007.

   [SDLP-ARCH] Norton, M., "SDLP Architecture (SDLP RFC 1)",
              draft-norton-sdlp-arch-xx, Work in Progress.

   [SDLP-ID]  Norton, M., "SDLP Identity Model (SDLP RFC 2)",
              draft-norton-sdlp-identity-xx, Work in Progress.

   [SDLP-LINEAGE] Norton, M., "SDLP Lineage and Object Format
              (SDLP RFC 3)", draft-norton-sdlp-lineage-xx,
              Work in Progress.

Author's Address

   M. Norton
   Independent Protocol Architect
   El Mirage, Arizona
   United States

   Email: mark433norton@gmail.com