Enabling Network Traffic Obfuscation - Pluggable Transports
draft-oliver-pluggable-transports-00

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Network Working Group                                           B. Wiley
Internet-Draft                                       Operator Foundation
Intended status: Informational                                 D. Oliver
Expires: January 9, 2020                                Guardian Project
                                                           July 08, 2019

      Enabling Network Traffic Obfuscation - Pluggable Transports
                  draft-oliver-pluggable-transports-00

Abstract

   Pluggable Transports (PTs) are a mechanism enabling the rapid
   development and deployment of network traffic obfuscation techniques
   used to circumvent surveillance and censorship.  This specification
   does not define or limit the techniques themselves, but rather
   focuses on the startup, shutdown, and inter-process communication
   mechanisms required to make these technologies interoperable with
   applications.

   This document is based heavily on [PT2.1].

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

Wiley & Oliver           Expires January 9, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            Pluggable Transports                 July 2019

   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Pluggable Transport Naming  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.2.  Transports API Interface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       5.2.1.  Goals for interface design  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       5.2.2.  Abstract Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Adapters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  API to IPC Adapter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  PT 1.0 Compatibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.3.  Cross-language Linking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.3.1.  Using the Dispatcher IPC Interface In-process . . . .   9
     6.4.  Anonymity Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   The increased interest in network traffic obfuscation technologies
   mirrors the increase in usage of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to
   actively monitor the content of application data in addition to that
   data's routing information.  Deep Packet Inspection inspects each
   packet based on the header of its request and the data it carries.
   It can identify the type of protocol the connection is using even if
   it was encrypted.  DPI is not a mechanism to decrypt what is inside
   packets but to identify the 'protocol' or the application it
   represents.

   Deep packet inspection has become the prime tool of censors and
   surveillance entities who block, log, and/or traffic-shape access to
   sites and services they deem undesirable.
   As deep packet inspection has become more routine, the sophistication
   of monitoring has increased to include active probing that
   fingerprints and classifies application protocols.  Thus, even as
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