Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and Their Role in Attack Defence
draft-paine-smart-indicators-of-compromise-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2020-03-06
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text pdf htmlized bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Internet Engineering Task Force                                 K. Paine
Internet-Draft                         UK National Cyber Security Centre
Intended status: Informational                             O. Whitehouse
Expires: September 7, 2020                                     NCC Group
                                                           March 6, 2020

    Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and Their Role in Attack Defence
             draft-paine-smart-indicators-of-compromise-00

Abstract

   Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) are an important technique in attack
   defence (often called cyber defence).  This document outlines the
   different types of IoC, their associated benefits and limitations,
   and discusses their effective use.  It also contextualises the role
   of IoCs in defending against attacks through describing a recent case
   study.  This draft does not pre-suppose where IoCs can be found or
   should be detected - as they can be discovered and deployed in
   networks, endpoints or elsewhere - rather, engineers should be aware
   that they need to be detectable (either by endpoint security
   appliances or network-based defences, or ideally both) to be
   effective.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 7, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Paine & Whitehouse      Expires September 7, 2020               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft          Indicators of Compromise              March 2020

   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

   This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not
   be created, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to
   translate it into languages other than English.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  What are IoCs?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Why use IoCs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  IoCs can be used even with limited resource . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  IoCs have a multiplier effect on attack defence effort  .   4
     3.3.  IoCs are easily shareable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.4.  IoCs can be attributed to specific threat actors  . . . .   5
     3.5.  IoCs can provide significant time savings . . . . . . . .   5
     3.6.  IoCs allow for discovery of historic attacks  . . . . . .   6
     3.7.  IoCs underpin and enable multiple of the layers of the
           modern defence-in-depth strategy  . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Pain, Fragility and Precision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Pyramid of Pain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Fragility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.3.  Precision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.4.  Comprehensive Coverage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Defence in Depth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Case Study: APT33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Overall TTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.2.  IoCs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   11. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   This draft aims to describe, and illustrate the purpose of,
Show full document text