Remote Attestation Procedures for Network Security Functions (NSFs) through the I2NSF Security Controller
draft-pastor-i2nsf-nsf-remote-attestation-07

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Interface to Network Security Functions                        A. Pastor
Internet-Draft                                                  D. Lopez
Intended status: Experimental                             Telefonica I+D
Expires: August 15, 2019                                         A. Shaw
                                                                     ARM
                                                       February 11, 2019

  Remote Attestation Procedures for Network Security Functions (NSFs)
                 through the I2NSF Security Controller
              draft-pastor-i2nsf-nsf-remote-attestation-07

Abstract

   This document describes the procedures a client can follow to assess
   the trust on an external NSF platform and its client-defined
   configuration through the I2NSF Security Controller.  The procedure
   to assess trustworthiness is based on a remote attestation of the
   platform and the NSFs running on it performed through a Trusted
   Platform Module (TPM) invoked by the Security Controller.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 15, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Establishing Client Trust  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.1.  First Step: Client-Agnostic Attestation  . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2.  Second Step: Client-Specific Attestation . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.3.  Trusted Computing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.4.  Topology Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  NSF Attestation Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  Requirements for a Trusted NSF Platform  . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.1.1.  Trusted Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.1.2.  Remote Attestation Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.1.3.  Secure Boot  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   5.  Remote Attestation Procedures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.1.  Trusted Channel with the Security Controller . . . . . . . 12
     5.2.  Security Controller Attestation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     5.3.  Platform Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   8.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

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1.  Introduction

   As described in [RFC8192], the use of externally provided NSF implies
   several additional concerns in security.  The most relevant threats
   associated with a externalized platform are detailed in [RFC8329].
   As stated there, mutual authentication between the user and the NSF
   environment and, more importantly, the attestation of the components
   in this environment by clients, could address these threats and
   provide an acceptable level of risk.  In particular:

   o  Client impersonation will be minimized by mutual authentication,