Remote Attestation Procedures for Network Security Functions (NSFs) through the I2NSF Security Controller
draft-pastor-i2nsf-nsf-remote-attestation-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2017-03-13
Replaces draft-pastor-i2nsf-vnsf-attestation
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Interface to Network Security Functions                        A. Pastor
Internet-Draft                                                  D. Lopez
Intended status: Experimental                             Telefonica I+D
Expires: September 14, 2017                                      A. Shaw
                                                    Hewlett Packard Labs
                                                          March 13, 2017

  Remote Attestation Procedures for Network Security Functions (NSFs)
                 through the I2NSF Security Controller
              draft-pastor-i2nsf-nsf-remote-attestation-01

Abstract

   This document describes the procedures a client can follow to assess
   the trust on an external NSF platform and its client-defined
   configuration through the I2NSF Security Controller.  The procedure
   to assess trustworthiness is based on a remote attestation of the
   platform and the NSFs running on it performed through a Trusted
   Platform Module (TPM) invoked by the Security Controller.

Status of this Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Establishing Client Trust  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.1.  First Step: Client-Agnostic Attestation  . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2.  Second Step: Client-Specific Attestation . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.3.  Trusted Computing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  NSF Attestation Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.1.  Requirements for a Trusted NSF Platform  . . . . . . . . .  8
       4.1.1.  Trusted Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       4.1.2.  Remote Attestation Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.1.3.  Secure Boot  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  Remote Attestation Procedures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.1.  Trusted Channel with the Security Controller . . . . . . . 12
     5.2.  Security Controller Attestation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.3.  Platform Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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1.  Introduction

   As described in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases], the use of
   externally provided NSF implies several additional concerns in
   security.  The most relevant threats associated with a externalized
   platform are detailed in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-framework].  As stated
   there, mutual authentication between the user and the NSF environment
   and, more importantly, the attestation of the components in this
   environment by clients, could address these threats and provide an
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